MORGAN v. USA, No. 1:2016cv01510 - Document 16 (Fed. Cl. 2017)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND FINAL ORDER re: granting 7 Motion to Dismiss - Rule 12(b)(1) and (6). The Clerk is directed to enter judgment. Mailed via USPS certified mail receipt #7017 1540 0000 1346 0232. Signed by Chief Judge Susan G. Braden. (dw) Copy to parties.
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MORGAN v. USA Doc. 16 oRlCIlNAt lln tbe @nrte! $.tutes @ourt of jfe[ersl No. l6-1510 Filed: June 30,2017 :t,f @tsrms FILED *r.* ** ** * *** * *,t * * * 'i:i*:t +* **** * *** *! ** {. ** * JUN 3 0 20t7 U.S. COURT OF FEDERAL CI-AIMS WILLIAM H. MORGAN, Plaintiff, pro se, 28 U.S.C. g 1491 (Tucker Act Jurisdiction); Rules ofthe United States Court of Federal Claims C'RCFC) 12(bX I ) (Subject Matter Jurisdiction), I 2(b)(6) (Failure To State A Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted), 4l(b) (Failure to Prosecute). THE T]NITED STATES, Defendant. ,l' * :f * * * * * *,t * * + :! * * *,t,* * * * * * + * * * * * * * {. :t *+*** * William H. Morgan, La Pine, Oregon, Plaintiff, pro se . Isaac B. Rosenberg, united states Department of Justice, Counsel for the Government. civil Division, washington, D.c., MEMORANDUM OPINION AND FINAL ORDER BRADEN, ChiefJudge. I. RELEVANTFACTUALBACKGROUND.I on october 28,2015, the Klamath county circuit court of oregon, convicted william H. Morgan of resisting anest and contempt of court. compl. App. at Ez-sz. Mr. Morgan was sentenced to twelve months of probation and required to pay a $500 fine. compl. app. ai Ez-El. Mr. Morgan was scheduled 1o be released from probation on october 11,2016. compl. at 2*3; compl. App. at E2-E3. on November 7,2016, Mr. Morgan called the southem oregon I The relevant facts discussed herein are derived from the November 14,2016 Complaint ("Compl.") and attached Appendices (..Compl. App. A_E',). Dockets.Justia.com ?E1? 1q50 0Bn0 13qb 0e3a Monitoring Services, LLC2 to request written confirmation that he completed probation, without any violations. Compl. App. El1. The SOMS informed Mr. Morgan that he successfully completed probation on October 11,2016, however, he did not receive written confirmation. Compl. at 2-3; Compl. App. at El l. II. PROCEDURALHISTORY. on November 14,2016, Mr. Morgan ("Plaintiff') filed a complaint in the united states court of Federal claims against the United states, oregon Supreme court, oregon court of Appeals, Klamath county circuit court, Klamath county Defenders office, Klamath county District Attomey, and the SOMS. Compl. at 1. The November 14,2016 Complaint alleges that the Govemment: (1) violated the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. $$ 2671-80, by acting negligently and intentionally inflicting emotional distress on plaintiff, Compl. at 2_3; (2) violated Plaintiffs constitutional rights, including the Fourth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' Due process clauses, and Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause, Compl. at2,4,5,6; (3) violated Plaintiff s rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. S 12101, Compl. at 1,3, 4,6; (4) violated the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. g 1051, the Hobbs Act, lS U.S.C. g l95l,and the Racketeer Influenced and Comrpt Organizations Act (,,RICO Act"i, lg U.S.C $$ 1961-68, Compl. at2, 4,5,6,7; (5) violated the Fifth Amendment Takings clause, by taking the Morgan family property, Compl. at 6; and (6) breached various contracts and waranties under the Contracts Dispute act C'CDA), 41 U.S.C. gg 7101-09, Compt. at 4, 5, 6. The November 14,2016 Complaint also requests the United States Court of Federal Claims to reconsider a different complaint, filed on August 2,2016.3 Compl. at 6. . ' The Southem oregon Monitoring Services, LLC ("soMs') is a bench probation monitoring service for Klamath County Court. The SOMS monitors defendants to ensure they complete bench probation conditions, e.g. treatment, community service, and payment of court fines and fees. Although the November 14,2016 complaint does not specify the case name or number in which the August 2,2016 complaint *as fiI"d, the court believes the referenced case is Morgan v. united states, No. 16-937. on october 24,2016, the united States Court of Federal claims dismissed Morgan, No. 16-937, pursuant to Rules of the united states court of Federal On November 14,2016, Plaintiff also filed a Motion For Leave To Proceed In Forma Pauperis. ECF No. 1. On December 16,2016, the court granted Plaintiff s motion. ECF No. 6. On January 13,2017,the Govemment filed a Motion To Dismiss ("Gov't Mot."), pursuant to RCFCF 12(bX1) and 12(bX6). ECF No. 7. On February 22,2017, nine days after plaintiffs response was due, the court issued a Show Cause Order, to ascertain why this case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute, pursuant to RCFC 41(b). ECF No. 8. On March 31, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Response