BRYANT v. HARRIS COUNTY GEORGIA et al, No. 4:2018cv00106 - Document 69 (M.D. Ga. 2020)
Court Description: ORDER granting 33 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 34 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 59 Motion to Set Aside. Defendants' summary judgment motions are granted as to Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims, and those claims are remanded to the Superior Court of Harris County. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 02/05/2020 (CCL)
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BRYANT v. HARRIS COUNTY GEORGIA et al Doc. 69 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA COLUMBUS DIVISION * JOANN BRYANT, * Plaintiff, vs. * CRYSTAL GAIL GARREN, et al., * Defendants. CASE NO. 4:18-CV-106 (CDL) * O R D E R Larry Wayne Burden, Jr. was an inmate at the Harris County Prison. On November basketball in afterwards. the His 5, 2015, prison mother Burden yard. brought collapsed Tragically, this while he wrongful playing died death soon action, alleging that the corrections officers on duty did not provide adequate aid Plaintiff to asserts Burden her after claims they learned pursuant to 42 he collapsed.1 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the corrections officers deprived Burden of his rights guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiff also claims that the Georgia Department of Corrections and Harris County are liable for any constitutional violations committed by the corrections officers. And, she asserts various state law claims. Defendants filed summary judgment motions, and Plaintiff filed a motion to set 1 Plaintiff also claimed that an unidentified prison guard used excessive force on Burden earlier in the day. She abandoned that claim, so Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on it. Dockets.Justia.com aside the Court’s previous order dismissing her claims against Harris County. evidence that As discussed below, Plaintiff did not present would permit a jury to conclude that the corrections officers violated Burden’s constitutional rights or that any constitutional violation caused Burden’s death. The Court thus grants Defendants’ summary judgment motions (ECF Nos. 33 & 34) and denies Plaintiff’s motion to set aside the order dismissing her claims against Harris County (ECF No. 59). SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” P. 56(a). Fed. R. Civ. In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the evidence is viewed summary in the judgment, light most drawing opposing party’s favor. U.S. 242, 255 (1986). favorable all to justifiable the party opposing inferences in the Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 A fact is material if it is relevant or necessary to the outcome of the suit. Id. at 248. A factual dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the record reveals the following facts. 2 Burden was Correctional prison. a state Institution The Prison is inmate (the owned housed at “Prison”), and the a operated Harris County minimum-security by Harris County. Harris County houses up to 150 state inmates in the Prison for a fee pursuant to an agreement Corrections (“GDOC”). with the Georgia Department of Plaintiff admits that Prison employees are hired by Harris County and are paid by Harris County. On November 1, 2015, Burden, who was twenty-four years old, complained to Corrections Officer Donald Barber of chest pain on his right side. Garren Dep. Ex. 37, Incident Report (Nov. 1, 2015), ECF No. 45 at 165. Burden stated that he thought it was because he drank so much coffee, and he asked for a medical request form. Id. Barber reported the issue to his supervisor, Crystal Garren, who told Barber to keep a close eye on Burden and have him fill out a medical request form. Id. Barber checked on Burden again, and Burden said it was a slight pain that “comes and goes.” Id. Barber advised Burden to fill out the medical request form and let officers know if the pain got any worse. Id. There is no evidence that any corrections officers except Barber and Garren knew that Burden had reported chest pain. And, Plaintiff pointed to evidence that on November 3, 2015 Burden saw a medical provider who doubted that Burden’s symptoms were heart related and prescribed Tylenol and Omeprazole, a medication for 3 gastroesophageal reflux symptoms. Walker Dep. Ex. 9, Physician’s Notes, ECF No. 47 at 258. On November 5, 2015, Crystal Garren, Daniel Maddox, Donald Walker, Jeremy McDowell, Noel Flowers, and Troy Moore (“Corrections Officer Defendants”) were on duty as corrections officers at the Prison.2 Prison that day. There were no medical personnel at the Burden and other inmates from his cell dorm had a recreation period in the Prison recreation yard, an open-air yard within the interior of the prison. with another inmate. He collapsed. Burden played basketball No corrections officers were physically present in the recreation yard when Burden collapsed. At approximately 11:37 a.m., Maddox was taking lunch bags and juice to inmates in the yard. the ground.3 He “then observed” Burden lying on Walker Dep. Ex. 10, Incident Report (Nov. 5, 2015), ECF No. 47 at 259. Maddox rushed to Burden. Maddox Dep. 49:20- 50:2, ECF No. 46 (stating that it took him about fifteen seconds to get to Burden). Moore, who was stationed in the Prison’s 2 Barber was not on duty and not at the Prison on November 5, 2015. Plaintiff did not point to any evidence that Barber was subjectively aware that Burden had a serious medical need or that Barber was deliberately indifferent to such a need. Accordingly, Barber is entitled to summary judgment. 