Williams et al v. Columbus Regional Healthcare System, Inc. et al, No. 4:2011cv00028 - Document 40 (M.D. Ga. 2012)
Court Description: ORDER granting Defendants' Motions to Dismiss 19 and 27 as to Plaintiffs' federal law claims, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law claims, and finding as moot 21 Motion to Strike. Ordered by Judge Clay D. Land on 02/01/2012. (CGC)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA COLUMBUS DIVISION REGINALD WILLIAMS, M.D. and NICOLE WILLAIMS, * * Plaintiffs, * vs. CASE NO. 4:11-CV-28 (CDL) * COLUMBUS REGIONAL HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, INC., et al., * Defendants. * O R D E R Plaintiff surgeon. Reginald Williams, M.D. (“Williams”) is a The claims in this action arise from the suspension of Williams’s medical privileges at two hospitals in Columbus, Georgia. Presently pending before the Court are the Motion to Dismiss of Doctors Hospital, Duke, Kevin Defendants Sass, the Columbus Medical Howard Regional Center, Weldon, Healthcare Andrew Larry System, Morley, Hung, Charles Lance Ray, Richard Wilson, James Miller and Scott Hannay (collectively, “Columbus Regional Defendants”) (ECF No. 19) and the Motion to Dismiss of Skip Freedman and AllMed Healthcare (collectively, “AllMed Defendants”) (ECF No. 27). Management Also before the Court is the Motion to Strike of the Columbus Regional Defendants (ECF No. 21). For the reasons set forth below, the Motions to Dismiss are granted as to Williams’s federal law claims. The jurisdiction Court over declines Plaintiffs’ to state exercise law claims are dismissed without prejudice. supplemental claims, and those The Columbus Regional Defendants’ Motion to Strike is moot. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD When considering a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true all facts set forth in the plaintiff=s complaint and limit its consideration to the pleadings and exhibits attached thereto. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007); Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state plausible on its face.’” a claim to relief that is Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, ____, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The complaint must include sufficient factual allegations “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “[A] formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Id. Although the complaint must contain factual allegations that “raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of” the plaintiff=s claims, id. at 556, “Rule 12(b)(6) does not permit dismissal of a well-pleaded complaint simply because ‘it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those 2 facts is improbable,’” Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS Williams makes the following allegations, which the Court accepts as true for purposes of the present motions. I. The Parties Williams, who is black, is a board certified general surgeon who is licensed to practice medicine in Georgia. Compl. ¶¶ 1, Health Care 26, System ECF No. 2. (“Columbus Defendant Regional”) Columbus owns and Am. Regional operates several health care facilities, including Defendant Doctors Hospital and Defendant the Medical Center, which are hospitals in Columbus, Georgia. Id. ¶ 3. Doctors Hospital and the Medical Center are separate entities that operate under the same board of directors. Id. ¶ 4. Defendant Howard Weldon, M.D. (“Weldon”) is a general surgeon who is a member of the medical staff at Doctors Hospital. Id. ¶ 7. In January 2010, Weldon was appointed chairman of surgery at Doctors Hospital. Id. ¶ 19. Defendant Andrew Morley, M.D. (“Morley”) is employed by Columbus Regional as chief medical officer for Doctors Hospital and the Medical Center. Charles Ray, radiological M.D. (“Ray”) services at is a Doctors 3 Id. ¶ 8. radiologist Hospital. Defendant who provides Id. ¶ 9. Defendant Larry Hung, M.D. (“Hung”) is a pathologist provides pathology services at Doctors Hospital. who Id. ¶ 10. Defendant Scott Hannay, M.D. (“Hannay”) is a general surgeon who is chief of staff of the Medical Center. Id. ¶ 11. Defendant James Miller, M.D. (“Miller”) is a physician who is also president of the Columbus Clinic. Id. ¶ 12. Defendant Richard Wilson, M.D. (“Wilson”) is a surgeon who practices in Columbus. Id. ¶ 13. the Medical Center. Defendant Lance Duke (“Duke”) is CEO of Id. ¶ 14. is CEO of Doctors Hospital. Defendant Kevin Sass (“Sass”) Id. ¶ 15. During the relevant timeframe, Weldon, Ray, Hung and Sass were members of Doctors Hospital’s addition, medical Weldon, executive Ray, committee. Miller and Id. Wilson Doctors Hospital’s credentials committee. were ¶ 16. In members of Id. ¶ 18. Hannay and Duke were members of the medical executive committee for the Medical Center. Id. ¶ 17. Defendant AllMed Healthcare Management (“AllMed”) is an independent review organization, and Defendant Skip Freedman (“Freedman”) is AllMed’s medical director. II. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. Williams’s Employment and Hospital Privileges In December 2008, Williams accepted a position as a general surgeon at the Columbus Clinic in Columbus, Georgia. Id. ¶ 32. Shortly after that, he joined the medical staffs of Doctors Hospital and the Medical Center. 4 Id. Williams was the only surgeon in the Columbus area who was trained in and performed bariatric surgery. Id. ¶ 33. He was also the only surgeon who performed advanced laparoscopic general surgical procedures at Doctors Hospital. Id. ¶ 34. Williams began to develop a “thriving surgical practice” and was a “very popular surgeon.” Id. ¶¶ 46-49, 53. Williams alleges that his success “inflamed Weldon’s racial prejudices to the point that he decided to drive [Williams] from the medical staff.” Id. ¶ 52. After Weldon became chairman of surgery at Doctors Hospital in January 2010, he initiated an external review of Williams’s cases even though, according to Williams, no one had expressed concern about his patient care and the review was unauthorized. Id. ¶¶ 54-55. During the first part of 2010, Weldon and Morley sent the medical records of six of Williams’s patients to AllMed for review. According to Williams, Freedman Id. ¶¶ 62, 71. presented the reviewing surgeons “with leading and loaded questions to answer” about the care the patient had received, and Freedman “either withheld material documents from the surgeon” or induced him to make “factually false clinical findings.” Id. reports containing the assertions about ¶¶ 64-65, 71-72. surgeons’ the findings Freedman Regional; the reports were critical of Williams. 5 patient’s to sent Columbus Id. ¶¶ 66, 72-73. Williams contends that the factually false, defamatory statements.” reports “contained Id. ¶ 73. The AllMed reports were “republished” to Duke, Hannay, Sass, the professional affairs committee of Columbus Regional’s board, and several committees at both the Medical Center and Doctors Hospital, including the credentials committees and the medical executive committees. Williams was reports. imposed not given Id. ¶ 79. a Williams’s an to respond to the Based on the reports, both hospitals “three-month, medical opportunity Id. ¶ 75. non-reportable privileges, though proctorship” the on proctorship did exclude certain procedures, such as Lap Band surgeries and endoscopies. Id. ¶¶ 80-81. The Columbus Clinic continued to support Williams after this proctorship was imposed. Id. ¶ 180. During sent the medical records of an additional ten patients to AllMed. Id. ¶ 82. the proctorship, Weldon and Morley According to Williams, the AllMed reviewers had minor criticisms about the medical management of these patients. Id. ¶ 84. Morley and Hannay compiled a table summarizing the AllMed reviewers’ findings regarding the first six cases and later updated the table, summarizing the ten additional cases. Id. ¶¶ 85-86. The table was presented to the credentials committees and medical executive committees of both hospitals. 6 Id. ¶ 87. According “misrepresented the to Williams, reviewers’ Morley findings” and about Hannay some of the cases and labeled other cases as “standard met but room for improvement” even though “the room for improvement related to management decisions made by physicians other than” Williams. Id. ¶ 88. Williams manipulated false his impression also surgical that alleges that complication [his] Weldon rate surgical and “to Morley create complication rate the was higher than that of other surgeons at Doctors Hospital for similar types of cases.” Id. ¶¶ 90-103. On July 1, 2010, “Morley summarily suspended [Williams’s] privileges at Doctors Hospital.” Williams of the suspension reasons for the suspension. included all endoscopies. procedures, but Id. ¶ 107. did Id. including Id. ¶¶ 110-111. not give ¶ 109. Lap Sass notified Band Williams The suspension procedures Id. ¶ 113. Williams requested reinstatement of his privileges. In support of his and Morley suspended Williams’s privileges at the Medical Center on July 2, 2010. ¶ 124. the Id. request, Williams submitted the report of an independent doctor who had reviewed the sixteen cases and concluded that they did not warrant any adverse action on credentials Williams’s committee privileges. at Doctors Id. ¶¶ Hospital, 123-124. which The included Weldon, Ray, Miller and Wilson, voted to deny the request for 7 reinstatement, but the medical executive committee of Doctors