Blount v. MCG Health, Inc., No. 1:2014cv00162 - Document 43 (S.D. Ga. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER denying 39 Motion for Summary Judgment, granting 20 Motion for Summary Judgment, directing the Clerk to enter final judgment in favor of Defendant, and closing this civil action. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 03/29/2016. (thb)
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Blount v. MCG Health, Inc. Doc. 43 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OP GEORGIA AUGUSTA DIVISION ANNIE W. BLOUNT, * * Plaintiff, * v. * CV 114-162 * MCG HEALTH, INC., d/b/a GEORGIA REGENTS MEDICAL CENTER, * * Defendant. * ORDER Pro se Plaintiff alleges Defendant terminated her employment as an act of racial discrimination filing an EEOC charge. summary judgment (doc. 39) (doc. because and in retaliation for her The Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for 20) and DENIES Plaintiff's cross-motion Defendant indisputably terminated Plaintiff's employment for the legitimate reason that she engaged in two acts of insubordination by refusing to attend a staff meeting and rehanging a banner in defiance of an order to remove it. I. Plaintiff, an BACKGROUND African-American female, began working for Defendant in the Georgia Regents University Cancer Center as a social worker on November 16, 2009. (Annie Blount Dep. 54:4-25; Dockets.Justia.com Def. Ex. 4; employment Steven Black occurred occurred during on 2012 Decl. f February and 4.) 6, January Termination 2013. 2013 of her Several events either relate that directly to her claims and the termination of her employment, or are at the very least illuminative of Plaintiff's workplace attitude and relationships. A, Promotion Supervisor of Susan Defendant promoted Ms. Doughtie Susan Doughtie, to Social a Caucasian, position of social worker supervisor in October 2012. Dep. 29, 84:13 2015, - 85:4; UK 1/ discriminatory was white, Def. 2.) and Ex. 21; Decl. Plaintiff that Susan, felt to the (Blount of Susan Doughtie, "the whole who was June situation was my part-time co-worker for her to have been promoted as my supervisor when I was doing the work and I had to actually train her, situation Worker was discriminatory." (Blount Dep. the whole 255:9 - 19.) Plaintiff did not apply for the supervisor position given to Ms. Doughtie. B. In (Blount Dep. 280:19 - 281:7.) Moving Into Shared Office Space late November 2012, including Plaintiff, (Doughtie Decl. K 7.) several employees changed offices, due to growth and limited office space. Plaintiff was upset about having to move during a scheduled clinic meeting. (Blount Dep. 99:18 - 100:9; 203:12-14.) Plaintiff also had to share her new office space with a colleague, Ms. Bridget Story. (Black Decl. % 6; Doughtie Decl. Plaintiff f 7.) Khleif, a On director "Space Matters" and a December at 4, the 2012, Cancer Center, sent an Dr. email Samir entitled that referred to the office move as humiliating wdebasement." (Def. Ex. 27; Blount 121:14 - 123:14.) Plaintiff testified she only complained about the office move on November not 29, 2012 publicly behind closed doors gripe 241:10-16; Def. Ex. about it. to (Blount the Dep. 215:20 216:20, for Plaintiff's 2012 Performance Evaluation Ms. Doughtie solicited feedback performance evaluation on November 28, 2012. had - 55.) C. - chaplain and did 17; Def. only Ex. 26; Doughtie Decl. supervised Plaintiff for (Blount Dep. 107:5 f 3.) three 2012 Because Ms. Doughtie weeks, she contacted eight physicians and four nurse navigators exclusively assigned to Plaintiff as of November 2012 for input. (Doughtie Decl. 1[3; Blount Dep. 91:17 - 93:7; Def. Ex. 24; Doughtie Decl. 1(3.) physicians and two nurse navigators responded. 149:18-21; Def. Two Ex. 40; Doughtie Decl. K 3.) Plaintiff within received the range of an overall "meets rating expectations" of and (Blount Dep. 1.7 out of 3.0, just above the range for "below expectations." Def. 26.) Ex. resistant to Evaluation change, with patients 110:16-20, and critiques difficult when working with peers, (Blount Dep. to and she co-workers. 