Allen et al v. City of Grovetown et al, No. 1:2010cv00022 - Document 112 (S.D. Ga. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER granting in part 100 Motion for Attorney Fees; granting in part 105 Motion for Attorney Fees; granting 111 Motion to Substitute Party. The Court awards $70,862.00 in attorney's fees and $8,009.16 in costs for a total of $78,871.16. The Clerk shall close this case. Jeremy D. Love, Jr. added. Gloria J. Allen (as next friend of J.D.L., Jr. and M.A.M., minor children of the decedent, Jeremy D. Love, Sr.) terminated. Signed by Judge J. Randal Hall on 02/25/2016. (thb)
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Allen et al v. City of Grovetown et al Doc. 112 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN AUGUSTA GLORIA J. ALLEN, FOR THE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA as Next DIVISION * Friend of J.D.L., Kr., M.A.M., and Z.G.L., minor children of the decedent, Jeremy D. Love, Sr., and GLORIA J. ALLEN, as * * * * Administratrix of the Estate * of Jeremy D. Love, * Sr., * * Plaintiffs, v. * MIKE FREEMAN, l:10-cv-22 Sergeant, individually and in his official capacity as an officer with the Grovetown Police Department, and CHESTER HOPKINS, Officer, individually and in his official capacity as an officer with the Grovetown Police Department, Defendants. ORDER This case comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs and Plaintiffs' for the same. below, fees Also (Docs. Plaintiffs' and costs pending 100, 105). motion for supplemental motion For the reasons discussed motions are GRANTED IN PART and attorneys' are AWARDED in the total before the Court is amount of $78,871.16. Plaintiffs' motion to substitute Jeremy D. Love, Jr. for J.D.L., Jr. as a Plaintiff in this case. (Doc. 111). That motion is GRANTED. Finally, in the Court's Order approving the settlement (Doc. 101), the Court, Dockets.Justia.com pursuant to Plaintiffs' S.D. counsels' for attorneys' fees and Ga. L.R. 17.1, the Court now approval Plaintiffs' of motion Having granted the motion for GRANTS Settlement with respect to Plaintiffs' (Doc. its fee arrangements until fees was resolved. costs, withheld Plaintiffs' Motion for Local Rule 17.1 petition. 99). I. On June 17, 2015, BACKGROUND Defendants made the following offer to Plaintiffs: Pursuant to Rule 68 of the Federal Civil Procedure, Defendants [sic] to Judgment allow Rules hereby to be of offers entered against them in this action in the amount of $100,000.00 (One Hundred Thousand Dollars and No/100), including all of Plaintiffs' claims for relief. This Offer of Judgment is made for the purposes specified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, and is not to be construed Defendants admission that this action, or that as are either liable Plaintiffs have an in suffered any damage. This Offer of Judgment shall not be filed with the Court unless (a) accepted or (b) in a proceeding to determine costs. (Doc. 93, offer, Ex. (emphasis on June 30, counsel. (Defs.' Defendants, defense 1) at counsel addition to the 2015, Opp'n that of added). Plaintiffs' Br., meeting, his Prior to accepting this Doc. counsel met with defense 107 at Plaintiffs' intention settlement amount." to seek (Id. ) 2). According counsel attorney's On the to "informed fees in same day as that meeting, and one day before the offer expired, defense counsel emailed Plaintiffs' counsel to explain that [t]he offer was to ^allow entered against them in amount of $100,000.00, Plaintiff's claims for Judgment to be this action in the including all of relief.' While I understanding contention in make clear to this may be a point of the near future, I wish to you and your client that our intention the for offer was to include all costs, fees, or any other relief your client may be entitled to in this action. (Id. , Ex. A) . offer. The (Doc. 92, Plaintiffs filed Defendants' Rule 68 Subsequently, expenses Plaintiff next under Ex. a offer. Soon and supplemented accepted after, indicating (Doc. Plaintiffs 68 Plaintiffs 2) . notice Rule later day, on Defendants' July their 3, 2015, acceptance 93). moved 42 for U.S.C. their attorneys' § 1988. motion fees (Doc. with 105) . Soon after, and 100). additional argument concerning the appropriate amount of attorneys' (Doc. of fees. Defendant filed its opposition brief (Doc. 107), and Plaintiffs filed their reply brief. (Doc. 110). The motion is now ripe for adjudication. Because Jeremy Love, and remains a minor, the Jr. was then a minor, Court ordered and M.A.M. Plaintiffs petition for approval of settlement pursuant to S.D. 17.1., which Plaintiff filed shortly thereafter. 