Mims v. Barnes et al, No. 1:2014cv00239 - Document 54 (S.D. Ga. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER granting 27 Motion to Dismiss. Therefore, Defendants Barnes, Jordan, Shepard, Conley, McNeil, and Lee, are dismissed in their individual and official capacities. Moving forward, only Plaintiff's FMLA claim against Defendant Georgia Department of Corrections remains. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 3/30/16. (cmr)
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Mims v. Barnes et al Doc. 54 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA AUGUSTA DIVISION JOHNNA JOWANNA MIMS, * * Plaintiff, v. * CV 114-239 * CAREY BARNES, JORDAN, TOMEIKA T. * MICHAEL STANTON SHEPARD, T.J. CONLEY, * SERGEANT * MICHAEL MCNEIL, and OFFICER JESSICA LEE, in their * * individual and official * capacities; and GEORGIA * DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, * Defendants, ORDER Presently before Shepard, Conley, the McNeil, For the reasons below, Court April 7, Defendants Barnes, and Lee's motion to dismiss Jordan, (Doc. 27). their motion is GRANTED. I, On is 2014, BACKGROUND Plaintiff was terminated from her position as a correctional officer at the Augusta State Medical Prison. (Sec. Plaintiff, December Am. Compl. , proceeding 24, 2014. pro Doc. se, (Compl., 20, filed Doc. 1.) at 6.) suit Subsequently, in this Since that Court time, on the Court has narrowed Plaintiff's claims to include the following: (1) a Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") claim against the Dockets.Justia.com Georgia Department of Corrections; (2) claim Barnes, for Michael damages Stanton against Shepard, Carey T.J. a procedural due process. Conley, Tomeika Michael Jessica Lee in their individual capacities; process claim Shepard, Conley, and (4) a for injunctive McNeil, relief (3) against defamation claim against Lee. and Shepard, official Conley, Jordan, McNeil, and a procedural due Barnes, Jordan, and Lee in their official capacities; (Doc. hope of further limiting Plaintiff's claims, Jordan, T. McNeil, capacities, have and Lee, filed the 28.) With the Defendants Barnes, in their individual instant motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).1 (Doc. 27.) The facts underlying this motion, as set forth in Plaintiff's complaint and accepted as true by the Court, are as follows. On February 23, 2014, Plaintiff's mother became quite ill and was admitted to the intensive care unit at Georgia Regents University Hospital. (Sec. Am. Compl. at 3.) While visiting 1 In response to Defendants' motion, Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition along with exhibits for the Court's consideration. (Doc. 33.) Because these exhibits are ^matters outside the pleadings," the Court must either exclude them or treat the instant motion as one for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (*If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56."); Prop. Mgmt. & Invs. , Inc. v. Lewis, 752 F.2d 599, 604 (11th Cir. 1985) ("The court has discretion as to whether to accept material beyond the pleading[s] that is offered in conjunction with a 12(b)(6) motion."). Yet, because the Court must assume that all facts pleaded in the complaint are true, Plaintiff's exhibits have little - if any - additional value. Therefore, the Court elects to exclude them. her mother at the hospital on February 24, 2014, Plaintiff encountered three employees of the Augusta State Medical Prison: Warden Michael Jessica Lee. Shepard, (Id. Sergeant at 4.) Michael McNeil, Accordingly, and Plaintiff Officer took the opportunity to inform Warden Shepard of her mother's condition and her possible need to advisement that she of Shepard, would be take Plaintiff unable FMLA paperwork. mother's to work then (Id.) Upon the informed her supervisor and submitted the necessary (Id.) When family leave. her work on March 5, health 2014. (Id.) improved, Plaintiff Upon her arrival, asked by an inmate how her mother was doing. returned to Plaintiff was (Id.) The inmate stated that Officer Lee, who worked the same post as Plaintiff, "had informed him that stroke, . . . was [Plaintiff's mother] in Intensive University on the third floor, (Id.) Care had suffered from a at Georgia Regents and . . . was not doing well." Plaintiff responded by telling the inmate that "he was lying and it was none of his business." (Id.) Weeks later, on the evening of March 29, 2014, two inmates approached Plaintiff and told her that "Officer Lee and Sergeant McNeil was [sic] on the phone during the day . . . criticiz [ing] [her] work ethic." (Id. ) with these inmates, Based on the rest of her conversation Plaintiff indicates that Lee and McNeil's conversation proceeded as follows: They criticized my work ethic saying that I am always have [sic] [Lee] waiting at the gate for twenty minutes because I am sleeping, I am a bad worker, I am never on top of my job, and