Bugge et al v. Roberts et al, No. 1:2008cv00065 - Document 69 (M.D. Ga. 2013)
Court Description: ORDER granting in part and denying in part 58 Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to all Defendants except Defendant Roberts. As to Defendant Roberts, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. Ordered by Judge W. Louis Sands on 9/30/13 (wks)
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Bugge et al v. Roberts et al Doc. 69 IN TH E U N ITED STATES D ISTRICT COU RT FOR TH E MID D LE D ISTRICT OF GEORGIA ALBAN Y D IVISION TROY P. CRUMBLEY, Plaintiff, v. WARDEN KEVIN ROBERTS, et al., Defen dan ts. : : : : : : : : : : Case No.: 1:0 8 -CV-65 (WLS) ORD ER Before the Court is Defen dan ts’ Motion for Summary J udgmen t. (Doc. 58.) For th e followin g reason s, Defen dan ts’ Motion for Summary J udgmen t is GRAN TED -IN PART AN D D EN IED -IN -PART. FACTU AL SU MMARY I. In tro d u ctio n The following sum m ary of relevant facts contains the undisputed facts derived from the Complain t (Doc. 1), Defen dan ts’ An swer (Doc. 16), Defen dan ts’ November 23, 20 0 9 Statemen t of Un disputed Facts (Doc. 20 -1), former plain tiff Peter A. Bugge’s J anuary 26, 20 10 Respon se to Defen dan ts’ Statemen t of Un disputed Facts1 (Doc. 25-12), Defen dan ts’ in stan t Statemen t of Un disputed Facts (Doc. 58-56), an d Plain tiff’s Response to Defen dan ts’ Statem en t of Un disputed Facts (Doc. 66), all of wh ich were Defendants’ November 23, 20 0 9 Statement of Undisputed Facts and former plaintiff Peter A. Bugge’s J anuary 26, 20 10 Response to Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts were in relation to a motion for summ ary judgm ent as to Bugge, executor of the estate of J ohn C. Bradford, the father of J ohn W. Bradford, an inm ate who died due to the alleged constitutional violations by Defendants in the abovecaptioned m atter. Plaintiff Bugge’s pleadings are relevant to the instant dispute because Mr. Bradford allegedly sustained injuries under facts sim ilar to those alleged by Troy P. Crumbley. For these reasons, som e facts are extrapolated from pleadings that do not directly relate to Crumbley. 1 1 Dockets.Justia.com subm itted pursuan t to Local Rule 56. 2 Where relevan t, th e factual summary also contains un disputed an d disputed facts derived from the pleadings, th e discovery an d disclosure materials on file, an d an y affidavits submitted, all of which are con strued in a ligh t most favorable to Plain tiff as the n on movin g party. F ED. R. CIV. P RO. 56; Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). II. Re le va n t Facts In J uly 20 0 6, J ohn W. Bradford (“Bradford”) an d Troy P. Crum bley (“Plain tiff”) were being h oused at Calhoun State Prison (“CSP”), which is located with in th e Middle District of Georgia. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 1-2.) Bradford was assign ed to cell 136 in Dorm J -2. (Doc. 25-12 at ¶ 1.) Plain tiff was assign ed to bun k 53B in Dorm D-4. (Doc. 66 at ¶ 2.) H owever, Defendan ts did not consistently en force bunk assign m ents. (Id.; Doc. 58-2 at 2 ln s. 6-13.) 2 Local Rule 56 states: The movant for summ ary judgm ent under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall attach to the m otion a separate and concise statem ent of the m aterial facts to which the movant contends there is no genuine issue to be tried. Each m aterial fact shall be num bered separately and shall be supported by specific citation to the record. Material facts not supported by specific citation to the record and statem ents in the form of issues or legal conclusions (rather than m aterial facts) will not be considered by the court. Affidavits and the introductory portions of briefs do not constitute a statem ent of material facts. The respondent to a motion for summary judgm ent shall attach to the response a separate and concise statem ent of m aterial facts, num bered separately, to which the respondent contends there exists a genuine issue to be tried. Response shall be m ade to each of the m ovant’s numbered m aterial facts. All m aterial facts contained in the m oving party’s statem ent which are not specifically controverted by specific citation to the record shall be deem ed to have been adm itted, un less otherwise inappropriate. The response that a party has insufficient knowledge to adm it or deny is not an acceptable response unless the party has com plied with the provisions of Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. All documents and other record materials relied upon by a party moving for or opposing a m otion for summ ary judgm ent shall be clearly identified for the court. Where possible, dates, specific page numbers, and line numbers shall be given. M.D. GA. LOCAL R. 56. 