95 at 3; Pis.' On July 20, the Court granted Plaintiffs' file a Ga. L.R. (Order, Doc. Petition for Approval of Settlement, 2015, to was Doc. 99). petition for settlement and ordered the Clerk to enter judgment against Defendants in the amount of $100,000, but withheld consideration of "the substance completion of and costs." of the parties' (Doc. II. Plaintiffs' Rule briefing 17.1 regarding petition upon attorney's fees 101). LIABILITY FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 "prompts both parties to a suit to evaluate the risk and costs of litigation, and to balance them against the likelihood of success upon trial on the merits." "plain Marek purpose v. . litigation." Id. Chesny, . . is 473 to U.S. 1, 5 encourage (1985). The settlement Rule's and avoid Rule 68(a) provides as follows: At least 14 days before the date set for trial, a party defending against a claim may serve on an opposing party an offer to allow judgment on specified terms, with the costs then accrued. If, within 14 days after being served, the opposing party serves written notice accepting the offer, either party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance, plus proof of service. The clerk must then enter judgment. Fed. R. Civ. to Rule 68, P. 68(a). When a party accepts an offer pursuant she may pursue "costs then accrued." Id. In this case, Plaintiffs seek costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to Rule 68 and 42 U.S.C. In Marek, include § 1988. the Supreme Court held that costs under Rule 68 attorneys' fees in cases where the underlying fee shifting statute defines costs as inclusive of attorneys' 473 U.S. § 1988, case, at 9. the As the underlying statute Court issue at recognized, in Marek defines costs as inclusive of attorneys' Court further held that, included in a Rule be to assigned form Supreme of a however, those "lump not 68 Rule categories; sum." 42 and Id. necessarily at 68 does not instead, 6. Such lump of costs. inclusive in this The fees may be require offers funds to may sum U.S.C. Id. -1 fees. though costs and attorneys' offer, fees. take the awards are, the Court As acknowledged, "[i]f an offer recites that costs are included or specifies amount for an costs, and the plaintiff accepts the offer, the judgment will necessarily include costs." Id. If, on the costs other included hand, and "the an amount offer for does costs not is state not that specified, the are court will be obliged by the terms of the Rule to include in its judgment an determines additional to be Delta Air Lines, (Powell, amount sufficient to Inc. v. Augusta, which cover in the its discretion costs." Id. 450 U.S. 346, 362, 365 it (citing (1981) J., concurring)). As Defendants correctly concede, "[t]he crux of the instant inquiry turns Defendants' on offer whether included ambiguity existed compensations for as to whether costs." (Defs.' 1 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) provides, in relevant part, that "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." Opp'n Br. at 2). in Rule Utility 68 The Eleventh Circuit has held that ambiguities offers are Automation to 2000, Auto F.3d 617, Fin. Ctr., Cochise Cnty., because 619 plaintiffs cannot counteroffer. Further, are because what a (quoting Webb, the (6th terms Automation later found in for view, the refusing "left hold the Relying with II Erdman v. This is so offer, modification 298 in at Rule the and or make F.3d a James, Detroit 1991). 