FUQUA et al v. Pridgen et al, No. 1:2012cv00093 - Document 82 (M.D. Ga. 2013)
Court Description: ORDER denying 48 Motion to Dismiss Complaint; denying 52 Motion to Dismiss Complaint; granting in part and denying in part 72 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction.Ordered by Judge W. Louis Sands on 7/30/13 (wks)
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FUQUA et al v. Pridgen et al Doc. 82 IN TH E U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT FOR TH E MID D LE D ISTRICT OF GEORGIA ALBAN Y D IVISION BEVERLY FUQUA et al, : : Plaintiffs, : : v. : : J OHN PRIDGEN et al, : : Defendants. : ___________________________ _: Case No.: 1:12-cv-93 (WLS) ORD ER Before the Court are Defendant Donnie Haralson’s Motion to Dism iss (Doc. 48 ); Defendant J udges J ohn Pridgen, Robert Chasteen, J r., and T. Christopher Hughes’s Motion to Dism iss (Doc. 52); and Defendants J am es R. Butts, J am es C. Clark, J ohn K. Fletcher, Dewey R. Hannon, Wilbert King, and Donald C. Paulk’s Motion to Dism iss (Doc. 72). For the reasons that follow, the judges’ and sheriff’s m otions (Docs. 48 , 52) are D EN IED , and the third m otion (Doc. 72) is D EN IED in p art and GRAN TED in p a rt. RELEVAN T PROCED U RAL an d FACTU AL BACKGROU N D This is a civil rights case against judges, bailiffs, and a sheriff in Ben Hill County and Crisp County, Georgia. Plaintiffs are m em bers of the public who allege the defendants barred them from attending crim inal proceedings at the County Law Enforcem ent courtroom s, in violation of the First Am endm ent to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section I, of the Georgia Constitution. (Doc. 1 ¶ 2.) They seek declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent future courtroom closures, nom inal dam ages against the bailiffs, and litigation expenses. (Id. ¶ 1.) 1 Dockets.Justia.com The Court described the factual allegations in a previous order. (Doc. 42.) Here it is sufficient to sum marize. Ben Hill County and Crisp County, both of the Cordele J udicial Circuit, have Law Enforcem ent Centers (LECs). The LECs house pretrial detainees and contain a sm all courtroom where Superior Court judges hold various crim in al hearings, such as arraignm ents, bond hearings, guilty pleas, and sentencings. Bailiffs or deputy sheriffs guard the LEC courtroom doors and stop every person seeking entrance. To gain entrance, the visitor m ust identify herself and the crim in al defendant whose hearing she wants to observe. The posted officer then tells the visitor to wait in the lobby until that person’s case is called. She is then allowed entrance only if she belongs to the crim inal defendant’s fam ily and that defendant enters a plea of guilty. This practice allegedly occurs regardless of available seating. Plaintiffs filed the com plaint containing these allegations on J une 21, 20 12. They also m oved for a prelim inary injunction and provided about a dozen affidavits substantiating the allegations. (Doc. 4.) In opposition to a prelim inary injunction, Defendants Chief J udge J ohn Pridgen and J udges Robert Chasteen, J r. and T. Christopher Hughes (“Defendant J udges”) provided affidavits stating they have open proceedings but som etim es ask court officers to lim it entry to interested parties because of space lim itations. (Doc. 10 .) In J anuary and February 20 13, Plaintiffs provided five m ore affidavits from individuals who were excluded from som e of the described proceedings. (Doc. 38, 41.) On February 20 , 20 13, the Court resolved three pending m otions, including Defendant J udges’ Motion to Dism iss. (Doc. 42.) In the process, the Court rejected Defendant J udges’ argum ents that the com plaint failed to state a First Am endm ent 2 violation and that Plaintiffs were not entitled to a declaratory judgm ent. The Court then scheduled a hearing on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Prelim inary Injunction. Fourteen days after the Order’s entry, on March 6, 20 13, Defendant J udges executed a standing order titled, “STANDING ORDER 20 13-0 1: COURTROOM ACCESS FOR CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS” (hereinafter “Standing Order”). (Doc. 52-2.) The Standing Order provides that “this Circuit has been and will continue to be dedicated to the Constitutional Rights of the Public to have access to the Courts.” Further, it