Maletta et al v. Woodle et al, No. 2:2020cv01004 - Document 84 (M.D. Fla. 2022)
Court Description: ORDER denying 68 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying as moot 75 Motion to Strike; denying 77 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 7/19/2022. (AFC)
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Maletta et al v. Woodle et al Doc. 84 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION ANDREW C. MALETTA and POLLY MALETTA, Plaintiffs, v. Case No: 2:20-cv-1004-JES-MRM DAVID WOODLE and FREDERICK J. LANGDON, Defendants. ORDER This case comes before the Court on the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment. (Docs. ## 68, 1 77.) filed. (Docs. ## 76, 79, 81, 83.) Responses and replies were For the reasons set forth, both motions are DENIED. I. Motions for summary judgment should only be granted when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex 1 The Court denied defendants’ first motion for summary judgment for failure to comply with the Case Management and Scheduling Order (CMSO). (Doc. #66.) Pursuant to the CMSO, defendants were required to seek leave to file a second motion for summary judgment (Doc. #24, § 3(a)). Defendants did not seek leave. The Court will, however, consider the merits of motion to avoid any further delay. Dockets.Justia.com Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “An issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.” Baby Buddies, Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 611 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2010). A fact is “material” if it may affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). “When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then ‘go beyond the pleadings,’ and by its own affidavits, or by ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593–94 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). “A court must decide ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’” Hickson, 357 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court views all evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); Tana v. 2 Dantanna’s, 611 F.3d 767, 772 (11th Cir. 2010). However, “if reasonable arising minds might differ on the inferences undisputed facts, then the court should deny summary judgment.” from St. Charles Foods, Inc. v. America’s Favorite Chicken Co., 198 F.3d 815, 819 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Warrior Tombigbee Transp. Co. v. M/V Nan Fung, 695 F.2d 1294, 1296-97 (11th Cir. 1983)) (finding summary judgment “may be inappropriate even where the parties agree on the basic facts, but disagree about the factual inferences that should be drawn from these facts.”)). Cross motions for summary judgment do not change the standard. See Am. Bankers Ins. Grp. v. United States, 408 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2005). Cross motions for summary judgment are to be treated separately; the denial of one does not require the grant of another; and summary judgment is inappropriate if disputes remain as to material facts. Id.; United States v. Oakley, 744 F.2d 1553, 1555 (11th Cir. 1984). II. The following facts are undisputed. 2 The parties in the lawsuit – Plaintiff Andrew Maletta (plaintiff or Maletta), Defendant David 2 No party fully complied with the CMSO. (Doc. #24.) Defendants completely failed to respond to plaintiff’s statement of material facts. Although plaintiff responded to defendants’ statement of material facts, plaintiff did not provide any record citations when denying statements. The Court, thus, derives this undisputed fact section from the parties’ statements that include citations, are supported in the record, and are material to the dispute. 3 Woodle (Woodle), and Defendant Frederick Langdon (Langdon) (collectively, defendants) – are or were members of an RV community at Riverbend Motorcoach Resort (Riverbend) in LaBelle, Florida. (Doc. #76 ¶ 1; Doc. #33, ¶ 7, 9.) Riverbend consists of 315 lots. (Doc. #76, ¶ 2; Doc. #33, ¶ 8.) Since Maletta purchased a lot in Riverbend, Maletta has been politically involved and active in governance, legal compliance, and fiscal issues within Riverbend. (Doc. #76 ¶¶ 5, 6.) Maletta has served in a variety of roles within the official governance structure of Riverbend, including being a member of the Coach House Committee. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 6.) Sometime in 2020, Woodle posted a letter titled, “A Cancer on our Resort and the Company you Keep” (the “Letter”), on a closed Facebook group consisting of Riverbend owners. # 77, ¶ 32; Doc. #1-1.) (Doc. #76, ¶ 7; Doc. The Letter includes two-and-a-half pages of approximately 100 signatures that were solicited by Woodle before the document was posted. (Doc. #1-1; Doc. #77, ¶ 31.) After the Letter was posted, Maletta asked Langdon, an administrator of the Facebook page, to remove the posting. did not remove the posting. (Doc. #77, ¶ 34.) (Id. ¶¶ 35.) The Letter reads as follows: 4 Langdon 5 (Doc. #1-1.) III. Plaintiff’s operative complaint asserts two counts, defamation and defamation per se, arising from the Letter. (Doc. #33.) 