115:3-6, included locate in failed go Dep. feedback. response, Ms. Carissa 10, Doughtie Moser, (Blount Dep. 2012, positive (Blount the a received nurse practitioner, improvement. but also comments her her comments level, should 26.) Doughtie with from December 7, In Ms. 2012. And on December Marshall, a nurse, the need Doughtie for informed and it was in reply to Plaintiff's have (Blount Dep. 161:7-11.) evaluation Ex. 161:2-12.) regarding Ms. 110:7, Moser's comments would not have improved her performance rating to the next that - feedback K 15.) % 15.) (Doughtie Decl. Plaintiff that Ms. evaluation. on Doughtie received from Ginger feedback contention positive 138:14-22; Doughtie Decl. Ms. extra mile 109:22 138:14-22, was difficult 117:22 - 118:1; Def. Dep. 109:8; Plaintiff Plaintiff asked two employees to provide Ms. additional - clinic, to (Blount 115:25 - 116:5, 107:24 submitted been included in the Plaintiff refused to sign without her signature. (Blount Dep. 155:17 - 156:10; Def. Ex. 42.) On Black, December the Cancer 10, 2012, Center Plaintiff complained Administrative Director, to Mr. Steven Ms. Tracey Slagle, her Doughtie had former supervisor, should not been have Plaintiff's (Blount Dep. 145:18 Doughtie Decl. and 146:14; t 16.) Doughtie completed her evaluation supervisor - Ms. Mr. for Def. less Ex. Ms. because than 39; that one month. Black Decl. Black explained that Ms. she t 9; Doughtie received input from multiple physicians and nurses and instructed Plaintiff to focus on the areas for improvement. 145:25 - 146:14; Def. Plaintiff evaluation Ex. 39; Black Decl. 1f 9. ) believes because (Blount Dep. of Ms. her Doughtie race. did not (Blount give her a fair Dep. 181:19-24.) However, Ms. Doughtie never used any racially offensive language. (Blount Dep. at 182:5-7.) During Plaintiff's three and a half years the Cancer Center, no one ever directed any racial comments toward her, and no one ever said anything to Plaintiff suggesting Ms. Doughtie had a bias against African-Americans. (Blount Dep. 182:8-11; 391:23 - 392:4.) D. On Encounter with Infusion Nurse Patti Parrish December experienced patient. Decl. 3, 2012, difficulty (Blount Dep. H 10.) When Ms. Patti locating Parrish, Plaintiff an to 123:19 - 125:19; Def. infusion assist Ex. with a 28; Doughtie Parrish finally made contact, refused to assist and gave Ms. nurse, Plaintiff Parrish contact information for the social worker assigned to the patient. 125:6; Def. Ex. 28; Def. Ex. 62, p. (Blount Dep. 10.) Plaintiff 124:20- testified Ms. Parrish had difficulty locating her because her office phone had not been set up yet service that day. 9-10, Ms. 16-17.) Doughtie worker's and her cell phone was Plaintiff had contends instructed and Ms. she refused to assist because her to Parrish not did assist not patient was experiencing domestic abuse. E. receiving (Blount Dep. 218:19 - 220:3; Def. Ex. 62, pp. patients 220:3; Def. not Ex. 62, pp. 9-10, other explain (Blount Dep. social that the 218:19 - 16-17.) Placement on Performance Improvement Plan On December 12, Improvement Plan Ashley Nix, and Mr. 2012, ("PIP") Plaintiff was placed on a Performance during Black. a meeting (Blount Dep. with 212:6 - Ms. Doughtie, 214:16; Def. Ex. 55; Doughtie Decl. 1f 17; Nix Decl. f 11; Black Decl. f 10.) As reasons engaged in for its gross issuance, the PIP cited misconduct by sleeping disciplinary meetings prior to December 3, that in Plaintiff multiple 2012; (2) (1) multi- exhibited disruptive behavior by complaining about the office move to co workers the day of the move; and (3) failed to follow protocol by refusing to assist Ms. Parrish with a patient who was a victim of abuse. (Doughtie Decl. H 17; Nix Decl. 1f 11; Black Decl. H 10; Def. Ex. 