THOMPSON v. USA, No. 1:2019cv01688 - Document 4 (Fed. Cl. 2019)
Court Description: REPORTED OPINION DISMISSING CASE. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment. Signed by Chief Judge Margaret M. Sweeney. (ac7) Service on parties made.
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THOMPSON v. USA Doc. 4 lln t\t @nite! $ltafts [,ourt of felers[ @tsimg No. l9-1688C (Filed: November 13, 2019) ****t** :f *** + ************** YOLANDA DENISE + :t * + :l :l + * ,1 * THOMPSON, * '! Plaintiff, Pro Se Plaintiff; Jurisdiction; Sua Soonte Dismissal THE TINITED STATES, ** + *,f * **:* *:t* {.* + *** Defendant. * *! !t* * {< ** i.* * **,t t *,t rr* *. Yolanda Denise Thompson, Philadelphia, PA, pro se. OPINION AND ORDER SWEENEY, Chief Judge This case arises out of pro se plaintiff Yolanda Denise Thompson's complaint conceming her ongoing criminal case and related bail conditions. Specifically, Ms. Thompson alleges that she cannot be subject to criminal prosecution because those involved in the case lack authority to prosecute or adjudicate the charges against her, and their insistence on doing so while subjecting her to bail conditions has resulted in a variety ofcompensable wrongs. The court, lor the reasons discussed below, dismisses the complaint for lack ofjurisdiction sua sponte. I. BACKGROUND On March 29,2018, a grand jury in the Eastem District of pennsylvania retumed a nrnecount indictment with respect to Ms. Thompson.r Specifically, the grand jury alleged that Ms. Thompson (l) conspired to defraud the United States by submitting fraudulent documents to the United States Internal Revenue Service and (2) aided and abetted in the preparation of fraudulent federal income tax retums. Ms. Thompson was arrested on July 25,2018, and detained until her arralgnment on August 2, 2018. During Ms. Thompson's anaignment in the United States District court for the Eastern District ofPennsylvania ("District court"), she was released on bail and ordered to, among other things, attend mental health services, submit to GpS ' The facts in this section are derived from the complaint (including attached exhibits), and matters of which the court may takejudicial notice pursuant to Rule 201 ofthe Federal Rules of Evidence. See Rockv Mountain Helium. LLC v. United States, g4l F.3d 1320, 1325-26 (F ed,. Cir.2016). ?01,s Pe50 0000 51,83 Eh0B Dockets.Justia.com monitoring, surrender her passport, remain in the Eastem District ofPennsylvania, stay in her home (except in limited circumstances), and refrain from preparing any tax retums without prior approval. While free on bail, she is being supervised by the United States Pretrial Services for the Eastem District of Pennsylvania. In her complaint, Ms. Thompson alleges that she never authorized those involved with her criminal case-who she calls "Traffickers" and identifies as federal prosecutors, federal judges, and others-to prosecute her or adjudicate charges against her.2 Indeed, she states that "Traffickers are acting without authority or eonsent from [Ms. Thompson] . . . ." Compl. 3; accord id. at 4 (explaining that the "Traffickers are without authority to act as Attomey in Fact for [Ms. Thompson]" and "are committing fraud, identity theft, and trafficking of persons without [her] consent"). She also alleges that the Traffickers, by illegally prosecuting and restricting her freedom, are violating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR"). Additionally. she avers that [b]y intentional unjust conviction and imprisonment, Human trafficking in Person by ibrce, fraud and coercion, isolating, enticing, transporting, holding, confining, harboring, profiting, soliciting, depriving liberty, threatening legal actions, psychological control, financial threats, legal harassment, withholding passport, threatening fbrce, debt bondage, causing financial harm, kidnapping and abduction, abusing position ofpower . . . . Id. at 11. She proceeds to state that govemment actors have committed or caused "intentional fraud, theft, battery, assault, hnancial losses, misrepresentation, false imprisonment, emotional inf'liction of mental distress, trespassing to land, trespassing to chattel and conversion and duress against [her] since the age of majority." Id. at 13. The court refers collectivelyto the purported wrongs identified in the prior two sentences as "Improper Conduct.,' Ms. Thompson concludes by requesting that the court (1) dismiss all ofthe cases against her for lack of jurisdiction, (2) release her immediately (apparently from her bail conditions given that she is not imprisoned), and (3) award her $10 billion for the Improper Conduct.3 2 Ms. Thompson's complaint is replete with confirsing statements that seemingly reflect grounded concepts in ideas espoused by Moorish sovereign citizens or similar movements. For example, she refers to herself as a trustee for,,YOLANDA DENISE THOMPSON, [personal Member Associationl," compl. 2, which is typical of sovereign citizens, see Bev v. State, g47 F.3d 559, 560-61 (7th Cir.2017) ("Many sovereign citizen organizations teach that whenever a Moor's name is spelled in capital letters in a government document, the name identifies not the individual but instead his'corporate shell identity' . . . ."). Although it is dilficult to discem what Ms. Thompson is attempting to convey in the portions of the complaint that are more heavily steeped in sovereign citizen concepts, the court can parse the crux of the allegations and claims. 