STIRLING, et al v. MERIDIAN SERVICES GROUP LLC, No. 3:2023cv00040 - Document 106 (M.D. Ga. 2025)
Court Description: ORDER granting in part and denying in part 94 Motion to Compel. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 2/14/2025. (ksl)
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STIRLING, et al v. MERIDIAN SERVICES GROUP LLC Doc. 106 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATHENS DIVISION RICHARD STIRLING, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, et al., Plaintiffs, * * * vs. * MERIDIAN SERVICES GROUP, LLC f/k/a WORK MANAGEMENT, INC., * CASE NO. 3:23-cv-40 (CDL) * Defendant. O R D E R Plaintiffs (“Meridian”) to moved to respond compel to Meridian requests Services for the Group, production LLC of documents submitted by four opt-in Plaintiffs in this collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. 1 For the reasons that follow, that motion (ECF No. 94) is granted in part and denied in part. BACKGROUND Richard Stirling brought this FLSA himself and others similarly situated. action on behalf of On June 6, 2024, the Court granted Stirling’s motion to conditionally certify this collective action. Since then, several potential plaintiffs who This motion also originally sought to compel discovery responses from Gary Harland, one of Meridian’s owners, pursuant to a subpoena. Following the parties’ in-person conference, Plaintiffs have agreed to withdraw their subpoena for Harland. Accordingly, this Order addresses only the discovery requests propounded to Meridian by the four opt-in Plaintiffs. 1 Dockets.Justia.com received notice of the conditional certification have opted in to this action, action’s (Shawn becoming discovery Brownell, Shelley, Jr.) documents (“RFPs”) opt-in period, Jerry of Hickerson, propounded to four Plaintiffs. requests Meridian. these During opt-in Danny Long, for the Meridian this Plaintiffs and Robert production objected to of these requests, and Plaintiffs filed the presently pending motion to compel. The parties claim that they met in a good faith attempt to resolve the dispute, but the Court is skeptical. This matter should have been resolved without the Court’s help. STANDARD Because the parties’ inability to resolve this matter on their own may reflect an unfamiliarity with the basic rules, the Court provides this elementary primer. “Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). requesting the production of One way parties do so is documents that are responding party’s possession, custody or control.” Civ. P. 34(a)(1). “in the Fed. R. When “a party fails to produce documents . . . as requested under Rule 34,” the “party seeking discovery may move for an order compelling” a response. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(iv). party But before doing so, the seeking an order to compel must certify that counsel have met in person in 2 a good faith attempt to resolve the dispute. 8 (ECF No. 25). the dispute Rules 16/26 Order Good faith contemplates that each side consider from dispassionately the evaluate other side’s whether discovery hill to die upon. this perspective is the and proverbial The in-person good faith meeting should be approached with an attitude of seeking common ground and not of justifying one’s entrenched position. Here, counsel implicitly claim to have searched for that ground, but their path to it was somehow impeded. It is puzzling to understand why. DISCUSSION Meridian’s compel are Stirling, pursuant main that so to arguments (1) it is this it no has against already longer Court’s Plaintiffs’ answered obligated Local Rule to 34, motion ten RFPs respond and (2) to to from RFPs allowing individual opt-in Plaintiff’s to propound discovery is contrary to this action’s collective nature. The Court finds neither argument particularly persuasive. I. Local Rule 34 Argument Plaintiffs’ dispute requests granted. by for counsel simply could filing production, a have request which the avoided this to propound Court would unnecessary additional have likely Defendant’s counsel astutely notes that Local Rule 34 provides that “[e]xcept with written permission of the [C]ourt 3 first obtained, requests for production under Rule 34 of the Federal Rules requests to apparently, of Civil Procedure each party.” M.D. for Defendant’s may Ga. not R. counsel. exceed 34. End But a conference would have gone something like this: ten (10) of story, good faith “Tell me why you need more requests; maybe we can work this out without you bothering the Court by filing a motion to exceed the limit.” Then Plaintiff’s counsel would hopefully respond: “Sure, I just need about ten more requests that are not Plaintiff-specific, and that way I can avoid getting bogged down in the issue of whether each opt-in plaintiff has the right requests under the local rule.” But no. was each made to litigate whether to ten separate Instead, the decision individual party in collective action can propound separate discovery requests. a And we wonder why modern litigation has become so costly—and often unnecessarily so. The bottom line for the Court, which may be based more on basic common sense and pragmatism than some fancy legal theory, is that if the discovery being sought is directed to class-wide issues, if the requests seek relevant evidence, and if the requests are not unduly burdensome, then the evidence should be produced. 4 II. FLSA Collective Action Argument The Court should have probably ended its order (some may say, lamentation) with the foregoing sentence and simply ordered responses to burdensome. the requests But because it found relevant Meridian’s and counsel not obviously unduly spent substantial time justifying its opposition to the requests for production, it seems a bit disrespectful to not even address the Meridian’s argument. The Court notes, however, that for future reference the following is pure dicta. Defendant argues that the purpose of collective “actions under the FLSA [are]: (1) reducing the burden on plaintiffs through the pooling of resources, and (2) efficiently resolving common issues of law and fact that arise from the same illegal conduct” and that allowing individual discovery requests Plaintiffs undermines those purposes. from these opt-in Morgan v. Fam. Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1264 (11th Cir. 2008). Meridian argues that this collective action is based on allegations of an illegal pay practice common to all opt-in Plaintiffs, so any individual discovery should be unnecessary and would impede the efficiencies of a collective action. Regardless of whatever purposes may be served by limiting discovery to the representative Plaintiff, the opt-in Plaintiffs are “party plaintiff[s]” in this action. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). By using this language, “[t]he statute does not indicate that 5 opt-in plaintiffs have a lesser status than named plaintiffs . . . . [t]o the contrary, by referring to them as ‘party plaintiff[s]’ Congress indicated that opt-in plaintiffs should have the same status in relation to the claims of the lawsuit as do the named plaintiffs.” Prickett v. DeKalb Cnty., 349 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); see also Mickles v. Country Club Inc., 887 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir. 2018) (“The plain language of § 216(b) supports that those who opt in become party plaintiffs upon the filing of a consent.”). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 provides that “[a] party may serve on any other party” a request for the production of documents “within the scope of Rule 26(b).” 34(a). As full party plaintiffs, the Fed. R. Civ. P. opt-in Plaintiffs are arguably entitled to use this discovery tool to obtain evidence relevant to the case. Additionally, Meridian’s argument that this collective action does not warrant individual discovery is undercut by their own actions: they have propounded discovery requests to the very same opt-in Plaintiffs whose RFPs they now seek to avoid. Apparently, unfamiliar with the “good for the goose, good for the gander rule,” Meridian’s counsel unashamedly tries to distinguish its discovery strategy. The Court finds the distinction unpersuasive and refuses to deny the motion to compel on these grounds. 6 III. Objectionable RFPs The Court does find some of the RFPs to be objectionable— something that again could have been worked out by counsel in a true good faith conference. For example, the Court declines to compel some of the opt-in Plaintiffs’ RFPs which seek irrelevant information or are unreasonably duplicative. Brownell’s RFPs 1 and 2 seek “[a]ll communications [Meridian] sent to or received from any individual identified in MER0001106” and “MER0005931105” regarding this action. Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. to Compel Ex. D, Brownell’s July 15, 2024 Discovery Requests 6, ECF No. 95-4. These numerical identifiers refer to those individuals on the final list of people to be notified that they could opt in to this action and those whose claims were subject to arbitration agreements. 9, ECF No. 95. Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. to Compel The individuals covered by these two RFPs either chose not to opt into this action or were precluded from opting in by the terms of an arbitration agreement. Accordingly, the Court finds that any communications Meridian may have had with these individuals are not relevant to the claims in this action. The Court declines to compel Meridian to respond to these RFPs. Additionally, communications in Brownell’s [Meridian] sent third to, RFP he from, [Plaintiff] during the [relevant time period].” asks or for “all about any Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. to Compel Ex. D, Brownell’s July 15, 2024 Discovery 7 Requests 6. This is nearly identical to Stirling’s RFP 8, to which Meridian has already responded. Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. to Compel Ex. A, Pl.’s Sept. 7, 2023 Discovery Requests 10, ECF No. 95-1. Accordingly, this request is unreasonably duplicative, and Meridian shall not be compelled to answer it. Long’s RFP 3 is similarly identical and shall not be compelled for the same reason. Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. to Compel Ex. F, Long’s July 15, 2024 Discovery Requests 6, ECF No. 95-6. The first two RFPs from Hickerson request communications between Meridian and employees of the law firm Smith Gambrell & Russell, LLP as well as documents from that firm. to Pls.’ Discovery Mot. to Requests Compel 6, Ex. ECF E, No. Hickerson’s 95-5. Def.’s Resp. July However, 15, 2024 Meridian represents that it has already provided Plaintiffs with all nonprivileged communications it had with this firm, including the requested documents. Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. to Compel 17- 18; Tsonis Decl. ¶¶ 13-15, ECF No. 95-3. Finding these requests unreasonably cumulative, the Court declines to compel responses to them. Shelley’s RFP 2 requests information concerning Meridian’s employment policies that is already covered (which the Court does not find objectionable). by Long’s RFP 2 Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. to Compel Ex. G, Shelley’s July 15, 2024 Discovery Requests 6, ECF No. 95-7; Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. to Compel 8 Ex. F, Long’s July 15, 2024 Discovery Requests 6. Therefore, Shelley’s RFP 2 is unreasonably duplicative, and the Court will not compel a response to it. Finally, the Court will not compel a response to Shelley’s RFP 4. This employees RFP seeks concerning a communications wide array of from 13 certain Meridian different topics. Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. to Compel Ex. G, Shelley’s July 15, 2024 Discovery Requests 6. This RFP is unreasonably duplicative of other requests which already capture any communications from Meridian employees which would be relevant to this action. See, e.g., Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. to Compel Ex. A, Pl.’s Sept. 7, 2023 Discovery Requests 10 (“Produce all communications sent to, from, or about each [Plaintiff] during the [relevant time period]”). CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion (ECF No. 94) is granted in part and denied in part. to compel The Court overrules any objection to Brownell’s RFP 4; Hickerson’s RFPs 3, 4, and 5; Long’s RFPs 1, 2, 4, 5; and Shelley’s RFPs 1 and 3. The Court finds that these requests seek relevant evidence and responding to them will not be unduly burdensome. Meridian shall respond to these RFPs within 21 days of this Order. The Court also extends the discovery period 60 days from the entry of this order; the deadline 9 to file dispositive or decertification motions shall be April 18, 2025. The motion to compel is denied as to all other RFPs. Hopefully, the next time counsel have a discovery dispute in this Court, they will try a little harder to find common ground. necessary, While the preparation of this order ended up being it quite frankly amounted to a waste of limited judicial resources. IT IS SO ORDERED, this 14th day of February, 2025. S/Clay D. Land CLAY D. LAND U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 10
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