Ingram et al v. AAA Cooper Transportation, Inc., No. 1:2014cv00142 - Document 45 (S.D. Ga. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER granting 26 Motion for Summary Judgment. The Clerk is directed to enter final judgment in favor of Defendant, terminate all deadlines and motions, and close this case. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 03/01/2016. (thb)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Ingram et al v. AAA Cooper Transportation, Inc. Doc. 45 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA AUGUSTA DIVISION MARK INGRAM, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Kellie Ingram, * * * * * Plaintiff, v. * l:14-cv-142 * AAA COOPER TRANSPORTATION, INC., Defendant. * ORDER At Mark issue Ingram and proceeding from in is January this Kellie Order positions taken by Plaintiffs Ingram in two proceedings. Plaintiff's 2008 are bankruptcy through May case, 2013 in which the The was United Bankruptcy Court for the District of South Carolina. is the present litigation, in which Plaintiffs first pending States The second seek to recover on Mark Ingram's loss of consortium claim and on Kellie Ingram's personal injury claims.1 Presently Dismiss, or in before the the Court Alternative is Motion Defendant's for "Motion Summary to Judgment" 1 Both the bankruptcy case and the present litigation were filed by Mark Ingram and Kellie Ingram. Kellie Ingram is now deceased, and this Court substituted Mark Ingram on behalf of Kellie Ingram's Estate. To maintain consistency, throughout this Order, the Court refers to Plaintiffs in plural with respect to both the current proceeding and the bankruptcy case. Dockets.Justia.com based on the Defendant doctrine argues that of judicial Plaintiffs estoppel. are estopped (Doc. from 26). asserting their claims in the present litigation because of their failure to disclose the existence of the claims as assets in their prior bankruptcy case. law, (Def.'s Br., Doc. 26-1 at 4). Under Georgia judicial estoppel is a matter for summary judgment, Court considers Trotter, et Defendant's motion as al., 442 S.E.2d 265, the reasons discussed below, 266 such. (Ga. and the Southmark Corp. Ct. App. 1994). v. For the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary judgment. I. The material facts BACKGROUND are not in dispute and establish the following. In January 2008, Plaintiffs Kellie and Mark Ingram filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of South Carolina. of their initial petition, (Doc. 26, Ex. A). As part Plaintiff's filed schedules of their real and personal property. (Id. at 12-16) . Subsequently, in April and May 2008, Plaintiffs amended their asset schedules. (Id., On Exs. B-C) . confirmed Plaintiffs' Post-confirmation, June Chapter on June 19, 5, 2008, the Bankruptcy 13 payment plan. 2009, Plaintiffs Court (Id., Ex. D). again amended their asset schedules, and the Bankruptcy Court likewise amended its confirmation order to reflect the change in assets. While the bankruptcy case remained 2012, pending, on 5, Kellie Ingram was involved in an automobile accident with an employee of Defendant AAA Cooper Transportation. of Mark Ingram, Doc. 31 at 23). the June present litigation. (Affidavit That accident is the subject of Plaintiffs never amended their asset schedules in the bankruptcy proceeding to reflect the potential claim against Defendant. Meanwhile, 30, 2013, Plaintiffs' the Bankruptcy Ingram. (Doc. trustee's report, creditors, while payment. 26, Court of I). $55,151.62 (Id. , Ex. In May 2014, Ex. Court H) . dispersed in On discharged According Plaintiffs closed Plaintiffs' State bankruptcy proceeded apace. debts May 9, Mark to and the $54,176.00 was 2013, On April bankruptcy to discharged the Kellie their without Bankruptcy Court case. Plaintiffs filed the present litigation in the Richmond County, Georgia against Defendant asserting Plaintiff Kellie Ingram's claims for personal injuries and Plaintiff Mark Ingram's loss of consortium claim. Ex. 1) . (Doc. On June 23, (Doc. '1, Defendant removed the case to this Court. 