55; Blount Dep. 219:5-11.) could be disciplined or The PIP warned Plaintiff she terminated there were other performance if she concerns. violated policy (Blount Dep. or 220:14-19; 10; Nix Decl. % Def. Ex. 55; Doughtie Decl. f 17; Black Decl. H 11.) Plaintiff about the objected, office move claiming and the she did incident not with complain Ms. openly Parrish was caused by phone problems and Ms. Parrish's failure to advise that the patient was an abuse victim. the PIP would remain in place reference to Ms. abused. Ms. Doughtie informed Plaintiff with an amendment to remove the Parrish telling Plaintiff the patient had been (Blount Dep. 244:24 - 245:23, 248:12 - 249:15; Def. Ex. 63; Doughtie Decl. 1f 18; Nix Decl. K 13; Black Decl. f 11.) F. Plaintiff's Initial Complaints of Discrimination On December 26, "being emailed Mr. "being professionally sabotaged." 255:5; Def. email Plaintiff Black she was targeted for psychologically and professionally abuse" and was that, 2012, Ex. 65; at the point, because discrimination. Plaintiff she Black Decl. 1f 12.) (Blount Dep. 254:9 - Plaintiff she did not mention discrimination in her did not consider it to be (Blount Dep. 255:6-11; Def. Ex. 65). contacted testified the EEOC on December 27 or 28, racial However, 2012 and submitted an EEOC Intake Questionnaire on December (Blount Dep. 193:8-10, 258:8-20, 260:18-25; Def. Ex. In the of the PIP Intake Questionnaire, was racial Plaintiff discrimination, and wrote 31, 2012. 68.) that Plaintiff issuance elaborated in her deposition she believed it was "more so retaliation" for a complaint she made about her performance evaluation on December 10th. (Blount Dep. 264:21 - 265:11; Def. Ex. 68.) However, Plaintiff did not complain of discrimination on December 10, 2012 and made her first official complaint of discrimination when she contacted the 354:5-9.) EEOC on December 27 or 28, In her email on December 10, 2012. 2012 (Blount to Mr. Dep. Black, Ms. Slagle, and Ms. Doughtie, she merely complained it was unfair to have Ms. Doughtie conduct her evaluation since she had only been supervisor for a month. (Blount Dep. 145:18 - 146:14; Def. Ex. 39; Black Decl. f 9; Doughtie Decl. f 16.) 6. The Banner Incident On January 15, remove a facsimile regulations Healthcare paper jam. 2013, Ms. Doughtie instructed Plaintiff decorative machine by banner because from (1) the it the Joint Commission Organizations ("JCAHO"); was on and receiving a tray violation of to of a the the Accreditation of (2) it could cause a Plaintiff initially removed the banner but rehung it. (Blount Dep. When Ms. 2013, Doughtie Plaintiff inspection but Decl. f 26.) the 338:3-13, discovered the explained rehung it 1f 21.) rehung banner on January she had taken once the inspectors inspection. testified by affidavit it down for left. (Blount Dep. that violation of JCAHO regulations. disagrees. Doughtie Decl. a 31, JCAHO (Doughtie Ms. Doughtie never told Plaintiff she could rehang banner after the Black 340:18-21; the 339:5-8.) banner was, in (Black Decl. H 20.) Mr. fact, a Plaintiff (Blount Dep. 340:13-17.) Plaintiff pointed out to Ms. Doughtie that a decorative vase belonging to Ms. Story was also a JCAHO on a top shelf and too close to the 20.) violation because it was ceiling. (Black Decl. f Ms. Story removed the vase when instructed to do so, she did not subsequently try to (Black Decl. and put it back on the top shelf. t 20; Blount Dep. 360:4 - 12.) Plaintiff alleges Ms. Story left a second, smaller vase on her shelf that was also a JCAHO violation. (Blount Decl. % 3, Blount Dep. 360:4 - 12.) Mr. Black testified it complied with the JCAHO requirement of an eighteen inch clearance from the ceiling, and therefore, she did not have to move it. H, (Black Decl. K 20.) Plaintiff's Refusal to Attend a Team Meeting On the morning of January 25, 2013, Ms. Doughtie informed Ms. Story and meeting at Plaintiff by email that she had