Green v. Value Place Property Management LLC et al, No. 4:2010cv00066 - Document 29 (M.D. Ga. 2011)
Court Description: ORDER granting 27 Motion for Summary Judgment. Ordered by Judge Clay D. Land on 12/27/2011. (CGC)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA COLUMBUS DIVISION STANTON GREEN, * Plaintiff, * vs. * VALUE PLACE PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, LLC, CASE NO. 4:10-CV-66 (CDL) * * Defendant. * O R D E R Plaintiff Stanton Green (“Green”) was employed by Defendant Value Place Property property attendant. Management, LLC (“Value Place”) as a Green, who is black, claims that Value Place terminated his employment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”). Plaintiff appears to contend that Value Place terminated him because of his race and in retaliation for his complaints to the NAACP and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Presently pending before the Value Place’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 27). Court is For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, drawing all justifiable inferences in the opposing party=s favor. U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 A fact is material if it is relevant or necessary to the outcome of the suit. Id. at 248. A factual dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. FACTUAL BACKGROUND In accordance with Local Rule 56, Value Place filed a statement of material facts to which Defendants contend there is no genuine dispute. Mem. of Law in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. § II, Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, ECF No. 28. Pursuant to Local Rule 56, each of Value Place’s fact statements is supported by a specific citation to the record. Green did not respond to Defendants’ statement of material facts as he was required to do under Local Rule 56. In fact, he did not respond to Value Place’s summary judgment motion at all. For these reasons, Value Place’s statement of undisputed material facts is deemed admitted under Local Rule 56. M.D. Ga. R. 56. The Court has reviewed those citations to “determine if there is, indeed, no genuine issue of material fact.” Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1269 2 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Based on the Court’s review of Value Place’s statement of material facts and record citations, the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Green, are as follows. Value Place is an extended stay lodging company. Value Place hired Green in July 2008 to work as a property attendant at its Columbus, Georgia location. Green’s duties included As a property attendant, maintenance, check-ins, and security. housekeeping, laundry, Property attendants must enter and check guest rooms periodically to make sure that they are clean. Unless they are on approved leave or vacation, property attendants are on call for guest services and emergencies. In January 2009, Value Place assistant manager Tammy Wells reported that Green had stolen money from the office cash drawer and said that there was a video to prove it. Based on these allegations, Green was terminated on January 10, 2009. Green contacted the NAACP, and a representative of the Columbus NAACP chapter contacted Value Place, claiming that Green had stolen any money and that he had been unfairly treated. an investigation, Value Place determined that Green not After had not taken any money but that he had improperly accessed the cash drawer. Based on these findings, Green’s employment was reinstated, and his termination was converted to a suspension with pay. 3 At some point in 2009, Green was reassigned from property attendant to studio attendant. Green believed that he was reassigned because he took two days off without a doctor’s note and he got behind reassignment, attendant position his cleaning made Green on the same was hourly, duties. wages, while After though the the property the studio attendant position was salaried. During 2009, Green had a series of disciplinary issues. February 2009, Green disrespectful to instructions from conduct could received a a received co-worker a in written who manager. result written a warning attempted Green was termination. In warning for poor for being relay to told In Green that March performance similar 2009, Green because he damaged company property by attempting to open a guest room door with a crow bar. Also during March, Green received a written warning for failure to meet cleaning standards, and he was told by his supervisors that he would be terminated if he did not meet expectations Columbus Value housekeeping for Place room became employees cleaning. understaffed quit, and the Later in because existing 2009, one of the the employees, including Green, were asked to take on additional housekeeping and cleaning duties, but Green failed to meet expectations for cleaning. Specifically, Green noted on his daily room cleaning schedule that he had cleaned guest room 325 even though he had 4 not; that guest room became infested with bugs and had to be fumigated. October In addition, Plaintiff received a written warning in 2009 for making a personal guest’s room without authorization. Place terminated Green for long distance call in a In December 2009, Value dereliction of duties and falsification of company records with regard to Room 325, for violating company policies by borrowing $20 from a guest, for taking an unauthorized break, and for unauthorized use of a guest’s phone. Green filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC on September 7, 2009, alleging that he was discriminated against because of his race and in retaliation for filing a complaint with the NAACP. In his EEOC charge, Green alleged that he had been demoted to housekeeping, subjected to harassment and had his hours and wages changed in retaliation for his complaint to the NAACP. He also claimed that his work environment had gotten worse since his reinstatement. DISCUSSION I. Discrimination Claim Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating “against any individual conditions, or with respect privileges to of his compensation, employment, individual’s race.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). because terms, of such Where, as here, there is no direct evidence of discrimination, the Court uses 5 the burden shifting approach established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). Springer v. Convergys Customer Mgmt. Grp. Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Green must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. The burden then shifts to Value Place to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment action. Id. Finally, the burden returns to Green to prove that the articulated reasons are pretext for discrimination. Id. Though it is not clear from the present record, Green appears to contend that Value Place discriminated against him because of his race by (1) suspending him with pay for the cash drawer incident, performance, (3) (2) giving him reassigning him written from warnings property for poor attendant to studio attendant, (4) giving him extra housekeeping work when Value Place employment. subjected became understaffed, and (5) terminating his In other words, Green appears to assert that he was to disparate discipline because of his race. To establish a prima facie case of disparate discipline, Green must establish that he “was a qualified member of a protected class and was subjected to an adverse employment action in contrast to similarly situated employees outside the protected class.” Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1264 6 (11th Cir. 2010).1 There is no evidence that Green did not violate the work rules for which he was disciplined. did not point protected class to any evidence engaged lighter discipline. in that similar a person misconduct Green also outside but the received Accordingly, the Court concludes that Green has not met his burden of establishing a prima facie case of discriminatory discipline. that Green discipline, had he Furthermore, even if the Court found established has not a prima presented facie any case evidence of to disparate rebut the legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons Value Place articulated for the discipline: Green did a poor job cleaning rooms and violated a variety of work rules. For these reasons, Value Place is entitled to summary judgment on Green’s discrimination claims. II. Retaliation Claim Value Place is also entitled to summary judgment on Green’s retaliation claims. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Green must show that (1) he engaged in statutorily protected activity, (2) he suffered a materially adverse employment action, and (3) there was a causal link between the two. 2010). Dixon v. The Hallmark Cos., 627 F.3d 849, 856 (11th Cir. Though it is not clear from the present record, Green 1 An employee may also establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge by showing that he was a qualified member of a protected class, was terminated and replaced by someone outside the protected class. Cuddeback v. Fla. Bd. of Educ., 381 F.3d 1230, 1235 (11th Cir. 2004). There is no evidence in the present record that Green was replaced by someone outside the protected class after he was terminated. 7 appears to contend that Value Place retaliated against him because he asked the NAACP to help him challenge his termination in January September 2009 2009. and because Green he appears filed to an EEOC assert complaint that Value in Place retaliated against him by (1) giving him written warnings for poor performance, (2) reassigning him from property attendant to studio attendant, (3) giving him extra housekeeping work when Value Place employment. a became sufficient and (4) terminating his Green has not, however, pointed to any evidence of connection retaliatory understaffed, between actions. evidence his complaints Moreover, even create prima to a and if he facie the had of allegedly pointed to retaliation, Green did not point to any evidence to rebut the legitimate nonretaliatory reasons Value Place articulated for the discipline: Green did a poor job cleaning rooms and violated a variety of work rules. For these reasons, Value Place is entitled to summary judgment on Green’s retaliation claims. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, Value Place’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 27) is granted. IT IS SO ORDERED, this 27th day of December, 2011. S/Clay D. Land CLAY D. LAND UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 8
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