2 On J uly 5, 20 0 6, followin g an altercation between Bradford an d an oth er in mate, Bradford was beaten by several in mates in his assign ed cell at CSP an d died from h is in juries. (Doc. 25-12 at ¶¶ 22-23.) In m ate Carlos Fan n in g pleaded guilty to volun tary man slaugh ter for Bradford’s death . (Id. at ¶ 64.) Bradford did n ot ask to be placed in protective custody prior to th e fatal beatin g, but th e parties disputed whether officers were alerted th at “th ere was about to be trouble” if Bradford an d the other in mate were n ot separated. (Id. at ¶ 15; see Doc. 25-2 at 2; see also Doc. 31 at 4 n .4.) On J uly 6, 20 0 6, th e day after Bradford’s death, a shakedown was con ducted at CSP by th e Departm en t of Correction s’ statewide tactical squad. (Doc. 66 at ¶ 52.) Th e sh akedown resulted in the con fiscation of 23 weapons. (Id. at ¶ 54; Doc. 58-34 at 3.) CSP was on “lockdown” from J uly 6 through J uly 12, 20 0 6. (Doc. 66 at ¶ 55.) Durin g that time, th e Office of In vestigation s an d Complian ce conducted in terviews at CSP. (Id. at ¶ 61.) Warden Roberts did n ot con duct or oversee th e in vestigations. (Id. at ¶ 62.) On J uly 7, 20 12, Plain tiff was question ed about Bradford’s murder an d th e conditions of the prison after inform ing an investigating officer “you’ve got problem s at this compoun d.” (Doc. 58-3 at 17 ln s. 10 -25.) Plain tiff “asked [investigators J ohn Moore an d Bruce Oliver] to be locked down ” at this time.3 (Id. at 15 ln s. 17-20 ; Doc. 584 at 4 ln s. 15-17.) On J uly 12, 20 0 6, aroun d 4:0 0 p.m., while Plain tiff was at the medical facility in th e prison , an officer an n oun ced that in vestigators wan ted to speak with h im for a secon d time. (Doc. 58-4 at 8 ln s. 2-11.) On ce Plain tiff met with the officer, the officer told Plain tiff th at he was wan ted for question in g a secon d time an d he therefore “must be tellin g them somethin g good.” (Id.) Th e purpose of th e secon d in terview was Plaintiff m aintains that he did not ask specifically to be placed in protective custody, but instead asked to be “locked down” and alleges that the investigators know that the two requests are syn on ymous. (Doc. 58-4 at 4 lns. 14-20 .) 3 3 to investigate an alleged incom e tax fraud schem e that was being perpetrated by inm ates at CSP. (Doc. 58-1 at 28 ln s. 14-20 .) Durin g the secon d in terview, h e again asked in vestigators to rem ove him from h is dorm itory. (Doc. 58-4 at 9 ln s. 10 -15.) Durin g the evenin g of J uly 12, 20 0 6, after the secon d in terview, J ohn Moore an d an oth er in vestigator told all in mates to “get in th e right bunks.” (Id. at 10 lns. 4-8.) Plain tiff was concern ed because in m ates were required to return to th eir assign ed bun ks to sleep th at n ight, an d his assign ed bun k was in a dimly lit area in the back of the dorm itory. (Id. at 10 ln s. 16-24.) Also, Plaintiff was concerned about rem aining in h is dorm itory because th e ann ouncem en t m ade by the officer escortin g him to the second in terview caused “the whole dormitory [to kn ow Plain tiff was goin g] to coun selin g” to speak with in vestigators. (Doc. 58-3 at 19 ln s. 8 -25.) At approxim ately 7:30 p.m., Plain tiff learn ed that an in mate h ad broken in to his locker. (Doc. 58-1 at 30 ln s. 10 -18.) Believin g h e n ow h ad a “legitim ate reason ” to speak with prison officials in light of h is con cern s about bein g suspected of providin g in formation about other in mates’ crim in al con duct, Plain tiff approached Defen dan t Battle. (Doc. 58-4 at 11 ln s. 2-13.) Plain tiff is “sure [he] told [Defen dan t Battle] sh e n eeded to move [Plain tiff to a differen t dorm ].” (Id. at 11 ln s. 11-13.) However, h e was n ot tran sferred to an other dorm . (See Doc. 58-27 at 2.) In addition , alth ough Plain tiff can n ot remember the exact con ten t of the in formation h e relayed to prison officials, h e rem em bers com plain in g about his placem en t in the back of the dorm itory to sleep, th e gen eral dan gerousn ess of the prison , an d his exposure to other in m ates. (Doc. 58-2 at 1 ln s. 16-21, 2 ln s. 19-23, 5 ln s. 3-4.) After th e shift chan ge at 10 :0 0 p.m., prison officials con ducted a “surprise” shakedown of Plain tiff’s dorm itory. (Doc. 58-1 at 32 ln s. 10 -14.) 4 Th e ligh ts were turn ed off an d Plain tiff was attacked by several in mates sh ortly before m idn igh t. (Id. at 12 ln s. 7-9.) Defen dan t Roberts, who was Warden of CSP from December 16, 20 0 4 th rough J un e 30 , 20 0 6, was n ot presen t at CSP on J uly 5, 20 0 6. (Docs. 20 -3 ¶ 7; 25-13 at ¶¶ 24, 25; 66 at ¶ 1.) Defen dan t Th om pson becam e Warden of CSP on J uly 1, 20 0 6, but was n ot presen t at th e prison un til J uly 5, 20 0 6. (Docs. 20 -13 at ¶ 8; 25-13. at ¶¶ 27, 28; 66 at ¶ 5.) Th e followin g Defen dan ts held the followin g position s at CSP at all times relevan t to th is suit: Defen dan t Christin e Cross was Deputy Warden of Care an d Treatmen t (Docs. 25-12 at ¶ 30 ; 66 at ¶ 8), Defen dan t J erry J efferson was Deputy Warden of Security (Docs. 20 -3 at ¶ 32; 66 at ¶ 11), Defen dan ts Eula Battle an d Eddie Smith were Sergean ts (Docs. 20 -3 at ¶ 40 ; 66 at ¶¶ 14, 23), an d Defen dan ts An thon y Cox, DeWayn e Booker, Derrick McDan iel, William McGin n is, an d Horace Gilbert were Correction al Officers II. (Docs. 20 -3 at ¶¶ 37, 44, 50 , 54, 57; 66 at ¶¶ 18, 27, 30 , 34, 37.) Plain tiff does n ot recall seein g Defen dan ts Cross or J efferson on J uly 12, 20 0 6, an d did n ot tell either of them that h e believed h e was in dan ger on that day. (Doc. 66 at ¶¶ 9, 12.) Defen dan t Battle worked from 1:45 p.m . un til 10 :0 0 p.m . on J uly 12, 20 0 6. