ARINGTON v. USA, No. 1:2018cv00713 - Document 6 (Fed. Cl. 2018)
Court Description: OPINION and ORDER: sua sponte dismissing complaint and granting 4 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment. Signed by Senior Judge Loren A. Smith. (ar) Service on parties made. [Sent via certified mail: 7017 1450 000 1346 2113]
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ARINGTON v. USA Doc. 6 ORIGINAL mlniteb $tate5 QCourt of jfeberal QClaitns No. 18-71 3 C Filed: June 11 , 2018 JAMES K. ARINGTON, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STA TES, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) FILED JUN 1 1 2018 U.S. COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS OPINION AND ORDER SMITH, Senior Judge On May 18, 20 18, plaintiff, proceedingpro se, fi led his Complaint with this Comt, seeking various forms ofrelief. Plaintiff's Complaint asse1ts, inter alia, that ce1tain state and government officials have unlawfully conspired against him by denying his state Worker's Compensation claim in violation of numerous state tort laws, contract laws, and constitutional rights. Plainti ff seeks monetary, declaratory, equitable, and injunctive relief. Upon sua spon/e review, this Court finds that plaintiffs allegations do not give rise to any cause of action over which this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Fmt hermore, plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Thus, this Court has no authority to decide plaintiffs case, and therefore must dismiss plaintiffs Complaint pursuant to Rules l 2(h)(3) and l 2(b)(6) of the Rules of the United States Comt of Federal Claims ("RCFC"). I. Background On August 29, 20 16, plaintiff filed his original Complaint in the U.S. District Court for the No1thern District of Indiana, alleging that the government paiticipated in bad faith, fraudulent, and criminal activity in violation of plaintiffs constitutional rights . Arington v. Workers Comp. Bd. ofInd. , No. 16-315, slip op. at3 -5 (N.D. Ind. June 1, 2017). Subsequently, plaintiff's Complaint was dismissed for fai lure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. On July 3, 2017, plaintiff filed a similar Complaint in this Comt, which was dismissed on July 5, 2017, for fai lure to pay a filing fee or complete a valid in forma pauperis application. Arington v. United States, No. 17-902. On May 18, 20 18, plaintiff filed an additional Complaint in this Court, asserting that the government, as a whole, is liable for several allegedly unlawful 7017 1450 ODDO 1346 2113 Dockets.Justia.com acts committed against him by federal and state officials. See Complaint (hereinafter "Comp!.") at 2 (specifying that plaintiff's Complaint is a Bivens action, pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (emphasis added)). In addition to his Complaint, plaintiff also submitted a valid application to proceed informa pauperis. ECF No. 4. In the case at bar, plaintiff alleges that federal judges in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana and U.S. Comi of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit violated plaintiff's constitutional rights by concealing criminal acts committed by state officials and private actors, and subsequently denying plaintiff of attainable medical recovery. Comp!. at 1, 5. Plaintiff asse1is that the government's denial of such medical recovery has prevented him from establishing his need of surge1y for an ongoing injmy, which could have been established at the time plaintiff's first Complaint was filed. Id. at 1. Plaintiff explains that he needs surgery to stop the deterioration of a work-related injury and to retain what medical recovery he has left as quickly as possible, and that lost medical recovery has no administrative remedy available other than legal claims against the federal government. Id. Specifically, plaintiff contends that his First and Eighth Amendment rights have been violated by the government's deliberate indifference, denial, and delay in providing him medical care. Id. at 32-33. Additionally, plaintiff asse1is that his constitutional rights have been violated by the government's conspiracy to deprive him of Due Process and Equal Protection under the law. Id. at 33. Further, plaintiff asserts state t01i and contract claims of negligence, gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and bad faith against the government. Id at 34. As to each count, for Counts I-VIII, plaintiff seeks $5,000,000.00 in compensatory damages and $5,000,000.00 in punitive damages, plus attorneys' fees and costs, with interest as a result of the government's alleged conduct. Id. at 34. As to each count, for Counts IX-X, plaintiff seeks $7,500,000.00 in compensatory damages, $7,500,000.000 in punitive damages, plus attorneys' fees and costs, with interest. Id. In total, plaintiff seeks $110,000,000.00, plus attorneys' fees, costs, and interest, in monetary relief, plus declaratory, equitable, injunctive, and any other relief as this Comi deems just. Id. at 2, 34. II. Standard of Review This Court's jurisdictional grant is found primarily in the Tucker Act, which provides the Comi of Federal Claims with the power "to render any judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States ... in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. § 149l(a)(l) (2012) (emphasis added). Although the Tucker Act explicitly waives the sovereign immunity of the United States against such claims, it "does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages." United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). Rather, to fall within the scope of the Tucker Act, "a plaintiff must identify a separate source of substantive law that creates [a] right to money damages." Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane). Additionally, a complaint shall be dismissed at any time for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." RCFC 12(b)(6). It is well-settled that a complaint should be 2 dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted "when the facts asserted by the claimant do not entitle him to a legal remedy." Lindsay v. United States, 295 F.3d 1252, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Boyle v. United States, 200 F.3d 1369, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Further, it is the Court's "independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists .... " Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010). "If the Comt determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the [C]ourt must dismiss the [case]." RCFC 12(h)(3). In determining whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, the Comt must accept as true all undisputed facts asserted in plaintiffs complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor. See Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 797 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). Notably, pleadings from pro se plaintiffs are held to more lenient standards than pleadings drafted by attorneys. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). However, "[d]espite this permissive standard, a pro se plaintiff must still satisfy the [C]omt's jurisdictional requirements" for the Comt to entertain plaintiffs claims. See Trevino v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 204, 208 (2013) (referencing Bernard v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 497, 499 (2004) ("This latitude ... does not relieve a prose plaintiff from meeting jurisdictional requirements.") (emphasis added)). Pro se or not, each plaintiff carries the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that this Comt has jurisdiction over its claims. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). III. Discussion The crux of plaintiffs Complaint hinges on his asse1tion that he was intentionally damaged by federal officials in their individual capacities. Comp!. at 2. In his Complaint, plaintiff declares, "[t]his case is a Bivens action ... [and] a plaintiff may bring a civil rights suit against federal officials in their individual capacit[ies] for damages caused by constitutional to1ts under color of their authority." Id. (emphasis added). Under Bivens, the Supreme Court held that private citizens may bring claims against government officials in their individual capacities for violations of constitutional rights. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 388. To have a federal cause of action, a plaintiff bringing a Bivens action must demonstrate that a constitutionally protected right to which he is entitled has been violated by a federal official. Id. In support of his Bivens action, plaintiff seeks "monetary, declaratory, equitable, and injunctive relief [for the government's] assistance in criminal acts, adding [sic] and abetting, [and] misprision of a felony of allowing unlicensed[,] unqualified people to dictate direct medical treatment of [him] within the [S]tate of Indiana and across state lines." Comp!. at 2. Further, plaintiff contends that the government, through federal judges, lmowingly allowed him to be placed in immediate danger and subsequently injured by denying his claims in prior Worker's Compensation Board ofindiana ("WCB") hearings, and thus violated his First, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 3. Plaintiff proffers that such judges have unlawfully assisted Indiana state officials and private actors, namely medical professionals, in committing a Class C felony under the Indiana Code. Id. at 5 (referencing Ind. Code§§ 2522.5-8-1 to -2 (2018)). 3 Under Indiana law, "[i]t is unlawful for any person to practice medicine ... in [Indiana] without holding a license or permit to do so .... " Ind. Code§ 25-22.5-8-1. Additionally, "[a] person who knowingly or intentionally violates [the Indiana Code] by unlawfully practicing medicine ... commits a Class C felony .... " Id § 25-22.5-8-2. Based on the relevant sections in the Indiana Code, plaintiff contends that WCB members were prejudiced against plaintiff, and wanted to conceal violations of state law committed by state officials and private actors. Comp!. at 3. Further, plaintiff alleges that federal judges and state officials violated state law and plaintiffs constitutional rights by knowingly concealing state officials' and private actors' unlawful practice of medicine. Id Plaintiff adds that, by assisting in such felonious and fraudulent activity, the government has denied plaintiff attainable medical recovery that he would have received two years ago, had the government not denied his WCB claims. Id at 4. It appears from the Complaint, that plaintiff seeks multiple avenues of relief for tortious and criminal acts allegedly committed by various federal and state officials. Id. at 2. Pursuant to the Tucker Act, this Court's jurisdiction does not extend to cases sounding in tort. 28 U.S.C. § 149l(a)(l). The Tucker Act grants this Court jurisdiction over suits against the federal government, not against individual federal officials. Id. Thus, the Bivens action asserted by plaintiff, which sounds in tort against various individual federal officials, lies outside the jurisdiction of this Court. Similarly, the Court is limited to hearing cases in which the Constitution or a federal statute requires the payment of money damages as compensation for violations. Id.; see also Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Mitchel/, 463 U.S. 206, 218 (1983)). As the remainder of plaintiffs claims involve declaratory, equitable, and injunctive relief, as opposed to monetaty relief, this Cornt does not possess jurisdiction to entertain such claims. See Brown, 105 F.3d at 624 ("The remainder of [plaintiffs] demands, which are for declaratory or injunctive relief, are also outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. The Tucker Act does not provide independent jurisdiction over such claims for equitable relief.") (citing United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 2-3 ( 1969)). Accordingly, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to ente1tain plaintiffs claims, and plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. IV. Conclusion Construing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Court finds that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims for monetary and non-monetai·y relief for t01tious acts allegedly committed by individual federal and state officials. Plaintiff has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that this Court has jurisdiction over his claims, and he has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Although the Cornt routinely affords pro se plaintiffs more lenience when filing complaints in this Cornt, such leniency does not extend to ente1taining a complaint that explicitly lies outside of this Court's jurisdiction. 4 For good cause shown, plaintiffs application to proceed informa pauperis is GRANTED. For the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs Complaint is, sua sponte, DISMISSED pursuant to RCFC l 2(h)(3) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and RCFC l 2(b )(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Clerk of Cami is hereby directed to enter judgment consistent with this Opinion. IT IS SO ORDERED. 5
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