3 In the cross motions (Docs. ## 68, 77), the parties separately argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 3 Plaintiff invokes the Court’s diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Plaintiff is a citizen of Pennsylvania, Woodle is a citizen of Texas, and Langdon is a citizen of Florida. (Doc. #33, ¶¶ 1-3.) Plaintiff alleges that he has suffered over $75,000 in damages, including “harm to his interest in privacy, mental distress and special damages.” (Id. ¶¶ 45, 48.) 6 The five required elements for defamation are: “(1) publication; (2) falsity; (3) actor must act with knowledge or reckless disregard as to the falsity on a matter concerning a public official, or at least negligently on a matter concerning a private person; (4) actual damages; and (5) statement must be defamatory.” Jews For Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1106 (Fla. 2008). Defamation per se claims are nearly the same, however, do not “require proof of actual damages.” Deeb v. Saati, 778 F. App’x 683, 687 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Lawnwood Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Sadow, 43 So. 3d 710, 712 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)). A. Defendants’ Motion (Doc. #68) 1. Substantial Truth Defendants first argue that the statements made in the Letter are substantially true so they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Doc. #68, pp. 3-12.) “Clearly, a false statement about another is a required element of defamation.” Kieffer v. Atheists of Fla., Inc., 269 So. 3d 656, 659 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (citing Cape Publ’n, Inc. v. Reakes, 840 So.2d 277, 279-80 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)). “According to the U.S. Supreme Court and Florida case law, falsity only exists if the publication is substantially and materially false, not just if it is technically false.” Smith v. Cuban Am. Nat. Found., DCA 731 So. 2d 702, 707 (Fla. 3d 1999). “Under the substantial truth doctrine, a statement does not have to be perfectly accurate if the ‘gist’ or the ‘sting’ of the statement is true.” 7 Smith, 731 So.2d at 706 (citations omitted). “The question of falsity, ‘overlooks the [Supreme] Court [has] held, inaccuracies and concentrates upon substantial truth.’” minor Id. at 707 (quoting Masson v. New Yorker Mag., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991)). “[I]n determining whether a statement is ‘substantially true,’ the statement in question must be read in full context of its publication.” Kieffer v. Atheists of Fla., Inc., 269 So. 3d 656, 659 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019). “Where a communication is ambiguous and reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning, it is for the trier of fact to decide whether the communication was understood in the defamatory sense.” Id. (quoting Perry v. Cosgrove, 464 So.2d 664, 666 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); then citing Pep Boys v. New World Commc'ns of Tampa, Inc., 711 So.2d 1325, 1328 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (“The questions of whether the broadcast contained false statements and/or statements that could be interpreted as false are questions of fact which should be left for a jury to determine where the communication is ambiguous and is reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning.”)). A review of the record evidence shows that a genuine dispute of fact exists over the substantial truth of the Letter. Viewing the evidence in light most favorable to plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find that the statements are not substantially true but instead substantially false. 