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Defen dan t Cox worked from 1:45 p.m . un til 10 :0 0 p.m . on J uly 12, 20 0 6 in CSP’s medical un it. (Id. at ¶¶ 19, 20 .) Plaintiff h as no recollection of seeing Defendan t Cox on J uly 12, 20 0 6. (Id. at ¶ 21.) Defen dan t Sm ith worked 9:45 p.m . on J uly 12, 20 0 6 un til 6:0 0 a.m. on J uly 13, 20 0 6, an d was assign ed to cen tral con trol # 2 as an assistan t supervisor. (Id. at ¶¶ 24, 40 , 41.) Plaintiff h as no recollection of seeing Defendan t Sm ith on th ose dates. (Id. at ¶ 25.) Defen dan ts Booker an d McDan iel were n ot presen t at CSP on J uly 12, 20 0 6. (Id. at ¶¶ 28, 32.) Defen dan ts McGin nis and Gilbert worked from 9:45 p.m . on J uly 12, 20 0 6 un til 6:0 0 a.m . on J uly 13, 20 0 6. (Id. at ¶¶ 35, 38 .) 5 In m ate McMillian , a wh ite m ale, arrived at CSP on Novem ber 9, 20 0 5, an d was in itially assign ed to Dorm J -2. (Doc. 25-1 at ¶¶ 1, 10 .) McMillian described Dorm J as the in take dorm itory; Dorm D as an “open dorm itory,” con tain in g D-1 for “m obile con struction ,” D-2, D-3 for “older in mates,” an d D-4, which was “kn own as th e rough est dorm itory”; Dorm E as con tainin g “two m an cells”; an d Dorm F, wh ich con tain ed Dorm F-2, a “faith based dorm itory an d safest housin g un it on the compoun d.” (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 6, 11, 12.) When McMillian first arrived at CSP, a black in mate offered h im a sh an k an d explain ed that wh ite in mates n eeded weapons for protection . (Id. at ¶ 10 .) McMillian was housed in Dorm J -2 for two an d on e-half mon ths, an d left on J an uary 22, 20 0 6. (Id. at ¶¶ 2, 4, 6.) He heard th at arm ed robberies an d locker break-in s occurred, but never witn essed them . (Id. at ¶ 2, 3, 11.) In mate Mobley, a wh ite male, was housed in Dorm J -2 at CSP beginn in g in Novem ber 20 0 5. (Doc. 25-5 at ¶¶ 1, 2.) Item s were stolen from Mobley’s locker in Decem ber 20 0 5 an d J anuary 20 0 6. (Id. at ¶¶ 5, 6.) Mobley h eard of oth er white inm ates experien cing locker break-ins, an d older white inm ates being victim s of “snatch robberies” while walkin g from th e store to th eir cells. (Id. at ¶ 6.) He regularly observed his cellmate with cocain e an d marijuan a. (Id. at ¶ 8.) Mobley feared for h is life durin g his tenure in Dorm J -2. (Id.) Mobley claims th at he wrote Defen dan ts Roberts an d Cross, am on g others, but h e was ign ored. (Id.) In mate Moss, a white male, was housed at CSP for approxim ately two years, begin n in g in 20 0 4. (Doc. 25-6 at ¶ 3.) While at CSP, Moss was h oused in Dorm H-1 for about six m on ths an d Dorm D-3 for about 18 m on ths. (Id. at ¶ 3.) Moss observed gan g problems in Buildin g D an d believed that th e “guards had n o con trol over the in mates.” (Id. at ¶ 5.) He explain ed th at th e “Gan gsta Disciples” was a gan g th at operated “in 6 every dorm itory but mostly D-4 … an d th ey con trolled th e drug trade, were extrem ely violen t runn in g in large packs stealin g, robbin g an d committin g acts of violen ce again st the wh ites an d receivin g little punishmen t when caught.” (Id. at ¶ 9.) Moss accused Officers Booker an d McDan iel as bein g “tied in to the gan gs” an d explain ed his belief th at Officer Booker was in volved in en ablin g an in mate to be “gan ged out by th e [Gan gsta Disciples.]” (Id. at ¶¶ 11-12.) Moss read a letter th at Plain tiff drafted to sen d to th e commission er regardin g the con dition s of the prison , an d wrote a similar letter to Defen dan t Roberts. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Moss observed Plain tiff as on e of the few in m ates in Dorm J -2 to be “called out … to be in terviewed,” had kn owledge that Plain tiff was afraid that th e Gan gsta Disciples believed that he “ratted them out,” an d attempted to deliver a weapon to Plain tiff for protection shortly before Plain tiff’s attack. (Id. at ¶¶ 20 -23.) PROCED U RAL H ISTORY Peter A. Bugge (“Bugge”), executor of the estate of J ohn C. Bradford, Bradford’s fath er, an d Plain tiff, brough t suit un der 42 U.S.C. § 1983, allegin g th at prison officials were deliberately in differen t to th e dan gers of CSP in violation of th e Eigh th Am en dm en t to th e United States Con stitution. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 4, 10 .) Specifically, Plain tiff an d Bugge alleged th at Defen dan ts were deliberately in differen t to th e violen t gan gs th at were open ly operatin g at CSP, took in adequate security measures, sch eduled security guards in a mann er that caused understaffin g, an d oth erwise allowed the operation of a dan gerous prison in a way that culmin ated in Bradford’s death an d Plain tiff’s in juries. (Id. at ¶¶ 10 -11.) The Com plain t n am ed form er Warden Kevin Roberts, curren t Warden Dan n ie Th ompson , Deputy Warden s Christin e Cross an d J erry J efferson , Sergean ts An th on y Cox an d Eddie Smith , Lieuten an t Eula Battle, an d Officers William McGin n is, Derrick McDan iel, an d Horace Gilbert. (Id. at ¶ 3.) 