she will stop relieving me. They stated that Sergeant Mitchell instructed her to write a statement and send it up to Security. (Id.) Yet, before sending it, Officer Lee showed the and different food service personnel her statement. On the manager next Mildred day, Gilliam behavior and remarks. the prison issue out later with March that Officer 30, advised (Id.) and of officers express [her] Lee's talk (Id. ) the about Then, as and the two altercation. (Id.) Even as the altercation was coming to an apparent end, Officer Lee "followed [Plaintiff] kitchen (Id. ) and began and physical to concerns" Officer Lee cursed at her twice, engaged in a verbal service Officer "attempted what Officer Lee had been telling the inmates. Plaintiff did so, and when Officer Lee arrived at Plaintiff Lee (Id.) inmate Plaintiff Thus, day, another inmates all the way on the other side of the pushing [Plaintiff] again in [her] back." Officer Lee then told Plaintiff that she had embarrassed herself and lost her job and badge. (Id.) After arriving at the scene of the struggle, Sergeant Lewis escorted Plaintiff to security. (Id.) Along the way, Plaintiff told Sergeant Lewis what happened and expressed her need to get witness statements. (IcL) Because of direction given by Sergeant Brown, Sergeant Lewis took Plaintiff to the visitation 4 area and told her not to move. (Id. at 4-5.) There, making a written statement about what had transpired, was given the "okay" to to to the A with kitchen day area later, Lieutenant Gibbons, Plaintiff leave the prison but could not go back get on March Orby after witness 31, Harmon, statements. Plaintiff Lieutenant and Deputy Warden T.J. Conley. and (Id. Officer at 5.) Lee met David Eason, Captain (Id.) First, Officer Lee told her version of the events that unfolded on the previous day. (Id.) (Id.) Then, Plaintiff was given the opportunity to do so. However, Plaintiff, as she did so, refused to Deputy Warden Conley interrupted listen to Plaintiff's side of the story, and told Plaintiff that she was lying and that she did not have any proof. (Id.) Consequently, Plaintiff told Deputy Warden Conley that it seemed "as if they had rehearsed how the meeting would go." The deputy warden responded by telling Plaintiff to hush and to get out of his office. On April Deputy Warden 1, 2014, of Plaintiff met with Warden Shepard and Administration Within that meeting, (Id.) Elizabeth Roberts. (Id.) Plaintiff told her side of the dispute, including her inability to prepare and submit a proper defense as to the accusations against her. (Id.) Yet, Warden Shepard did not acknowledge or address Plaintiff's concerns and instead suspended Plaintiff with pay until internal affairs investigator. (Id. ) she could speak with an Consistent Internal 2014. Affairs (Id.) not with the Investigator After looking warden's good" wishes, Tomeika Plaintiff T. Jordan on immediately telling Plaintiff for her, Investigator met April that Jordan with 4, "it then is told Plaintiff that she "might as well come on in and tell the truth" because if Plaintiff lied, "another charge" would be added her then-pending charges of assault and violation of oath. Once inside concerns her with Investigator regarding inability Conley's to the prison's on to April Plaintiff's employment Thereafter, Plaintiff with code" response, be placed the spite Designee of her and However, regarding evidence Plaintiff's Plaintiff's on her Shepard (Id.) terminated (Id. at 6.) requesting that a "no certifications. a timely for Adverse Actions, of (Id.) In to the appeal Carey Barnes, but (Id.) unsuccessful Georgia Department files her enforcement, story. prison. Georgia, submitted her termination was upheld. In relayed learned that Warden Shepard had submitted Plaintiff Commissioner's Warden (Id.) and Deputy Warden whole medical an email to officials in Forsyth, re-hire her 2014, the policy statements, hear 7, Plaintiff selective collect witness unwillingness Ultimately, Jordan, to appeal, Corrections stemming request from was Plaintiff with a request her (Id.) for termination. denied. contacted certifications, Plaintiff all (Id. ) Moreover, maintains that "Julie Lewandowski favored and testimony into intentionally matched without Officer taking consideration." created Lee's anything (Id.) a and false her that report witness's [Plaintiff] Plaintiff also that [sic] submitted maintains that "Sergeant McNeil destroyed statements that were written on [her] behalf to prevent the truth from coming out." II, (Id.) DISCUSSION In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Court tests the legal sufficiency of the the complaint, not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail on the merits. Scheuer v. Rhodes, all 416 U.S. facts 232, (1974). The Court must accept as true alleged in the complaint and construe all inferences in the Hoffman-Pugh v. The 236 Court, light most Ramsey, however, 312 need favorable F.3d 1222, not accept to the plaintiff. 