scheduled a staff 3:00 p.m. in the office shared by Plaintiff and Ms. Story. (Blount Dep. 292:16 - 293:4; Def. Ex. 75; Doughtie Decl. U 22.) At 2:50 p.m., Ms. Doughtie sent a second email advising she had changed the location to a conference 293:8-18; Def. Ex. 76; room. Doughtie Decl. 1f 22.) (Blount Dep. Plaintiff missed Ms. Doughtie's second email because she went to the restroom and did not check Plaintiff take Blackberry. (Blount Dep. 293:17-22.) returned to her office and waited for the meeting to place. (Blount her Dep. Neither 293:20 Ms. - Story 294:4.) nor Ms. Doughtie Plaintiff inquiries but instead just sat and waited. did was not there. make (Blount Dep. any 299:20- 300:1.) Ms. Doughtie called Plaintiff around 3:05 p.m. Plaintiff Dep. was and inform her of the to see where location change. (Blount 301:2-12, 302:3-18; Doughtie Decl. f 22.) Plaintiff chose to not attend the meeting because Ms. Doughtie would not permit Plaintiff to record the meeting. - 304:1, wanted to words 304:11-19, (Blount Dep. 305:10-21; Doughtie Decl. record the meeting so against me Plaintiff told Ms. later." 301:13-22, 302:19 % 22.) Plaintiff "that way no one could use my (Blount Dep. 303:14 - 304:1.) Doughtie she "could not afford to meet with 10 her without recording it" and that she was meeting. (Blount Dep. 336:25 - 337:14; Def. Ex. Ms. attend "not coming" Doughtie the notified Mr. meeting, and Mr. process to fire her. Black of Black 92.) Plaintiff's suggested to the failure initiation of to the (Doughtie Decl. t 23; Doughtie Decl. Ex. C; Black Decl. 1f 16; Black Decl. Ex. A; Nix Decl. f 15 & Ex. A.) I. Plaintiff's Termination On February 1, 2013, Plaintiff and Ms. Doughtie attended a meeting with Tiffany McGuire from Human Resources to review the recent problems with Plaintiff's work performance and attitude. On February 4, 2013, Ms. for in two jobs McGuire emailed Plaintiff organizations affiliated (Blount Dep. 330:5-23; Def. Ex. either. 331:4-12; Def. (Blount Dep. with Ms. Doughtie, Mr. Black, 90.) with suggestions MCG Health. Plaintiff did not pursue Ex. 90.) Plaintiff met and Ms. Nix on February 6, 2013, and Ms. Nix offered her the choice to be terminated or resign in lieu of termination. 28.) (Blount Dep. 333:11-22; Doughtie Decl. Plaintiff did not resign and was terminated. 333:22 - American, 335:3.) Defendant hired LaKeesha Cooks, H (Blount Dep. an African- to replace Plaintiff as a social worker in the Cancer Center. (Doughtie Decl. K 32; Black Decl. K 22; Nix Decl. K 29.) Plaintiff's discharge summary 11 recounts imposition of the PIP on December 12, 2012 due to "gross misconduct" and lists two infractions warranting termination, Plaintiff's refusal to attend the staff banner. meeting (Blount Dep. January 25, 336:6-11, According to acts insubordination of the on 337:21 decision makers, and 2013 both and rehanging - 338:2; infractions sufficient cause discharge under MCG Health's Rules of Conduct. 28; Black Decl. insubordination f 19; Nix Decl. as the "refusal f or Def. 17.) willful of Ex. the 92.) constituted for immediate (Doughtie Decl. 1f Those rules define disobedience of a reasonable request from a supervisor or another in a position of authority." (Def. Ex. 16, p. 2; Blount Dep. 73:24 J. On 74:13.) Plaintiff's Appeal of Her Termination February 12, 2013, Plaintiff submitted Dispute Request in accordance with company policy. 350:10 - 351:2; Def. Ex. 97; Nix Decl. 1 20.) a Discharge (Blount Dep. By letter dated February 26, 2013, Joseph Thornton, Vice President of Ambulatory Care, upheld the discharge and explained that, banner back on the fax machine, Plaintiff by putting the willfully failed to comply with a reasonable request of her supervisor. (Blount Dep. 365:1-8, 366:18 - 367:2; Def. Ex. 100; Nix Decl. H 22.) On February 27, 2013, Plaintiff appealed her termination to 12 Susan Norton, Vice President of Human Resources.1 367:15-23; Def. Plaintiff's Dep. Ex. 101; Nix Def. that on Ex. back to be insubordinate." Ms. explained, 105; Plaintiff's banner 105.) K 23.) Ms. Norton upheld termination by letter dated March 18, 2013. 