Florida Foundation Seed Producers Inc v. Georgia Farm Services LLC et al, No. 1:2010cv00125 - Document 212 (M.D. Ga. 2013)
Court Description: ORDER denying 181 Motion for Reconsideration re 180 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment. Ordered by Judge W. Louis Sands on 6/26/2013. (bcl)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Florida Foundation Seed Producers Inc v. Georgia Farm Services LLC et al Doc. 212 IN TH E U N ITED STATES D ISTRICT COU RT FOR TH E MID D LE D ISTRICT OF GEORGIA ALBAN Y D IVISION FLORIDA FOUNDATION SEED PRODUCERS, INC., Plain tiff, v. GEORGIA FARMS SERVICES, LLC, GREAT SOUTHERN PEANUT, LLC, an d WILLIAM DOUGLAS WINGATE, Defen dan ts. GEORGIA FARM SERVICES, LLC, Third-Party Plaintiff, v. GEORGIA CROP IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION, INCORPORATED, Th ird-Party Defen dan t. __________________________ : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : CASE NO.: 1:10 -CV-125 (WLS) ORD ER Presen tly pendin g before the Court is Defendan ts’ Motion for Recon sideration (Doc. 181). I. Le ga l Sta n d a rd : As the Eleven th Circuit n oted in Region 8 Forest Serv. Tim ber Purchasers Council v. Alcock, 993 F.2d 80 0 , 80 5-0 6 (11th Cir. 1993), relief gran ted from m otion s for recon sideration are within “th e sound discretion of the district judge.” Th is Court’s Local Rules address m otion s for recon sideration , providin g in relevan t part that: 1 Dockets.Justia.com 7.6 MOTION S FOR RECON SID ERATION . Motion s for Recon sideration shall n ot be filed as a matter of routin e practice. Wh en ever a party or attorn ey for a party believes it is absolutely n ecessary to file a motion to recon sider an order or judgmen t, th e motion shall be filed with the Clerk of court within fourteen (14) days after en try of the order or judgm en t. M.D. Ga. Local R. 7.6. Addition ally, it is the lon gstan din g practice of this Court to gran t a motion for recon sideration on ly wh en th e movan t timely demon strates th at eith er: (1) th ere h as been an in terven in g chan ge in the law; (2) n ew an d previously un available eviden ce has been discovered through th e exercise of due diligen ce; or (3) the court made a clear error of law. McCoy v. Macon W ater Auth., 966 F. Supp. 120 9, 1222-23 (M.D. Ga. 1997). II. D e fe n d an t’s Mo tio n fo r Re co n s id e ra tio n Defen dan t argues that: (1) the Court should recon sider its fin din g that GSP h as n ever been authorized by Plain tiff to propagate, con dition , sell, offer to sell, or oth erwise use th e Florida-0 7 variety for an y purpose; an d (2) that the Court should recon sider its fin din g that th e sale of Florida-0 7 peanuts to the edible market violates the PVPA as a m atter of law. (Doc. 181 at 1, 3.) To bolster its argumen t relatin g to GSP’s alleged authorization , Defen dan t again cites to a March 25, 20 0 9, em ail between Defen dan ts an d the Un iversity of Florida wh erein th e University of Florida stated th at it was “okay with issuin g th e tags in th e n ame of the n ew compan y, Great Southern Pean ut.” (Doc. 181 at 2.) Defen dan ts argue that th e email presen ts a fact issue as to wheth er GSP had authorization to handle Florida-0 7 seed. In respon se, Plain tiff asserts that Defen dan ts’ argumen t is n o differen t th an the argumen t presen ted in the summary judgmen t briefin g, wh ere Defen dan ts 2 argued that GSP did n ot violate th e PVPA because GCIA an d the Un iversity of Florida were n otified of the relation ship between Defen dan t GFS an d GSP. The Court addressed th e question of wheth er GSP h ad authorization to han dle Florida-0 7 seed in its previous order. Specifically, the Court h eld: Nor is the Court con vinced the alleged n otice provided to GCIA an d the Un iversity of Florida authorizes the sale. The Seed Agreemen t states in Section 2(a) that “[n ]o Plan t Material supplied or origin atin g from the Plan t Material produced un