Hospital rejected that recommendation on October 21, 2010 and reinstated Williams’s privileges, subject to continuation of the proctorship that had been imposed prior to the suspension. Id. ¶¶ 125-126. medical Weldon made a motion for the Doctors Hospital executive reinstate committee Williams, and to on reconsider November 2, its 2010 decision the to Doctors Hospital medical executive committee voted on the motion and denied Williams’s request for reinstatement. Id. ¶¶ 127-128. The Medical Center medical executive committee voted to grant Williams’s request for reinstatement, subject to a reportable proctorship or an additional year’s training. Id. ¶ 129. Williams requested a hearing to challenge the denial of reinstatement at Doctors Hospital and to challenge conditions of reinstatement at the Medical Center. the Id. ¶ 136. Columbus Regional offered Williams a hearing at the Medical Center. Id. ¶¶ 137-139. According to Williams, Hannay “retracted all his criticism about the six cases” that he had previously reviewed, “except for one criticism about one case” that Williams contends relates to a procedure that Williams did not perform. Id. ¶¶ 140-145. The hearing was adjourned so that the Medical Center and Williams could negotiate a settlement informed agreement. the Medical Id. Center ¶ 146. that 8 he Williams would not ultimately execute a settlement agreement, and he asked for the hearing to resume; he also asked to be reinstated at Doctors Hospital. Id. ¶¶ 150-151. On March 1, 2011, the Doctors Hospital medical executive committee voted to rescind their decision of November 2, 2010 and reinstate Williams’s their October privileges, 21, subject 2010 to decision to continuation restore of the proctorship that had been imposed prior to the suspension. Id. ¶ 156. The same day, the Medical Center medical executive committee voted to impose a proctorship, which it labeled a “Performance Improvement Plan” similar to the proctorship it had imposed on November 2, 2010, except that “final intraoperative decisions” were to be made by Williams and the proctorship would be non-reportable. Williams interfere” alleges with his that Columbus ability to Id. ¶¶ 157-158. Regional treat “continued patients at Doctors Hospital, including patients requiring bariatric surgery. ¶ 160. to Id. According to Williams, Sass refused to allow Williams to schedule fifteen patients for Lap Band surgery at Doctors Hospital. Id. ¶ 161. In addition, Williams has interviewed with several hospitals in Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Texas and Virginia “but was told that he could not be credentialed as a result of Defendants’ unjustified and wanton actions.” Id. ¶ 173. Williams also “applied to seven different locum 9 tenens agencies” but “was told that he would not even be considered for locum tenens positions because of Defendants’ wanton actions.” Id. ¶ 174. In addition, Williams contends that “Weldon’s persistent denigration” of Williams “eventually caused The Columbus Clinic to terminate its contract” with Williams. Id. ¶ 180. Williams alleges that the decisions about his medical privileges were motivated by racial bias and that the Columbus Regional Defendants treated “ostensible concerns about the quality of [his] patient care differently from the concerns about the quality of care” of white doctors. Id. ¶ 163(x). III. Williams’s Claims Williams brings a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“§ 1981”) against Weldon, intentionally Morley interfered and Hannay, with alleging Williams’s that ability they to form contracts with third parties and interfered with “his equal enjoyment of the laws and proceedings afforded by the Bylaws of Doctors Hospital and The Medical Center.” Id. ¶ 178. Williams also contends that Weldon caused the Columbus Clinic to terminate its contract with Williams “by continually berating and denigrating” him to members of the clinic. Id. ¶¶ 179-180. Williams further asserts that by suspending his privileges, Defendants ability form to “improperly contracts with 10 interfered other with hospitals” [his] and his ability to enter contracts with prospective employers. 