1225 (11th Cir. the complaint's conclusions as true - only its well-pleaded facts. Iqbal, 556 U.S. A 662, complaint on its face.'" 544, "factual content 570 inference that alleged." Id. 2002). legal Ashcroft v. "contain sufficient factual matter, xto state a claim to relief that is plausible Id. 550 U.S. See 678-79 (2009). also must accepted as true, reasonable at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. (2007)). that the allows The plaintiff the defendant is court to liable Corp. v. Twombly, is required to plead draw for the the reasonable misconduct "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement, ' possibility that Finally, a although construed, but it defendant pro Hughes v. se asks has for acted pleadings 1160 that leniency does not allow the Court to Inc. v. 1998), Cnty. of. Escambia, be sheer Id. liberally (11th Cir. sustain an action." Fla., a 2003), "rewrite an otherwise 132 F.3d 1359, overruled on other grounds by Iqbal, A. than unlawfully." should Lott 350 F.3d 1157, deficient pleading in order to more GJR Invs., 1369 556 U.S. (11th Cir. 662. Procedural Due Process Claims The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. According to Supreme Court precedent, this clause provides two types of constitutional protection - procedural due process and substantive due process - such that "a violation of either may form the basis for a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Price v. City of Ormond Beach, Fla., No. at *4 (M.D. Fla. May 19, 2006) . a denial three of procedural elements: (1) 6:05-cv-1064, As for a § 1983 claim alleging due process, a deprivation that of protected liberty or property interest; (3) constitutionally-inadequate 2006 WL 1382096, process." 438 F.3d 1336, 1347 (11th Cir. 2006). "requires a (2) proof of constitutionally- state action; Arrington v. and Helms, In this case, Defendants maintain that Plaintiff's due process claims should be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead element one - a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected property or liberty interest. Because constitutionally-protected property interests not from the regulations, Constitution, ordinances, but and from such contracts," look to Georgia's employment statutes. will employment state, sources the Id. as Court "stem statutes, must at 1348. first As an at- Georgia does not provide employees with an innate property interest in employment. See O.C.G.A. § 34-7- 1 ("An indefinite hiring may be terminated at will by either."). Thus, to produced survive facts Defendants' sufficient to motion, Plaintiff demonstrate that must another created her property interest in continued employment. have source Over the years, plaintiffs have met this burden by alleging, inter alia, that they had an unexpired employment contract or that they had received a promise Bd. of Regents (1977). of that their contract would be renewed. State Conversely, Colls, here, v. Roth, Plaintiff has 408 U.S. alleged See 564, no 576 facts suggesting that she has a property interest in her continued employment with the medical prison. Plaintiff's procedural due process claim, is based on a deprivation property interest, is dismissed. of a For that reason, to the extent that it constitutionally-protected Meanwhile, for a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutionally-protected liberty interest to have occurred, state actor standing [her] must and have "threaten[ed] association freedom to in take the serious damage community" advantage or of to other employment No. 3:07-cv-110, 1970866, 2007) (citing *6 (M.D. Dougherty Cnty. , Ga., Fla. • July 684 F.2d 3, 1365, 1373 [her] "foreclose[d] opportunities." Yelvington v. Fleming, at a 2007 WL demons (11th Cir. v. 1982)). More specifically, for Plaintiff to move forward with a libertybased claim, "(1) a false attending public, she must have pled facts a governmental (5) meaningful statement, by the (2) of a sufficient to stigmatizing employee's show that nature, (3) made discharge, [was] employer, governmental (4) (6) without a opportunity for an employee name clearing hearing." Cotton v. Jackson, 216 F.3d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 2000)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Within her brief, Plaintiff makes factual allegations indicating that the government has damaged her reputation and foreclosed her future employment opportunities false reasons for her termination. However, in allegations her complaint, regarding (2) (PL's Br., Plaintiff stigmatic by Doc. makes harm or (4) publicizing 33, no at 4.) factual publication. While Plaintiff has alleged that Officer Lee "defamed [her] work ethic and character" in a way that 10 "ultimately affected [her] livelihood," Officer Lee's statements were not made by a "government employer" or in relation to Plaintiff's