der this Agreemen t will be used for an y purpose oth er th an th at stated in this Agreemen t with out the express written permission of FFSP.” Defen dan ts offer n o auth ority that states th at the provision s of a licen sin g agreemen t between a licen see an d a licen sor that has been assign ed all rights under a plan t variety certificate sh ould be discarded when the licensee bypasses th e licen sor and n otifies the origin al bearer of the certificate of a chan ge in corporate structure. It is undisputed that Plain tiff did n ot provide written permission to authorize GFS to sublicen se conditioning an d stocking to GSP. Under 7 U.S.C. § 2541(a)(7), conditioning a protected variety for th e purpose of propagation without authority is considered infringem ent. Moreover, un der § 2541(a)(8), stockin g th e variety for con dition in g for the purpose of propagation without authority is con sidered in frin gem en t. The record reflects that GSP did n ot have a licen se or an y auth ority from Plain tiff to con dition , stock, or take an y action with regard to the Florida0 7 variety. (Doc. 180 at 18-19.) No in terven in g chan ge in the law has been offered. (See generally Doc. 181). Nor do Defen dan ts offer an y n ewly available eviden ce. Defen dan ts sim ply resubm it the sam e argum en t as to GSP’s authorization to h andle Florida-0 7 seed. Accordin gly, th e Court fin ds that n othin g Defen dan ts provide supports a gran t of th eir Motion for Recon sideration on GSP’s alleged auth orization to h an dle Florida-0 7 seed. With respect to Defen dan ts’ second argumen t – that the sale of Florida-0 7 peanuts to the edible market does n ot violate th e PVPA – Defen dan ts again ask the Court to insert new provisions in th e relevant statute an d narrow the scope of 3 in frin gemen t to exclude th e sale of seed to th e edible market. Defen dan ts again turn to extrin sic eviden ce to support th eir th eory, despite the Court’s in ability to resort to extrin sic eviden ce where the express con tract term s are clear an d un ambiguous, as th ey are in the Licen se Agreemen t. See Fecteau v. Southeast Bank, N.A., 585 So. 2d 10 0 5, 10 0 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). The Court addressed this argum ent in full in its previous Order, h oldin g th at: Defen dan ts argue th at un der the PVPA, on ly sales of seed for propagation purposes in frin ge th e certificate holder’s righ ts. As th e relevan t sale of seed was for con sumption rath er th an propagation , Defen dan ts assert th at n o violation of th e PVPA occurred. The foundation of Defen dan ts’ argumen t derives from the Supreme Court’s 1995 decision in Asgrow Seed Co. v. W interboer, 513 U.S. 179, 181 (1995), in which the Court stated, “th e PVPA “protects own ers of novel seed varieties again st un authorized sales of th eir seed for replan tin g purposes.” However, Defen dan ts’ readin g of Asgrow fails to accoun t for th e con text of the case – the Court was reexamin in g the then-available saved-seed exemption for farm ers. Th e Court determ in ed th at th e saved seed exem ption mean t “seed saved for replan tin g… ot m erely crop that is stored for later m arket sale or use as n fodder.” Asgrow , 513 U.S. at 188-89. However, in the sam e opin ion , the Court also observed that Section 2541(a)(1) of the PVPA “prohibits all un authorized tran sfer of title to, or possession of, th e protected variety.” Id. at 191. Thus, as our sister district court foun d, “the m ost logical readin g of th e Supreme Court’s use of “for replan tin g purposes” at the begin n in g of its opinion is n ot as a broad limitation on the protection the PVPA affords, but as th e Court settin g th e stage for its later discussion of th e th en -applicable “saved seed exemption .” AGSouth Gen etics, LLC v. Cunningham , 20 11 WL 18330 16, at *5 (S.D. Ala. May 13, 20 11). Moreover, the lan guage of the statute itself does n ot support Defen dan