WILLIAMS v. OWENS et al, No. 1:2011cv00142 - Document 40 (M.D. Ga. 2013)
Court Description: ORDER granting 30 Motion for Summary JudgmentOrdered by Judge W. Louis Sands on 07/31/2013 (mpw)
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WILLIAMS v. OWENS et al Doc. 40 IN TH E U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT FOR TH E MID D LE D ISTRICT OF GEORGIA ALBAN Y D IVISION POLAMESHA WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. Com m issioner BRIAN OWENS, GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, CALHOUN STATE PRISON, and CLAY TATUM, Defendants. : : : : : : : : : : : : : CASE NO.: 1:11-CV-142 (WLS) ORD ER Before the Court is Defendants Brian Owens, Georgia Departm ent of Corrections, Calhoun State Prison, and Clay Tatum ’s Motion for Sum m ary J udgm ent. (Doc. 30 .) For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ m otion is GRAN TED . PROCED U RAL BACKGROU N D This Title VII case arises out of a confrontation between Plaintiff Polam esha William s (“William s”) and Donovan Toole (“Toole”), both form er correctional officers at Calhoun State Prison. After William s slapped Toole during a disagreem ent, the prison warden, Clay Tatum , fired her for purportedly violating a workplace violence policy. William s, a black wom an, then filed suit alleging her term ination resulted from sex and race discrim ination. She claim s her firing was pretextual because Toole, a white m an with an alleged history of instigating violence, was not also fired. After the close of discovery, Defendants m oved for sum m ary judgm ent. They raise a num ber of argum ents. First, they claim that Defendants Tatum , Owens, and Calhoun State Prison are im proper parties because William s seeks to hold the em ployer, 1 Dockets.Justia.com the Departm ent of Corrections, liable. Second, Defendants argue William s has not established a prim a facie case because she has not identified a sim ilarly situated person outside her protected class who did not suffer an adverse em ploym ent action. Finally, they m aintain Tatum and his supervisors fired William s for a legitim ate, nondiscrim inatory reason—nam ely, striking another em ployee. William s failed to respond to Defendants’ m otion for about four m onths. With the Court’s leave, William s filed an out-of-tim e response opposing sum m ary judgm ent. In the response, William s argues Toole is a sim ilarly situated em ployee. Additionally, she claim s that the term ination was pretextual because Toole had a history of provoking violent reactions, and he violated the tardiness policy num erous tim es before being fired. STATEMEN T OF U N D ISPU TED FACTS The following facts are derived from the Com plaint (Doc. 1); the Answer (Doc. 19); Defendants’ Statem ent of Undisputed Facts (Doc. 30 -2)), which was subm itted according to Local Rule 56; 1 and the record in this case. The facts are straightforward and essentially undisputed. William s, a black wom an, began working as a correctional officer at Calhoun State Prison on May 5, 20 0 5. (Doc. 32-2 ¶ 1; Doc. 37 ¶ 1.) Correctional officers with the Georgia Departm ent of Corrections (“DOC”) are expected to know and abide by DOC policies, procedures, rules and regulations, including the DOC Standard Operating Pro1 William s, who is represented by counsel, filed a deficient response to Defendants’ Statem ent of Material Facts. First, William s claim s, in nearly half of her responses, she “is without further inform ation sufficient to adm it or deny” certain facts. In other responsive paragraphs, William s denies certain facts without citation to the record. This Court’s local rules provide: “All m aterial facts contain ed in the m oving party’s statem ent which are not specifically controverted by specific citation to the record shall be deem ed to have been adm itted, unless otherwise appropriate. The response that a party has insufficient knowledge to adm it or deny is not an acceptable response unless the party has com plied with the provisions of Rule 56[d] of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” These deficien t responses are, therefore, deem ed adm itted. 2 cedures (“SOP”). (Doc. 30 -2 ¶ 3; Doc. 37 ¶ 3.) The SOP provides that “em ployees m ust conduct them selves in a m anner which reflects credit upon them selves, their coworkers, and the Departm ent.” (Doc. 5, Ex. B.) According to the SOP, “[e]m ployees shall not engage in illegal activity or other activity which would violate public safety or public trust,” such as “any assault or battery.”