182, 185 & 187. of his Id. ¶¶ Williams further alleges that the suspension privileges interfered with his ability “to form a contract to treat twenty-six patients who had already been approved by their insurance companies for Lap Band Procedures, and several procedures Williams patients at the also who time asserts were of [his] that even waiting for suspension.” after the endoscopic Id. ¶ suspension 184. was lifted Defendants interfered with his ability to treat Lap Band cases. Id. ¶ 188. Williams contends that the actions of Weldon, Morley and Hannay were racially motivated. ¶ 187. Williams also contends E.g., id. that “Columbus Regional is vicariously liable for Morley’s racially motivated tortious conduct.” Id. ¶ 189. Williams also brings a claim against Weldon, Morley, Hannay, Duke and Columbus Regional under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (“§ 1985(3)”), contending that their actions were in furtherance of a conspiracy to deprive Williams of his rights, including his right to interstate travel, because of his race.1 Id. ¶¶ 192-203. Williams also asserts claims against Duke, Sass and Columbus Regional under 42 U.S.C. § 1986, asserting that they could have prevented 1 the damages caused by the Williams alleges that there were conspiracies between Weldon and Morley, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 192-195; between Weldon, Ray and Hung, id. ¶ 196; and between Hannay, Morley and Dukes, id. ¶¶ 197-199. 11 conspiracy between the other doctors but failed to do so. Id. ¶¶ 205-208. Finally, Williams asserts various claims under Georgia law, including: claims for violations of the Doctors Hospital bylaws; defamation; relationships; distress. and tortious interference intentional with of infliction business emotional Williams’s wife Nicole Williams also brings a claim against all Defendants for loss of consortium. DISCUSSION I. Williams’s § 1981 Claims A. Elements of a § 1981 Claim Section 1981 “creates a federal right of action victims of certain types of racial discrimination.” for Jimenez v. Wellstar Health Sys., 596 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2010). “To state a claim for non-employment discrimination under § 1981, a plaintiff must allege (1) he is a member of a racial minority, (2) the defendant intended to racially discriminate against him, and (3) the discrimination concerned one or more of the activities enumerated in the statute.” Id. (citing Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 211 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2000)). The rights enumerated in § 1981 include the right “to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws 12 and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Defendants do not dispute that Williams is a member of a racial minority. Defendants also cannot seriously dispute that Williams sufficiently alleged that Defendants took the challenged contend, actions because however, that of Williams’s Williams failed discrimination concerned one enumerated in § Williams interfered with 1981. “his equal or race. to more Defendants allege that the of the activities asserts that Defendants enjoyment of the laws and proceedings afforded by the Bylaws of Doctors Hospital and The Medical Center.” Am. Compl. ¶ 178(b). Williams also contends that Defendants interfered with his right to contract in three different ways: contractual Defendants existing (1) relationship interfered patients, Williams’s Weldon ability with with and to interfered (3) the Williams’s the form with Columbus ability suspension contracts Williams’s Clinic, to treat interfered with (2) his with prospective employers. The consistent flaw that is fatal to Williams’s Complaint is that each of his claims has as an essential factual predicate the termination of his hospital privileges. Whether the claim is based directly upon the termination of those privileges or is indirectly connected (such as his employment 13 termination claim), the termination essential to each of his claims. of those privileges is Unfortunately for Williams, the Eleventh Circuit in Jimenez held that under Georgia Law hospital privileges do not create a protectable legal interest that a physician may vindicate via a § 1981 claim. backdrop, the Court addresses each of With this Williams’s specific theories in turn. B. Interference with Equal Enjoyment of the Laws Claim Williams claims that Defendants interfered with “his equal enjoyment of the laws and proceedings afforded by the Bylaws of Doctors Hospital and the Medical Center.” 178(b). right Id. ¶ Section 1981 provides that all persons shall have the “to the full laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). and equal benefit of all To state a claim under the equal benefit clause of § 1981, a plaintiff must “identify a relevant law or proceeding for the ‘security of persons and property’” and must allege that the defendants deprived him “of ‘the full and equal benefit’ of this law or proceeding” because of racial animus. Phillip v. Univ. of Rochester, 316 F.3d 291, 298 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting § 1981(a)). Even if the Court were to conclude that the hospital bylaws at issue here were “laws” or “proceedings” within the meaning of § 1981, Williams’s 14 equal benefit claim fails because the bylaws do not protect a liberty or property interest and are therefore not “for the security of persons and property.” hospitals’ Williams bylaws appears guaranteed him to the contend right that to the continued medical privileges at Doctors Hospital and the Medical Center unless certain conditions were met; he alleges that Defendants violated the hospitals’ bylaws by failing to comply with the “prerequisites for summary suspension.” 183. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 181, Under Georgia law, “medical staff bylaws, which govern medical staff privileges, do not create a contractual right to the continuation of those privileges.” 1309. Moreover, privileges at a liberty interest. denial of specific a right hospital Jimenez, 596 F.3d at to continued would not medical implicate a Cf. Ming Wei Liu v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala., 330 F. App’x 775, 780-81 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (finding no claim for violation of liberty interest because plaintiff’s employment claim was based opportunity and on not the a loss complete of a denial freedom to pursue employment in his chosen field”). the denial of a right to continued medical specific of “his Finally, privileges at Doctors Hospital and the Medical Center does not implicate a property interest because in Georgia, physicians do not have a property interest in maintaining 15 medical staff privileges. Jimenez, 596 F.3d at 1310. For all of these reasons, Williams’s § 1981 equal benefit claim fails and is dismissed. C. Interference with Contract Claims In addition to his § 1981 equal benefit claim, Williams also asserts § 1981 contract interference claims. “To state a claim under § 1981 for interference with a right to contract, ‘a plaintiff must identify an impaired contractual relationship under which the plaintiff has rights.’” Jimenez, 596 F.3d at 1309 (quoting Kinnon v. Arcoub, Gopman & Assocs., 490 F.3d 886, 890 (11th Cir. 2007)). show that the defendant’s contractual relationship. 1. interference A plaintiff must also caused the impaired E.g., Kinnon, 490 F.3d at 892. Interference with Columbus Clinic Contract Williams alleges that “Weldon intentionally and specifically interfered with the Plaintiff’s actual contract with The Columbus Clinic by continually berating and denigrating the Plaintiff to members of The Columbus Clinic.” Am. Compl. ¶ 179. Williams further asserts that the Columbus Clinic its terminated contract with Williams because “Weldon’s persistent denigration of the Plaintiff.” 180. Plaintiff’s allegations are vague and conclusory. of Id. ¶ The focus of Williams’s Complaint is his loss of medical staff privileges at two Columbus hospitals, allegedly because of the discriminatory acts of the Defendants. 16 Because Williams has no protected interest in the continuation of his hospital privileges, he has no claim arising from the loss of those privileges. See Jimenez, 596 F.3d at 1309-10. Therefore, to survive a motion to dismiss, Williams’s claim against Weldon must be based on conduct by Weldon that caused the Columbus Clinic to terminate him unrelated to the loss of his hospital privileges. Weldon had Although something Williams to do does with summarily his allege termination that by the Columbus Clinic, he does not allege how, beyond Weldon’s role in the investigation of Williams’s hospital privileges, Weldon was involved. had any Williams does not allege that Weldon actually authority to terminate his employment with the Columbus Clinic or had sufficient influence as a third party to cause alleges Williams’s that the termination. Columbus Clinic Moreover, while supported him Williams after the initial proctorship was imposed in May 2010, Am. Compl. ¶ 180, Williams does not allege that the Columbus Clinic continued to support or employ him after Williams could no longer perform surgeries in Columbus because suspended at the two only his medical hospitals in privileges town where were he was credentialed. It would unspecified be sheer comment by speculation to conclude Weldon to the led that some termination of Williams’s employment by the Columbus Clinic as compared to 17 the more likely reason that a surgeon who had lost or limited hospital privileges could no longer do the job he was hired to do. Williams’s Weldon claim wrongfully against interfered Weldon with his is essentially hospital that privileges, which ultimately resulted in the termination of his employment with Columbus Clinic. Since Williams cannot state a § 1981 claim based on the termination of his hospital privileges and because no other specific facts are alleged as the reason for the termination of his contract with the Columbus Clinic, the Court finds that Williams’s Complaint simply does not include sufficient factual allegations regarding this claim “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” U.S. at 555. Likewise, the allegations do Twombly, 550 not “raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of” Williams’s claims. Id. at 556. For these reasons, the Motion to Dismiss is granted as to this claim. 