1) . During the deposition of Mark Ingram, Plaintiffs' Defendant Defendant learned of prior bankruptcy and that Plaintiffs' were Ex. 1 at 2) . not among Plaintiffs' sworn claims against assets. (Doc. 37, Defendant then informed Plaintiffs' counsel of its intent to file a motion for summary judgment asserting judicial estoppel for taking an inconsistent position as to the existence of these claims in the bankruptcy proceeding. On March 13, 2015, Plaintiffs (Doc. 26, Ex. L) . filed a motion in the Bankruptcy Court to reopen the bankruptcy case and amend their schedule of assets to include claim and the of Kellie Court to claims Ingram. Mark Ingram's loss of consortium for personnel injuries held by the (Doc. 26, Ex. ruled on Plaintiffs' Dismiss, or in the Alternative, and Brief in this case. Mark Support (Doc. Ingram's on 26). motion, the K) . Before Defendant Motion grounds of the Bankruptcy filed for Estate its "Motion Summary Judgment judicial estoppel" The Bankruptcy Court subsequently denied motion to reopen the bankruptcy proceeding, reasoning that, because 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) and § 1329(c) creditors' years, ability to Plaintiffs' receive creditors reopening the proceedings. II. Summary genuine as entitled to judgment 56(a). the payments stood is to from to debtors gain limit to five nothing from (Doc. 40, Ex. A at 7-8). SUMMARY JUDGMENT judgment dispute in STANDARD appropriate any material only fact if and as a matter of law." "there the Fed. is no movant is R. Civ. P. Facts are "material" if they could affect the outcome of suit under Liberty Lobby, the governing Inc., 477 U.S. substantive 242, 248 law. (1986). Anderson v. The Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, U.S. in Matsushita 574, Elec. 587 (1986), [its] favor." 1428, 1437 Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 and must draw "all justifiable inferences U.S. v. Four Parcels of Real (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc) Prop., 941 F.2d (internal punctuation and citations omitted). The Court, moving by motion. How reference Celotex to carry proof at 1115 trial. (11th Cir. two has to Corp. this proof at trial, of party the initial materials v. Catrett, burden depends Fitzpatrick v. 1993) . on When burden file, 477 on City of the by negating an essential showing basis 317, the Atlanta, 2 has the (1986). burden F.3d the the for 323 bears non-movant the movant may carry the ways: the U.S. who of of 1112, burden of initial burden in one element of the non- movant' s case or by showing that there is no evidence to prove a fact necessary to the non-movant's case. Clark, 604, Inc., Adickes v. 929 F.2d S.H. 477 U.S. 317). response in & Co., Before the opposition, movant has met genuine Kress issues its 606-08 398 See Clark v. Coats & (11th Cir. U.S. 144 1991) (1970) (explaining and Celotex, Court can evaluate the non-movant's it must first initial burden of of material fact judgment as a matter of law. F.3d 248, 254 (11th Cir. 1997) consider whether showing that there are no and that it is entitled Jones v. City of Columbus, (per curiam). the to 120 A mere conclusory statement that the non-movant cannot meet the burden at trial is insufficient. Clark, 929 F.2d at 608. If-and only if-the movant carries its initial burden, the non-movant may avoid summary judgment only by "demonstrat[ing] that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment." proof at trial, Id. the When the non-movant bears the burden of non-movant must tailor its method by which the movant carried its response to the initial burden. If the movant presents evidence affirmatively negating a material fact, the non-movant withstand fact a "must directed sought to be the movant shows non-movant must respond verdict either with additional verdict motion deficiency." burden by Id. relying on Fitzpatrick, that the sufficient trial at trial 2 sufficient on the F.3d at record material 1116. on a material fact, contains based 1117. the to on The withstand the alleged non-movant pleadings or by cannot repeating a the directed evidentiary carry F.2d Rather, (11th Cir. 1981). the its conclusory See Morris v. Ross, 1033-34 If evidence allegations contained in the complaint. 1032, to ignored" by the movant or "come forward evidence at at of evidence show that was "overlooked or evidence motion negated." an absence with 663 non-movant must respond with affidavits or as otherwise provided by Federal Rule of Civil In notice this of Procedure action, 56. the Clerk Defendant's motion for of the Court gave Plaintiffs summary judgment and informed them of the summary judgment rules, the right to file affidavits or other materials in opposition, and the consequences of default. (Doc. Wainwright, 27.) 772 The notice requirements F.2d 822, 825 (11th Cir. of Griffith v. 1985) (per curiam), therefore, are satisfied and the motion is ripe for review. III. Defendants doctrine the of argue that judicial potential party is bankruptcy done so, not as claims because assets they proceeding Plaintiffs that and estopped amend contend their if an judicial motion to their Chapter move to 13 reopen disclosure. estoppel to disclose under Georgia law, they asset are barred by the failed during Plaintiffs counter that, judicially notwithstanding Plaintiffs' estoppel claims bankruptcy case. DISCUSSION does reopen and not a a Having apply, amend was ultimately unsuccessful. The Court begins by discussing the bankruptcy laws that are relevant to Defendant's judicial estoppel motion. This includes a also discussion of bankruptcy law generally and a more particular examination of Plaintiffs' motion to reopen and the Bankruptcy Court's denial of that motion. With that analysis in hand, the Court turns to the judicial estoppel question. A. Relevant Bankruptcy Law The Court begins with a general overview of the bankruptcy laws relevant to this case. Unlike Chapter 7, which serves to liquidate a debtor's assets, Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code serves 1239, 13 a reorganization purpose. 