explains, “it is and always has been the policy of the Superior Court J udges of the Cordele J udicial Circuit that all proceedings in all courtroom s of the Circuit be open to the general public, except when closure is specifically found by the Court to be necessary in certain specific cases provided by law.” The Standing Order then provides that the bailiffs and deputy sheriffs “shall allow access for persons who wish to observe court proceedings to the extent possible to rem ain in com pliance with occupancy and safety requirem ents.” The Standing Order states that all crim inal court proceedings will be held in the Ben Hill and Crisp County courthouses, unless ordered otherwise in particular cases. Shortly after filing the Standing Order, Defendant J udges m oved to dism iss this case for m ootness. They argue the case no longer presents a live controversy because the Standing Order requires the bailiffs and sheriffs to keep courtroom s open and the county courtroom s allow m ore seating. In its February 20 , 20 13 Order, the Court also denied Defendant Crisp County Sheriff Donnie Haralson’s m otion to dism iss. Haralson filed an interlocutory appeal and renewed his m otion to dism iss for qualified im m unity and sovereign im m unity. After Haralson voluntarily dism issed his appeal, he also m oved to dism iss for m ootness and lack of standing. He argues Plaintiffs lack standing to seek a declaratory judgm ent 3 because he cannot provide the relief requested. Only the judges can decide where an d how to conduct the crim inal proceedings. He rests his m ootness argum ent on Defendant J udges’ Standing Order. Finally, the newest parties to this action—Ben Hill County bailiffs J am es R. Butts, J am es C. Clark, J ohn K. Fletcher, Dewey R. Hannon, Wilbert King, and Donald C. Paulk—m oved on May 10 , 20 13 to dism iss claim s for lack of standing and absolute quasi-judicial im m unity. Like Sheriff Haralson, they, too, argue they cannot provide the requested relief because only the judges control the courtroom s. Additionally, they claim they are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial im m unity because they m erely serve as conduits for a valid judicial order. The bailiffs also m ove to dism iss any existing Sixth or Fourteenth Am endm ent claim s. D ISCU SSION The Court first addresses Defendants’ Motions to Dism iss Under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of standing and m ootness. After concluding the case rem ain s justiciable, the Court rejects Defendant Bailiffs’ assertion of absolute quasi-judicial im m unity. To the extent Plaintiffs raised Sixth and Fourteenth Am endm ent claim s in their com plaint, the Court dism isses them . Fin ally, the Court den ies Defendant Haralson’s renewed grounds for dism issal. I. J u s ticiability Article III of the United States Constitution lim its federal judicial power to “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2. "In our system of governm ent, courts have 'no busin ess' deciding legal issues or expounding on law in the absence of such a case or controversy.” Already , LLC v. N ike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 726 (20 13) (quoting Daim lerChry sler Corp v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (20 0 6). This lim it—called 4 justiciability—preserves separation of powers and ensures that the courts of the United States focus only on cases presenting an actual adversarial dispute. Al N ajjar v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330 , 1335 (11th Cir. 20 0 1). The requirem ent of justiciability includes the doctrines of standing and m ootness. Id. Both standing and m ootness ask, in essence, whether interested parties present a case with an actual, live controversy to which a court can provide m eaningful relief. E.g., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997). Defendant Bailiffs and Defendant Haralson claim Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue injunctive or declaratory relief because these defendants allegedly have no control over the courtroom proceedings. Defendant J udges and Defendant Haralson argue this case is m oot because they have ceased the challenged practice. After a consideration of both argum ents, 1 the Court concludes that this case is justiciable as to all parties an d claim s. a. Stan d in g Standing is a core com ponent