(Id.) Moreover, workplace violence “will result in appropriate disciplinary action, up to and including dism issal, rem oval from the workplace and/ or crim inal charges.” (Doc. 5, Ex. E.) In 20 0 9, Clay Tatum , a white m an, was warden at Calhoun State Prison. (Doc. 30 -2 ¶ 2; Doc. 37 ¶ 2.) That year, William s was disciplined twice for conflicts with coworkers. On J uly 20 , 20 0 9, William s received an Official Letter of Reprim and arising from a confrontation with another correctional officer, Dianundra Parks. 2 Then on Decem ber 11, 20 0 9, William s slapped Toole during a disagreem ent about work responsibilities in the prison con trol room . Toole did not strike William s but walked to the telephone an d reported the incident. After William s and Toole’s confrontation, Tatum reviewed reports from the incident. (Doc. 30 -5 ¶ 14.) Shift supervisors Lt. J essie Tarver and Lt. Russell Hollm an, both black m en, reported that Toole told them that William s struck him ; she told them , “it was done as an im pulse” because “[Toole] stepped into her personal space.” (Doc. 30 -5, Ex. D.) Tatum also reviewed William ’s statem ent. (Doc. 30 -5 ¶ 14.) In her statem ent, 2 William s claim s this inform ation is hearsay and should be excluded. This assertion is wholly without m erit. Ordinarily, inadm issible hearsay can not be considered on a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent. Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 68 3 F.3d 1283, 1293 (11th Cir. 20 12) (quoting Macuba v. Deboer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 1999)). But a district court m ay consider hearsay statem ents on a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent if the statem ent could be reduced to adm issible evidence at trial. Id. Here, the Court m ay consider this evidence for several reasons. First, the statem ents in the letter are not offered for the truth of the m atter asserted. Rather, Defendants proffered the letter to show its effect on Tatum ’s state of m ind when he fired William s. Second, even if the letter was hearsay, Tatum could testify him self at trial to the fact that he disciplined William s on this occasion . Finally, the letter is a record of a regularly conducted activity under Federal Rule of Evidence 80 3(6). 3 William s also said she struck Toole “on an im pulse” because he “stepped into [her] personal space.” (Id.) Tatum viewed this incident as workplace violence. He considered William s’ prior confrontation with Parks and, taken together, thought these incidences dem onstrated an in ability to m aintain com posure. Tatum concluded that William s’ conduct violated several provisions of the SOP. He also thought the conduct created a safety concern because it in dicated to inm ates a lack of control over the area. Before deciding to fire William s, Tatum consulted several other sources. First, he reviewed the Adverse Sanction Guidelines provided by the DOC’s Legal Office. These guidelines provided that workplace violence accom panied by aggravating circum stances, such as physical contact and prior adverse action, warranted dism issal. Tatum also contacted the DOC’s Legal Office, which advised him that dism issal was appropriate. Tatum then decided to fire William s. Toole did not receive any disciplin e. Tatum testified Toole was not disciplined because he did not strike William s or violate the SOP rules. Moreover, to Tatum ’s knowledge, Toole never engaged in violen ce during his em ploym ent at the prison. On Decem ber 14, 20 0 9, Tatum notified William s he intended to fire her for the incident, effective Decem ber 15, 20 0 9. The letter inform ed her she had a right to request review of the decision. William s appealed the dism issal to Robert Cooley, a black m an, who is the Com m issioner’s Designee for Adverse Action. Tatum provided Cooley with the reasons for his decision. William s subm itted statem ents from herself, Tarver, and Hollm an. On Decem ber 22, 20 0 9, William s and Tatum received notice from Cooley upholding the dism issal. 4 William s also wrote the Com m issioner of the DOC, Brian Owens, a white m an , alleging her term ination was racially m otivated. Owens initiated an investigation into the decision. Nola Bricker, a white wom an, interviewed William s and other witnesses, reviewed personnel files, and studied the dem ographic m akeup of the prison. She concluded that William s’ claim of racial discrim ination was unsubstantiated. D ISCU SSION I. Su m m ary Ju d gm e n t Stan d ard s Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, sum m ary judgm ent is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and adm issions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any m aterial fact and that the m oving party is entitled to a judgm ent as a m atter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). An issue is “genuine” if the eviden ce is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonm oving party. Hoffm an v. Allied Corp., 912 F.2d 1379, 138 3 (11th Cir. 1990). A fact is “m aterial” if it is a legal elem ent of the claim under the applicable substantive law and it m ight affect the outcom e of the nonm oving party’s case. Allen v. Ty son Foods, 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A judgm ent is appropriate “as a m atter of law” when the nonm oving party has failed to m eet its burden of persuading the Court on an essential elem ent of the claim . See Cleveland v. Policy Mgm t. Sy s. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 8 0 4 (1999); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. The m ovant bears the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of m aterial fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. The m ovant can m eet this burden by presenting eviden ce showing there is no dispute of m aterial fact or by showing, or by pointing 5 out to, the district court that the nonm oving party has failed to present evidence in support of som e elem ent of its case on which it bears the ultim ate burden of proof. Id. at 322– 24. Once the m ovant has m et its burden, the nonm oving party is required “to go beyond the pleadings” and identify “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324. To avoid sum m ary judgm ent, the nonm oving party m ust do m ore than sum m arily deny the allegations or “show that there is som e m etaphysical doubt as to the m aterial facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 58 6 (198 6). Rather, the nonm oving party m ust provide “enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.” W alker v. Darby , 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990 ) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986)). On a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent, the Court m ust view all the evidence and all factual inferences drawn therefrom in the light m ost favorable to the nonm oving party and determ ine whether that evidence could reasonably sustain a jury verdict. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23; Allen, 121 F.3d at 646. However, the Court m ust grant sum m ary judgm ent if there is no genuine issue of m aterial fact and the m ovant is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). II. Race an d Se x D is crim in atio n Title VII m akes it unlawful for em ployers to discrim inate “with respect to [an em ployee’s] com pensation, term s, or privileges of em ploym ent” on the basis of “race, color religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 20 0 0 e-2(a)(1)(a). A plaintiff m ay prove she received disparate treatm ent on account of her race or sex through direct or circum stantial evidence. EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1286 (11th Cir. 20 0 0 ). “Direct eviden ce is eviden ce that establishes the existence of discrim inatory intent behind the em ploym ent decision without any inference or presum ption.” W ilson v. 6 B/ E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 10 79, 10 86 (11th Cir. 20 0 4) (citation om itted). Where, like here, the plaintiff relies on circum stantial evidence, she m ay satisfy her burden through the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting fram ework. Holland v. Gee, 677 F.3d 10 47, 10 55 (11th Cir. 20 12). The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting fram ework requires the plaintiff to first establish a prim a facie case of discrim ination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 80 2 (1973). Once the plaintiff establishes her prim a facie case, the burden shifts to the em ployer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscrim in atory reason for the adverse em ploym ent decision. Id.; Com bs v. Plantation Patterns, 10 6 F.3d 1519, 1528 (11th Cir. 1997). If the em ployer offers a legitim ate reason for the decision, the plaintiff m ust then produce eviden ce “sufficient to perm it a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the reasons given by the em ployer were not the real reasons for the adverse em ploym ent decision.” Chapm an v. Al Transport, 229 F.3d 10 12, 10 24 (11th Cir. 20 0 0 ). In this case, William s claim s she suffered disparate treatm ent because of her race and sex. To establish a prim a facie case of disparate treatm ent, the plaintiff m ust show (1) she belonged to a protected class; (2) was qualified for the job; (3) suffered an adverse em ploym ent action; and (4) her em ployer treated sim ilarly situated em ployees outside of her class m ore favorably than she was treated. Burke-Fow ler v. Orange County , 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 20 0 6). Defendants claim William s cannot establish her prim a facie case because she has not identified any sim ilarly situated em ployees who received m ore favorable treatm ent. Alternatively, they argue they have a legitim ate, nondiscrim in atory reason for firing William s—workplace violence—and she has not refuted that reason by providing eviden ce of a pretext. 