Corbin et al v. Prummell, Jr. et al, No. 2:2022cv00394 - Document 62 (M.D. Fla. 2022)
Court Description: OPINION AND ORDER overruling: 13 Objection and the 11 Motion to Recuse remains denied. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 11/30/2022. (RKR)
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Corbin et al v. Prummell, Jr. et al Doc. 62 Case 2:22-cv-00394-JES-KCD Document 62 Filed 11/30/22 Page 1 of 8 PageID 392 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION SANDRA CORBIN and JOHN CORBIN, Plaintiffs, v. Case No: 2:22-cv-394-JES-KCD BILL PRUMMELL, JR., in his official capacity as Sheriff of the Charlotte County, Florida; DAVID GENSIMORE, individually and in his official capacity as a Deputy for the Charlotte County Sheriff’s Office, AARON WILLIAMS, individually and in his official capacity as a Deputy for the Charlotte County Sheriff’s Office, KENRICK ROGUSKA, individually and in his official capacity as a Deputy for the Charlotte County Sheriff’s Office, and MICHAEL DAVIDSON, individually and in his official capacity as a Deputy for the Charlotte County Sheriff’s Office, Defendants. OPINION AND ORDER This matter comes before the Court on plaintiffs' Objection to Magistrate Kyle Dudek’s Order (Doc. #13), filed on August 11, 2022. After service of process and at the request of the Court, defendants filed a Response (Doc. #51) on October 12, 2022. For Dockets.Justia.com Case 2:22-cv-00394-JES-KCD Document 62 Filed 11/30/22 Page 2 of 8 PageID 393 the reasons set forth below, the Objection is overruled, and the underlying motion is denied. I. After the magistrate judge originally assigned to this case transferred to the Tampa Division of the Middle District of Florida, newly appointed Magistrate Judge Kyle Dudek was assigned as the magistrate judge for this case. thereafter, plaintiffs filed a Motion (Doc. #10.) to Recuse Shortly Re-Assigned Magistrate Kyle Dudek or Alternatively Objection to Re-Assignment (Doc. #11.) On July 28, 2022, Magistrate Judge Dudek issued an Order (Doc. #12) denying the recusal motion, finding “that a wellinformed observer would not question my ability to be impartial here simply because I have defended law enforcement agencies. Reasonable, well-informed observers represent a variety of clients.” understand that (Doc. #12, p. 4.) law firms Plaintiffs filed the Objection (Doc. #13) to the reassignment and the failure to recuse, which is now before the undersigned. The Court will review the issues under a de novo standard. II. Plaintiffs have no basis to object to the reassignment of their case. The magistrate judge originally assigned to the case transferred to the Tampa Division of the court, and most of his Fort Myers cases were reassigned to the newly appointed magistrate - 2 - Case 2:22-cv-00394-JES-KCD Document 62 Filed 11/30/22 Page 3 of 8 PageID 394 judge who took his place in the Fort Myers division. Plaintiffs’ objection to reassignment is overruled. III. Plaintiffs also seek disqualification of Magistrate Judge Dudek, and object to his refusal to recuse himself in this case. In their original motion to recuse (Doc. #11), plaintiffs asserted the following grounds for disqualification of Magistrate Judge Dudek: (1) his longstanding history of representing law enforcement and municipal defendants as lead counsel in similar causes of action to those presented in plaintiffs’ case; (2) his continuing to advertise himself as representing law enforcement and municipalities in similar causes of action, even after his appointment as a magistrate judge; (3) a pending appeal of a trial before the undersigned in which he participated as counsel for defendant law enforcement officials defending similar types of causes of action to those being presented by plaintiffs; and (4) his resulting conflict and bias as a decision-maker. Plaintiffs continue to press these grounds in their Objection. The pertinent standards for disqualification of a federal judicial officer are well established. Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a judge shall “disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” The test under § 455(a) is whether an objective, disinterested, lay observer fully informed of the facts underlying the grounds on which recusal was - 3 - Case 2:22-cv-00394-JES-KCD Document 62 Filed 11/30/22 Page 4 of 8 PageID 395 sought would entertain a significant doubt about the judge's impartiality. United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 744–45 (11th Cir. 1989); Thomas v. Tenneco Packaging Co., 293 F.3d 1306, 1329 (11th Cir. 2002); In re Evergreen Sec., Ltd., 570 F.3d 1257, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009). An allegation of bias must show that “the bias is personal as distinguished from judicial in nature.” Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Additionally, “Section 455(a) requires recusal when the objective circumstances create an appearance of partiality.” United States v. Cir. Cerceda, Disqualification 188 is circumstances exist. F.3d also 1291, 1293 required (11th where certain 1999). specific 28 U.S.C. § 455(b). The Supreme Court has also held, however, that the Due Process Clause may sometimes demand recusal even when a judge “ha[s] no actual bias.” Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986). Recusal is required when, objectively speaking, “the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S. Ct. 1456, 43 L. Ed. 2d 712 (1975); see Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 8, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1905, 195 L. Ed. 2d 132 (2016) (“The Court asks not whether a judge harbors an actual, subjective bias, but instead whether, as an objective matter, the average judge in his position is likely to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional potential for bias” (internal quotation marks omitted)). - 4 - Case 2:22-cv-00394-JES-KCD Document 62 Filed 11/30/22 Page 5 of 8 PageID 396 Rippo v. Baker, 580 U.S. 285 (2017). Plaintiffs argue that they have satisfied these standards, largely based on the assertion that Magistrate Judge Dudek’s entire career has been representing police and municipalities in § 1983 actions, and that Judge Dudek “STILL” represents police and municipalities and has “current advertisements” reflecting that a “large part of his practice” is in civil rights litigation. (Doc. #13, p. 4) (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs argue that the motion is not about the level of knowledge he has developed, but Judge Dudek’s “active and current ongoing representation advertisement of/to police and municipal defendants”. and (Id., p. 10.) The record is clear that Magistrate Judge Dudek has a longstanding professional history of representing law enforcement and municipal defendants as defense counsel in cases asserting claims similar to those presented in plaintiffs’ case. Nothing about the prior emphasis in the same practice area, standing alone, disqualifies a judicial officer. For example, magistrate judges who have been former prosecutors or public defenders routinely handle criminal cases unless there is a specific reason in a particular case not to do so. Here, plaintiffs have not proffered any specific reasons demonstrating a need for disqualification of Magistrate Judge Dudek in this case. - 5 - Case 2:22-cv-00394-JES-KCD Document 62 Filed 11/30/22 Page 6 of 8 PageID 397 Plaintiffs’ most significant basis for disqualification is that after his judicial appointment Magistrate Judge Dudek continues to advertise himself as representing law enforcement and municipalities in similar causes of action. A federal magistrate judge occupies a full-time judicial position, 28 U.S.C. § 636(a), and cannot practice law on the side. 28 U.S.C. § 631(c). As it turns out, plaintiffs’ only support for this allegation is that Magistrate Judge Dudek’s former law firm did not update its website to remove his biography and other information after his appointment to his judicial position. Magistrate Judge Dudek has no control over his prior firm, although the Court notes that the information is no longer being displayed on that website 1. Since there is no reliable information that Magistrate Judge Dudek is practicing law of any kind while serving in his current position, the Court finds no basis for disqualification. Plaintiffs also point to a pending appeal of a trial conducted by the undersigned in which, prior to his judicial appointment, Magistrate Judge Dudek participated as counsel for defendant law enforcement officials defending similar types of causes of action to those being presented by plaintiffs. The record establishes that Magistrate Judge Dudek has no involvement in the appeal, and 1https://www.henlaw.com/attorneys/?search-term-all=attorneys - 6 - Case 2:22-cv-00394-JES-KCD Document 62 Filed 11/30/22 Page 7 of 8 PageID 398 there is nothing about that case or the existence of an appeal which would support disqualification. Finally, plaintiffs generically refer to Magistrate Judge Dudek’s “conflict and bias as a decision-maker.” 2.) (Doc. #11, p. No specifics are identified, rather plaintiffs suggest that their prior grounds lead to conflict and bias. ¶ 49.) (Doc. #13, p. 13 This is insufficient to require disqualification. Upon de novo review of the record, the undersigned finds that an objective, disinterested lay observer who was fully informed of the facts underlying the asserted grounds for disqualification would not entertain a significant doubt about Magistrate Judge Dudek’s impartiality. The undersigned further finds that the objective circumstances established in the record do not create an appearance of partiality, and that there are no specific circumstances established under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) which would require disqualification. Finally, the undersigned finds that the objective circumstances do not establish the probability of actual bias on the part of Magistrate Judge Dudek which is too high to be constitutionally tolerable. Accordingly, it is now ORDERED: Plaintiffs' Objection to Magistrate Kyle Dudek’s Order (Doc. #13) is OVERRULED. Plaintiffs’ Motion - 7 - to Recuse Re-Assigned Case 2:22-cv-00394-JES-KCD Document 62 Filed 11/30/22 Page 8 of 8 PageID 399 Magistrate Kyle Dudek or Alternatively Objection to Re-Assignment (Doc. #13) is DENIED. DONE and ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this of November 2022. Copies: The Hon. Kyle C. Dudek Counsel of Record - 8 - 30th day
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