of Article III’s case-and-controversy lim itation. Lujan v. Defenders of W ildlife, 50 4 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citation om itted). “The Suprem e Court has explained that the ‘irreducible constitutional m inim um ’ of standing under Article III consists of three elem ents: an actual or im m inent injury, causation, and redressability.” H olly w ood Mobile Estates Ltd. v. Sem inole Tribe of Fla., 641 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir. 20 11) (citing Lujan, 50 4 U.S. at 560 – 61). Defendant Haralson and Defendant Bailiffs challenge the third elem ent. Redressability requires the plaintiff to show it is “’likely,’ as opposed to m erely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan, 50 4 U.S. 1 The Court m ay consider the entire record on a m otion to dism iss for lack of standing or m ootn ess, Elend v. Basham , 471 F.3d 1199, 120 8 (11th Cir. 20 0 6), and the Court has considered the entire record. 5 at 561 (quoting Sim on v. E. Ky . W elfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 , 43 (1976)). In other words, “[r]edressability is established when a favorable decision would am ount to a significant increase in the likelihood that the plaintiff would obtain relief that directly redresses the injury suffered.” Holly w ood Mobile Estates Ltd., 641 F.3d at 1266. The rem edy need not m en d every injury, so long as it provides som e m easure of relief. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526 (20 0 7). Non-judicial defendants claim redressability is lacking because they have no authority to grant the requested relief. Specifically, only the judges, they assert, can control who enters the courtroom s and where the proceedings are located. Thus, they argue injunctive and declaratory relief cannot rem edy Plaintiff’s alleged injury. This argum ent is unpersuasive. First, assum ing Defen dants’ version of the events—that they are m erely passive enforcers of the judge’s instructions—their argum ents lack legal m erit. It is bedrock federal law that a defendant who enforces an unconstitutional policy can be en joined from future enforcem ent, regardless of the policy’s authorship. See Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Sec’y , Fla. Dept. of Transp., 715 F.3d 1268, 1289– 90 (11th Cir. 20 13). Defendants’ argum ent to the contrary is like saying the attorney general in Ex Parte Young could be not enjoined because he was enforcing a legislative act only the legislature could am end. Cf. Ex Parte Young, 20 9 U.S. 123, 159– 60 (190 8). The act m ay be unconstitutional in the abstract but it does not generally cause injury until there is a possibility of enforcem ent. See Babbitt v. United Farm W orkers N at’l Union, 442 U.S. 28 9, 298 (1979). Enjoining an executive officer from carrying out an unconstitutional com m and prevents that com m and from causing injury. 6 Notably, neither the bailiffs nor Sheriff Haralson offer any law to directly support this result. Their reliance on Abdullah v. Alabam a Sentencing Com m ission, 386 F. App’x 947 (11th Cir. 20 10 ), is m isplaced. Defendant Bailiffs description of Abdullah is accurate: “In that case, the plaintiff sought to have a state statute concerning sex offender reporting abrogated and to have state records of sex offenders purged . . . . The defendant, however, was only em powered to m ake recom m en dations concern ing crim in al legislation and was not em powered to enact, m odify, appeal or enforce legislation.” (Doc. 72-1 at 4 (citing Abdullah, 386 F. App’x at 949) (em phasis added).) Unlike Abdullah, Defendants not only enforce the challenged practice, but also, based on the preponderance of the record evidence, enforce it with wide discretion. Second, beyond its lack of legal support, Defendants’ argum ents face a m ore practical problem . The record does not support their role as passive enforcers. Defendants point to the judges’ affidavits and Standing Order to establish they obediently m in ister the judges’ instructions. This is odd, because, in those very docum ents, Defendant J udges im ply, perhaps accidentally or unintentionally, that any violation is on the part of the bailiffs and deputy sheriffs. “It . . . has always been” the judge’s policy to keep the courtroom s open absent a case-by-case finding. (Doc. 52-2.) Further, the judges claim they have alw ay