3 Defendants pointed to surveillance footage from which a jury could conclude that Burden was still on his feet playing basketball at 11:39:04. Nelson Decl. Ex. 1, M2U00388 00:01, ECF No. 35; Barber Dep. 62:1-16, ECF No. 48 (viewing video and stating that Burden is the player with the ball at 11:39); Walker Dep. 152:11-20, ECF No. 47 (viewing video and stating that Burden is still up at 11:39). But the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, and a jury could conclude based on the incident report that Maddox saw Burden on the ground at or shortly after 11:37 a.m. and that the time stamp on the surveillance footage was slightly off. 4 control room with Walker, noticed that several inmates were banging on a window between the yard and a hallway outside the control room. ground. Moore went to the yard and saw Burden on the He thought that Burden might have been knocked out while playing basketball; he saw that Burden was breathing and that his eyes were open, then shook him and asked him if he was okay. Moore Dep. 68:3-69:3, ECF No. 55. Moore attended started to moving Burden. inmates Burden off did questions, but he was still breathing. approximately 11:39 a.m., Garren, over the radio. Maddox the not yard respond while to Maddox Maddox’s Maddox Dep. 50:10-23. called for his At supervisor, He also asked for 911 to be called. Plaintiff admits that someone at the Prison called Harris County 911 at 11:41 dispatched to a.m. the and that Prison emergency at 11:42 medical a.m. personnel Pl.’s Resp. were to Corrections Officer Defs.’ Statement of Material Facts ¶¶ 27-28, ECF No. 58-2. Confusingly, though, Plaintiff also asserts that 911 was not called until 11:44 a.m. Pl.’s Resp. to Corrections Officer Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 3, ECF No. 58; Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts in Resp. to Corrections Officer Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 24, ECF No. 58-1 (pointing to the incident report, which states that Maddox was taking lunch to the inmates on the yard at “approximately 1137 hours,” that Maddox “then observed” Burden on the ground and called for help, that CPR began at 5 “approximately 1142 hours,” and that 911 was called “at approximately 1144 hours”). Garren, Whittaker Flowers, ran Maddox’s call. to the McDowell, recreation and prison counselor as as yard soon Barbara Garren got Garren and Whittaker helped Maddox assess Burden for injuries, McDowell helped clear inmates from the yard, and Flowers retrieved a handheld video camera to record the incident pursuant to Prison protocol. Walker, who was still manning the control room, notified the other officers that he had combat life-saving training from his time in the Army, so McDowell went to the control room and Walker rushed to the yard. The officers observed scrapes on Burden’s face and believed that Burden may have hit his head on the ground when he collapsed. Burden was still breathing, although his breaths became gasps with fifteen seconds or more between them. Then, at approximately 11:42 a.m., when they realized that Burden had not taken a breath in about a minute, Walker and Whittaker began attempting to perform cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), including chest compressions and mouth-to-mouth. Plaintiff asserts that Whittaker did not perform the chest compressions correctly. Plaintiff argues that corrections officers “accused” Burden of faking a serious medical condition, that the officers delayed CPR until five minutes after Burden stopped breathing, and that the officers’ “motivation in delaying CPR” was because “Burden 6 could have been faking his unresponsiveness.” Pl.’s Statement of Facts in Resp. to GDOC Mot. for Summ. J. ¶¶ 4, 8-9, ECF No. 56-3; Pl.’s Statement of Facts in Resp. to Corrections Officer Defs.’ Mot. for argument. Summ. J. ¶ 14. The record does not support this First, the testimony Plaintiff cited for her argument that the officers accused Burden of faking his unresponsiveness and therefore delayed treatment does not support it. Rather, the officer was asked a question that assumed it took five minutes for officers to assess the situation and begin CPR, and he responded, “[W]e were still figuring out what happened. We didn’t know if he was faking it. We didn’t know if he got punched. We didn’t know if he had ran into the basketball hoop. Nobody knew what happened. We were still assessing the area. We had people all over the yard. We was getting people off the yard.” Dep. 88:10-19, ECF No. 52. Flowers Second, and more importantly, the record simply does not support Plaintiff’s assertion that Burden stopped breathing a minute after officers arrived to assess him, but that five minutes went by before any of the officers began attempting Walker’s CPR. The evidence deposition—does not Plaintiffs support this cited—page assertion. 107 of The evidence does suggest that Burden collapsed at 11:37 a.m. and that chest compressions started five minutes later. 106:24-107:21. Walker Dep. But it does not establish that Burden stopped breathing five minutes before officers attempted to resuscitate 7 him, and Plaintiff did not point to any other evidence to support this assertion. As discussed above, Burden was still breathing when officers responded to him, and Plaintiff admits that fact. Pl.’s Resp. to Corrections Officer Defs.’ Statement of Material Facts ¶ 22 (admitting that Burden was “taking deep breaths and his eyes were open”). Burden began “taking Plaintiff also pointed to evidence that in very slow gasps of air” and that corrections officers began CPR when they realized that Burden had not taken a breath in about a minute. Incident Report (Nov. 5, 2015), ECF No. 47 at 259. support Plaintiff’s assertion In summary, the record does not that the officers intentionally delayed CPR until five minutes after Burden stopped breathing. Emergency medical personnel arrived between 11:45 a.m. and 11:49 a.m. and took over the response, and they departed with Burden via ambulance between 11:51 a.m. and 11:55 a.m. was pronounced dead at the hospital at 12:29 p.m. Burden The cause of death was later determined to be cardiac dysrhythmia (irregular heartbeat) with cardiomegaly (enlarged heart) and myocardial fibrosis (impairment of heart muscle cells). The Prison had an automated external defibrillator (“AED”) in the control room, but no policy or directive on when to use it. Haden Dep. 212:25-213:14, ECF No. 44. All the officers on duty except Moore, who was a cadet in training at the time of Burden’s death, had received training on how to use the AED. 8 McDowell Dep. 50:19-20, ECF No. 49; Moore Dep. 17:23-18:11. Under GDOC’s standard operating procedures that apply to county prisons, the initial response of corrections officers “to urgent or emergent medical defibrillation when with indicated, personnel.” may Automated immediate include External First Aid, Defibrillator notification of health CPR, (AED) care Lewis Dep. Ex. 2, GDOC Standard Operating Procedure ¶ VI.A.2, personnel are potentially a an and VH31-0005 take requests on life ECF site No. and response stretcher” to the location. at 200. corrections threatening “medical 53 medical bag, If officers emergency, portable oxygen, no healthcare respond they to a “should” AED, and a Id. ¶ VI.B.2, ECF No. 53 at 201-02; Lewis Dep. 67:16-20, ECF No. 53. Moreover, according to GDOC’s in-service training witness, GDOC officers are trained that if a person stops breathing and does not respond when the officer taps him, then the officer should immediately call for someone to get an AED. Raffield Dep. 29:19-30:19, ECF No. 43. None of the corrections officers on duty at the Prison on November 5, 2015 thought to retrieve the AED for use on Burden. And, the Prison’s AED was inoperable on November 5, 2015 because its batteries were dead. Walker Dep. 71:4-13. DISCUSSION Plaintiff brought federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that Defendants violated 9 Burden’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishments.4 The Eighth Amendment prohibits “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” because it “constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). establish a constitutional deliberate-indifference “To claim, [Plaintiff] must demonstrate ‘(1) [that Burden had] a serious medical need; (2) the defendants’ deliberate indifference to that need; and (3) causation between that indifference and [Burden’s] injury.’” Taylor v. Hughes, 920 F.3d 729, 733 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306–07 (11th Cir. 2009)). There is no dispute that Burden had a serious medical need when he collapsed and became unresponsive. Corrections Officer Defendants acted To establish that the with deliberate indifference, Plaintiff “must prove three things: (1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than [gross] negligence.” Goebert v. Lee Cty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1327 (11th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th 4 Plaintiff also invokes the Fourteenth Amendment. Burden was a convicted prisoner, so the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishments clause applies. The Court presumes that Plaintiff invokes the Fourteenth Amendment because the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishments clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. See Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Plaintiff does not appear to assert an independent Fourteenth Amendment claim. 10 Cir. 2005) (per curiam), abrogated on other grounds by Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2477 (2015)). A prison guard may be deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need if he knows that fourteen an inmate minutes to has check stopped [the breathing inmate’s] but fails condition, “for call for medical assistance, administer CPR or do anything else to help.” Bozeman, 422 F.3d at 1273. Liability can also attach when a prison official takes no action despite knowing that an inmate reported being “all busted up” from a car wreck—even hearing the inmate cry out in pain for several hours. 920 F.3d at 734. after Taylor, And, a prison official may be deliberately indifferent if he intentionally delays medical treatment despite having reason to know that the delay could worsen the inmate’s condition. Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1329 (jail commander was deliberately indifferent when he intentionally delayed for one day, with “no good reason,” authorizing medical care for an inmate with a serious medical need that was getting progressively worse); accord Alsobrook v. Alvarado, 477 F. App’x 710, 713 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (corrections officer was deliberately indifferent because he refused to transport an inmate to medical care for almost two hours even though the inmate was continuously bleeding from a gash to his head). Here, the Corrections Officer Defendants did not refuse to seek medical treatment for Burden. 