SMITH et al v. MARTIN MARIETTA MATERIALS INC, No. 4:2020cv00080 - Document 41 (M.D. Ga. 2021)

Court Description: ORDER denying 24 Motion for Hearing; granting 30 Motion for Protective Order; granting 32 Motion to Compel; granting in part and denying in part 13 Motion to Compel. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 02/04/2021 (CCL)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA COLUMBUS DIVISION JAMES K. SMITH, et al., * Plaintiffs, * vs. * MARTIN MARIETTA MATERIALS, INC., * Defendant. CASE NO. 4:20-CV-80 (CDL) * O R D E R When the Court initially reviewed the pending motions to compel and motion disappointed simple that discovery for counsel disputes pandemic had something to protective could on not their do with order, the resolve their own. Court Assuming was relatively that the their disagreeability, the Court gave counsel a chance to redeem themselves and resolve their discovery disputes within two weeks. Counsel sought and received an extension of time to resolve their differences, and two weeks parties’ stretched most disappointed. recent into two status months. report, the After reviewing Court is even the more It is clear to the Court that these issues should have been resolved by counsel. But since they were not, the Court is duty bound to do it for them. DISCUSSION This action asserts relatively straightforward claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Court handles similar cases on a regular basis without the complications counsel in this action have created. Plaintiffs are current and former hourly manual labor workers employed at Defendant’s quarry in Junction City, Georgia. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant failed to pay them for all the time and overtime hours worked under the Fair Labor Standards Act. the Court are Defendant’s motion as required Presently pending before for a protective order and Plaintiffs’ two motions to compel. I. Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order (ECF No. 30) The central dispute raised order is whether “Confidential protect financial – certain Attorneys’ documents it information production goals. says by the documents Eyes may Only.”1 contain regarding motion for be designated Defendant sensitive its protective wants commercial incentive plans as to and and Plaintiffs, who have not yet received these documents because of the disagreement regarding the protective order, insist that Defendants could not possibly have good cause for keeping such documents confidential. Defendant suggests that the Court conduct an in camera review of the documents to Based on the latest status report, the Court is under the impression that the parties exchanged drafts of a proposed protective order and agreed to all terms except the level of confidentiality for incentive plans and production goals. 1 2 help it decide the scope of the protective order. Everyone puts the cart before the horse. The Court may enter a protective order “requiring that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a specified way.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(G). The Court declines to conduct an in camera review of an unknown number of documents that haven’t even been produced just to figure out what level of confidentiality they should be designated. Instead, the Court finds that the more logical approach is to grant Defendant’s Defendant to documents that motion designate are for as a protective order and “CONFIDENTIAL–ATTORNEYS’ highly confidential, EYES including containing highly sensitive financial data. permit ONLY” documents Then Defendant can produce the documents, and Plaintiffs’ attorneys and any expert witnesses trial. will have access to them so they can prepare for If, after reviewing the documents, Plaintiffs’ counsel concludes that Plaintiffs truly cannot prepare for trial unless they too have access to the incentive plans and production goals, then Plaintiffs’ counsel should confer in good faith with Defendant’s counsel to seek a downgrade of the confidentiality designation of the documents. In summary, Defendant’s motion for protective order (ECF No. 30) is granted. Defendant 3 shall submit its proposed protective order to the Clerk’s Office - Columbus Division email address: columbus.ecf@gamd.uscourts.gov. II. Plaintiffs’ First Motion to Compel (ECF No. 13) Based on the most recent status report, counsel could not reach an agreement on five types of Plaintiffs’ first motion to compel. evidence at issue in The Court addresses each type of evidence in turn. A. Affirmative Defenses In the latest discovery status report, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant did not adequately respond to the interrogatories and document defenses. requests concerning Defendant’s affirmative Plaintiffs seek the factual basis for the following affirmative defenses: (1) good faith, (2) lack of a willful violation, (3) Plaintiffs were fully compensated, (4) the time sought is too irregular or administratively difficult to record, (5) some Plaintiffs might be exempt, (6) the allegations only impact a small number of employees, and (7) Plaintiffs are not similarly situated. Defendant did not respond to this assertion in the latest status report and did not point to evidence that it provided a complete response to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests regarding a factual basis for these seven affirmative defenses. Defendant Within twenty-one days of the date of this Order, shall supplement its discovery responses factual basis for these seven affirmative defenses. 