68 a 1244. offer position offer means." of Id. on this principle, Utility Automation "$45,000 fees. Defendants' Co-op., 2004); of 2000, of 147 F.3d at 623). offer or would be will Cir. (9th Cir. the consequences court include attorneys' In 564 879-81 plaintiffs Eleventh Circuit defendant's 561, control the offeror. accord McCain v. seek clarification substantial, guessing F.3d Utility the Elec. Chocatwatchee 1998)); 926 F.2d 877, defendants v. against (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Webb v. (7th Cir. 378 construed Inc. Inc., 298 F.3d 1238, 1244 147 be costs 2000 accrued" that the did not Id. they "made a clear and unequivocal offer to fully and wholly satisfy Plaintiffs." (Defs.' Opp'n Br. at 2) . They characterize their offer as a lump sum offer that represents Defendants' total liability. Defendant, this argument misses the (Id.) mark. Unfortunately for To be sure, the Supreme Court has blessed "lump sum offers" that do not specify what recovery compensates for a plaintiff's claim for relief and what compensates for costs or attorneys' fees. Marek, 473 U.S. at 6-7. The question before the Court, however, is not whether it is permissible to enter into a lump sum offer, but whether Defendants' includes offer is costs. unambiguously In short, a lump sum Defendants' offer offer that does not unambiguously include costs. Two other Circuit Courts of Appeals have considered Rule 68 offers with the exact language as the present offer. See Sanchez v. Cir. 2013); (3d Cir. 2011). Prudential Lima v. Pizza, Newark Police In Sanchez, Inc., 709 Dept., F.3d 658 689, F.3d 324, the defendant's offer provided, 691 (7th 327 in relevant part, as follows: Pursuant Civil to Rule 68 Procedure, of the Federal Defendant, Rules of PRUDENTIAL PIZZA, INC., hereby offers to allow Judgment to be entered against them [sic] in this action in the amount of $30,000 including all of Plaintifff s claims for relief. 709 F.3d at 691 (second emphasis added). The Seventh Circuit, relying Webb on ambiguities its previous against ambiguous and, the precedent offeror, in held on that the interpreting it against the offeror, construing offer was found that it did not include costs under Rule 68. IcL_ at 692. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that "Plaintiff's claims for relief" "specified terms" as required by Rule 68(a). IcL are not Moreover, the Seventh Circuit distinguished "claims" for relief from "demands for relief" and found that attorneys' plaintiff's claim." Id. at 693. fees are "not part of a Similarly, offer that in Lima, ambiguous, the the Third Circuit found the defendant's interpreted offer did not it against include costs. the 658 offeror, F.3d at and 333. held Just as in Sanchez, defendant's offer provided that: Pursuant to Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants City of Newark . . . and Garry McCarthy, hereby offers [sic] to allow Judgment to be entered against these defendants in this action in the amount of $55,000.00, including all of Plaintiff's claims for relief against all defendants Id. at Third 327 (emphasis Circuit plaintiff's found claims the attorney's for the uniquely .... that for fees injury added) . rise the Seventh fees are Circuit, not part the of a "Unlike other judicial relief, allowed under from the attorneys' relief. giving separable Like to § an cause 1988 are not action. of action compensation Their to be award is proved at trial." Id. (quoting White v. N.H. Dep't of Emp't Sec, 455 U.S. 445, 452 (1982)). As discussed above, in Utility Automation 2000, the Eleventh Circuit joined the majority of circuits in holding that ambiguous offeror. Rule 298 68 F.3d offers at 1244. are to be Applying interpreted against the this same principle, the Third and Seventh circuits have held the exact language at issue in this offeror, case to be ambiguous, to be exclusive of costs. and, interpreted against the The cases instance, Dano's 1995) cited by Defendants' Restaurant Defendants reliance Systems, is misplaced. are on Inc., distinguishable. Broadcast 902 Broadcast Music, Music, F.Supp. which 224 For Inc. (M.D. v. Fla. implicitly reasoned that agreements that are silent as to costs include costs,2 was decided prior to Utility Automation 2000 and its reasoning is no longer valid. 