s directed the bailiffs and deputy sheriffs to allow the public in the proceedings as space perm its. (E.g., Doc. 10 -1 ¶¶ 18– 22.) But som eone, according to the allegations of about a dozen affiants, has denied the public full access to the proceedings at the LECs despite abundant seating. In every case, the person in the first instance to deny entry is a bailiff or deputy sheriff. In sum m ary, the record and law am ply support the Court’s finding that Plaintiffs have stan ding to seek an injunction again st the bailiffs and sheriff. Regardless of the 7 source of the alleged policy of closure, an injunction will prevent them enforcing the challenged practice. Because the Court concludes Plaintiffs have standing to seek injunctive relief, the Court likewise finds they m ay also seek a declaratory judgm ent. See Arris Group, Inc. v. British Telecom m . PLC, 639 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 20 11) (“A party has standing to bring an action under the declaratory judgm ent act if an ‘actual controversy’ exists, 28 U.S.C. § 220 1(a), which is the sam e as an Article III case or controversy.”). Their m otions to dism iss on this ground are D EN IED . b. Mo o tn e s s Defendant J udges and Defendant Haralson claim this case is now m oot because the Standing Order ends the challenged practice. “[A] federal court has no authority ‘to give opinions upon m oot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare prin ciples or rules of law which cannot affect the m atter in issue in the case before it.” Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 50 6 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)). When a case becom es m oot—m eaning it no longer presents a “live” controversy to which a court can provide m eaningful relief—a court m ust dism iss it for lack of justiciability. Troiano v. Supervisor of Elections in Palm Beach Cnty ., Fla., 38 2 F.3d 1276, 1282 (11th Cir. 20 0 4) (citations om itted). Ordinarily, a defendant cannot m oot a case in the m idst of litigation sim ply by ending its unlawful conduct. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (20 0 0 ). “Otherwise, a defendant could engage in unlawful conduct, stop when sued to have the case declared m oot, then pick up where he left off, repeating this cycle until he achieves all his unlawful ends.” Already , LLC v. N ike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 727 (20 13). For that reason, the defendant who seeks to m oot a case through voluntary cessation of the challenged practice faces a “stringent” burden. 8 Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 189. He m ust show that “subsequent events m ade it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Id. (quoting United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 20 3 (1968)). The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that “when the defen dant is not a private citizen but a governm ent actor, there is a rebuttable presum ption that the objectionable behavior will not recur.” Troiano, 382 F.3d at 1283 (em phasis in original). If there is reasonable basis to believe the term inated conduct will recur, however, the governm ent defendant is not entitled to rely on its presum ption to m oot the case. Id. at 1283– 8 5; Harrell v. The Florida Bar, 60 8 F.3d 1241, 1266 (11th Cir. 20 10 ). Courts in the Eleventh Circuit consider a num ber of factors to weigh the possibility of recurrence for governm ent officials: (1) whether the term ination of the offending conduct was unam biguous, (2) whether the policy change appears to be the result of substantial deliberation or sim ply an attem pt to m anipulate the Court’s jurisdiction; and (3) whether the governm ent has “consistently applied” the new policy. Rich v. Sec’y , Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 716 F.3d 525, 531– 32 (11th Cir. 20 13) (citations om itted). The tim ing and content of the decision are relevant both to whether the term ination was unam biguous and whether the policy change appears to be an attem pt to m anipulate the Court’s jurisdiction. Harrell, 60 8 F.3d at 1266– 67. “As for tim ing, a defendant’s cessation before receiving notice of a legal challenge weighs in favor of m ootness . . . while cessation that occurs ‘late in the gam e’ will m ake a court ‘m ore skeptical of voluntary changes that have been m ade.’” Id. at 1266 (citations om itted). Thus, for exam ple, the Eleventh Circuit has found cases justiciable when the state changed course after being sued by a plaintiff and the Departm ent of J ustice, Rich, 716 9 F.3d at 532; when the defendant brought a m ootness argum ent during a hearing for prelim inary injunction, N at’l Ass’n of Bds. of Pharm acy v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sy s. of Ga., 633 F.3d 1297, 1312 (11th Cir. 2011); and when a city m oved to dism iss the case for m ootness one day after am ending its challenged ordinance and six weeks after the filing of the lawsuit, N at’l Adver. Co. v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 943 F.2d 283, 284– 8 6 (11th Cir. 1991). As for the content of the decision, the Eleventh Circuit has considered a num ber of factors to determ ine whether the defendant “unam biguously term inated” the unlawful conduct. See Harrell, 60 8 F.3d at 1267. “[A]ct[ing] in secrecy, m eeting behind closed doors and . . . failing to disclose the basis for [the] decision” cut against a finding that the case is m oot. Id. (noting that, as a result of the secrecy, the court has “no idea whether the [defendant’s] decision was ‘well-reasoned’ and therefore likely to endure”). Likewise, courts view with skepticism defen dants who, while claim ing the case is m oot, continue to push the challenged practice’s constitutionality. See id.; ACLU v. The Florida Bar, 999 F.2d 1486, 1494 (11th Cir. 1993). Additionally, “[i]n determ ining whether an offending policy is likely to be reinstated, the [the Eleventh Circuit] is m ore likely to find that the challenged behavior is not reasonably likely to recur where it constituted an isolated incident, was unintentional, or was at least engaged in reluctantly. . . . Conversely, [the court is] m ore likely to find a reasonable expectation of recurrence when the challenged behavior constituted a continuing practice or was otherwise deliberate.’” Atheists of Fla., Inc. v. City of Lakeland, Fla., 713 F.3d 577, 594 (11th Cir. 20 13) (internal citation and quotations om itted). 10 Applying these factors, the Court concludes Defendants have not unam biguously term inated the challenged practice. Defendants’ Standing Order, filed nine m onths after the initiation of this lawsuit, cam e “late in the gam e.” Rich, 716 F.3d at 532 (citation om itted). The extraordinary delay in executing the one-page order causes the Court pause, particularly given the haste—two weeks—with which Defendants executed it following the denial of their m otion to dism iss. That the Standing Order arrived just before a hearing on a m otion for prelim inary injunction also suggests Defendants have not unam biguously term inated the challenged practice. Defen dants have offered no explanation for the delay. The content of the Standing Order fares no better in the Court’s analysis. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the Standing Order m erely reiterates the position Defendants took in their m otion to dism iss and response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Prelim inary Injunction. The Order begins by explaining the Defendant J udges are dedicated to the public’s constitutional right to attend court proceedings. Further, the Standing Order explains “it is and alw ay s has been the policy of the Superior Court J udges . . . that all Court proceedings in all courtroom s of the Circuit be open to the general public, except when closure is specifically found by the Court to be necessary in certain specific cases as provided by law.” (Doc. 52-2 (em phasis added).) The Order therefore requires “the bailiffs and/ or deputy sheriffs . . . [to] allow access for persons who wish to observe court proceedings to the extent possible to rem ain in com pliance w ith occupancy and safety requirem ents.” (Id. (em phasis added).) But Defendant J udges have long argued their proceedings are open to the public “to the extent possible to rem ain in com pliance with occupancy and safety requirem ents.” (See Doc. 10 at 10 (noting the judges instruct courtroom staff to “first ensure that any m em bers of the 11 public with an interest in the proceedings . . . are perm itted to enter the courtroom for those proceedings and then, if space is available, perm it the public to enter and leave at their discretion”); Doc. 10 -1 ¶ 22 (“My instructions to the