1244 U.S.C. § 1306(a) 1306(a) vests estate. Id. petitioner's and the at § 1327(b) plan Waldron, 536 F.3d plan, or the (quoting 13 U.S.C. petitioner's § 1327(b) order property Then, . . . interact to form estate Upon petitioning for bankruptcy, 1241. estate to the debtor the In re (11th Cir. 2008), the Eleventh Circuit explained how property and debtor property. § In upon "returns § 1327(b)). the bankruptcy confirmation some Me] except as confirming in of property the of the otherwise provided in the plan.'" Crucially, Id. at 1242 the Eleventh Circuit held that any assets acquired after confirmation remain part of the estate property pursuant to § 1306(a). Id. at 1243. Thus, Waldron explicitly held that a debtor's claims for legal relief of all types that arise after the confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan but before the completion of the plan are property of the bankruptcy estate. See id. at 1241-43, 1245.2 Chapter 13 would, petitioners bankruptcy disclosure not court in of course, be largely a dead letter were required and to disclose their a bankruptcy their creditors. case 2 As the Eleventh Circuit confirmation assets remain part is crucial assets "Full to noted in Waldron, of the bankruptcy to and the the honest effective whether postestate or are returned to the petitioner is subject to a circuit split. 536 F.3d at 1241-43. In Plaintiffs' own bankruptcy case, the Bankruptcy Court noted the existence of the split, but found it unnecessary to engage in that question because petitioner's plan and the confirmation order provided that ''property of the estate does not vest in the debtor until the closing of the case." (Doc. 31). functioning of the federal bankruptcy system." Aeroplex, Inc., quotations 291 F.3d 1282, omitted). "A 1286 debtor (11th to the bankruptcy 541(a)(7)). The court." IcL disclosure of Cir. seeking bankruptcy laws must disclose all assets, (citing Burnes v. Pemco 2002)(internal shelter under the or potential assets, 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(1), gives the trustee such ''assets and creditors a meaningful right to request ... a modification of the debtor's plan to pay his creditors," Waldron, 1245, or grant the trustee an opportunity to claims and obtain money for the creditors." Stores, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-052, 536 F.3d at "to settle the Brown v. Winn-Dixie 2015 WL 3448614, at *7 (S.D. Ga. May 20, 2015). Further, "[t]he duty to disclose is a continuing one not once that does bankruptcy court; end rather, a the forms debtor statements if circumstances change." are must submitted amend Burnes, his to the financial 291 F.3d at 1286. Additionally, bankruptcy courts may not confirm or modify a Chapter 13 greater than 1329(c). payment plan five years. As Chapter 13 noted to by to 11 the include require U.S.C. § Bankruptcy this payments over 1322(d); Court, five-year 11 a U.S.C. Congress limitation period § amended period to "provide the relief and fresh start for the debtor that is the essence Cong. of modern 1st Sess. With proceedings 117 that, bankruptcy law." H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th (1977). the relevant Court to this now turns motion. to the Plaintiffs bankruptcy filed for Bankruptcy on January 31, 2008. amended their asset schedules. confirmed Plaintiffs' June 2008, 24, assets, June Plaintiffs Plaintiffs On June 5, the Bankruptcy Court 13 plan. again Post-confirmation, amended their schedule which the Bankruptcy Court confirmed a month later. 