7 ( a) Sim ilarly s itu a te d e m plo ye e s The Court agrees with Defendants that William s has failed, as a m atter of law, to identify a com parator outside her protected class. “In determ in ing whether em ployees are sim ilarly situated for purposes of establishing a prim a facie case, it is necessary to consider whether the em ployees are involved in or accused of the sam e or sim ilar conduct and are disciplin ed in different ways.” Maniccia v. Brow n, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 1999). The “quantity and quality of the com parator’s m isconduct m ust be nearly identical.” Stone & W ebster Constr., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 684 F.3d 1127, 1135 (11th Cir. 20 12). “The m ost im portant factors in the disciplinary context . . . are the nature of the offenses com m itted and the nature of the punishm ent im posed.” May nard v. Bd. of Regents of Div. of Univs. of Fla. Dep’t of Educ. ex rel., 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 20 0 3) (citation om itted). William s claim s Toole is a sim ilarly situated because they both “were correctional officers assigned to the sam e area(s).” (Doc. 38 at 3.) And while William s was fired after two incidents of m isconduct, “Toole was not term inated until after he violated GDOC policies m ultiple tim es (chronic tardiness).” (Id. at 4.) Moreover, “Toole had a history of invoking violence through actions with his co-workers.” (Id.) But Toole’s and William s’s m isconduct are not “nearly identical.” They are not even alike. Tardiness is a far cry from battery—one is unprofessional, the other a crim e. And even assum ing Toole had a “history” of provoking violence—an inferen ce unsupported by record evidence and any reasonable inference 3 —there is no allegation he slapped or struck another em ployee. 3 Other than the incident resulting in her dism issal, William s failed to identify any incidents of Toole actually provoking violence. To support this allegation, William s points to a statem en t from another correctional officer she obtained after her term ination , which said: On March 11, 20 10 , at approxim ately 1340 hours I, Officer Peterson, was exiting the briefing room . Officer Toole was standing in the doorway. I turned sideways to get by Officer 8 Had he been the incendiary William s suggests, he would still not be sim ilarly situated because there is no evidence Tatum knew of such conduct an d had reason to disciplin e. At bottom , William s has not identified a white or m ale correctional officer who, like her, hit another officer while on duty. It is clear, based on the undisputed DOC guidelines, that prison officials consider workplace violence coupled with physical contact to warrant severe sanction. William s has not identified a com parator and has therefore failed to establish her prim a facie cases of race an d sex discrim ination. ( b) Evid e n ce o f a pre te xt Even if William s had established her prim a facie case, Defendants would still be entitled to a judgm ent as a m atter of law. William s has not refuted their legitim ate, nondiscrim inatory reason for her term ination. As previously m entioned, once the plaintiff establishes her prim a facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to show it term inated her for a legitim ate, nondiscrim inatory reason. Com bs v. Plantation Patterns, 10 6 F.3d 1519, 1528 (11th Cir. 1997). “[T]he defendant m ust clearly set forth, through the introduction of adm issible evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff’s rejection.” Texas Dep’t of Cm ty . Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). “If the defendant carries this burden of production, the presum ption raised by the prim a facie case is Toole. He then brushed up against m e. I asked Officer Toole to stop playing. He in turn put his fists up in a defense m anner and stated [sic] ‘ What you want to do Officer Peterson. [sic] Go ahead hit m e. [sic] I told Officer Toole to get out of m y face and quit playin g. He continued to bounce around like he wanted to fight. Officer Toole tends to play entirely too m uch at tim es. He constantly aggravates em ployees to the point where you really want to put your hands on him but you can’t because you will be fired and Officer Toole will still have his job. After the Decem ber 11, 20 0 9 incident, William s also in form ed Cooley that “Officer Toole later expressed his apologies to m e. I too, [sic] apologized to him . He claim ed that he was only joking and that I understood his intentions. I explained to him , whether jokin g or not, he had no right to invade m y personal space. Officer Toole does have a reputation of being playful; however, he had never approached m e in the m anner in which he did.” (Doc. at 129– 30 .) Even viewed in the light m ost favorable to William s, these reports fail to establish William s had a “history” of provokin g violence. 