3 Ms. Thompson also requests that Albert Upshur-an individual who the aforementioned grand jury indicted for the same conduct as Ms. Thompson-receive the relief. Mr. Upshur, however, is not a plaintiff in this case. -2- same II. LEGALSTANDARDS A, Pro Se Plaintiffs Pro se pleadings are "held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" and are "to be liberally construed." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (intemal quotation marks omitted). However, the "leniency afforded to a p1q g9 litigant with respect to mere formalities does not relieve the burden to meet jurisdictional requirements." Minehan v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl.249,253 (2007); accord Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("The fact that [the plaintiffl acted plg se in the drafling of his complaint may explain its ambiguities, but it does not excuse its failures, if such there be."). In other words, a pro se plaintiff is not excused from his burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, that the court possesses jurisdiction. See McNutt v. Gen. Motors AcceDtance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 179 (1936); Banks v. United States,741 F.3d, 1268, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2014). B. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Whether the court possesses j urisdiction to decide the merits ofa case is a "threshold matter." Steel Co. v. Citizens lbr a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83,94-95 ( 1998). Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived or forfeited because it "involves a court's power to hear a case." Arbaueh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625,630 (2002)). "Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause." Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 506, 514 (1868). Therefore. it is "an inflexible matter that must be considered before proceeding to evaluate the merits of acase." Matthews v. United States,72 Fed. C|.274,278 (2006); accord K-ConBlds. Sys.. Inc. v. United States,778F.3d 1000, 1004-05 (Fed. Cir.2015). Either parry, or the court sua sponte, may challenge the court's subject matter-jurisdiction at any time. Arbaueh, 546 U.S. at 506; see also Jeun v. United States, 128 Fed. CI. 203,209-10 (2016) (collecting cases). C. The Tucker Act The ability of the United States Courr of Federal Claims ("Court of Federal Claims',) to entertain suits against the united States is limited. "The united states, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents ro be sued." UnitedStatesv.Sherwood,3l2U.S.584,586(1941). The waiver of immunity "may not be infened, but must be unequivocally expressed.,, United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465,472 (2003). The Tucker Act, the principal statute governing the jurisdiction of this court, waives sovereign immunity for clams against the United States, not sounding in ton, that are founded upon the United States constitution, a federal statute or regulation, or an express or implied contract with the United States. 28 U.S.C. $ 1a9l(a)(1) (2018); White Mountain, 537 U.S. at 472. However, rhe Tucker Act is merely ajurisdictional statute and "does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages." United States v. Testan ,424 U.S.3g2,2gg (1976). Instead, the substantive right must appear in another source of law, such as a "money- -3- mandating constitutional provision) statute or regulation that has been violated, or an express or implied contract with the United States." Loveladies Harbor. Inc. v. Uniled States,27 F.3d1545, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc). III. ANALYSIS Ms. Thompson's complaint reflects her disagreement with the criminal process that she is cunently subject to in the District Court. Specifically, she is alleging that she cannot be subject to bail conditions or criminal prosecution because she has not consented to the prosecutors' or judge's authority. This is, at bottom, a challenge to the validity ofthe criminal case and associated decision by the District Court judge to impose bail conditions. The Court of Federal Clairns, however, lacks jurisdiction over challenges to criminal proceedings in a district couft or disagreements with those courts' decisions." See Cooper v. United States, 104 Fed. CL.306,312 (2012) (holding that the court lacks jurisdiction "to the extent that plaintiff is challenging his criminal trial . . . and the conduct ofthe government and its officers in connection with the prosecution ofplaintiffin [district court]"); see also Joshua v. United States. 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. Cir. l99a) ("[T]he Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction to review the decisions ofdistrict courts . . . relating to proceedings before those courts."). Thus, the court lacks jurisdiction over Ms. Thompson's complaint.5 Additionally, notwithstanding the jurisdictional bar noted above, the court also lacks jurisdiction over individual portions of Ms. Thompson's complaint for different reasons. First, the court cannot entertain a claim based on Ms. Thompson's allegation concerning a purported UDHR violation because the UDHR "does not contain any substantive rights enforceable against 4 Although the complaint is not clear, Ms. Thompson seemingly states that she is not responsible for the underlying criminal conduct-preparing fraudulent tax documents. $g9 Compl. 