11 When Maddox found Burden unresponsive but breathing, he immediately called his supervisor for help. The recreation yard. supervisor and other officers ran to the Walker told the other officers that he could help because of his combat training, so he went to the yard to help while McDowell took over for him in the control room. Flowers followed Prison policy and got a camcorder to record the response. When they realized that Burden had not taken a breath in about a minute, Walker and Whittaker began attempting CPR on Burden and continued until the paramedics arrived, though Whittaker’s hand placement for the chest compressions was wrong. Either four or seven minutes after Burden collapsed (one minute before or two minutes after officers began attempting CPR), Harris County 911 was called. Plaintiff does not appear to assert that any of these responses evinces a deliberate indifference to Burden’s serious medical need. Rather, her argument focuses on the Corrections Officer Defendants’ failure to use an AED on Burden. According to Plaintiff, Walker should have asked someone to retrieve the AED while he was attempting CPR; McDowell should have summoned someone to the control room to get the AED; and Flowers, Garren, and Maddox should have gone to get the AED.5 5 Certainly, the Plaintiff also argues that Moore should have gotten the AED. But she did not rebut Defendants’ evidence that Moore, who was a cadet, had not been trained on the AED and did not know that the Prison had one. Thus, his failure to bring the AED to the yard could not be deliberate indifference, and he is entitled to summary judgment. 12 failure to use the AED by all five corrections officers who had been trained to use it could be evidence of their negligence, and the failure of the Prison to adequately maintain batteries could likewise be evidence of negligence. viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the AED But even the record establishes that the officers summoned 911 shortly after Burden collapsed and that jail personnel attempted to perform CPR on Burden from the time they realized he had stopped breathing until the paramedics arrived and took over attempting to resuscitate Burden. They were not consciously indifferent to the situation. Negligent medical care does not violate the Constitution. “In the medical adequate medical context, care an inadvertent cannot be said failure to to provide constitute ‘an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ or to be ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’” Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 10607). In Mann, for example, the deputies “may have made an error in judgment” but were not deliberately indifferent when they took an arrestee experiencing “excited delirium” to the jail instead of to the hospital. Id. at 1307-08. And, they “took appropriate action” of applying cold compresses to cool down the arrestee, who they thought was suffering from a heat stroke, and ultimately calling 911 about nineteen minutes unresponsive with labored breathing. 13 after the Id. arrestee at 1301, became 1308. Similarly, here, corrections officers called 911 shortly after Burden collapsed, and officers attempted CPR on Burden from the time they realized he had stopped breathing until the paramedics arrived. This is not a case where prison officials ignored a serious medical need or intentionally delayed medical care. The Court finds that Plaintiff has not met her burden of pointing to evidence suggesting that the corrections officers disregarded Burden’s risk by conduct that is more than gross negligence.6 Even if a genuine factual dispute existed regarding the corrections officers’ deliberate indifference to Burden’s serious medical need, Plaintiff failed to point to evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that such indifference proximately caused Burden’s death.7 “An inmate who complains that delay in medical treatment rose to a constitutional violation must place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of delay in medical treatment to succeed.” McDaniels v. Lee, 405 F. App’x 456, 458–59 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (quoting Hill v. Dekalb Reg’l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 6 The Corrections Officer Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiff did not present enough evidence to establish a constitutional violation. Even if there were such evidence, these Defendants would still be entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiff did not point to any authority clearly establishing that the failure to use an AED would amount to deliberate indifference under the circumstances presented here, where officers promptly called for emergency medical personnel and attempted to perform CPR. 7 Plaintiff does not argue that she could not present evidence on causation based on the limited discovery the Court permitted so that Plaintiff could find out what happened to Burden. Rather, she argues that the present record contains substantial evidence of causation. 14 1176, 1188 (11th Cir. 1994), overruled in part on other grounds by Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 n.9 (2002)). Plaintiff argues that she presented “substantial evidence” that the failure Burden’s death. to use AED was the proximate cause of Pl.’s Resp. to Corrections Officer Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 14-15. GDOC’s an medical She did not. director agreed Plaintiff pointed out that that CPR, which keeps blood pumping when the heart stops, would not get the heart started again but an AED may. not point to conditions any would Lewis Dep. 60:13-19. medical have evidence responded to on an But Plaintiff did how AED Burden’s or to any heart medical evidence that proper and timely use of an AED would have made a difference to Burden. Walker, a Rather, Plaintiff cited the testimony of corrections officer, and Warden Alex Haden, who