2012, the occurred. accident giving rise to Plaintiffs' Plaintiffs never amended their asset Upon learning estoppel in this Court Chapter In April and May, to their As their motion. Defendant's litigation, reopen disclosure. of of In claims schedule. to seek judicial Plaintiffs moved in the Bankruptcy bankruptcy mentioned intent on case above, the to amend Bankruptcy In its well-reasoned order, their Court asset denied the Bankruptcy Court acknowledged that "[t]he proper inquiry focuses on the effect of reopening the case on the creditors. no effect on administration the would should be denied." Co. , 406 however, F.3d that estate creditors, necessary, then (Doc. 31, Ex. 1 at 4) 538, the be or If the reopening will have 543 (8th Cir. the and no motion 2005)). The Court (Id. at 7). result Plaintiffs' of the potential bankruptcy claims 10 On that basis, (Id. at 7-8). proceedings against prohibited Thus, there was no potential benefit to the creditors in reopening. the Court denied Plaintiffs' motion to reopen. found, which coincided approximately with the closing of the case in 2013, The reopen (citing In re Apex Oil five-year limitation period, any distribution to creditors. to further Defendant is now clear: were estate property under their plan, and they had a continuing duty to disclose their claims to the Bankruptcy Court from the time the claims arose in June 2012 until their bankruptcy case closed in May 2013. And, finally, because they attempted to reopen and amend after the close of the five-year limitation period, payment plan could not be modified to benefit their creditors, resulting in the Bankruptcy Court denying Plaintiffs' reopen their and duty Plaintiffs bankruptcy amend. to Plaintiffs disclose disclosed trustee their the may therefore claims claim, have failed against their moved to 1244 (noting that 11 U.S.C. motion to comply creditors the allows Had or the Chapter See Waldron, § 1329(a) with Defendant. amend payment plan to reflect this new asset. at to their 536 F.3d trustees unsecured creditors to move to modify the plan to, 13 and inter alia, increase payments or extend the plan's time for payments). As it in stands, Plaintiffs were able to discharge $55,151.62 unsecured claims. B. Judicial Estoppel In a diversity action, the application of judicial estoppel is a matter of v. S. 1995) . Diamond state law. Associates, Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc., 44 F.3d 925, 930 Inc. (11th Cir. Prior to 1994, the doctrine of judicial estoppel was evidently unknown to Georgia law. In 1994, Georgia's first foray into this field began explicitly as a way of applying the 11 federal doctrine of judicial estoppel in an effort to effectuate the decisions Trotter, 1994) . of Smith As Southmark, & the the bankruptcy Jacobs, Court courts. 442 S.E.2d discusses application of See in 265, greater Southmark Corp. 266 Ct. (Ga. detail judicial estoppel below, in v. App. since Georgia and federal courts has diverged. Under Georgia law, the "precludes a from asserting proceeding which party is doctrine inconsistent a of judicial position with a in Emory University, Wolfork v. 555 S.E.2d 96, 98 (Ga. Ct. App. Tackett, 540 S.E.2d 611, 612 a position successfully asserted by it in a prior proceeding." (Ga. estoppel previously Coachran v. 2001) Ct. judicial App. (quoting 2001)). "[T]he essential function and justification of judicial estoppel is to means prevent of the use obtaining of unfair intentional advantage self-contradiction in a forum as provided a for suitors seeking justice. The primary purpose of the doctrine is not to protect the litigants, the judiciary." Southmark, punctuation omitted). who would attempt calculated proceedings but to protect the integrity of 442 S.E.2d at 267 "The doctrine (citations is directed against and those to manipulate the court system through the assertion of divergent sworn positions and is designed to prevent parties in judicial from making a mockery of justice through inconsistent pleadings." Johnson v. Trust Co. Bank, 478 S.E.2d 629 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (citations and punctuation omitted). 12 Georgia courts have frequently applied judicial estoppel where a party fails to disclose a potential claim among their assets in a bankruptcy proceeding. 524 S.E.2d 510 that (Ga. Ct. App. See, e.g., Reagan v. 1999). Lynch, These courts have reasoned "[c]ompliance with disclosure requirements is essential to maintaining a disclosure disclose that requirements such such (citations Byrd v. bankruptcy Towne is The Lake, light Chapter viewed exist." omitted). In under information claims JRC case. 11, as is Ltd., true 484 the the amounting Southmark, same of 442 under S.E.2d stringent failure to a S.E.2d Chapter 309 (Ga. to denial at 267 13. See Ct. App. 1997) . As discussed above, to disclose any assets, Bankruptcy Court and their case, bankruptcy asset disclosures against claim to Defendant. "amount [s] Southmark, Plaintiffs were under a continuing duty including potential legal claims, to the their creditors. Plaintiffs reflect to a denial 442 S.E.2d at 267. failed to the Plaintiffs' During the amend their existence failure that to such pendency of of sworn their claim disclosure their claim[] exists." Plaintiffs' pursuit in this Court of a claim, the existence of which they denied to the Bankruptcy Court, constitutes an inconsistent position. There is, however, one frequently Id. litigated difference between Georgia's judicial estoppel and its federal counterpart that allows a party to remedy 13 its previously inconsistent position. Under Georgia law, where a party amends their bankruptcy court filings to reflect the potential claim, summary judgment on Clark v. Perino, 509 S.E.2d 707 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998); Johnson v. Trust Co. courts judicial Bank, in 478 the Cartersville, estoppel S.E.2d Eleventh Georgia, grounds 629 (Ga. Circuit, 348 F.3d is Ct. see 1289, not warranted. App. 1996). Barger 1297 v. (11th See Unlike City Cir. of 2003), Georgia applies this exception even when the debtor amends only after the threat litigation. 