termination. Consequently, procedural Plaintiff due has process failed claim to on based present a a plausible deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty interest.2 B. Defamation Claim Within their brief, as to the merits of Defendants do not advance any arguments Plaintiff's defamation claim. Instead, Defendants highlight three provisions of the Georgia Tort Claims Act ("GTCA"). a tort duties while or therefor." have no against "[a] state officer or employee who commits acting within the is O.C.G.A. 50-21-25(a). liability § for with not scope employment interference Third, First, subject losses "[n]o person, firm, to his . . rights." or lawsuit Second, from: contractual of her or "[t]he § liability state . libel, Id. official shall slander, or 50-21-24(7). or corporation having a tort claim the state under this article shall bring any action against the .state upon such claim without first giving notice" in accordance with section 50-21-26. Though Plaintiff's 2 it appears, defamation Because Plaintiff based claim Id^ § 50-21-26(a). on cannot is proceeding pro se, pleadings with leniency. these provisions, continue, the GTCA that also the Court must evaluate her With that obligation in mind, one might argue ^ that the Court should incorporate the factual allegations found in Plaintiff's brief into her complaint. However, by doing so, the Court would be xxrewrit[ing] an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action" a course the Eleventh Circuit has prohibited. 11 GJR Invs. , 132 F.3d at 1369. provides as follows: "[N]othing in this article shall be construed to give a state officer or employee immunity from suit and liability if it is proved that the officer's conduct was not within the scope of or employment." Id. § or employee's his or her official duties 50-21-25(a). Accordingly, Plaintiff's defamation claim may continue if the statements in question were made outside the scope of Officer Lee's official duties or employment. In Georgia, courts have not clearly identified xx[w]hat constitutes actions taken within the scope of official duties or employment" for purposes of the GTCA. S.E.2d 167, 872, 874 (Ga. (Ga. principle, "scope" 172 Ct. Ct. App. App. See Ferrell v. Young, 2013); 2008). Massey v. Instead, when Georgia appellate courts generally should be "broadly construed" and Roth, (2) (1) 659 746 S.E.2d applying this note that the give examples of what conduct has previously fallen within such scope. See id. Chief among these examples are sexual assaults by state police officers that arrests. See Ferrell, Given Officer have this Lee's occurred broad during routine traffic stops and 746 S.E.2d at 172-73. interpretation, statements regarding the Court Plaintiff's finds work that behavior made while speaking over the telephone with Sergeant McNeil fall within the scope of her employment. v. Famesi, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1341 12 See Rayburn ex rel. Rayburn (N.D. Ga. 1999) ("Whether a state employee Georgia Tort official Officer entitled Claims the Court."); 2001) (" [I]f is Act Carter v. the shortcomings act facts are not letter inmates bad worker, relate to Officer Lee's the medical efficient facility. publication prison's the in (Ga. dispute, a Ct. App. whether law."). Yet, Plaintiff's tougher question. to why Plaintiff was a of. this purpose Nevertheless, 113 outlining is Unlike her over-the-phone explanation as under law to be decided by a question of sharing her multiple immunity 548 S.E.2d 110, applicable is of with official a question of Glenn, relevant immunity is Lee's is to of letter running a does not safe and if a sexual assault committed by a police officer in the midst of a traffic stop occurs within the scope of his duties, it stands to reason that Officer Lee's publication occurred within the scope of her employment. Based on this conclusion, plausible because defamation it slander, can claim against have Plaintiff Plaintiff has no has liability also Officer for failed to failed to assert a Lee. losses As a result, Plaintiff's dismissed. 13 from assert defamation claim against the State of Georgia. 50-21-24(7). Furthermore, a libel plausible See O.C.G.A. defamation or claim § is Ill, For the reasons to dismiss (Doc. above, 27). CONCLUSION the Court GRANTS Defendants' Therefore, the Clerk is directed to ENTER JUDGMENT in favor of Defendants Barnes, McNeil, and to and Lee, TERMINATE in their individual these Defendants motion Jordan, and Shepard, official as parties. Conley, capacities, Moving forward, only Plaintiff's FMLA claim against Defendant Georgia Department of Corrections remains. ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, March, Georgia, this nJD**^ day of 2016. HONOfiABETE J. RANDAL HALL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE FHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 14
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