generally agreed that they understood an AED can be effective to treat cardiac events. medical causation Even if their testimony could be viewed as evidence, Plaintiff did not point to any evidence that Walker and Haden were qualified to offer medical opinions. pamphlet Plaintiff also submitted an American Heart Association which states that an AED can stop “ventricular fibrillation by using an electrical shock” and that if a person experiences ventricular fibrillation, his “chance of survival decreases by 7 to 10 percent for every minute that passes without defibrillation.” Pl.’s Resp. to GDOC’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 1, 15 Pamphlet, ECF No. 56-1 at 4. But Plaintiff did not point to evidence that Burden suffered from ventricular fibrillation or that his condition likely would have responded to an AED. Without some medical evidence that Burden’s cardiac event could have been treated successfully with an AED, the Court cannot speculate that a defibrillator would have made a difference simply because Burden’s death was related to several issues with his heart.8 In summary, Plaintiff did not point to evidence from which a reasonable jury Defendants were need or that could conclude deliberately any deliberate that the indifferent to indifference Officer Defendants caused Burden’s death. Corrections a by serious the Officer medical Corrections Accordingly, Plaintiff has not created a genuine factual dispute on these issues. The 8 Plaintiff argues that causation “can be shown by personal participation in the constitutional violation.” Pl.’s Resp. to Corrections Officer Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 14 (quoting Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1327). The causation question at issue in the portion of Goebert that Plaintiff cites is whether a jail commander who delayed a plaintiff’s obstetrical treatment had a causal connection to the plaintiff’s harm—the stillbirth of her baby. There was a fact question on the issue because the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff showed that the jail commander knew that the plaintiff had a serious medical need (leaking amniotic fluid for days) but decided to withhold medical care, resulting in a one-day delay of proper obstetrical care. There was medical evidence that the commander’s delay foreclosed several treatment options, and there was medical evidence that if the plaintiff had received appropriate obstetrical care sooner, the baby’s chance of survival would have been significantly higher. Id. at 1319, 1329. Thus, there was a fact question on whether the jail commander’s deliberate indifference caused the loss of the plaintiff’s child. Id. at 1329. Here, in contrast, there is no medical evidence that Burden’s medical conditions would have responded to an AED or that he would have had a significantly better chance of survival if an AED has been used. 16 Corrections Officer Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment. All of Plaintiff’s claims against GDOC are based on GDOC’s alleged failure to supervise and train the Corrections Officer Defendants. In the absence of a constitutional violation, the supervisory liability claim against GDOC cannot succeed, even if the Court were to accept Plaintiff’s argument that the county Prison employees were also employed by GDOC. Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2019) (“[T]here can be no supervisory liability . . . violation.” Thomas, reasons, 516 if (second F.3d there was alteration 952, Plaintiff’s 955 in underlying original) (11th municipal County likewise fails.9 no Cir. liability constitutional (quoting 2008))). claim Gish For against v. similar Harris See, e.g., Miller v. Harget, 458 F.3d 1251, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding no basis for holding a city liable under § 1983 without an underlying constitutional violation by a city employee). CONCLUSION Burden’s death was tragic. The possibility that it may could have been prevented compounds the heartbreak. 9 Moreover, The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s claim against Harris County because Plaintiff did not adequately allege a Harris County policy or custom was the moving force behind a constitutional violation that injured Burden. Bryant v. Harris Cty., No. 4:18-CV-106 (CDL), 2018 WL 5316359, at *7 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 26, 2018). Plaintiff moved to set aside that order, arguing that Burden’s death was the result of a Harris County policy, but the claim against Harris County fails without an underlying constitutional violation. 17 evidence of possible someone accountable. federal claims is negligence increases the desire to hold But the narrow issue regarding Plaintiff’s whether a constitutional violation by the Defendants caused Burden’s death; and as explained previously, the answer to that question is clear. Accordingly, Defendants’ summary judgment motions (ECF Nos. 33 & 34) are granted as to all of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. Those are the only claims over which the Court has original jurisdiction. exercise supplemental jurisdiction over The Court declines to Plaintiff’s state law claims, and those claims are remanded to the Superior Court of Harris County. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Plaintiff’s motion to set aside the Court’s order granting Harris County’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 59) is denied. IT IS SO ORDERED, this 5th day of February, 2020. S/Clay D. Land CLAY D. LAND CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 18
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