ts’ in terpretation of Asgrow , as th e in fringem ent provision of th e PVPA fails to men tion “replan tin g” as a prerequisite to in frin gemen t. As the court foun d in AGSouth Genetics, th e legislative history of the PVPA after th e 1994 Am en dm en t provides n o in dication th at an in ten t to “replan t” was ever considered to be a prerequisite to in frin gemen t. Id. at *6. In light of th is con text, the Court does n ot in terpret Asgrow to provide an exemption from in frin gemen t when the sale of seed is for “oth er than reproductive purposes.” Rather, under 7 U.S.C. § 2541, an y sale occurrin g outside of th e auth ority of th e certificate holder is considered an in frin gin g act. Section 2541(a)(1) of the PVPA states that “it shall be an in frin gemen t of the rights of the own er of a protected variety to…without authority...sell or m arket th e protected variety.” There is n o dispute that 4 th e Florida-0 7 variety is a protected variety, an d th at Plain tiff is th e own er of the Florida-0 7 variety. Moreover, as stated above, the record demon strates that GSP has n ever been authorized by Plain tiff to propagate, con dition , sell, offer to sell, or otherwise use the Florida-0 7 variety for an y purpose. (Doc. 116-1 at 1-3; Doc. 115-2 at 99-10 4). The record also shows th at GSP sold 558,0 76 pounds of Florida-0 7 seed for n on -seed purposes in various com m ercial sales. (Doc. 115-2 at 32-87). Accordin gly, th e Court fin ds th at n o genuin e issue of material fact remain s as to wh eth er GSP’s sale of 558,0 76 pounds of Florida-0 7 seed for n on seed purposes in various com m ercial ch an n els violated 7 U.S.C. § 2541(a)(1) an d in frin ged Plain tiff’s right as the own er of a protected variety, th e Florida-0 7. Defen dan ts n ow cite to AGSouth Genetics, LLC v. Cunningham , 20 11 WL 18330 16, (S.D. Ala. May 13, 20 11), to assert that the question of in frin gem en t on n on seed sales is n ot a matter of law, but rather a question for the jury to decide. In AGSouth, th e defen dan t, relyin g on the Supreme Court’s decision in Asgrow , m oved for summary judgmen t of n on -in frin gemen t on the theory that to in frin ge th e PVPA, th e seed must have been sold for replan tin g. The court den ied the defen dan t’s motion , fin din g th at: (1) th e question before the Court was strictly th at of statutory in terpretation , an d th erefore appropriate for summary judgmen t; an d (2) th e court would n ot gran t the defen dan t judgmen t as a matter of law on a n ovel or con trary in terpretation of th e law. Id. at *5. The Plain tiffs in AGSouth did not m ove for sum m ary judgm en t of in frin gem en t; th erefore, th e question of in frin gem en t was n ever before the court to decide. In the instan t case, th ere are n o facts in dispute, Plain tiff has moved for summary judgmen t of in frin gemen t, th e terms of the con tract are un ambiguous, an d as th e court in AGSouth held, when the on ly issue is a question of statutory in terpretation , it is appropriate to decide that issue by summary judgmen t. AGSouth, wh ile instructive, does n ot dictate the result in the in stan t case. 5 Defen dan ts have iden tified n o in terven in g chan ge in th e law or clear error an d have presen ted n o n ew eviden ce that would require the Court to gran t th e Motion for Recon sideration . Accordin gly, the Court fin ds that Defen dan ts have failed to meet the stan dard n ecessary for relief on a m otion of recon sideration with respect to th eir argumen t that th e sale of Florida-0 7 peanuts to the edible market does n ot violate th e PVPA. For th e foregoin g reason s, Defen dan ts’ Motion for Recon sideration (Doc. 181) is D EN IED . SO ORD ERED , this 26 th day of J un e, 20 13. / s/ W. Louis Sands_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ TH E H ON ORABLE W . LOU IS SAN D S, U N ITED STATES D ISTRICT COU RT 6
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