113, 116 Additionally, (M.D. Fla. 1996) in the Blumel court v. Mylander, interpreted an 165 F.R.D. offer "to settle all pending claims against him" as inclusive of costs and attorneys' precedent fees. In Utility and Sanchez in Lima, Defendants' to precedent. Likewise, 858 light F.2d 397, the Automation which exclude 401 of intervening Eleventh Circuit 2000, the interpret costs, are more Court consistent 1988), that exactly offers Defendant cites Radecki v. (8th Cir. believes like with current Amoco Oil Co., which asserts that requiring a "laundry list" of relief "runs counter to the purpose of Rule 68 to assume that forms of relief not mentioned are not intended to be included precedent, within Radecki the is sum offered." entirely Automation 2000, 298 F.3d at 1244 2 The court Under backwards. this See circuit's Utility ("[A]ny ambiguity in the terms in Broadcast Music identified the correct question: "the silence of the instant parties as to the itemized amounts of the offer of judgment does not invalidate the offer. It does, however, create the dilemma of which Plaintiffs complain. Does the award include 'costs?'" 902 F. Supp. at 226. The court, however, went on to assume the offer included costs and only analyzed whether costs included attorneys' fees under the substantive statute. Id. at 226-27. That analysis skips a critical step and is untenable after Utility Automation 2000. of an offer must be resolved against its drafter, absent a clear and therefore, indication to the contrary the accepting party cannot be deemed to have received its fees or waived the rights to seek them."). Defendants Services, part of WL also LLC, for the a Defendant's 2117451, at *2 misses the mark. held cite liable whether an for unambiguously that LLC (M.D. is Ga. May 21, Ga. fees This certainly true that a defendant fees; the costs and Farm l:09-cv-186, 2014). question settle "all plaintiffs' includes v. "attorney's 'total liability.'" No. attorney's offer to Genetics, proposition n.l It AGSouth in this claims attorneys' 2014 point can be case for fees. are is relief" On that question AGSouth Genetics provides no help because the offer of judgment explicitly included attorneys' fees. Without reference to any legal Id. at *2. authority, Defendants also urge the Court to consider extrinsic evidence of an email sent to Plaintiffs' counsel purporting to reveal the meaning of the words in Defendants' Third Circuit criticized the district the intent offer. court's behind In Lima, use of the conveying the offer in interpreting the terms of the offer. F.3d at 331-32. That email included the phrase, "if the email 658 [the offer is] accepted, this litigation will be resolved in its entirety." Id. at 331. Because the email is extrinsic to the offer itself, the Third Circuit held that "it does not inform whether the [o]ffer itself explicitly includes 10 fees and costs." Id. For the will reasons not given by consider intentions the here. the Third Circuit extrinsic See id. in Lima, evidence at of 331-32. the the Court offeror's Further, utilizing extrinsic evidence to determine the meaning of a Rule 68 offer could frequently lead to collateral proceedings that disturb the entire purpose behind Rule 68's "plain purpose ... is litigation."). required Utility 68. To avoid defendants Automation to 2000, Cf. to 298 473 U.S. encourage the at their F.3d offers at 5 (Rule and settlement problems, these make Marek, avoid Eleventh Circuit unambiguous. 1244. The See utilization of extrinsic evidence to interpret ambiguous offers runs counter to the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit's precedent. In conclusion, the Court finds that Defendants' offer was ambiguous as to whether costs and attorneys' Rule 68 fees were included. Interpreting the ambiguities in the offer against the offeror, the Court finds that Defendants' offer to settle "plaintiff's claims for relief" do not include costs under Rule 68. Accordingly, pursuant Marek, to Federal attorneys' III. "The Plaintiff is Rule of Civil entitled Procedure to costs 68(a) accrued and, under fees as well. AMOUNT OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." 11 Bivins v. Wrap It Up, quotations hourly Inc., 548 F.3d 1348, omitted). In rate and the court number must enumerated in Johnson v. Ga. (5th Cir. 1974) . "lodestar." Id. Id. v. Lambert 2000) . Hous. v. entitlement rates." Auth., fee and Norman, of is a consider the Highway Express, Cnty., should be 836 F.2d 151 applicant hours twelve Inc., is factors 488 F.2d 714 F. the F.2d at the Court may adjusted upward or downward. 