bailiffs are, and always have been, that when space is available m em bers of the public should be perm itted to enter and leave at their discretion provided that they do not disrupt proceedings.”); Doc. 10 -2 (sam e); Doc. 10 -3 (sam e); Doc. 9-1.) At bottom , the Standing Order harkens back to the sam e hyper-technical argum ent the Defendants m ade in their m otion to dism iss— nam ely, that because they never entered a written or oral order form ally closing the courtroom , there was and is no constitutional violation, m erely space lim itations. But this explanation fails to explain why so m any m em bers of the public allege they are excluded from proceedings, despite available seating. Additionally, by m aintaining it “always has been” the judges’ policy to keep the proceedings open, Defendants have essentially continued to press the challenged practice’s constitutionality. Because the Standing Order echoes fam iliar statem ents, it raises questions about the reasons for its sudden issuance. In explanation, Defendants point to affidavits they executed about a year ago, which reflect “their intention . . . to do what is necessary to ensure that all superior court proceedings are open to the public to the extent consistent with capacity and safety concerns. . . . Moving all superior court crim inal proceedings to the larger county courthouses which can accom m odate m ore m em bers of the public and ordering all bailiffs and deputy sheriffs to follow their directives in this regard accom plishes this objective.” (Doc. 77 at 8.) But the Court fails to see why this reasoning did not persuade Defendants som etim e in the nine m onths between the com plaint and Standing Order. Because the Standing Order’s reasoning and purpose are buried 12 beneath such questions, the Court is unable to assess whether its reasoning is sound today an d whether the decision is likely to endure. See Harrell, 60 8 F.3d at 1267. The evidence also preponderates toward a finding that the challenged practice is m ore than a one-tim e occurrence. About eighteen people have testified via affidavit that they have been excluded, often on different days, from som e part of the LEC proceedings. In their affidavits, Defendants disavow any knowledge, beyond a single episode, of com plaints from m em bers of the public being excluded from crim inal proceedings at the LECs. But this statem ent is underm in ed by the fact that Defendants were sued for the sam e conduct in 20 0 3. But regardless of that case, this lawsuit and the affidavits in the Motion for Prelim inary Injunction surely put Defendants on notice of com plaints about the proceedings in the LECs. Despite that, Plaintiffs furnished affidavits as late as February 20 13 of people who cannot gain access to all of the proceedings. Because the challenged practice is not a fleeting, one-tim e incident, the Court is less likely to find the case is m oot. Finally, the Court notes there is no eviden ce that Defendants have consistently applied the new policy. There is also no evidence in the record identifying any case-specific decision by order based on space lim itations. For those reasons, the Court finds the case is not m oot because Defendants have not unam biguously term inated the challenged practice. The sam e facts also m ake it appear as though Defendants’ Standing Order is an attem pt to m anipulate the Court’s jurisdiction. In other words, at this stage, the Court cannot say it is absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur at the LECs or the county courthouses. Defendants’ Motions to Dism iss m ust be, and are, D EN IED . 13 II. Abs o lu te Qu a s i-Ju dicial Im m u n ity Defendant Bailiffs claim they are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial im m unity because they are being sued for executing a judge’s facially valid order. The doctrine of absolute quasi-judicial im m unity derives from absolute judicial im m unity. Roland v. Phillips, 19 F.3d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1994). “The policy justifying an extension of absolute judicial im m unity . . . is to prevent court personnel and other officials from becom ing a ‘lightning rod for harassing litigation’ aim ed at the court.” Richm an v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430 , 435 (7th Cir. 20 0 1) (quoting Ashbrook v. Hoffm an, 617 F.2d 474, 476 (7th Cir. 