to the February 22,2017 Show Cause Order, but did not respond to the January 13,2017 Motion To Dismiss. ECF No. 9. On April 4, 2017,the court issued a Scheduling Order directing Plaintiffto file a Response to the January 13,2017 Motion To Dismiss by April lS,20lj. ECF No. 10. On May 2,2017, Plaintiff filed a Response to the January 13,2017 Motion To Dismiss No. 12. On May 18,201"1, the Govemment filed a Reply (,,Gov't Reply,,). ("P1. Resp."). ECF ECFNo. m. 15. DISCUSSION. A. Jurisdiction. The United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491' "to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the $ constitution, or any Act of congress or any regulation of an executive department. or uDon anv express or implied contract with the United States. or lor liquidated or uniiquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 28u.s.c. g lagl(a\1). The Tucker Act, however, is..a iurisdictional statute; it does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United Stares for money damages . . . [T]he Act merely confers jurisdiction upon [the United States Court of Federal claims] whenever the substantive right exists." united siates v. Testan, 424 u.s. 392, 3gg (lg7 6). . To pursue a substantive right under the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must identify and plead an independent contractual relationship, Constitutional provision, federal statute, an-d,/or executive agercy regulation that provides a substantive right to money damages. See Todd v. United States, 386 F.3d 1091, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("[J]urisdiction under the Tuiker Act requires the liuganr to idenlif! a substantive right for money damages against the United States ."p*ut" fiom the Tucker Act[.]"); see also Fisher v. (Jnited states,4O2 F.3d 1167,1112 (Fed. cir. 2005) (en banc) (,,The TuckerAct... does not create a substantive cause ofaction; . . . a plaintiff must idintify a separate source of substantive law that creates the right to money damages. . . [T]hat source must be 'money-mandating'"'). Specifically, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the source of subsranuve law upon which he relies "can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government[.]" Testan, 424 u.S. at 400. And, the plaintiff bears the burden oi establishins . claims ("RCFC') 12(bxl). ECF No. 13. on November 7,2016, Morgan, No. 16-937 was appealed to the united states court ofAppeals for the Federal circuit. ECFNo. 16. on April 5, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the court,s dismissal. ECF No. 20. jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. See Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846F.2d,746,748 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("[O]nce the [trial] courr's subject matter jurisdiction [is] put in question . . . . [the plaintiff] bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence."). B, Standard Of Review For Pra Se Litigants. Pro se plaintiffs' pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those of litigants represented by counsel. See Haines v. Kerner,404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (holding that pro se complaints, "however inartfully pleaded," are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers"). The court traditionally examines the record "to see if pro se] [a plaintiff has a cause ofaction somewhere displayed." Ruderer v. united states,412F.2d 12g5,, 1292(Ct. Cl. 1969). C. Standard Of Review For Motion To Dismiss, pursuant to RCFC l2(bxl). A challenge to the United States Court ofFederal Claims' "general power to adjudicate in specific areas of substantive law. . . is properly raised by a [Rule] l2(b)(l) motionf.]', palmer v. unitedstates,168F.3dl3l0, 1313(Fed.cir.'t999);seealsoRCFCl2(bX1)("Evliydefenseto claim for relief in any pleading must be asserted in the responsive pleading. . . . But a party may assert the following defenses by motion: (1) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction[.]"). a When considering whether to dismiss an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, ,.a court must accept as true all undisputed facts asserted in the plaintiffls complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor ofthe plaintiff." Trusted Integration, Inc.v. United States,65g F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 201l). D. Standard Of Review For Motion To Dismiss, pursuant To RCFC l2(bx6). A claim is subject to dismissal under RCFC 12(bX6), if it does not provide a basis for the court to grant relief. ,see Bell Atl. corp. v. Twombly,550 u.s. 544, ss5-56 (2007) (,.