380:10-19; explained Decl. (Blount Dep. the Story fax "conscious machine . . . not f the 383:25 treated 24.) decision was (Blount Dep. was because Ms. Nix Decl. Ms. to the considered 384:6; differently, Norton place action - (Blount Def. Ms. Ex. Norton Story had removed the vase from her shelf as instructed and never returned it. (Def. Ex. 105.) Ms. Norton also found Plaintiff's refusal to attend the staff meeting to be insubordinate. (Blount Dep. 385:12-17; Def. Ex. 105.) Plaintiff next appealed to Steven Scott, an African-American who is the Chief Operating Officer for MCG Health. 392:20 2013, - 393:3; Mr. Scott change the Def. Ex. Def. Ex. 110; Nix Decl. notified Plaintiff termination decision. 112; Nix Decl. f 26.) that H 25.) he saw (Blount Dep. Mr. (Blount Dep. On April no 10, reason 393:25 to - 395:8; Scott's decision was the 1 Also on February 27, 2013, Plaintiff emailed Ms. McGuire that she "would harassment." like to make a formal complaint of discrimination and (Blount Dep. 368:23 - 369:11; Def. Ex. 102; Nix Dec. H 23.) Plaintiff explained that, with regard to Ms. Doughtie's actions, "maybe it [sic] professional jealousy or pure racism, I am not sure" and that w[i]t 372:15- 25; Def. could have Ex. been a 102.) 13 number of things." (Blount Dep. final stage of the discharge dispute 395:12-23; Def. Ex. 113; Nix Decl. f II. A. process. (Blount Dep. 27.) DISCUSSION Summary Judgment Standard Summary genuine dispute entitled to 56 (a) . judgment as is to any judgment as Facts are appropriate material a matter of umaterial" only fact if and law." wthere the Fed. Inc., no movant is R. Civ. P. if they could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law. Liberty Lobby, is 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Anderson v. The Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, U.S. Matsushita Elec. 574, 587 inferences in Real Prop. , (1986), [its] 941 Indus. and favor." F.2d 1428, Co. v. must Zenith Radio Corp., draw "all United States v. 1437 (11th Cir. 475 justifiable Four Parcels of 1991) (en banc) (internal punctuation and citations omitted). The moving party has the Court, motion. initial burden of by reference to materials on file, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. showing the the basis for the 317, 323 (1986). How to carry this burden depends on who bears the burden of proof at trial. 1115 (11th Cir. Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1993). When the non-movant has the burden of 14 proof at trial, the movant may carry the initial burden in one of two ways—by negating an essential element of the non- movant's case or by showing that there is no evidence to prove a fact necessary to the non-movant's case. See Clark v. Coats & (11th Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d (explaining Adickes v. and Celotex evaluate first of Corp. , 477 the S.H. whether the 606-08 Kress & Co., U.S. non-movant's consider 604, at 323) . response movant 1991) 144 (1970) 398 U.S. Before in has Cir. the Court opposition, met its it initial must burden showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. v. can City of Columbus, curiam). cannot F.2d at A meet mere 120 F.3d 248, conclusory the burden at 254 (11th Cir. statement trial is that the insufficient. Jones 1997) (per non-movant Clark, 929 608. If—and only if—the movant carries its initial burden, the non-movant may avoid summary judgment only by Memonstrat[ing] that there is indeed a material summary judgment." of proof at trial, Id. issue of fact that precludes When the non-movant bears the burden the non-movant must tailor its response to the method by which the movant carried its initial burden. If the movant presents evidence affirmatively negating a material 15 fact, the