2. Interference with Williams’s Existing Patients Williams also alleges that Defendants interfered with his existing patients and patients who requested to have surgery performed by Williams. Specifically, Williams alleges that the suspension of his privileges interfered with his ability “to form a contract to treat twenty-six patients who had already been approved by their insurance companies for Lap Band Procedures, and several patients who were waiting for 18 endoscopic procedures at the time of [his] suspension.” Am. Compl. ¶ 184. suspension Williams was lifted also asserts Defendants that still even interfered after the with his ability to treat approximately fifty Lap Band cases and that he was not allowed to schedule patients for Lap Band surgery at Doctors Hospital. Relying on Id. ¶¶ 160-161, 188. Jimenez, Defendants contend that these potential contracts cannot form the basis of a § 1981 claim. In Jimenez, the doctor alleged that the hospital’s suspension of his medical staff privileges “interfered with his right to contract with patients and third party payors.” F.3d at 1310. Jimenez, 596 There, the doctor “had access to the patients he treated at [the hospital] only because they were admitted to the hospital while he was on call; thus, his relationship with them was a benefit of the medical staff privileges to which he was no longer entitled.” Id. Williams argues that Jimenez is distinguishable from this case because Williams did not gain access to the patients solely because they were already patients at Doctors Hospital or the Medical Center. However, Williams’s claim is based on his allegation that Defendants interfered with Williams’s ability to contract with his patients by denying him access to those hospitals. other words, the only way that Defendants interfered In with Williams’s existing patient relationships was that the denial 19 of hospital privileges prevented him from performing surgeries at The Medical Center and Doctor’s Hospital.2 Because Williams had no contractual right to continuation of his medical staff privileges, Jimenez, conclude that 596 F.3d at 1309, the Court cannot Williams has stated a § 1981 claim based on Defendants’ alleged interference with the relationship between Williams and his prospective patients. The Motion to Dismiss is therefore granted as to this claim. 3. Interference with Prospective Employers Williams also asserts that Defendants’ actions caused him to lose employment opportunities with prospective employers. E.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 173-174, 185. While racially motivated interference with a contract does form the basis of a § 1981 claim, interference with a possible future contract cannot. Jimenez, 596 F.3d at 1310 (noting that future contracts a doctor might have formed with potential patients were “too speculative to form the basis of a § 1981 claim”). Williams cannot base a claim on the loss of Therefore, prospective employment opportunities, and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted as to that claim. 2 To the extent that Williams alleges that he was denied access to Doctors Hospital and the Medical Center even after the suspension was lifted in 2011, such a denial is not materially different than any other type of interference with Williams’s medical staff privileges. Under Jimenez, § 1981 simply does not provide a remedy for harm to Williams caused by interference with his hospital privileges because Williams had no contractual right to continuation of his medical staff privileges. Jimenez, 596 F.3d at 1309. 20 II. Williams’s § 1985(3) Claim Williams claims that Weldon, Morley, Ray, Hannay, Duke and Columbus Regional acted in furtherance of conspiracies to deprive Williams of his rights, including interstate travel, because of his race. 203.3 allege: his right to Am. Compl. ¶¶ 192- “To state a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must (1) defendants engaged in a conspiracy; (2) the conspiracy’s purpose was to directly or indirectly deprive a protected person or class the equal protection of the laws, or equal privileges and immunities under the laws; (3) a conspirator committed an act to further the conspiracy; and (4) as a result, the plaintiff suffered injury to either his person or his property, or