7 On March 30 , 20 0 9, this Court gran ted Defen dan ts’ Motion to Dism iss as to Plain tiff for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (Doc 15 at 3.) The Court den ied Defen dan ts’ Motion to Dism iss as to Bugge. (Id. at 10 .) On Septem ber 24, 20 10 , th e Court gran ted Defen dan ts’ Motion for Summary J udgmen t as to Bugge, fin din g th at “n on e of th e Defen dan ts had sufficien t kn owledge of [a substan tial risk of serious h arm to Bradford an d th erefore Bugge] failed to establish a n ecessary causal lin k between an y of th e Defen dan ts an d th e attack on Bradford.” (Doc. 31 at 23.) The Eleven th Circuit reversed this Court’s Order on May 18, 20 11. See Bugge v. Roberts, 430 F. App’x 753 (11th Cir. 20 11). The Eleven th Circuit foun d th at Plain tiff h ad exh austed admin istrative remedies because officials at CSP im properly denied h is formal grievan ce. Id. at 756. Also, th e Eleven th Circuit held th at Bugge’s eviden ce was sufficien t to survive summary judgmen t based on the claim that Defen dan ts were “deliberately in differen t to a substan tial risk of harm posed to Bradford due to dan gerous prison condition s at CSP, an d that defen dan ts’ deliberate in differen ce to those con dition s caused the attack th at resulted in Bradford’s death.” Id. at 759. Am on g the evidence th at the Eleven th Circuit foun d persuasive was eviden ce suggestin g: num erous racially charged robberies occurred at CSP, particularly of store-bough t goods; th ere were “hun dreds” of weapon s in the prison , an d alm ost every in m ate in Bradford's dorm itory own ed or had access to a shan k; prison officials refused to disciplin e in mates for possessin g weapon s; an d gan gs, which operated in every dorm itory, were extremely violen t, stealin g, robbin g, an d committin g acts of violen ce again st white in mates in particular. Th ere is also eviden ce that officials en couraged in mates to obtain weapon s for protection , due to the dan gerous con dition s at CSP… Viewin g this eviden ce in the light most favorable to Bugge, gen uin e issues of m aterial fact rem ain as to wh eth er a substantial risk of serious h arm existed at CSP. Bugge, 430 F. App’x at 759. 8 However, the Eleven th Circuit held that all Defen dan ts were en titled to summary judgmen t except for Warden Roberts because th ere was eviden ce that h e was aware of th e dan gerous condition s at CSP, an d eviden ce suggested that he was the on ly Defen dan t with “the power to take reason able steps to address them.” Id. at 760 . The Court n oted th at “Warden Roberts left his post at CSP on J uly 2, 20 0 6, and that Warden Th om pson took over on J uly 5, 20 0 6, the day of Bradford’s m urder. Thom pson , therefore, h ad n o opportun ity to learn about or address the con ditions th at existed wh en Roberts left im m ediately before th e m urder.” Id. at 761 n .9. On reman d, Bugge an d Defen dan ts reached a settlemen t agreemen t an d this Court dism issed Bugge’s claim with prejudice. (Docs. 46, 47.) On October 4, 20 12, Defen dan ts filed the instan t Motion for Summary J udgmen t. (Doc. 58.) Plain tiff respon ded on Novem ber 19, 20 12. (Docs. 65, 66.) Defen dan ts filed th eir reply on December 20 , 20 12. (Doc. 68.) Havin g the ben efit of full briefin g on th e in stan t matter, Defen dan ts’ Motion for Summary J udgmen t (Doc. 58) is ripe for review. D ISCU SSION I. Su m m ary Ju d gm e n t Stan d ard Sum m ary judgm ent is proper “if the pleadings, deposition s, answers to in terrogatories, an d admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if an y, show that there is n o genuin e issue as to an y material fact an d that the movin g party is en titled to a judgmen t as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). An issue is “genuine” if the eviden ce is such that a reason able trier of fact could return a verdict for th e n on m ovin g party. Hoffm an v. Allied Corp., 912 F.2d 1379, 1383 (11th Cir. 1990 ). A fact is “m aterial” if it is a legal elemen t of the claim un der the applicable substan tive law an d it migh t affect the outcom e of the n on m ovin g party’s case. Allen v. 9 Ty son Foods, 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997) (citin g An derson v. Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A judgm en t is appropriate “as a m atter of law” when th e n on m ovin g party has failed to m eet its burden of persuadin g th e Court on an essen tial elemen t of th e claim. See Cleveland v. Policy Mgm t. Sy s. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 80 4 (1999); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Th e movan t bears the in itial burden of showin g that there is n o gen uin e issue of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. The m ovan t can m eet this burden by presen tin g eviden ce sh owin g th ere is n o dispute of m aterial fact, or by sh owin g or poin tin g out to th e court th at the n on m oving party h as failed to presen t eviden ce in support of som e elem en t of its case on wh ich it bears th e ultim ate burden of proof. Id. at 322-24. On ce th e m ovant has m et its burden , the nonm oving party is required “to go beyon d th e pleadin gs” an d iden tify “specific facts showin g that there is a genuin e issue for trial.” Id. at 324. To avoid sum m ary judgm en t, th e n on m ovin g party m ust do m ore than summarily den y the allegation s or “show th at there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. In dus. Co. v . Zen ith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, the n on m ovin g party must provide “en ough of a showin g th at the [trier of fact] could reason ably find for that party.” W alker v. Darby , 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990 ) (citin g Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 251). “[M]ere con clusion s an d un supported factual allegation s are legally in sufficien t to defeat a summary judgmen t m otion .” Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 20 0 5). On a motion for summary judgmen t, th e Court must view all the eviden ce an d all factual in feren ces drawn th erefrom in th e ligh t most favorable to th e n on m ovin g party, an d determ in e wheth er that eviden ce could reason ably sustain a jury verdict. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322- 23; Allen, 121 F.3d at 646. “In feren ces from th e n on m ovin g 10 party’s ‘specific facts’ as to other material facts, h owever, may be drawn on ly if they are reason able in view of other undisputed background or con textual facts an d on ly if such in feren ces are perm issible un der th e govern in g substan tive law.” Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 1996). The Court must gran t summary judgmen t if it fin ds th ere is n o gen uin e issue of material fact an d th e movan t is en titled to judgm en t as a m atter of law. F ED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). II. Co u rt’s An alys is Defen dan ts claim th ey are en titled to summary judgmen t for th ree reason s. First, Defen dan ts assert th at Plain tiff’s claims again st Defen dan ts Thompson and Cross are barred by res judicata because Plain tiff brought iden tical claims against those defen dan ts in Georgia Superior Court an d those claims were dism issed with prejudice. (Doc. 58-55 at 3.) Secon d, Plain tiff failed to presen t sufficien t eviden ce to survive summary judgmen t on his deliberate indifferen ce claim as to both harms alleged; th e h arm stemmin g from “in adequate security measures” at CSP, an d th e harm stemmin g from the question in g that occurred on J uly 7 an d 12, 20 0 6. (Id. at 7.) Third, an d in th e altern ative, Defen dan ts argue th at they are en titled to qualified im mun ity. (Id. at 17.) In view of the followin g fin din gs an d rulin gs, the Court does n ot an d n eed n ot address the res judicata defen se. The Court addresses th e other two argumen ts in turn . A. 4 2 U .S.C. § 19 8 3 & D e libe ra te In d iffe re n ce “Every person wh o, under color of an y statute, ordin an ce, regulation , custom , or usage, of an y State … subjects, or causes to be subjected, an y citizen … to th e deprivation of an y righ ts, privileges, or immun ities secured by the Con stitution an d laws, sh all be liable to th e party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedin g for redress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, “a plaintiff must establish th at an act or om ission 11 com m itted by a person actin g un der color of state law deprived him of a right, privilege, or im m un ity secured by the Con stitution or laws of the Un ited States.” Chatham v. Adcock, 334 F. App’x 281, 287 (11th Cir. 20 0 9) (citation om itted). Further, a plain tiff must demonstrate “proof of an affirmative causal conn ection between th e official’s acts or om ission s an d the alleged con stitution al deprivation .” Murphy v. Turpin, 159 F. App’x 945, 947 (11th Cir. 20 0 5) (quoting Zatler v. W ain w right, 80 2 F.2d 397, 40 1 (11th Cir. 1986)). “[P]rison officials have a duty to protect prison ers from violen ce at th e h an ds of oth er prison ers.” Farm er v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). “A prison official’s ‘deliberate in differen ce’ to a substan tial risk of serious harm to an in mate violates the Eighth Am en dm en t.” Id. Thus, “deliberate in differen ce” is action able un der 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To succeed on a deliberate in differen ce claim, Plain tiff must demonstrate that Defen dan ts were “aware of specific facts from which an in feren ce could be drawn th at a substantial risk of serious h arm exists—and [Defen dants] must [have] also draw[n] that inference.” Carter v. Gallow ay , 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 20 0 3). “To survive sum m ary judgm en t on such a § 1983 claim , a plain tiff m ust ‘produce sufficien t eviden ce of (1) a substan tial risk of serious harm; (2) the defen dan ts’ deliberate in differen ce to that risk; an d (3) causation .” Bugge v. Roberts, 430 F. App’x 753, 757 (11th Cir. 20 11) (citing Hale v. Tallapoosa Cn ty ., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995)); Staley v. Ow ens, 367 F. App’x 10 2, 10 7 (11th Cir. 20 10 ) (citin g Carter, 352 F.3d at 1350 )). Plaintiff argues th at Defen dan ts were deliberately in differen t to two substan tial risks of serious harm: (1) th e gen eral risk of harm faced by th e allegedly in adequate security measures taken at CSP, an d (2) th e individualized risk of harm faced after the Departm en t of Correction s in vestigators question ed him on J uly 7 an d 11, 20 0 6. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 12, 19.) 