Dehaan v. Urology Center of Columbus LLC et al, No. 4:2012cv00006 - Document 16 (M.D. Ga. 2012)

Court Description: ORDER granting 3 Partial Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Ordered by Judge Clay D. Land on 04/16/2012. (CGC)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA COLUMBUS DIVISION RICHARD W. DEHAAN, * Plaintiff, * vs. * CASE NO. 4:12-CV-06 (CDL) UROLOGY CENTER OF COLUMBUS, LLC * and WILLIAM M. HARPER, IV, * Defendants. * O R D E R Plaintiff Richard Dehaan (“Dehaan”) was an employee of Defendant Urology Center of Columbus, LLC (“Urology Center”), and Defendant Dr. William M. Harper, Center’s president and CEO. and Harper subjected him IV (“Harper”) was Urology Dehaan asserts that Urology Center to a hostile work environment and terminated his employment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Dehaan also contends that Urology Center negligently supervised and negligently retained Harper and inflicted emotional distress on Dehaan. that Harper intentionally Presently pending before the Court is Harper’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 3). Harper seeks dismissal of Dehaan’s Title VII claims against him. Harper also seeks dismissal of Dehaan’s negligent supervision and negligent retention claims against Urology Center. For the reasons set forth below, Harper’s motion to dismiss is granted. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD When considering a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true all facts set forth in the plaintiff=s complaint and limit its consideration to the pleadings and exhibits attached thereto. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007); Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The complaint must include sufficient factual allegations “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “[A] formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Id. Although the complaint must contain factual allegations that “raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of” the plaintiff=s claims, id. at 556, “Rule 12(b)(6) does not permit dismissal of a well-pleaded complaint simply because ‘it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable,’” Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). RELEVANT FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS Dehaan was employed by Urology Center as “Practice Advisor and Consultant to Dr. William Harper.” Compl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 1-2. During the relevant timeframe, Harper was president and CEO of 2 Urology Center and had authority to hire, fire and discipline employees. with Id. ¶ 6. another promotion Urology Center pay practices, Id. ¶¶ 9-10. and environment.” Castellucci, Deehan alleges that Harper’s relationship and and “fostered created Dehaan discriminatory a hostile complained to Dr. work Sean chairman of Urology Center’s Compliance Committee, about the situation. Dehaan employee Id. ¶ 12-13. Castellucci According to Plaintiff, when confronted Harper about the situation, “Harper became extremely indignant and began screaming, yelling and cursing at [Dehaan], accusing [Dehaan] of disloyalty, interfering in his personal affairs, and threatening [Dehaan] with physical harm.” terminated. Id. Id. ¶ 17. Dehaan’s employment brought Urology Center. then Dehaan contends that Harper’s actions “caused him extreme stress resulting in a heart attack.” Dehaan was a six count Complaint Id. ¶ 19. against Harper and Counts I and II allege that Urology Center and Harper are liable under Title VII for creating a hostile work environment and for retaliation. Id. ¶¶ 23-33. that to Harper subjected emotional distress. Dehaan Id. ¶¶ 35-46. Count III alleges intentional infliction of Counts IV and V allege that Urology Center negligently supervised and retained Harper and that Urology Center’s negligent supervision and retention resulted in Dehaan’s termination. damages. Id. ¶¶ 48-55. Id. ¶¶ 67-68. 3 Count VI seeks punitive DISCUSSION Harper seeks dismissal of Counts I, II, IV and V. He contends that he cannot be held liable under Title VII because he was not Plaintiff’s employer and that Dehaan’s state law claims for negligent supervision and negligent retention must be dismissed because they fail to state claims upon which relief may be granted. I. The Court addresses each issue in turn. Dehaan’s Title VII Claims Against Harper A Title VII claim may be brought only against an “employer.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3(a); accord Dearth v. Collins, 441 F.3d 931, 933 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). was Urology Center and not Harper. Dehaan’s employer Therefore, Dehaan’s Title VII claims against Harper must be dismissed. The Court rejects Plaintiff’s contention that the Court should also consider Harper to be his employer because Harper was the sole owner of Urology Center, with “operational control of the business and employee supervision.” Compl. ¶ 7. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a similar contention in Dearth. In Dearth, an employee claimed that she was sexually harassed by her supervisor, who was also shareholder of the company. the president, director and sole Id. at 932. The employee sought to recover under Title VII against the supervisor in his individual capacity, and the Eleventh Circuit rejected the claim because “relief under Title VII is available against only the employer and 4 not against individual employees whose actions would constitute a violation of the Act.” Id. at 933. This case is indistinguishable from Dearth, and the Court therefore cannot find that Harper was Dehaan’s “employer” within the meaning of Title VII. Accordingly, Dehaan’s Title VII claims against Harper fail, and Harper is entitled to dismissal of those claims. II. Dehaan’s Negligent Supervision and Retention Claims “A brought claim for pursuant negligently employee hires, negligent to Georgia retains subsequently hiring, or harms law retention arises supervises the or when an plaintiff.” supervision an employer employee and Farrell that v. Time Serv., Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1300 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). To establish a negligent retention or supervision claim, the plaintiff must show that the employer knew or should have known it was “foreseeable from the employee’s tendencies or propensities that the employee could cause the type of harm sustained by the plaintiff.” Drury v. Harris Ventures, Inc., 302 Ga. App. 545, 548, 691 S.E.2d 356, 359 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Novare Grp., Inc. v. Sarif, 290 Ga. 186, 190-91, 718 S.E.2d 304, 309 (2011). Dehaan’s from negligent allegations that supervision Harper and screamed retention and claims cursed at arise Dehaan, berated Dehaan in front of a co-worker, threatened Dehaan with physical harm, and terminated Dehaan’s employment. 5 Compl. ¶¶ 17, 40. Dehaan has not, however, alleged that Harper had a propensity to engage in such outbursts or that Urology Center knew or should have known outburst about such occurred relationship a propensity. when with he another Dehaan confronted employee, alleges Harper and he about contends that the Harper’s it was “foreseeable” that Harper would engage in abusive behavior toward an employee who confronted Harper about such situations. Plaintiff’s Complaint does supporting this assertion. that Dehaan’s Complaint not contain any factual However, allegations For these reasons, the Court concludes fails to state a claim for negligent supervision and negligent retention. CONCLUSION As discussed dismissed because above, Harper meaning of Title VII. Dehaan’s Counts Complaint was I not and II Dehaan’s against Harper are employer within the Counts IV and V are dismissed because fails to state supervision and negligent retention. a claim for negligent Counts III and VI remain pending against Harper and Urology Center, and Counts I and II remain pending against Urology Center. IT IS SO ORDERED, this 16th day of April, 2012. S/Clay D. Land CLAY D. LAND UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 6

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