8 2. Limited Public Figure Defendants also argue that plaintiff cannot prove the third element of his claim – that defendants acted with knowledge or reckless disregard as to the falsity on a matter concerning a public official, or at least negligently on a matter concerning a private person. See Jews For Jesus, 997 So. 2d at 1106. Defendants contend that plaintiff is a “limited public figure” so must prove actual malice (i.e., knowledge convincing evidence. or reckless disregard) by clear and Defendants then conclude that plaintiff cannot prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. “Public figure status ‘is a question of law to be determined by the court.’” Jacoby v. Cable News Network, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 3d 1303, 1309 (M.D. Fla. 2021), aff’d, No. 21-12030, 2021 WL 5858569 (11th Cir. Dec. 10, 2021) (citing Mile Marker, Inc. v. Petersen Publ’g, L.L.C., 811 So.2d 841, 845 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)). “Because of the expressive freedom guaranteed by the First Amendment, a defendant may not be held liable for defaming a public figure about a matter of public concern unless he is shown to have ‘acted with actual malice.’” Id. (quoting Silvester v. Am. Broad. Cos., 839 F.2d 1491, 1493 (11th Cir. 1988)). “Two fundamental criteria help draw the line between public and private figures: (1) public figures usually have greater access to the media which gives them a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy; and, 9 more importantly, (2) public figures typically voluntarily expose themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehoods.” Id. at 1310 (cleaned up). “Courts are to employ a two-step process in determining whether a particular claimant is a limited public figure or simply a private plaintiff.” Mile Marker, 811 So. 2d 845. “First, the court must determine whether there is a ‘public controversy,’. . .whether a reasonable person would have expected persons beyond the immediate participants in the dispute to feel the impact of its resolution.” Id. (citation omitted). “After defining a public controversy, the court must then determine whether the plaintiff played a sufficiently central role in the instant controversy to be considered a public figure for purposes of that controversy.” Id. at 846 (citations omitted). Based on the current record, the Court finds that there is disputed evidence as to whether plaintiff is a limited public figure. To be sure, it is undisputed that plaintiff thrust himself into the Riverbend community when running for office and serving in a variety of roles within the official governance structure of Riverbend.” (Doc. #76, ¶¶ 4-6.) 4 However, the Court is not persuaded that the 4 E.g., Agar v. Judy, 151 A.3d 456, 478–79 (Del. Ch. 2017) (“Other courts similarly have held that candidates who seek to be elected to lead organizations become limited public figures for purpose of communications related to the election.”) (collecting cases); but see McIntyre v. Jones, 194 P.3d 519, 527 (Colo. App. 2008) (distinguishing cases of large homeowners associations being matters of public controversy and declining to find that selecting 10 undisputed evidence shows the Letter arises from a public controversy over Riverbend’s governance or plaintiff’s involvement thereof. See Arnold v. Taco Properties, Inc., 427 So. 2d 216, 218 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (“Under the limited public figure concept, only statements relating to the controversy giving rise to the public figure status receive the protection of the actual malice standard.”) Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied. B. Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. #77) To succeed on summary judgment, plaintiff must demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material fact on each defamation element he is required to prove. Similar to defendants’ substantial truth argument, plaintiff argues that the undisputed material facts demonstrate that the statements in the Letter are substantially false. (Doc. #77, pp. 9-21.) As previously discussed, there are disputes concerning the substantial truth or falsity of the Letter. When viewing the evidence in light most favorable to defendants, a reasonable jury could find that the Letter is not substantially false. Because plaintiff failed to demonstrate this essential element of his claims, his motion for summary judgment is denied. Accordingly, it is so ordered: 1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #68) is DENIED. a bookkeeper for a small homeowners association was a matter of public concern). 11 2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #77) is DENIED. 3. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Affidavits 5 (Doc. #75) is DENIED as moot. DONE and ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this day of July, 2022. Copies: Counsel of Record 5 In the motion to strike (Doc. #75), plaintiff requests that the Court strike 44 affidavits (Doc. #68-2) used to support defendants’ motion for summary judgment for various reasons. Whether the Court considers the affidavits or not, there are material disputes of fact concerning substantial truth or falsity that must be resolved by a jury. The decision to deny the motion as moot has no impact on plaintiff’s motion for sanctions for failure to obey a discovery order (Doc. #72), pending before the Magistrate Judge. 12
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