9 rebutted . . . and drops from the case.” St. Mary ’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 50 9 U.S. 50 2, 50 7 (1993) (internal citation and quotation m arks om itted). To show that the defendant’s proffered reason is a pretext, the plaintiff m ust introduce evidence sufficient to perm it a reasonable factfinder to conclude that reason was not the real reason for the term ination. Hulbert v. St. Mary ’s Health Care Sy s., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1298 (11th Cir. 20 0 6) (quoting Chapm an v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 10 12, 10 24 (11th Cir. 20 0 0 )). A plaintiff m ay show that the use of a “work rule” is pretextual by providing eviden ce (1) she did not violate the cited work rule, or (2), if she did, other em ployees outside the protected class, who engaged in sim ilar acts, were not sim ilarly treated. Dam on v. Flem ing Superm arkets of Fla. Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1362 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Alphin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 90 4 F.2d 1497 140 1 n.1 (11th Cir. 1991)). Ultim ately, “[federal courts] do not sit as a ‘super-personnel departm ent,’ and it is not [their] role to second-guess the wisdom of an em ployer’s business decisions—indeed the wisdom of them is irrelevant—as long as those decisions were not m ade with a discrim inatory m otive.” Alvarez v. Roy al Atlantic Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1266 (11th Cir. 20 10 ) (quoting Chapm an, 229 F.3d at 10 30 ). Here, Defen dants have provided a legitim ate, nondiscrim in atory reason for William s’ term ination. The DOC procedures proscribe workplace violence, assault and battery, and conduct that underm ines public trust in the DOC. The DOC Adverse Sanction Guidelines also provides that workplace violence with physical contact warrants dism issal. There is no dispute that William s did, in fact, strike Toole. Before reaching his decision, Tatum reviewed four statem ents, all of which corroborated the narrative that William s im pulsively slapped Toole during a disagreem ent. Tatum also consulted with the DOC Legal Office, which inform ed him dism issal was appropriate. 10 William s argues this reason was a pretext because she m erely defended herself against Toole, “who had a history of inciting violent behavior (albeit no actual striking of another em ployee).” (Doc. 38 at 4 (parenthesis in original).) But there is no eviden ce the prison officials responsible for the discipline knew William s defended herself against Toole or that Toole had a history of inciting violent behavior. Tatum testified, without contradiction, that to his knowledge, “Toole n ever engaged in a physical altercation during his tenure at Calhoun State Prison.” William s’ own statem ent explain ed she an d Toole “had a m om ent where he stepped into m y personal space and I reacted on an im pulse and struck him in the face.” None of the incident statem ents explain that William s acted in self-defense. More im portantly, prison officials were entitled to treat different conduct differently, and the Court does not sit to second-guess those decisions. There is no dispute that William s alone struck another em ployee. Perhaps Toole instigated that reaction. But given that Toole’s and William ’s conduct were dissim ilar—and hers uniquely serious—William s cannot establish a pretext m erely by pointing out that she was fired an d Toole was not. There is no evidence the DOC applied the workplace-violence rule inconsistently or deviated from its rules when punishing William s. To the contrary, William s’ discipline set in m otion a m ulti-stage, well-docum ented review that involved people of other race and gender than Tatum . William s has not provided sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that workplace violence was not the real reason for the discipline. The defendants are also entitled to sum m ary judgm ent on this alternative ground. CON CLU SION 11 For those reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Sum m ary J udgm ent (Doc. 30 ) is GRAN TED . It is hereby ORD ERED AN D AD J U D GED that William s shall take nothing by her Com plaint (Docs. 1), and JU D GMEN T shall be entered in favor of Defendants. SO ORD ERED , this 31st day of J uly 20 13. / s/ W. Louis Sands TH E H ON ORABLE W . LOU IS SAN D S, U N ITED S TATES D ISTRICT COU RT 12
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