12 i. Substan tial Risk of Harm As to the first elemen t, which is the objective compon en t of the claim, “an excessive risk of inm ate-on-in m ate violen ce at a jail creates a substantial risk of serious harm .” Purcell v. Toom bs Cn ty ., 40 0 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 20 0 5). Although “occasion al, isolated attacks by on e prison er on an other may n ot con stitute cruel an d unusual pun ishmen t … [a] prison er has a right … to be reason ably protected from con stan t th reat of violen ce … from his fellow in mates.” Id. at 1320 -21 (citin g W oodhous v. Virgin ia, 487 F.2d 889, 890 (4th Cir. 1973)). The objective stan dard “em bodies ‘broad an d idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized stan dards, hum anity, an d decency’ but m ust be balanced against com petin g penological goals.” LaMarca v. Turn er, 995 F.2d 1526, 1535 (11th Cir. 1993) (citin g Estelle v. Gam ble, 429 U.S. 97, 10 2 (1976)). Defen dan ts argue th at Plain tiff did n ot face an y substan tial risk of serious harm. (Doc. 58-55 at 7.) Defendan ts assert that the general prison conditions did not pose such a risk because substan tial chan ges took place at CSP followin g Bradford’s murder on J uly 5, 20 0 6. (Id. at 8 .) Defen dan ts also claim th at the in terviews th at took place on J uly 7 and 12, 20 0 6 did n ot pose such a risk of harm to Plain tiff because n on e of th e Defen dan ts h ad any in volvemen t in callin g Plain tiff to meet with th e in vestigators, Plain tiff did n ot ask to be placed in protective custody, an d the white in mate that was im plicated in th e tax fraud schem e that was bein g investigated on J uly 12 was not in volved in the beatin g that occurred later that n igh t. (Id. at 8.) Plain tiff argues that the general condition of CSP posed a substantial risk of h arm to him because of the widespread violence at th e prison an d presence of weapon s. (Doc. 65 at 8-9.) Plain tiff also argues th at the in terviews posed a substan tial risk of harm because in mates had 13 witn essed circumstan ces that would permit them to in fer h e had been cooperatin g with investigators regarding crim inal activity at CSP. (Id. at 9.) The Court fin ds th at both substan tial risks of h arm iden tified by Plain tiff existed before h e was attacked on J uly 12, 20 0 6. Based on the eviden ce before the Court, con strued in a ligh t most favorable to Plain tiff, th e record supports a fin din g th at, alth ough efforts were bein g made by th e Departmen t of Correction s to remediate th e dan gerous n ature of CSP, a reason able jury could find th at th e condition of CSP posed a substan tial risk to Plain tiff. The on ly eviden ce Defen dan ts have presen ted that suggests a reduction in the dangerousn ess of CSP is that 23 weapons were confiscated during the shakedown on J uly 6, 20 0 6. (Docs. 58-34 at 3; 66 at ¶ 54.) Th is fact alon e does n ot n egate th e Eleven th Circuit’s findin gs regardin g th e dan gerousn ess of CSP. Th e Eleven th Circuit foun d that, prior to Bradford’s murder, gan g activity was rampan t th rough out th e prison , weapon s were widely available, an d guards suggested to in mates th at they should obtain weapon s to protect th emselves. Bugge, 430 F. App’x at 759. The eviden ce did n ot con fin e these con dition s to Bradford’s dorm itory. Id. In fact, the eviden ce supported a fin din g th at Plain tiff’s dormitory, Dorm D-4, was more dan gerous than Bradford’s dorm itory, Dorm J -2. (Doc. 25-6 ¶ 9.) A reason able jury could fin d, based on the eviden ce before the Court, th at the action s taken by the Departmen t of Correction s in th e days in terven in g Bradford’s death on J uly 5 and Plain tiff’s beatin g on J uly 12 did n ot operate in such a way to extin guish the substan tial risk of h arm posed by the dangerous condition of CSP. Furth ermore, th e Court finds a substan tial risk of harm was posed to Plain tiff by his participation in th e investigations that took place on J uly 7 an d 12, 20 0 6. At th at time, Plain tiff was removed from his dormitory twice in the presen ce of all other 14 inm ates for the purpose of speaking with in vestigators. (Doc. 58-4 at 8 lns. 2-11.) Plain tiff was on e of the few in mates removed from his dormitory for this purpose. (Doc. 25-6 ¶¶ 20 -23.) Clearly, the in mates were aware th at th e in vestigation s were takin g place in ligh t of a recen t murder that occurred at CSP. They were likely to in fer th at investigators were seeking suspects who were involved in Bradford’s m urder. In ligh t of the gan g activity an d violen ce at CSP, th e Court fin ds th at Plain tiff faced a substan tial risk of harm by bein g placed back in the n orm al population in his dorm itory followin g his interviews with investigators. ii. Deliberate In differen ce The second elemen t is a subjective stan dard with three compon en ts: “(1) subjective kn owledge of a risk of serious harm ; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by con duct that is m ore th an m ere n egligen ce.” Bugge, 430 F. App’x at 757 (citin g McElligott v . Foley , 182 F.3d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir. 1999)). In other words, Defen dan ts m ust have “kn ow[n ] of an d disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [Plain tiff’s] h ealth or safety.” Farm er, 511 U.S. at 837. It is n ot n ecessary th at Plain tiff demon strate kn owledge that it was “likely [he was] to be assaulted by a specific prison er who even tually comm itted th e assault.” Rodriguez v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 50 8 F.3d 611, 617 (11th Cir. 20 0 7). Defen dan ts may escape liability if they show th at “they did n ot kn ow of the un derlyin g facts in dicatin g a sufficien tly substan tial dan ger[,] or th at th ey kn ew th e un derlyin g facts but believed (albeit un soun dly) that th e risk to which th e facts gave rise was insubstantial or nonexisten t.” Farm er, 511 U.S. at 844. Th e requisite state of min d for deliberate in differen ce is somethin g more th an negligen ce or carelessness. See Ray v. Foltz, 370 F.3d 10 79, 10 83 (11th Cir. 20 0 4). As such , “sim ple n egligen ce is n ot action able un der § 1983, an d a plain tiff must allege a 15 ‘con scious or callous in differen ce to a prison er’s rights.’ ” Sm ith v. Reg’l Dir. of Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 368 F. App’x 9, 14 (11th Cir. 20 10 ) (quotin g W illiam s v. Ben nett, 689 F. App’x 1370 , 1380 (11th Cir. 1982)). “The kn own risk of in jury must be a stron g likelih ood, rather th an a mere possibility[,] before a guard’s failure to act can con stitute deliberate in differen ce.” Staley , 367 F. App’x at 10 7 (quotin g Brow n v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990 )) (alteration in origin al). Plain tiff claims th at Defen dan ts were deliberately in differen t to th e substan tial risk of h arm posed by (1) th e general dangerousness of CSP, and (2) th e individualized risk of harm posed by his participation in the investigations that took place on J uly 7 an d 12, 20 0 6. As to the first risk of h arm, th e eviden ce demon strates that the on ly defen dan ts who had the power to chan ge th e dan gerous con dition of CSP were th e form er an d curren t Warden s, Defen dan ts Roberts an d Thompson . See Bugge, 430 F. App’x at 760 -61. Accordin gly, all other Defen dan ts are en titled to summary judgmen t as to th e first risk of h arm. See id. As to Defen dan t Th ompson , Plain tiff’s own deposition testim ony illustrates that Defen dan t Thompson was takin g steps to make th e prison safer. A sh akedown was con ducted on J uly 6, 20 0 6; the prison was locked down from J uly 6 un til J uly 12, 20 0 6; crim inal activity at th e prison was being in vestigated; known gang m em bers were being placed in segregation . Un like Defen dan t Roberts, th ere is n o eviden ce th at suggests an y in m ate n otified Defen dan t Thompson of the dan gerous con dition of the prison . (See generally Docs. 25-1, 25-4, 25-5, 25-6, 25-7.) Because th ere is n o eviden ce in th e record to support a fin din g th at Defen dan t Thompson was deliberately in differen t to the con dition of CSP, h e is en titled to summary judgmen t as to the first risk of h arm. 16 As to Defen dan t Roberts, he would on ly be entitled to summary judgmen t on this elemen t if circum stances took place between Bradford’s murder an d Plain tiff’s beatin g in such a way that chan ged the basis of the Eleven th Circuit’s fin din g th at he was deliberately in differen t to th e harm posed by th e dan gerous condition of CSP. As the Court poin ted out on appeal, Defen dan t Roberts was th e on ly defen dan t wh o was alleged to h ave h ad th e power to take reason able steps to address th e dan gerous condition of CSP. Bugge, 430 F. App’x at 760 . Because the evidence suggested that “several in m ates wrote to Roberts to in form him of the dan gerous prison con dition[,] Roberts failed to discipline inm ates for possessing weapon s or en gaging in gang violen ce[, an d] th e pervasive and widespread n ature of the con ditions that th e eviden ce sh ows existed suggest[ed] th at Roberts ‘h ad been exposed to in form ation con cern in g th e risk an d thus must have kn own about it,’ ” a jury question existed as to wheth er Defen dan t Roberts was deliberately in differen t. Id. at 760 -61 (citation om itted). There is no eviden ce in th e record to suggest th at circum stances ch an ged such th at Defendan t Roberts was deliberately in differen t to the risk of harm posed to Bradford, but n ot deliberately in differen t to the risk of h arm posed to Plain tiff. The eviden ce presen ts a jury question as to wh ether Defen dan t Roberts was deliberately in differen t to the h arm posed by the dan gerous con dition of CSP. As such, Defen dan t Roberts is n ot en titled to sum m ary judgm en t as to this elem en t. As to the secon d alleged risk of harm, Plain tiff has failed to demonstrate that an y particular Defen dan t h ad subjective kn owledge of th e risk posed by his participation in th e in vestigation s. Plain tiff was un sure as to whether he in formed any Defen dan ts that he believed h e was in dan ger. (See Doc. 58-4 at 11 ln s. 11-13.) Th e on ly person s Plain tiff is certain h e told th at h e believed h e was in dan ger were in vestigators J ohn Moore an d 17 Bruce Oliver. (Doc. 58-3 at 15 ln s. 17-20 ; Doc. 58-4 at 4 ln s. 15-17.) Those individuals are n ot n amed in this suit. As such, Plain tiff has failed to demon strate that Defen dan ts “actually possessed the requisite kn owledge to be held liable.” See Bugge, 430 F. App’x at 758-59. Therefore, all Defen dan ts are en titled to summary judgmen t as to the secon d risk of h arm . iii. Causation To survive summary judgmen t, Plain tiff must raise a factual question as to whether Defen dan t Roberts’ alleged deliberate in differen ce caused the h arm actually suffered by Plain tiff. Hale, 50 F.3d at 1582. In other words, Plain tiff m ust h ave produced sufficien t evidence to raise a jury question as to wheth er Defen dan t Roberts was deliberately in differen ce to th e dan gerous condition of CSP and, as a result, Plain tiff was beaten by other in m ates. See id. As n oted above, eviden ce exists in the record that suggests Defendan t Roberts’ h ad knowledge of the dangerous condition of CSP. The record also supports a fin din g th at, without Defen dan t Roberts’ deliberate in differen ce to the dan gerous condition of CSP, those respon sible for Plain tiff’s beatin g would n ot h ave had th e opportun ity to carry out th e same. Thus, a jury could fin d th at Defen dan t Roberts’ deliberate in differen t to th e risk posed by th e gen eral con dition of CSP caused the harm suffered by Plain tiff. As such, Defen dan t Roberts is n ot en titled to summary judgmen t because “genuin e issues of material fact exist as to th e remain in g elemen t of [Plain tiff’s] claims against Roberts—deliberate in differen ce an d causation .” See Bugge, 430 F. App’x at 761. B. Qu alifie d Im m u n ity To defeat qualified im mun ity, Plain tiff must show th at Defen dan t (1) violated a con stitution al righ t (2) that was clearly establish ed at the time of the alleged violation . 