non-movant "must respond with evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial fact sought to be negated." Fitzpatrick, the of the movant non-movant evidence "come a shows that an absence must was either show "overlooked or forward with additional directed evidence verdict motion evidentiary deficiency." on material 2 F.3d at 1116. on a that the the ignored" material record by the If fact, contains movant or evidence sufficient to withstand at Id. trial based at 1117. on the alleged The non-movant cannot carry its burden by relying on the pleadings or by repeating conclusory allegations contained in the complaint. v. Ross, B. 663 F.2d 1032, Plaintiff 1033-34 Cannot Her Title VII (11th Cir. Satisfy the See Morris 1981). Prima Facie Elements Discrimination Claim Because There Is of No Evidence Defendant Treated More Favorably a Similarly Situated Employee Not of the Same Protected Class. Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating "against any individual with conditions, or individual's race, 42 U.S.C. any direct her respect privileges color, § 2000e-2(a)(1). evidence disparate of to of [her] employment, religion, sex, terms, because national or of such origin." Because Plaintiff has not presented discrimination, treatment compensation, claim 16 under the Court Title VII must analyze using the framework outlined by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 792 (1973). (11th Cir. In Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 411 U.S. 1287, 1999) . a disparate ultimate burden of treatment case, the plaintiff bears Stone Crab, Inc. , 220 F.3d 1263, Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, come forward with discrimination. case, she raises If a prima the the to the inference defendant 1274 (11th Cir. case of establishes that a 115 F.3d 1555, carries its burden, 1564 the 2000). employment prima discriminatory facie intent The burden of production then to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the action in question. v. Reno, EEOC v. the plaintiff must first facie plaintiff motivated the challenged action. shifts the proving that the employment action at issue was taken because of the plaintifffs protected status. Joef s 1293 (11th Cir. plaintiff 1997). Holifield If the defendant retains the burden of persuasion to show that the employer!s proffered explanation was not the real reason for the employment change, but was instead a pretext for discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, Texas Depft of Cmtv. Affairs v. 256 (1980). If, however, the plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case for discrimination, summary 17 judgment in favor of the defendant is App'x 346, favor of proper. 350 Summer v. (11th Cir. employer where 2011) City of Dothan, Ala., 444 F. (affirming summary judgment in former employee alleging race and sex discrimination under Title VII failed to establish a prima facie case for discrimination) . disparate treatment, of a protected a plaintiff must show: class; employment action; employees who favorably; and (4) Board Regents, of Holifield, The the Further, class, (2) she was her employer not of the prima (1) facie she is a member subjected F.3d to adverse treated similarly situated same protected she was qualified to do the job. 342 case of 1281, 1289 (11th class more Mavnard v. Cir. 2003); 115 F.3d at 1562. parties do not dispute that Plaintiff, an African- is a member of a protected class, was qualified job, and suffered an adverse employment action. because Plaintiff was replaced by a member of the same there replacement However, (3) were American female, for To establish a the treated less is by no a allegation member parties do of outside disagree a prima of over her facie case through protected class. whether Plaintiff was favorably than a similarly situated employee of different race, Ms. Story. 