PORTER v. WILLIAMS et al, No. 4:2015cv00093 - Document 14 (M.D. Ga. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER granting 10 Motion for Summary Judgment and remanding state law claims to the State Court of Muscogee County, Georgia. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D. LAND on 6/28/2016 (tlf).
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PORTER v. WILLIAMS et al Doc. 14 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA COLUMBUS DIVISION MICHELLE PORTER, * Plaintiff, * vs. * CASE NO. 4:15-CV-93 (CDL) J. LEN WILLIAMS and HOUSING * AUTHORITY OF COLUMBUS, GEORGIA, * Defendants. O R D E R Michelle Porter, who proceeds pro se, brings this action against her former employer, the Housing Authority of Columbus, Georgia (“Housing Authority”), and the Chief Executive Officer of the Housing Authority, J. Len Williams, for allegedly denying her overtime compensation in violation of the Fair Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. Labor Porter also brings numerous state law fraud claims against Defendants. Presently pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 10). For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Porter’s FLSA claim and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Porter’s state law claims. Accordingly, this action is remanded to the State Court of Muscogee County for resolution of those state law claims. Dockets.Justia.com SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Civ. P. 56(a). In determining whether a Fed. R. dispute of genuine material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, drawing all justifiable inferences in the opposing party’s favor. 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., A fact is material if it is relevant or necessary to the outcome of the suit. Id. at 248. A factual dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. BACKGROUND Viewed in the light most favorable to Porter, the record reveals the following. Porter began working at the Housing Authority in February 2011. of The Housing Authority is an entity created by the state Georgia Housing to provide Authority housing initially network coordinator. to hired low-income persons. Porter a as The neighborhood Porter learned of the neighborhood network coordinator position through an advertisement that represented the job as earning “$30,000 plus” annually. 50:9, ECF No. 8. Pl. Dep. 49:11- The advertisement also represented that the 2 job paid $13.78 per hour and was part time. Porter asserts that the Housing Authority defrauded her because the advertisement stated that “$30,000 network the plus” neighborhood and Porter’s coordinator acknowledges, network annual never however, that coordinator income exceeded the as a could neighborhood $30,000. Housing earn Porter Authority paid her $13.78 per hour, as advertised. Approximately two years later, in May 2013, the Housing Authority made Porter its family self-sufficiency coordinator. This position was full time and provided limited benefits. position paid position was $19.57 funded per by hour. grant a The from family the The self-sufficiency U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”). Porter claims that she worked overtime without compensation while employed as a family self-sufficiency coordinator. Porter worked worked over forty hours a week on one occasion: forty-two hours the week of December 9, 2013. she Pl. Dep. Ex. 3, Pl.’s Timesheets, ECF No. 8-3 at 75; Pl. Dep. 33:8-19, 42:17-20; Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 3, ECF No. 12 (stating that Porter does not dispute that the only week that she worked overtime was the week for December 9, 2013). Housing Authority’s time sheets and pay stubs reflect The that Porter was compensated with three hours of paid time off during the following week. Nevertheless, 3 Porter contends that the Housing Authority denied her overtime pay because it did not— with the exception of the week of December 9—allow her to work over forty hours a week. For example, Porter testified that if she worked ten hours on a Monday, her supervisor would require her to work only six hours another day that week. 42:21-43:8. Pl. Dep. Thus, with the exception of the week of December 9, Porter never worked more than forty hours in a workweek. Porter several also ways coordinator. made contends while she that Defendants was a defrauded family her in self-sufficiency First, Porter claims that the Housing Authority fraudulent misrepresentations regarding Porter’s eligibility for benefits such as a cell phone stipend and travel mileage reimbursement. Porter testified that when she began working as a family self-sufficiency coordinator, she asked her immediate director supervisor, Susan McGuire mileage reimbursement. Beverly for a LaMee, cell and phone human stipend permission and travel LaMee and McGuire initially told Porter that she was not eligible for these benefits. received resources from Housing Authority Later, LaMee Chief Executive Officer J. Len Williams to give Porter a cell phone stipend and travel mileage Authority gave reimbursement. reimbursement. Porter a From cell phone then on, stipend the and Housing travel It also awarded her these benefits in arrears to cover the entire time that she was employed as a family self- 4 sufficiency coordinator. Id. at 85:6-17. Nevertheless, Porter claims that the Housing Authority intentionally defrauded her by initially declining her request for travel reimbursement and a cell phone stipend and then later giving her those benefits. Id. at 111:20-23. Second, Porter contends that the Housing Authority defrauded her by not paying her the entire amount awarded by the HUD grant. The HUD grant provided $46,000 in funding for the family self-sufficiency position and the Housing Authority used approximately $40,000 to pay Porter. Porter asked LaMee and McGuire why she was not paid the entire $46,000 awarded by the grant. LaMee and McGuire explained that the Housing Authority used the remaining funding to pay overtime, bonuses, and the employer match on social security. Porter was unsatisfied with LaMee and McGuire’s answer so she met with Williams. Williams represented pay insurance that and the remaining social funding security. Porter was used claims to that for Williams intentionally lied to her because the Housing Authority never provided her with health insurance. She also claims that the Housing using Authority defrauded her by some of the grant funding to pay the employer match on her social security; Porter believes it is unlawful for an employer to use grant funding to pay its portion of social security. 5 Id. at 89:1-15. Finally, Porter contends that the Housing Authority made fraudulent representations in a letter it sent regarding health insurance. This letter stated that the Affordable Care Act did not require the Housing Authority to provide Porter with health insurance. Porter asserts that the letter was fraudulent because she believes that the Affordable Care Act required the Housing Authority to provide her with health insurance. On Porter. January 16, 2014, the Housing Authority terminated The Housing Authority asserts that it terminated Porter due to “unsatisfactory job performance.” Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. O, Separation Notice, ECF No. 10-21. that she had no job performance problems. to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 4-5. Porter contends Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n A few months later, in August 2014, Porter filed a complaint with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) regarding the Housing Authority’s failure to provide her with health insurance. An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) concluded that the Affordable Care Act did not require employers to provide health insurance in 2014; therefore, the ALJ granted the Housing Authority’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. the State Court of Muscogee Porter then brought this action in County, removed it to this Court. 6 Georgia and Defendants DISCUSSION Porter brings claims against the Housing Authority for FLSA violations. She also brings several fraud claims against both the Housing Authority and Williams. I. Fair Labor Standards Act Porter overtime claims that compensation in the Housing violation of Authority the denied FLSA. The her FLSA provides: [N]o employer shall employ any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). To prevail on an FLSA overtime claim, an employee must prove that she was “permitted to work [overtime] without compensation.” Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir. 2007). carried out his burden if he proves that “[A]n employee has he has in fact performed work for which he was improperly compensated and if he produces sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference.” Id. at 1316 (quoting Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946), superseded by statute on other grounds, 29 U.S.C. § 254(a), as recognized in Integrity Staffing Sols., Inc. v. 7 Busk, 135 S. Ct. 513, 516-17 (2014)). “The burden then becomes the employer's, and it must bring forth either evidence of the precise amount of work performed or evidence to negate the reasonableness of the inference to be drawn from the employee's evidence.” Id. Porter fails to produce any evidence indicating that she worked over forty hours in a workweek without receiving overtime compensation. Porter worked overtime on only one occasion: she worked forty-two hours during the week of December 9, 2013. The Housing Authority’s records reveal that it Dep. 42:17-20. compensated Porter with three hours of paid time off. Ex. 4, dispute Porter Request that Pl. for she asserts Payment, received that she ECF this should overtime pay instead of time off. No. 8-4. compensatory have been Porter time Pl. Dep. does off. not But compensated with The FLSA permits employers to give employees of a public agency compensatory time off in lieu of overtime pay: Employees of a public agency which is a State, a political subdivision of a State, or an interstate governmental agency may receive, in accordance with this subsection and in lieu of overtime compensation, compensatory time off at a rate not less than one and one-half hours for each hour of employment for which overtime compensation is required by this section. 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(1). Housing Authority Porter introduces no evidence that the awarded compensatory inconsistent with § 207(o). 8 time off in a manner Porter also asserts that the Housing Authority denied her overtime pay by preventing her from working over forty hours a week. For example, if Porter worked ten hours one day, then she was required to work only six hours on another day of that same week. Pl. Dep. at 41:22-42:16. This system ensured that Porter did not work more than forty hours in one workweek. 43:5-8. a Id. at “[A] workweek no longer than the prescribed maximum is nonovertime workweek requirements . . . but under not the [the Act, to which overtime 29 C.F.R. § 778.101. Porter evidence not present any that pay compensation requirements] are applicable.” does the would Because allow a reasonable juror to conclude that she worked over forty hours in a week without receiving overtime compensation, her claim for overtime compensation under the FLSA fails. Accordingly, the Housing Authority is entitled to summary judgment on Porter’s FLSA claim.1 In Porter’s response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Porter asserted for the first time that the Housing Authority violated the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3101 et seq., as well as 18 U.S.C. § 1035 and 18 U.S.C. Chapter 47. The Federal Insurance Contribution Act does not create a private right of action. McDonald v. S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 291 F.3d 718, 723 (11th Cir. 2002). Therefore, any claim under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act fails as a matter of law. Porter also claims that the Housing Authority violated 18 U.S.C. § 1035 and 18 U.S.C. Chapter 47. These are criminal provisions of the U.S. Code that do not provide a private right of action and do not suggest that Congress intended to create a private right of action. Hanna v. Home Ins. Co., 281 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1960) (“The sections of Title 18 may be disregarded in this suit. They are criminal in nature and provide no civil remedies.”). Thus, any claims under Title 18 fail as a matter of law. 1 9 II. State Law Claims Porter’s state law claims against the Housing Authority and Williams are dubious. claims against the But the resolution of her state law Housing Authority requires the Court to decide a state law sovereign immunity issue that has not been squarely addressed by the Georgia appellate courts. Rather than injecting itself unnecessarily into the resolution of a state law issue of first impression, the Court exercises discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. its Porter’s Accordingly, this action shall be remanded to the State Court of Muscogee County, Georgia for the resolution of those state law claims. CONCLUSION For the above stated reasons, the Court grants the Housing Authority’s claim. motion for summary judgment as to Porter’s FLSA The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state Williams. law claims against the Housing Authority and Accordingly, the Clerk shall enter final judgment in favor of the Housing Authority on Porter’s FLSA claim, and shall then remand this action to the State Court of Muscogee County for resolution of Porter’s state law claims. IT IS SO ORDERED, this 28th day of June, 2016. S/Clay D. Land CLAY D. LAND CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 10
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