[A wellpleaded complaint] requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitatlon of the elements ofa cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right of relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegationsin the complaint are true (even if doubtful in facQ." (intemal citations omitted)); see also iirdroy r. united states,295 F.3d' 1252' 1257 (Fed. Cir.2002) ("A motion to dismiss. . . for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is appropriate when the facts asserted by the claimant do not entitie him to a legal remedy."). A complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to reliefthatisplausibleonitsface."'Ashqoftv. Iqbal,556rJ.s.66,,679(2009)(quotingTwombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The allegations contained in a complaint also must indicate to thJ court that there is "more than a sheer possibility that a defendani has acted unla'*fully. 1d. .,Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." 1d. To determine whether a complaini itates a plausible claim foi relief, a coun must engage in a context-specific analysis and "draw on itsjudicial experience and common sense.,, 1/. ar 678-79. E. The Government's January 13,2017 Motion To Dismiss The November 14, 2016 Complaint, Pursuant To RCFC l2(bXf) And 12(b)(6). 1. The Government's Argument. The Govemment argues that claims in the Novemb er 14, 2016 Complaint alleging wrongdoing by the oregon Supreme court, oregon court of Appeals, Klamath county circuit court, Klamath county Defenders office, Klamath county District Attorney, and the soMS, must be dismissed, because the United States Court ofFederal Claims only has jurisdiction to adjudicate claims against the United States govemment; claims against private parties and state govemments and their employees, cannot be adjudicated by the court. Gov't Mot. at 7. The Govemment also points out that the court does not have jwisdiction to adjudicate the tort claims alleged in the November 14,2016 Complaint, because neither the Federal Tort Claims Act nor the Oregon Tort Claims Act confer jurisdiction on the court. Gov't Mot. at 9. Likewise, the Fourth Amendment, Eight Amendment, Due process clause, and Double Jeopardy clause claims alleged in the November 14,2016 Complaint must be dismissed, because thoie piovisions are not money-mandating. Gov't Mot. at l0-l 1 . In addition, the court does not have jurisdiction over statutory civil rights claims. Gov't Mot' at 10 (citing Marlin v. IJnited States,63 Fed. Cl. 475,476 (2005) (holding-that staturory civil rights claims reside exclusively with the district courts)). Nor does the court have iurisdiction to adjudicate the November 14,2016 complaint's Lanham Act, Hobbs Acr, and RICb Act claims, because those statutes either grant exclusive jurisdiction to the United States district courts or are criminal statutes. Gov't Mot. at 10. Finally, the court does not have jurisdiction to re-adjudicate Morgan, No. 16-937, because that case is on appeal before the United States Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit. Gov't Mot. at 12. In addition, the Govemment argues that the November 14, 2016 complaint's Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and Breach-of-Contract claims fail to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for reliefabove the speculative level and should be dismissed, p-ursuant to RcFc l2(bX6). Gov't Mot. at 11-12. Regarding the Takings clause claim, the November 14,2016 complaint does not identify a property interest that was taken or allege any other specific facts to supporr a takings claim. Gov't Mot. at 8. Regarding the Breach-of-Contract claim, the November 14,2016 Complaint does not allege any contractual agreement between Plaintiff and the United States. Gov't Mot. at 8. 2. The plaintifps Response. Plaintiff responds that the court has jurisdiction to adjudicate claims against the state of Oregon, because Oregon is an agent of the United States. Pi. Resp. at Z. In'addition, plaintiff raises a new claim, alleging that the United States Court of Federal'Claims is conspirin! with the Democratic National Committee C,DNC,) to deny his claims. pl. Resp. at 3. _ 3. The Government's Reply. The Govemment replies that, as a matter of law, the state of oregon is not an agent of the _ United States for the purpose of esta.blishing Tucker Acr jurisdiction. dov,t Repty at iciting stebbins v. united states,l05 Fed. cl. gt, 84-85 (2012) ( ..plaintiff cannot recoveiin the court of i-i Federal Claims simply by arguing that the United States is responsible, under the doctrine of respondeat superior[.]")). And, Plaintiffs new allegation that the court is conspiring with the DNC to deny his claims is not properly before the court, because Plaintiff may not allege new claims or amend his November 14, 2016 complaint in a response to a motion to dismiss. Gov't Reply at 2. (quoting Driessen v. united states, 116 Fed. c|.33,44 n.l0 (2014) (stating that "[i]t is generally improper for a party to raise new claims not included in its complaint in an opposition to a motion to dismiss.")). In the alternative, the allegation should be dismissed, because it sounds in tort and is frivolous. Gov't Reply at 2. 