18 a uIn determining whether employees are similarly for purposes of establishing a prima facie case, situated it is necessary to consider whether the employees are involved in or accused of the same ways." or similar Maniccia conduct v. and Brown, 171 1999)(citations omitted). adequate similarities 2011) . comparator's disciplined F.3d 1364, in 1368 different (11th Cir. Plaintiff bears the burden of showing between outside her protected class. Cir. are her conduct and that of others Summers, 444 F. App'x at 348 (11th Indeed, "the misconduct quantity [must] be and nearly quality identical of to the prevent courts from second guessing employer!s reasonable decisions and confusing apples with oranges." Here, Defendant terminated Plaintiff because she rehung the banner after Ms. JCAHO violation, because Maniccia, 171 F.3d at 1369. Doughtie told her to remove it as a potential and she could not she refused record it. to attend Plaintiff a staff meeting contends Ms. Story is a proper comparator because the vase on top of her shelf was also a However, JCAHO violation Plaintiff insubordination by and she fails to Ms. Story, was never point much less reprimanded out two. any for it. acts of Indeed, the undisputed evidence is that Ms. Story complied with instructions to remove the vase and never returned it. 19 (Black Decl. H 20; Blount Dep. 360:4 - 12.) Furthermore, Ms. Story attended the staff meeting Plaintiff refused to attend on January 25, and nothing in the record suggests that Ms. to attend a staff 2013, Story ever refused meeting or otherwise defied any orders from her supervisors. Undeterred, left on the violation. Plaintiff shelf that Plaintiff points to Plaintiff has a second believes presented no vase to Ms. a be Story JCAHO evidence that a supervisor ever instructed Ms. Story to remove this second vase. Mr. Black explained the second vase did not have to be removed because it did not constitute a JCAHO violation. (Black Decl. f 20.) In her untimely motion for summary judgment, appears to argue for the first time that Ms. comparator because, after Plaintiff's Plaintiff Story is a proper termination, Ms. Story failed to lock her office and left her patient files vulnerable to theft. an email to (Doc. 39, pp. 9-10.) from Ms. Doughtie instructing Plaintiff and Ms. lock the door to Plaintiff also In support, Plaintiff submitted their office when leaving. submitted Plaintiff's replacement, a declaration stating she from Story (Id. at LaKeesha 23.) Cooks, "witnessed the door to the office that I shared with Bridgett Story unlocked and open even 20 when both Ms. Story and Medical records that was I was Story's employment the Health Insurance (XXHIPAA"). (Id.) of the building. (Cooks Decl. f 6.) without supporting evidence, Ms. out [sic] under my responsibility was kept locked in my desk drawer." asserts, [sic] because Portability Plaintiff that Defendant leaving the and door [sic] terminated open violated Accountability Act The argument fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact or show entitlement to summary judgment for at least five reasons. First, almost Plaintiff three months filed after her the motion deadline for summary given in judgment the Court's Scheduling Order, and the Court is not required to consider it. Young v. Palm Bay, 2004) . about City of Second, Ms. Plaintiff Story's alleged Fla., 358 failed to include insubordination Defendant's summary judgment motion, minimum by Loc. R. 56.I.2 F.3d 859, in 863 any her (11th Cir. of the facts response to which is required at a bare (See doc. 36.) 2 Plaintiff's untimely motion also alleges spoliation of (1) notes allegedly taken by Ms. McGuire during the February 1, 2013 meeting; and (2) an email exchange between Ms. Doughtie and Mr. Black on January 25, 2013. (Doc. 39, pp. 2-6.) The first allegation is based on mere speculation by Plaintiff that notes would have been taken during such an important meeting. (Doc. 39, pp. 4-5.) There is no evidence to support a finding of spoliation. The second accusation is without merit because Defendant produced the original email. (Doc. 28, p. 19; Jason Rote Decl. M 2-5.) 