1292, Supp. bears documenting 836 (internal "reasonable" compensable After calculating the lodestar, Fulton "The what 2008) The product of these two figures is the then consider whether it Norman (11th Cir. determining what "reasonable," 1350 1302 2d the 1364, burden appropriate 1303. (11th The 1369 of hours Court Cir. 1988); (N.D. Ga. establishing and hourly should also be mindful that a request for attorneys' fees "should not result in a second major litigation." Id. A. Reasonable Hourly Rate "A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, at 1299. and reputation." Id. The "going rate" in the community is the most critical factor in setting the fee rate. Martin v. Univ. of S. Ala., 911 F.2d 604, 610 (11th Cir. 1990). The relevant legal community is the district in which the court sits. Knight v. Alabama, 824 F. Supp. 1022, 1027 n.l (N.D. Ala. 1993) (citing Turner v. Sec'y of 12 Air Force, Court is 944 F.2d itself community, it 804, 808 considered may an consult independent judgment. (11th Cir. expert its Norman, own 1991)). on Because hourly experience rates in the in the forming an 836 F.2d at 1303. Plaintiffs seek an hourly rate of $450.00 per hour for Mr. Batson's time, and $250.00 per hour for Mr. argue that the $450.00 hourly rate for Mr. for two reasons. significant First, experience in because jail House. Batson is reasonable Mr. suicide Plaintiffs Batson cases and possesses other cases alleging constitutional violations against government officials. Second, higher Plaintiffs rate similar jail Mr. legal that, Batson expertise. relevant Georgia for argue is given suicide 1988's justified to Similarly, community should there are no cases" because § in attract Plaintiffs be who Augusta. that from "specialize Defendants the lawyers argue broadened lawyers purpose, of the Augusta, in only oppose the reasonableness of these hourly rates. As Mr. experience Batson's declaration in civil rights attests, he litigation and, has significant in particular, in advancing the causes of those incarcerated in jails and prisons. (Batson Decl., Doc. 105, Ex. 1 II 7-29). that Mr. Batson's contributed to Mr. Batson, their experience success because few, benefited in this if any, 13 The Court has no doubt Plaintiffs litigation. and According to Augusta attorneys have this experience, Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Batson should recover at a rate similar to that commanded by attorneys in Atlanta, Georgia. The Court if, may award a non-local hourly rate Plaintiffs demonstrate [the Southern [their] Dep't. District] of Transp., that the district 29 "a lack of attorneys who claims." Barnes, if, 168 are willing F.3d at 437 F.3d 1489, 1494 and and only practicing able to in handle (citing Cullens v. Ga. (11th Cir. 1994) (finding court did not err by awarding Macon, Georgia rates because "plaintiffs did not meet their burden of showing a lack of Macon lawyers willing or able to handle their individual claims")). Comm'n, 2012), no Just No. as in Martin v. Augusta Richmond 2012 WL 5950408 (S.D. l:12-cv-58, Cty., Ga. Nov. Ga., 28, Plaintiffs have not put forth any evidence that there are local handled attorneys this counsel's "believe [s] case. affidavit that with the Instead, that [he is] skills and Plaintiffs indicates that familiarity rely on to have Plaintiffs' Plaintiffs' counsel the only person in Augusta with [his] level of knowledge and experience,"3 and that he "believe [s] that no lawyers would want to invest in the expert because they would not appreciate the facts involved." (Batson Decl. This there evidence does not prove that attorneys able to take this case on; 3 Although written as a tautology, were rather, the 11 38, not any 40). local it merely proves Court understands Mr. Batson to mean that he believes he is the only attorney in Augusta with significant experience in this field. 14 that Plaintiffs evidence is insufficient to support an Atlanta billing rate. See Barnes, 168 F.3d at A did not know of any. This 437. court consider its "is itself an expert on the question and may own knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form an independent judgment either with or without Stierheim, the 10 aid F.3d 776, may command fees at believe that the of witnesses 781 as to (11th Cir. value." 