338, 339 cv-3, 2014 that judicial estoppel in See Rowan v. George H. Green Oil, (Ga. Moreover, of Ct. WL the simply 2002); 69088866, Georgia moving successful or not, See Rowan, App. at Court to Tuten v. *2-3 of Target (S.D. Appeals amend or Ga. has reopen, at above, contend, is Inc., 572 S.E.2d Corp., No. Dec. 8, least 4:142014). suggested whether eventually may be sufficient to avoid judicial estoppel. argue that this exception applies virtue of moving to reopen the bankruptcy case, There subsequent 572 S.E.2d at 339. Plaintiffs they the some Georgia exception in cured their merit to previously Plaintiffs' here. By Plaintiffs have, inconsistent argument. As position. mentioned courts have often framed the application of the terms of whether the party has moved to amend rather than whether the party has, in fact, amended their asset disclosure. compatible Additionally, with the policy Plaintiffs' rationale 14 view is arguably motivating judicial estoppel. By moving to amend or reopen, Plaintiffs, in a sense, attempted to arguably change have no its longer position taken in an the bankruptcy inconsistent case position and in a judicial proceeding. In its protects brief, Defendant plaintiffs who have argues that successfully Georgia amended law only their asset disclosures in the bankruptcy proceeding and that those who have only moved to remain amend or subject undisclosed to moved to judicial claims. reopen a bankruptcy proceeding estoppel Defendant in pending reaches this litigation conclusion on by analyzing Georgia cases and determining that any suggestion that merely moving to amend or reopen is sufficient occurred in dicta. After judicial reviewing estoppel the cases, Georgia the Court Court is of Appeals's convinced supporting both parties' positions exists. to "moving to amend" defeating judicial estoppel, Compare, e.g., 537 Ct. 200, 201-02 (Ga. App. bankruptcy added) the pleadings with id. amendment that that plaintiff to at 202 ever include court we have there has been no tort to amend his claim.")(emphasis P[I]f the bankruptcy court permits an allowing an omitted tort claim, the Georgia are Jowers v. Arthur, attempted the dictum there 2000) P [W] hen applied judicial estoppel to bar a claim, evidence that For every reference equal references to "amends." S.E.2d numerous in which 15 it stands the tort to reason claim is asserted should honor the bankruptcy court's actions.")(emphasis added). But, as Defendant Georgia court either argues, held the Court that moving has not to amend, found standing sufficient or insufficient to defeat where alone, a was judicial estoppel. That question appears to remain open. That motion said, alone Plaintiffs' this is Court need not sufficient. and distinction between the present case to pending. or Bankruptcy to Court's reopen amend motion whether Bankruptcy The address reopen Court remains found that the amend and a is a making denial of significant case where a motion Significantly, five-year a limitation the period prohibited approval of any extension of a payment plan and that reopening would therefore not be of any benefit to Plaintiffs' creditors. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have been unsuccessful in amending their previous position in the bankruptcy proceeding. As Georgia courts have recognized, successfully amending an asset disclosure is, in essence, position. has See Cochran, successfully a way of retracting an earlier 555 S.E.2d at 99 ("[W]hen a plaintiff amended her petition to include any claim against the defendant as a potential asset . . ., it cannot be said that the present position in the trial court is inconsistent with the position asserted by plaintiff in a prior proceeding and, claim." therefore, (emphasis Plaintiffs' failure judicial estoppel does not bar her added)). to reopen The the 16 opposite bankruptcy is true proceedings here. sets their position, stone. as reflected on their asset disclosure, It is also no matter that Plaintiffs attempted, unsuccessfully, to reopen the proceedings. in albeit While it may be true in