21 Third, the declaration whether Ms. Cooks or Ms. unlocked. Fourth, left the door violation locked. of the termination Ms. she order fails of given to Plaintiff, fails did so from to show that, intentionally Ms. Doughtie Plaintiff admits Ms. because Cooks to state Story was at fault for leaving the door Plaintiff open, Fifth, from the to and in keep Story willful the door Story resigned in lieu of HIPAA violations, which means Ms. if Ms. the same option Story was not treated more favorably than Plaintiff. C. Even if Plaintiff Elements to of Rebut Her the Could Satisfy Discrimination Legitimate, the Claim, Prima She Has Nondiscriminatory Facie Failed Reasons Given for Her Termination. If the plaintiff is able to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the employer must nondiscriminatory reason for the McDonnell Corp., 411 U.S. Douglas articulates one or more such articulate a legitimate, challenged employment at 802-03. reasons, the If the plaintiff action. employer has the opportunity to come forward with evidence to establish that the employerfs articulated discrimination. Id. at To show pretext, is one must that might meet that reasons merely pretexts for 804. and u [p]rovided that the proffered reason motivate reason are head a on 22 reasonable and rebut employer, it, and an employee the employee cannot succeed reason." more by simply Chapman, than one quarreling with 229 F.3d at 1030. legitimate, If the wisdom of that the employer proffers non-discriminatory reason, the plaintiff must rebut each of the reasons to survive a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1037. reason by proffered discrimination unless the it A legitimate nondiscriminatory employer is not is shown both that a the reason was and that discrimination was the real reason." Center v. Hicks, Plaintiff 509 U.S. does 502, not 515 (1993) dispute that "pretext St. for false Maryf s Honor (citation omitted). she chose to rehang the banner in violation of the order from Ms. Doughtie to remove it, and that could not strength she refused record of to it. attend the Ultimately, Defendant's reasons, failing to rebut these legitimate, her termination, Plaintiff has staff meeting Plaintiff not because quibbles their with truthfulness. she the By nondiscriminatory reasons for failed to meet her burden under the McDonnell Douglas framework. D. Plaintiff's Fatal Retaliation Defect Defendant's That Claim Plaintiff Legitimate, Suffers Has from Failed Non-Retaliatory the Same, to Rebut Reasons for Her Termination, To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff protected must activity; show: (2) (1) she 23 she engaged suffered an in a adverse statutorily employment action; and (3) she established a causal F.3d 1281, 1307-08 establishes a prima production shifts to articulating a (11th facie Cir. case between the Bryant v. Jones, protected activity and the adverse action. 575 2009). of Once retaliation, the defendant to rebut legitimate, adverse employment action. link a plaintiff the burden of the presumption by non-discriminatory reason for the Id. Even assuming Plaintiff can present a prima facie case of retaliation, she has failed nonretaliatory reasons to rebut Defendant's for her termination, as legitimate, discussed above regarding Plaintiff's discrimination claim. III. The (doc. 39) , Court 20), DENIES DIRECTS Defendant, GRANTS the CONCLUSION Defendant's motion Plaintiff's motion Clerk to enter for summary judgment for summary judgment final judgment in (doc. favor of and CLOSES this civil action. SO ORDERED this &\/ aay of March, 2016, at Augusta, Georgia. DAL UNITEti STATES DISTRICT JUDGE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 24
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