1994). a higher rate in Atlanta, Augusta legal market Loranger Although v. counsel the Court does not would bear such billing for the services rendered in the present case This Court has previously approved $250.00 per reasonable billing rate in the Augusta legal market. v. Consumer Law Grp. Nov. 6, 2012); et al., No. l:ll-cv-187, Johnson v. YKK Am., Inc., Doc. No. hour as a See Guzman 91 (S.D. 3:07 cv 048, Ga. Doc. 171 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 29, 2010); Ingram v. Kellogg's Sales Co., No. l:09-cv-021, Doc. 39 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 24, 2010); Ruben Chevrolet, 6, 2009) . And, Inc., No. l:06-cv-195, Doc. Salazar v. Milton 86 (S.D. Ga. Mar. as Defendant notes, recognizing that two years have passed since the Court assessed the above-mentioned cases, the Court recently billing rate. 152, 2015 WL approved $275.00 per Raiford v. Nat'l Hills, 195983, at *2 (S.D. Ga. hour as a reasonable Exch., LLC, No. Jan. 14, 2015); l:ll-cvM.I.T., Inc. v. Medcare Express, N. Charleston, LLC et al., No. l:14-cv081, Doc. 12 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 14, 2014). 15 Upon consideration of the Johnson factors, relevant legal market and counsel's including the experience and expertise, the Court sets the billing rate at $275.00 per hour Batson. Mr. for Mr. The Court also approves a rate of $250.00 per hour for House. B. Hours Reasonably Expended When exclude exercising excessive, proper redundant, from fee applications. (11th Cir. 1999). unreasonable reputation, to "billing otherwise ACLU of Ga. v. Barnes, "[H]ours bill or judgment," a excluded client" without or experience of counsel. are unnecessary must hours 168 F.3d 423, those reference Norman, attorneys that to would the 428 be skill, 836 F.2d at 1301. "[A] lawyer may not be compensated for hours spent on activities for which he would not bill a client of means who was seriously intent on vindicating similar rights, recognizing that in the private sector the economically rational person engages in some cost benefit analysis." Id. If fee applicants do not exercise billing judgment, should do it for them. See Barnes, 168 F.3d at 428 ("Courts are not authorized to be generous with the money of others, is as much courts and it the duty of courts to see that excessive fees and expenses are not awarded as it is to see that an adequate amount is awarded."). The decision to prune hours is thus squarely within the Court's discretion. Columbus Mills v. Freeland, 16 918 F.2d 1575, 1301) . If claimed 1580 a is (11th Cir. district 1990) court unreasonably (citing Norman, does high, find that "[it] has the two 936 F.2d number of choices: at hours it may conduct an hour-by-hour analysis or it may reduce the requested hours with an across-the-board cut." Plaintiffs Jack Batson, (Batson spent which Decl.). 260.6 this the the hours particular, preparing Ex. A at 3), case declaration itemizes In hours (Batson Decl., with provide (Batson Bivins, Mr. 548 F.3d at 1350. of he Plaintiffs' spent Batson filings and on counsel this declares conducting case. that he discovery 17.43 hours in phone time associated Decl. 1 52; Id. emailing (Batson Decl. 1 53; Id. Ex. C). Ex. B) , and 8.9 hours Plaintiff also seeks 3 hours spent preparing the fee application. (Dec. Batson Decl. 1 55) . Defendant has not disputed the reasonableness of the hours spent or the costs expended in litigating this case. However, the absence of an objection does not relieve the Court of its duty to conduct an independent review of Plaintiffs' request. In conducting the review, the Court notes that its efforts have been complicated by numerous deficiencies in the billing summary prepared by Plaintiffs' counsel. Some entries reflect an inordinate amount of time allocated to tasks while other entries appear unrealistically low. The Court's experience suggests that billing summaries with such deficiencies are evidence of a lack of proper time-keeping efforts 17 by counsel. As it is impractical time that to attempt may have to determine been under the appropriate billed on amount certain work, of the Court's review is limited to addressing any overbilled entries. To do otherwise would simply reward counsel for sloppy recordkeeping. The Court's review has resulted in a number of adjustments. These adjustments Batson claiming § 1988 and of 10 Rule With two types: that 68; of are and the hours at F.3d compensable hours). of hours reasonableness Loranger, are 781-783 hours respect from to the (1) adjustments non-compensable (2) under adjustments