198 0 )). “Therefore, law enforcem ent personnel, acting in furtherance of their official duties and relying on a facially valid court order, are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial im m unity from suit in a section 1983 action.” Roland, 19 F.3d at 556 (citing Henry v. Farm er City State Bank, 8 0 8 F.2d 1228, 1239 (7th Cir. 1986)). A “facially valid order” does not m ean a lawful order. Id. “An erroneous order can be valid.” Id. (quoting Turney v. O’Toole, 898 F.2d 1470 , 1473 (10 th Cir. 1990 )). But “[w]hile non-judicial officers are entitled to absolute im m unity when their official duties have an integral relationship with the judicial process . . . that im m unity only attaches when the officials are acting within the scope of their authority.” Blanchard v. Overton, 449 F. App’x 8 62, 8 64 (11th Cir. 20 11) (internal quotation m arks and citations om itted). The party invoking the im m unity bears of the burden of establishing it applies. Antoine v. By ers & Anderson, Inc., 50 8 U.S. 429, 432 (1993). The Court finds that Defendant Bailiffs have not m et their burden. Absolute quasi-judicial im m unity does not apply to claim s for declaratory and injunctive relief. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 540 (1984); Shuler v. Sw atek, 465 F. App’x 90 0 , 90 3 (11th Cir. 20 12) (noting, in suit against sheriffs acting in quasi-judicial capacity, that 14 “judicial im m unity does not bar claim s brought under § 1983 seeking injunctive and declaratory relief.”). As to Plaintiffs’ request for nom inal dam ages, Defendant Bailiffs have failed to show they followed a valid judicial order and, thus, acted with absolute im m unity. According to the Com plaint, the bailiffs are “directly responsible for setting policy and determ ining who enters and leaves the courtroom , and when.” (Doc. 43 ¶¶ 19– 24 (em phasis added).) The Com plaint states that the bailiffs do not allow m em bers of the public into the courtroom s unless (1) the person seeking entry is related to a crim inal defendant and (2) the crim inal defendant enters a plea of guilty. (Id. ¶ 27.) The Com plaint provides num erous exam ples of the bailiffs applying this policy. (Id. ¶¶ 31(a), 31(b), 31(d), 31(e).) The judges allegedly have “authorized, condoned, ratified, approved, and/ or knowingly acquiesced” in this policy, (Id. ¶¶ 15– 17) but nothing in the Com plaint im plies they ordered the bailiffs to restrict access in this m anner. Drawing all reasonable inferen ces in Plaintiffs’ favor, and lim iting review to the four corners of the com plaint, Keating v. City of Miam i, 598 F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir. 20 10 ) (citation om itted), 2 the Court m ust conclude that Defendant Bailiffs are not entitled to absolute quasi-judicial im m unity at this im m ature stage of litigation. This ground is also D EN IED . III. Sixth a n d Fo u rte e n th Am e n d m e n t Claim s Defendant Bailiffs m ove to dism iss Plaintiffs’ Sixth and Fourteenth Am endm ent claim s. To the extent Plaintiffs bring those claim s, they are D ISMISSED for the reasons stated in the Court’s previous Order. (Doc. 42.) 2 Because the Court has not considered m aterials outside of the Com plaint to address this ground of Defendant Bailiffs’ Motion to Dism iss, the Court does not convert the m otion to a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent. 15 IV. D e fe n d an t H a rals o n ’s claim s fo r qu alifie d im m u n ity a n d s o ve re ign im m u n ity Defendant Haralson renewed his claim s for qualified im m unity and sovereign im m unity in his m otion to dism iss to preserve those issues for appeal. The Court now denies those claim s for the sam e reasons stated in its previous Order. (Doc. 42.) CON CLU SION For those reasons, Defendant J udges’ and Defendant Haralson’s m otions (Doc. 48 , 52) are D EN IED . Defendant Bailiffs’ (Doc. 72) m otion is D EN IED in p art and GRAN TED in p art, as follows: all of Defendant Bailiffs’ claim s regarding standing and absolute quasi-judicial im m unity are denied, and his claim s regarding any existing Sixth and Fourteenth Am endm ent claim s are granted. SO ORD ERED , this 30 th day of J uly 20 13. / s/ W. Louis Sands TH E H ON ORABLE W . LOU IS SAN D S, U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT 16
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