18 Floy d v. Corder, 426 F. App’x 790 , 791-92 (11th Cir. 20 11) (citin g Hollom an ex rel. Hollom an v. Harlan d, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 20 0 4)). “A govern m en t officer defen dan t is en titled to qualified im munity un less, at the time of th e in ciden t, ‘preexistin g law dictates, th at is, truly compel[s],’ th e conclusion for all reason able, similarly situated public officials that what Defen dan t was doin g violated [Plain tiff’s] federal rights in th e circum stan ces.” Marsh v. Butler Cn ty ., Ala., 268 F.3d 10 14, 10 30 31 (11th Cir. 20 0 1) (citin g Lassiter v. Ala. A&M Un iv., 28 F.3d 1146, 1150 (11th Cir. 1994)). A govern men t officer is n ot en titled to qualified im mun ity where previous cases with “m aterially similar” facts establish that th ose specific circum stances violate federal law. Id. at 10 32. On appeal, th e Eleven th Circuit foun d th at th e con dition of CSP, if proved, would have violated Bradford’s constitution al righ ts based on th e preceden t set by Marsh, 268 F.3d 10 14, Hale v. Tallapoosa Cn ty ., 50 F.3d 1579 (11th Cir. 1995), an d W illiam s v. Edw ards, 547 F.2d 120 6 (5th Cir. 1977). In Marsh v. Butler Coun ty , the Eleven th Circuit held that similar prison con dition s as th ose allegedly presen t at CSP violated a clearly establish ed con stitution al right. Marsh, 268 F.3d at 10 33 (citations omitted). In Marsh, the plain tiff alleged th at violen t in mates were n ot segregated from th e rest of the in mate population , th e prison was routin ely un derstaffed, homemade weapon s were readily available, an d prison ers were n ot adequately disciplin ed. Id. at 10 29. W illiam s an d Hale also in volved dan gerous prison condition s. See Hale, 50 F.3d at 1581 (overcrowdin g an d frequen t in mate figh tin g); W illiam s, 547 F.2d at 1211 (270 stabbin gs with 20 resultin g deaths in th ree years, n um erous forcible rapes, overcrowdin g, un derstaffin g of prison guards, an d san itation violations). Th e Eleven th Circuit im plicitly foun d that Marsh, W illiam s, an d Hale are “m aterially similar” to th e circumstan ces in this case, an d “ ‘dictate[d]’ … th e 19 con clusion for all reason able, similarly situated public officials th at what Defen dan t was doin g violated [Plain tiff’s] federal rights in the circum stances.” See Marsh, 268 F.3d at 10 30 -31. The law of the case doctrin e holds that “a decision of an appellate court on a legal issue must be followed in all subsequen t proceedin gs in the same case.” Jeffries v. W ood, 114 F.3d 1484, 148 9 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation om itted). For the doctrin e to apply, th e appellate court must have actually decided th e issue. Un ited States v. Sain til, No. 13-11549, 20 13 WL 4838821, *2 (11th Cir. Sept. 12, 20 13) (citin g Un ited States v. Escobar-Urrego, 110 F.3d 1556, 1560 (11th Cir. 1997)). Un der this doctrin e, “[a]n appellate decision binds all subsequent proceedings in the sam e case not on ly as to explicit rulings, but also as to issues decided necessarily by implication on th e prior appeal.” Un ited States v. Krocka, No. 12-14435, 20 13 WL 2631426, *3 (11th Cir. J un e 13, 20 13) (citin g Un ited States v. Tam ay o, 80 F.3d 1514, 1520 (11th Cir. 1996)). Alth ough th e Eleven th Circuit did n ot explicitly h old that qualified im munity does n ot apply to Defen dan t Roberts, it noted th at “based on Marsh, Hale, an d W illiam s, th e con stitution al righ t at issue was clearly establish ed at th e time of th e defen dan ts’ alleged miscon duct.” Bugge, 430 F. App’x at 760 n .8. Th e Court vacated summary judgmen t in favor of Defen dan t Roberts. Id. at 761. This holdin g n ecessarily im plies th at th e Eleven th Circuit foun d that Defen dan t Roberts is n ot en titled to qualified im mun ity sin ce a con trary fin din g would h ave en titled Defen dan t Roberts to summary judgmen t. Because the same dan gerous con dition s that were prevalen t at th e prison in relation to Bradford’s death could be deemed to have con tributed to Plain tiff’s beatin g, th e Eleven th Circuit’s im plicit holding that Defen dan t Roberts is n ot en titled to qualified im munity is th e law of the case. 20 Based on th e foregoin g, Defen dan ts’ Motion for Summary J udgmen t is GRAN TED as to all Defen dan ts except Defen dan t Roberts. As to Defen dan t Roberts, Defen dan ts’ Motion for Summary J udgmen t is D EN IED . SO ORD ERED , this 30 th day of Septem ber, 20 13. / s/ W. Louis Sands _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ TH E H ON ORABLE W . LOU IS SAN D S, U N ITED STATES D ISTRICT COU RT 21
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