RANGEL et al v. COMPLIANCE STAFFING AGENCY, LLC et al, No. 3:2016cv00030 - Document 49 (M.D. Ga. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER granting 15 Motion for Conditional Certification. Ordered by US DISTRICT JUDGE CLAY D LAND on 07/12/2016. (CCL)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATHENS DIVISION ADRIAN RANGEL, individually and * on behalf of all similarly situated individuals, et al., * Plaintiffs, * vs. * COMPLIANCE STAFFING AGENCY, LLC, et al., CASE NO. 3:16-CV-30 (CDL) * * Defendants. * O R D E R Defendant Compliance Staffing Agency, LLC (“Compliance”) provides staffing services to its clients, including Defendant Elite Storage Solutions, LLC (“Elite”). installs storage systems. Elite manufactures and Compliance places workers who assemble pallet racks for Elite’s storage systems, which are installed for Elite’s clients. Plaintiffs Adrian Rangel, Luis Rangel, and Jacobo Rangel worked on an Elite client site in Tennessee. They were hourly workers who performed tasks related to the pallet rack assembly process. They claim that they and similarly worked situated individuals who on pallet rack assembly at Elite client sites were misclassified as independent contractors rather than employees and that they were not paid overtime wages as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219. They filed this action seeking overtime wages and damages under the FLSA. Plaintiffs also seek conditional certification of their putative FLSA collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Defendants oppose certification, arguing that Plaintiffs’ proposed class is too broad and includes individuals who are not similarly situated to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have not Defendants also maintain that established that individuals wish to opt in to this action. detail below, the Court grants similarly situated As discussed in more Plaintiffs’ motion for conditional certification (ECF No. 15). DISCUSSION An employer overtime who compensation violates the requirements FLSA’s shall be minimum liable wage or to the affected employees in the amount of the unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). An action to recover such wages or compensation may be maintained against the employer as a collective action, and employees wishing to be plaintiffs in such an action must “opt in” by filing a written consent with the court. See id. To maintain an FLSA collective action, the plaintiffs “must demonstrate that they are similarly situated.” Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1258 (11th Cir. 2008). 2 The Eleventh Circuit has approved a two-stage procedure for managing FLSA collective actions. “The first step of whether a collective action should be certified is the notice stage.” at 1260. Id. During the notice stage, the court must determine “whether other similarly situated employees should be notified” of the action based on the pleadings and any affidavits. Id.; accord Hipp v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1218 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). The plaintiff must show “a ‘reasonable basis’ for his claim that there are other similarly situated employees.” Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1260; accord Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1097 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that plaintiffs must demonstrate “a ‘reasonable basis’ for their claim of class-wide discrimination”). The standard for determining similarity at the notice stage is “fairly lenient.” Id. at 1261 (quoting Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1218). If the court conditionally certifies a collective action, then putative class members are given notice and an opportunity to “opt in.” 252 F.3d at 1218. stage. ready The second stage is the “decertification” When “discovery is largely complete and the matter is for trial[,]” “decertification,” a and defendant the may court file must a make determination on the similarly situated question.” Mooney Hipp, v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 3 F.3d 1207, motion “a for factual Id. (quoting 1214 (5th Cir. 1995)). If the Court determines that the matter should not proceed as a collective action, the action shall be decertified. Plaintiffs presently seek conditional certification so that they may notify potential class members of their right to opt in to the action. No discovery has taken place. In support of their motion to certify, each Plaintiff submitted a declaration. According to Plaintiffs’ declarations, each Plaintiff provided pallet rack assembly services at an Elite client site—Jacobo Rangel as a forklift operator, Luis Rangel as a scissor lift operator, and Adrian Rangel as a floorman. that they Compliance were and employed Elite by Compliance controlled their Plaintiffs assert and work Elite and schedule, protocols, assignments, and employment conditions. that duties, Plaintiffs also contend that they were not paid overtime wages even though they worked more than forty hours per week. Finally, Plaintiffs claim that they know other individuals who worked for Defendants with the same or similar job duties and under the same practices and policies but did not receive overtime. maintain that employees as other denied Defendants’ independent similarly situated compensation, practice of contractors employees, would likely action if given notice. 4 Thus, Plaintiffs improperly is who opt classifying widespread have in to and that wrongfully been the collective Defendants that object Plaintiffs are to conditional not similarly certification, situated to other arguing hourly pallet assembly laborers who worked for Compliance and Elite. First, Defendants emphasize that Elite’s pallet assembly workers were placed states. at The fifty Court different finds job this argument conditional certification stage. not necessarily doom a sites across twenty-five unpersuasive at the Geographical differences do collective action, as long as the plaintiffs held similar positions and were subjected to similar treatment by the same decisionmakers. See, e.g., Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1219, 1245 (finding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in plaintiffs held certifying the same a collective job title action and where alleged the similar discriminatory treatment, even though the plaintiffs worked in different geographical locations). Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs were not subjected to similar treatment by the same decisionmakers. In support of this argument, Defendants point to the declarations of David Hurd, one of Elite’s officers. In his declarations, Hurd avers that approximately half of the workers on Elite’s projects are managed by Elite’s clients or are subject to policies and procedures. certain client Hurd thus appears to acknowledge that half of the workers on Elite’s projects are managed directly by Elite. Hurd’s declarations do not state that Plaintiffs were 5 managed by a client (and not Elite), and his declarations do not state that Plaintiffs were not subject to Elite’s overtime policies and procedures even if they were managed by a client. Nothing in the present record refutes the assertions in Plaintiffs’ declarations: Plaintiffs and other pallet assembly workers on Elite client sites had similar job duties and worked under similar policies made by the same decisionmakers. Therefore, for purposes of the present motion for conditional certification, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiffs have sufficiently established under the lenient notice-stage standard that they are similarly situated to other hourly pallet assembly workers who worked on Elite client sites as forklift operators, scissor lift operators, and floormen—including workers who were placed by Compliance. The remaining question is whether Plaintiffs have demonstrated “that there are other similarly situated employees” who desire to opt in. Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1259-60; accord Dybach v. State of Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 942 F.2d 1562, 1567 (11th Cir. 1991). Although a district court would abuse its discretion by granting conditional certification when a motion is supported only by “counsel’s unsupported assertions that FLSA violations [are] widespread and that additional plaintiffs would” join the action if given notice, Haynes v. Singer Co., 6 696 F.2d 884, 887-88 (11th Cir. 1983), the present record is more substantial than that. Plaintiffs presented declarations stating that Defendants controlled their work schedule, duties, protocols, assignments, and employment conditions. Plaintiffs’ declarations also state that Plaintiffs were not paid overtime wages even though they worked more than forty hours per week. Plaintiffs’ declarations further state that Plaintiffs know other workers who performed the same or overtime similar practices job and duties, were procedures, collective action if given notice. and subjected would to opt the in to same the Defendants do not dispute that hundreds of Elite’s workers, including client site pallet assembly workers, were classified as independent contractors and were not paid overtime. In sum, Defendants there had a does not appear widespread to practice be of any dispute classifying that pallet assembly workers as independent contractors and not paying them overtime. The misclassified contractors. only the The dispute pallet Court is whether assembly is Defendants workers actually independent that satisfied as Plaintiffs’ declarations—which aver that Defendants controlled Plaintiffs’ work schedule, duties, protocols, assignments, and employment conditions—“successfully contrary” on this engage point defendants’ and suggest 7 affidavits that to Plaintiffs the were misclassified.1 Grayson, 79 F.3d at 1097 (quoting Sperling v. Hoffman–LaRoche, 118 F.R.D. 392, 406 (D.N.J. 1988)). The Court acknowledges that some other district courts have applied a stricter standard for conditional certification, requiring a critical mass of similarly situated employees to opt in as plaintiffs before the Court authorizes notice to be sent to such employees. The Court rejects the rationale of these cases, which seem to establish some arbitrary number of opt-ins before an action can be certified. Under this rationale, conditional certification would presumably be inappropriate if you had 20 named plaintiffs, with the prospect of additional opt-ins if notice were provided, but at the time of the motion for conditional certification, employees had actually opted in. no other similarly situated Yet if you only had one named plaintiff and 19 opt-ins before certification, then that action would be certified. The Court rejects this approach. Moreover, the Court does not find such an approach supported by Eleventh Circuit precedent, which makes it clear that a more lenient standard should be applied at the conditional certification stage. 1 Obviously, once some discovery is completed, it may become clear that pallet assembly workers were properly classified as independent contractors or that Defendants did not control the manner and means by which pallet assembly workers’ work was accomplished. But at this point, the record is not sufficiently developed for the Court to find as a matter of law that Plaintiffs have not shown a reasonable basis for their claims. 8 In the present case, evidence exists that there was a widespread practice of classifying pallet assembly workers as independent contractors and not paying them overtime. Three Plaintiffs consented to join this action; they just all happened to do so at the same time. Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ sworn declarations state that they know other individuals who would opt in if given notice. It is reasonable to conclude that, given the number of potential workers who may not have been fully compensated, some would likely seek to recover whatever compensation the law requires them to be paid. They certainly should be given notice of their rights and the opportunity to exercise them if they wish to do so. the Court applicable is at satisfied this stage that in the For all of these reasons, under the litigation, lenient standard Plaintiffs have sufficiently established that other similarly situated employees would opt in to this action if given notice. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs’ motion for conditional certification (ECF No. 15) is granted.2 The Court conditionally certifies this action as an FLSA collective action for all hourly workers who, in connection with the pallet rack 2 By granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify, the Court is not making a final determination that Plaintiffs’ and the potential class members were “employees” and not “independent contractors” within the meaning of the FLSA. But based on the present record, sufficient evidence exists for conditional certification. 9 assembly process, performed services in the positions of forklift operator, scissor-lift operator, or floorman for Defendant Elite Storage Solutions, LLC (including any workers placed with Defendant Elite Storage Solutions, LLC by Defendant Compliance Staffing Agency, LLC) and who were classified as independent contractors at any time during the last three years.3 The parties shall confer and submit to the Court within fourteen days of today’s order the following: (1) a joint proposed notice and consent form for Court approval; and (2) a joint proposal on the methodology for class notification. The Court is inclined to approve notice via first-class mail and email to all individuals who are potential opt-in plaintiffs based on the class as defined above. Finally, Plaintiffs seek limited discovery for the purpose of identifying and notifying potential class members. twenty one Plaintiffs’ days of counsel today’s with a Order, list of Defendants all Within shall individuals provide who are potential opt-in plaintiffs based on the class as defined above. The list shall be in electronic format and shall include each individual’s name, job title, last known address, email address, telephone number, employment dates, and employment location. The parties shall enter into a confidentiality agreement such 3 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants willfully violated the FLSA. Willful violations of the FLSA are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 10 that any of the information provided shall be used solely for the purpose of notifying potential class members of their right to opt in to this action. IT IS SO ORDERED, this 12th day of July, 2016. S/Clay D. Land CLAY D. LAND CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 11
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