4 on the B. Investigations and Prior FLSA Complaints In the latest discovery status report, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant did not adequately respond to its interrogatory and document requests regarding any investigations to determine whether Defendant clearly address report. If privileged had violated this issue Defendant documents has the in the not regarding FLSA. Defendant latest already FLSA did discovery produced status all investigations not non- at the Junction City quarry for the three years preceding the filing of the Complaint, it shall do so within twenty-one days of the date of this Order. log for If Defendant has not yet provided a privilege responsive documents that are being withheld on the basis of privilege, it shall do so within twenty-one days of the date of this Order. C. In Work Schedule Information the latest discovery that Defendant did not requests regarding status report, completely respond Plaintiffs’ work including changes to their schedules. Plaintiffs argue to their discovery schedule information, In addition, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants did not produce an unredacted version of a March 2020 document Plaintiffs signed acknowledging their work schedules. Defendant does not appear to object to producing an unredacted version of the March 2020 document once a protective order is entered; within twenty-one 5 days after entry of the protective order, Defendant shall produce the document. Defendant does appear to object to producing emails on this and other topics; that issue is addressed in more detail below. D. Production Goals and Incentive Plans Defendant represents that it will respond to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests regarding production goals plans once the protective order is entered. days after entry of the protective and incentive Within twenty-one order, Defendant shall respond to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests regarding production goals and incentive plans. E. Email Correspondence In the latest discovery status report, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant has not produced a single email in response to their discovery requests. The parties say that they conferred on keyword searches and the subjects to be covered by the email production, but they made about as much progress as the Atlanta Falcons did in the fourth quarter of Superbowl LI. objects to producing 126,000 emails that it Defendant identified as potentially responsive to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests based on five keyword searches, but Defendant offers no solutions for identifying and producing Plaintiffs’ discovery emails requests. 2 that On are the responsive other to extreme, It is not clear from the present record if Defendant has already reviewed the emails for privilege and relevance or if Defendant seeks to narrow the results before it even reviews the emails. 2 6 Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s searches were inadequate, and they want to inspect Defendant’s computer systems to ensure that the searches were complete, and they suggest that additional keyword searches may be necessary. The Court declines to permit an inspection of Defendant’s computer systems. not explain Defendant in Regarding additional searches, Plaintiffs did the should run status or report why. The what additional Court will searches not additional searches without this basic information. require Any motion to compel additional searches at this time is denied. Regarding the emails Defendant identified by running the keyword searches, Defendant contends that the number of email results shows that Plaintiffs’ proposed keyword too broad.3 themselves searches were The real question, though, is whether the emails are responsive to Plaintiffs’ document requests, relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims, and proportional to the needs of the case. The Court cannot divine the answer to this question based on the present record. Surely at least some of the emails are relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims and proportional to the needs of the case. Within seven days of the date of this Order, Defendant shall explain why any specific subset of the emails is not discoverable under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), Based on the information Defendant provided, it appears that nearly half of the emails were identified based on a query that searched for emails containing one of Plaintiffs’ surnames—including the surnames Smith and Brown and Davis. 3 7 and Defendant identifying shall an alternative solution for are responsive, relevant, and Plaintiffs shall have seven days to respond. The all proportional. propose emails that parties are strongly encouraged to resolve this issue on their own; if the Court must decide the issue, it will determine which party was more unreasonable and impose sanctions accordingly. III. Plaintiffs’ Second Motion to Compel (ECF No. 32) Plaintiffs Defendant’s seek manual electronic labor until the present. hourly time records workers from for April all 20, of 2017 Defendant represents that it produced the time records for the seventeen individuals who opted in to this action, but Defendant objects to producing any time records for the twenty-four manual labor hourly workers who did not opt in. Defendant contends that these time records are not relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims or proportional to the needs of the case. Based on the present record, the Court is satisfied that the time workers records are of relevant all to of Defendant’s Plaintiffs’ defenses for discovery purposes. widespread the alterations to manual claims and labor hourly Defendant’s They may be probative on how clock-in/clock-out times were, which is relevant to whether Defendant acted in good faith or willfully violated the FLSA. They are also relevant to which management employees were involved their motives. in the alleged scheme and Defendant did not establish that production of 8 this evidence would be disproportionate to the needs of the case or unduly burdensome. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ second motion to compel (ECF No. 32) is granted, and Defendant shall produce the responsive time records within twenty-one days of today’s Order. CONCLUSION Defendant’s motion for protective granted, and the Court will order (ECF enter the No. 30) is protective order separately. Plaintiffs’ first motion to compel (ECF No. 13) is granted part in and denied in part as discussed above. Plaintiffs’ second motion to compel (ECF No. 32) is granted. The motion for hearing (ECF No. 24) is denied. The Court places the parties on notice that the Court is not inclined deadline any to extend further. discovery The or delays the dispositive caused by the motion parties’ discovery disputes are not good cause for an extension. IT IS SO ORDERED, this 4th day of February, 2021. S/Clay D. Land CLAY D. LAND U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 9

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