expended on the (distinguishing the to 42 based the adjustments, Mr. U.S.C. on litigation. determination first due the See determination of reasonable "[t]he Supreme Court has clearly stated that the time that is compensable under § 1988 is that reasonably expended on 782 of (internal the quotations relevant federal the litigation." omitted). "Time litigation is expended independent not The Court determines that the 7.25 hours Mr. June 30 and July 1, the compensable." Id. Batson requests for 2015 concern probate court proceedings that are not compensable Additionally, Id. at in this case. 3 hours Mr. (Doc. Batson 105, spent Ex. 2 at 3) . preparing his attorneys' fee application are excluded because those hours were not accrued at the time of the Rule 68 offer. The Court requested hours. now determines Four entries 18 the reasonableness on Mr. Batson's fee of the request evidence "excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary" time spent litigating this case. Id. (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. The December 30, hours 424, 434 expended motion to (1983)). preparing reconsider a the brief Court's in part, an points excessive addressed motions. hours and 14 contained Robinson. Court (Doc. to and at 9-15). at all, another the Mr. reduces to is, Defendants at least reargue on the this the in same underlying request from 20 Chief To the brief in opposition to summary attempt to re-litigate the Court's Defendants 61). reconsider Grovetown briefs sur-reply dismissing Order attempt Court Plaintiffs' hours. Plaintiffs' judgment Robinson redundant the of dismissing Plaintiffs' in Accordingly, to support Order City of Grovetown and Police Chief Al 2010 entry of 20 City In this brief, its of Order of and Al Plaintiffs again asked the dismissing Police Al Grovetown Robinson Defendants from the City case. extent re-raising these issues was of (Id. warranted Batson's decision to bring these issues before the Court in a sur-reply brief to an unrelated motion made by the remaining Defendants does not constitute the appropriate method for doing so and is redundant to Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. portion of the Court reduces Mr. Ex. To account previously denied for the sur-reply brief addressed to this Batson's fee request on this entry 2 at 2) from 15 hours to 11 hours. 19 redundant topic, the (Doc. 105, Mr. Batson Plaintiffs' request also opposition does Plaintiffs' not to specify 60 summary how hours of fees judgment. these hours related (Id.). were The divided response brief and response to Defendants' of Material Facts. for requests summary found Mr. Batson in fee between Statement The Court's Order denying Defendants' judgment to violation motion of Local Rules 7.1 and 56.1 because his response to Defendant's statement of and facts was "have "inappropriately consistently resources." (Doc. of material fact that discussed above Accordingly, 63 is the at inundated frustrated 36). the with legal Court and arguments" wasted its Preparing responses to statements include the excessive legal argumentation an unreasonable Court reduces use the of counsel's requested time. hours for opposition to summary judgment from 60 to 50. Likewise, the July 16, 2014 entry for 15 hours on a motion to reconsider unnecessary the because, Court's as denial the of Court's summary Orders judgment (Docs. 63, was 65) explain, Mr. Batson's violation of Local Rules 7.1 and 56.1 "had no effect on the disposition of [Defendants'] motion for summary judgment," which was, in fact, denied. (Doc. 65 at 3). If Mr. Batson felt the need to challenge the Court's determination even though it did not affect his client, then those hours were "spent on activities for which he would not bill a client of means." Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301. 20 The Court determines that the 15 hours expended on that motion was unreasonable, and, therefore, reduces Mr. Batson's fee request by that amount. After making calculates the that Mr. above-mentioned adjustments, Batson spent a total of 244.68 the Court recoverable hours in litigating this case. Plaintiffs also request reasonable attorney's time incurred evidence 104, of Ex. by 23.70 2 at counsel hours 1-2) . probate proceedings this case. finds this Stanley worked Many in of Mr. on behalf those Mr. of worked 14.3 Mr. Batson requests however, are not review of the House House (Doc. compensable hours the concerned evidence, recoverable for submitted Plaintiffs. hours, state court that After the Court's that House. fees in the Court as part of case. In passing, time. (Doc. 99, Ex. 1 at 2) . 