some sense that once the motion to reopen and amend was made Plaintiffs were immediately asserting both proceedings, and, upon the bankruptcy the reality Bankruptcy Court's proceedings Plaintiffs' is position to in a that they denial, extinguish the consistent used creditors' proceeding in successfully conclusively their bankruptcy have position is the claims. contained in their asset schedules, which lack the present claims. Having failed to amend their current inconsistent mockery of the justice because of the Bankruptcy reopening. positions in asset the system. two This Court's schedules, Plaintiffs' proceedings is makes particularly specific reason for a true not The five-year limitation period allowed Plaintiffs to extinguish their creditors' claims and to move on with their lives. Though disclosures, they their may attempt have tried to amend to reopen was their asset unsuccessful, the bankruptcy proceeding remains closed, their position in the now- complete bankruptcy remains one of non-disclosure, this worked to Plaintiffs' substantial benefit and all of and to the prejudice of Plaintiffs' creditors. To conclude otherwise would lead to perverse outcomes. Many debtors have potential claims accrue after confirmation of an asset distribution plan. It is easy to imagine these debtors 17 failing to disclose bankruptcy period. assets their proceeding Cf. Waldron, were increased not claims and during would to be the pendency of the the five-year 536 F.3d at 1245 subject payments during ("If post-confirmation disclosure, rare limitation modifications because voluntarily disclose new assets . . . ."). few debtors for would Once the bankruptcy case has closed and the five-year limitation period has passed, these that the debtors could file they could defeat reopen the bankruptcy court only statutes of a would need claims with confidence, case, deny while the motion resting based To execute such a scheme, the knowing judicial estoppel motion by moving to bankruptcy limitation period. would their slightest window limitations and the assured on the that a five-year debtor-plaintiffs between their claims' five-year bankruptcy limitation period. With that in mind, heart of the estoppel." (Ga. Ct. "essential CSX Transp., App. acknowledged, estoppel] it is clear that this case goes to the 2009) . Georgia function and justification of judicial Inc. As v. the Howell, Georgia 675 S.E.2d Court courts "apply federal of law 306, 308 Appeals has [of judicial in order to give the proper effect to the judgment of the bankruptcy court .... The goal is to afford the judgment of the bankruptcy court the same effect here as would result in the court where S.E.2d at 266. that judgment was rendered." Southmark, 442 Consistent with that goal, Georgia courts do not 18 apply judicial estoppel when a plaintiff successfully amends its bankruptcy filings to reflect its legal claims. effect to the bankruptcy court proceedings. Similarly, applying judicial estoppel where a bankruptcy court has to amend or estoppel] Transp., reopen supports "the primary Doing so gives denied a motion purpose of [judicial . . . protecting the integrity of the judiciary." CSX 675 S.E.2d at 308. Where, as here, a plaintiff fails to disclose a potential claim during a bankruptcy case and conclusively fails to reopen the case on the grounds that the five-year limitation period has passed, they proceeding have which is "assert[ed] inconsistent a position with a in position successfully asserted by it in a prior proceeding." 442 S.E.2d at 266. judicially estopped Having done so in this case, from asserting their a judicial previously Southmark, Plaintiffs are claims against Defendant.3 3 The Court's decision rests on Plaintiffs' conclusive failure to reopen and amend the bankruptcy case on the grounds that the five-year limitation period has passed. The relevant considerations could be different where a plaintiff has moved to amend or reopen and the motion remains pending in the bankruptcy court. The relevant considerations may also be different had Plaintiffs failed to reopen their bankruptcy court proceeding for different reasons. See In re James, 487 B.R. 587, 594 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2013) (finding no motive to conceal a claim where debtors Chapter 13 plan paid creditors 100% of their owed debts). 19 IV. For motion FINAL the for foregoing summary JUDGMENT and motions, in reasons, judgment. favor CONCLUSION of the The Court Clerk Defendant, is GRANTS Defendant's DIRECTED terminate all to ENTER deadlines and CLOSE this case. ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this / day of March, 2016. HONORABLE J. RANDAL HALL UNITED/STATES DISTRICT JUDGE SOUTHERN 20 DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