was deprived of privilege of a citizen of the United States.” F.3d at 1312. private actors, a right or Jimenez, 596 “When the alleged § 1985(3) conspirators are the plaintiff 3 must demonstrate that the Williams also appears to contend that violations of § 1981 can be enforced through § 1985(3). The Eleventh Circuit rejected this theory in Jimenez, so Williams cannot base his § 1985(3) claim on alleged violations of § 1981. See Jimenez, 596 F.3d at 1312 (“[W]e hold conspiracies to violate rights protected under § 1981 are . . . insufficient to form the basis of a § 1985(3) claim.”). Williams further appears to assert that Defendants deprived him of certain protections afforded by the hospitals’ bylaws and that the deprivation gives rise to a claim under § 1985(3). However, “[w]hen the alleged § 1985(3) conspirators are private actors, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the conspiracy was aimed at rights constitutionally protected against private impairment.” Id. Williams’s rights under hospital bylaws are not “serious constitutional rights” that are protected by § 1985(3), and he cannot base his § 1985(3) claim on alleged violations of the hospital bylaws. 21 conspiracy was aimed at rights against private impairment.” Id. constitutionally protected “These rights include only select serious constitutional rights,” including “the right to interstate travel and the right against involuntary servitude.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Williams alleges that Defendants conspired to suspend his privileges at Doctors Hospital and the Medical Center because of his race, which in turn adversely affected his ability to obtain credentials at other hospitals. 182, could 187. not E.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ Williams alleges that other hospitals where he obtain credentials included hospitals outside of Georgia and that the conspiracy to suspend his privileges in Georgia therefore had the “effect” or “result” of interfering with his right to interstate travel. E.g., id. ¶¶ 187, 202. To state a claim under § 1985(3), however, Williams must have alleged that the conspiracy’s purpose was to deprive him of his right to interstate travel. E.g., Jimenez, 596 F.3d at 1312; accord Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 275 (1993) (noting that a conspiracy to rob an interstate traveler would not violate criminal counterpart of § 1985(3) unless the predominant purpose of the conspiracy was to impede or prevent the exercise of the right of interstate travel); cf. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 90, 106 (1971) (finding that complaint stated claim under § 1985(3) 22 because plaintiffs alleged that defendants intentionally drove their truck into the path of the plaintiffs’ car, blocking its passage over the public highway, and then severely beat the plaintiffs with the intent to impede their right to interstate travel). Though resulted in Williams an claims impairment that of the his alleged ability to conspiracies obtain a job outside of Georgia, he did not allege that the purpose of the alleged conspiracies interstate travel. a claim under was to deprive him of his right to Accordingly, his Complaint fails to state § 1985(3), and that claim is therefore dismissed. III. Section 1986 Claim “Under 42 U.S.C. § 1986, a defendant may be liable if he knew of a § 1985 conspiracy and failed to prevent it, despite having the power to do so.” Johnson v. Wilbur, 375 F. App’x 960, 964 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). claim is derivative of a § 1985 Given that a § 1986 violation, id., and that Williams’s Complaint fails to state a claim under § 1985(3), the Complaint likewise fails to state a claim under § 1986, and that claim is therefore dismissed. CONCLUSION As discussed above, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 19 & 27) are granted as to Williams’s federal law claims. 23 There are original no claims jurisdiction. remaining The over Court which the declines Court to has exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims, and those claims are dismissed without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (stating that district courts “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over” a state law claim if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”). The Columbus Defendants’ Motion to Strike (ECF No. 21) is moot. Regional Having dismissed all of the claims in this action, the Court directs the Clerk to terminate the action. IT IS SO ORDERED, this 1st day of February, 2012. S/Clay D. Land CLAY D. LAND UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 24
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