52.65 hours in paralegal No description of how that time was spent appears in the record. The Court DENIES recovery of Mr. House Batson's estimates was paralegal six time. hours of Mr. paralegal also time requests spent what he preparing "petitions of administration and organizing the GBI records." (Doc. 104, Ex. 2 at 2) . As the Court has mentioned elsewhere, the time spent working with the petitions of administration is not compensable in this proceeding. Though the GBI records are relevant, without a more detailed breakdown of how much time Mr. House spent organizing those records, the Court DENIES recovery of the six hours of Mr. House's paralegal time. 21 C. Lodestar Based case on the above, the Court finds the lodestar in this to be: Batson: $275.00/hour at 244.68 = $67,287.00 House: $250.00/hour at 14.3 hours = $3,575.00. Thus, Court the total therefore of attorneys' lodestar in this GRANTS IN PART case is Plaintiffs' $70,862.00. motion for The recovery fees in the amount of $70,862.00. D. Costs Plaintiffs also Batson of $7,217.57 expert (Doc. costs, 104, Plaintiffs' incurred costs 2 costs. by Mr. litigation (Batson Decl. and Ex. claim at In Batson relevance to this case. 1 54; incurred 3) . the by costs Id. Mr. Defendant Court's and Mr. Ex. D), House does view, House incurred are not of Mr. exclusive of of some by $1,385.59. object of the to costs questionable In particular, the Court finds that the expenses incurred by Mr. House between May and October 2009 were not incurred as part of this case. Similarly, the $350.00 paid by Mr. Batson to the Columbia County Probate Court in July, 2015 is not recoverable because it was not part of this case. Court therefore finds that Mr. of $6,867.57 and Mr. House The Batson incurred recoverable costs incurred 22 recoverable costs of $791.59. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART Plaintiffs' motion for a total of $8,009.16 in costs. IV. PLAINTIFFS' LOCAL RULE 17.1 MOTION FOR APPROVAL In the Court's July 20, approval of the minor Plaintiffs' Mr. House reflects Court best. children motions the at agreement, the Court reserved the any fee arrangement between Plaintiffs' Plaintiffs same a that his to can (House Aff., Having awarded attorneys' be 104, after fee as and costs. Mr. that 1 1 Batson and Mr. recover fees respective discussed above. to settle (Doc. With that, 99) with 101). Plaintiffs though the House's Mr. as of fee bare-bones Id. , Ex. 2 at at 21). fees and costs as described above, the Court now ORDERS that Mr. their with from 12; (Doc. Batson, characterized Ex. counsel and consideration arrangement decipher only Doc. fees fee contingency loss which until for attorneys' declares is 2015 Order, and costs House are permitted to only in the the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' respect amounts motion to the remaining question of the fee arrangements and Local Rule 17.1. V. The Court attorneys' GRANTS CONCLUSION IN PART Plaintiffs' motion for costs fees. The Court AWARDS $70,862.00 in attorneys' and $8,009.16 in costs for a total of $78,871.16. the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' and fees Additionally, motion pursuant to Local Rule 17.1 23 (Doc. 99) . Order, J.D.L., case as mentioned in the introduction to this the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' motion to substitute Jeremy D. Love, 111). Finally, Jr., who is now an adult, as a party in this matter for Jr. a minor child of decedent Jeremy D. Love Sr. (Doc. At the Court's order, the Clerk entered judgment in this on resolved, July 20, 2015. (Doc. 102). With these motions there are no longer any pending motions in this case; accordingly, the Clerk shall CLOSE THIS CASE. ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, February, Georgia, this _^2^$J daY of 2016. HONOR^BIiEXr. RANDAL HALL UNITEDJsTATES DISTRICT JUDGE IRN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 24
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