6 ("Trustee deny being liable or responsible for the errors and omissions ofany offeror partner of offeror, or their agents on behalf of YOLANDA DENISE THOMPSON agency / instrumentality ofthe United States . . . ."), 8 (alleging that "Trustee deny that Trustee received full disclosure regarding the underlying financial assets" or knew that financial information was being mispresented). If the complaint is read in that manner, the outcome remains the same because Ms. Thompson is still contesting the validity ofa pending criminal case or the charges therein. 5 Moreover, because Ms. Thompson seemingly relies throughout her complaint on theories associated with sovereign-citizen movements, supra note 2, it is also appropriate to dismiss the complaint for lack ofjurisdiction because the claims are frivolous, United States v. Sterline, 738 F.3d 228,233 n.1 (l 1th Cir. 2013) (noting that courts routinely reject sovereign citizen legal theories as "frivolous"); United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753,767 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that sovereign citizen "theories should be rejected summarily, however they are presented"); see also Moden v. United srates,404 F.3d 1335, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (acknowledging that the Court of Federal Claims lacks subiect-matter iurisdiction over a frivolous claim). -4- . . ."0 Gimbemat v. the lederal govemment for money damages, as required by the Tucker Act Fed. Cl.231,234 United States, 84 Fed. Cl. 350,354 (2008); see Phaidin v. United States,28 and the (1993) ("The IUDHR] is an authoritative statement of customary international law. jurisdiction claims over permitting entertain the court to Tucker Act contains no language founded upon intemational customary law."). Second, Ms. Thompson's allegations of Improper Conduct reflect purported wrongdoings that sound in tort or involve criminal code violations (or both), and the court cannot exercise jurisdiction over claims premised on such conduct. Haka v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 111, 114 (2012) ("The court cannot decide [plaintiff s] . . . claims because they either involve criminal code violations or sound in tort."); see 28 U.S.C. $ 1ae1(a)(1). . Finally, contrary to Ms. Thompson's representation in her complaint, the court cannot exercise jurisdiction over her claims based on 28 U.S.C. $ 1495. Pursuant to that statute, the court can entertain "any claim for damages by any person unjustly convicted ofan offense against the LJnited States and imprisoned." The Court of Federal Claims can only adjudicate a claim on the aforementioned grounds "after a[nother] court has reversed a plaintiff s conviction on the grounds of innocence or. . . the President ofthe United States has pardoned the plaintiff." Phang v. United States, 87 Fed. CI. 321, 330 (2009), affd sub nom. Phu Mane Phang v. United States,388 F. App'x 961 (Fed. Cir.20l0); accord 28 U.S.C. $ 2513. Ms. Thompson, however, does not identifo any reversed or pardoned conviction, and the criminal docket for her case in the Eastem District ofPennsylvania reflects that she has not been convicted on the aforementioned charges. Thus, the courl cannot exercise jurisdiction over Ms. Thompson's complaint based on $ 1495.7 IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons explained above, the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction to entertain Ms. Thompson's claims. Accordingly, the court DISMISSES Ms. Thompson's complaint without prejudice. No costs. The clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly. The court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. $ 1915(aX3), that any appeal from this order 6 Ms. Thompson identihes the State of Pennsylvania as one of the "Traffickers" who was violating the UDHR but, in addition to its lack ofjurisdiction over claims based on the UDHR, the court cannot entertain claims against a state. Trevino v. United States, 557 F. App'x 995, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("[T]he [Court of Federal Claims] lacks jurisdiction over [plaintiffs] claims against states . . . ."); see Moore v. Pub. Defs. Office,76Fed. Cl'.617,620 (2007) ("When a plaintiff s complaint names private parties, or local, county, or state agencies, rather than federal agencies, this court has no jurisdiction to hear those allegations."). 7 To the extent that Ms. Thompson is asserting the same claims on behalf of Mr. Upshur, !99 supl4 note 3 (requesting relieffor Mr. Upshur), the court lacks jurisdiction over such claims for the reasons stated with regard to Ms. Thompson's claims. Moreover, regardless of the jurisdictional baniers, Ms. Upshur cannot obtain relief via Ms. Thompson's complaint because he is not a Danv to the lawsuit. would not be taken in good faith because, as asserted, Ms. Thompson's claims are clearly beyond the subject-matter jurisdiction of this court. IT IS SO ORDERED. -6-
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