4. The Court's Resolution. a. The United States Court Of Federal Claims Does Not Have Jurisdiction To Adjudicate Claims Against States And Their Agencies And Officials. The November 14,2016 Complaint alleges that agencies and officials of Oregon violated States Court of Federal Claims, however, only has juiisdiction to adjudicate claims made against the united states. see united states v. sherwood,'312 u.s. 5g4, 588 (1941) ("[The court's] jurisdiction is confined to the rendition of money judgments in suit brought for that relief against the United States . . . and if the relief sought is agai"-st others than the united states the suit as to them must be ignored as beyond the jurisdiction ofthe court.,,). Plaintiffs rights. The United For these reasons, the court has detcrmined that it does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the November 14,2016 Complaint,s claims against Oregon, its agencies, or officials. b. The United States Court Of Federal Claims Does Not Have Jurisdiction To Adjudicate Tort Claims. The November 14, 2016 Complaint's negligence claim and intentional infliction of emotional distress claim sound in :ort. see 24 Stuart M. Speiser et al., AMERICAN LAw oF TORTS $ 9:1 (2017) (explaining that negligence is an extensive part of tort law); 44 Stuart M. Speiser et al., AMERICAN LAw oF TORTS g 16:16 (2016) (describing intentional infliction of emotional distress as a tort). The United States Court of Federal Claims]however, does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate cases sounding in tort. see 28 u.s.c. g lagl(a)(1) 1..The united states court of Federal claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment ;"y claim against the United States . . . in cases not so-unding in rorr ." {emphasis aide-cl)); see"d; Kiene irso Corp.'u. unirca sos u.s. 200, 214 (1993) ("[T]ort cases are outside the jurisdiction of the court ofFederal {.ot.r"' Claims."). - For these reasons, the court has determined that it does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the November 14, 2016 Complaint's negligence claim or intentionai infliction of emotional distress claim. c. The United States Court Of Federal Claims Does Not Have Jurisdiction To Adjudicate plaintiff s Constitutional Claims. The November 14, 2016 Complaint alleges that the Govemment violated plaintiff s rights under the Fourth Amendment, Eighth Amendmint, Fifth Amendment,s Due process and Double Jeopardy clauses and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due process clause. compl. at2,4,5, 6. .r-he court does not have judsdiction to adjudicate claims based on the Fourth or Eighth Amendments, because neither is money-mandating. see Brown v. united states, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. cir. 1997) (holding that a violation of the Fourth Amendment does not mandate the payment of money); see also Trafny v. united states, 503 F.3d 1339, l34o (Fed. cir. 2007) Qter curiam) (holding that the United States Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction over claims arising under the Eighth Amendment because it is not money-mandating). Nor does the court have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims based on the Due Process or the Double Jeopardy Clauses. See smith v. united states, 709 F .3d I I 14, 1 I 16 (Fed. cir. 2013) ("The law is well settied that the Due Process Clauses of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not mandate the payment of money and thus do not provide a cause of action under the Tucker Act."); see also Bernaugh v. United States,38 Fed. Cl. 538, 541 (1997) (determining that the courr does not have iurisdiition over Double Jeopardy claims because they are not money-mandating). For these reasons, the court has determined that it does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate complaint's Fourth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, Due process clause or Double Jeopardy Clause claims. the November 14,2016 d, The United States Court Of Federal Claims Does Not Have Jurisdiction To Adjudicate PlaintifPs Civit Rights Claims. The November 14, 2016 Complaint alleges violations under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ADA. compl. at 1,3, 4, 6. But, the court does not have jurisdiction ovlr claims arising under the civil Rights Act. ,See Anderson v. unitetl states, 22 cl. c1. 17g, 179 n.2 (1990) ("Jurisdiction over such cases resides in the district courts relative to violations ofany provision of the civil Rights Act."). In addition, the court does not have jurisdiction over craims because they are not money-mandating. searres v. united statei, gg Fed. cl. g01, g05 (2009) ("The ADA is not a statute mandating payment by the United States.,,) and the Abi For these reasons' the court has determined that the November 14,2016 Complaint's civil rights claims. e. it does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate The United States Court Of Federal Claims Does Not Have Jurisdiction To Adjudicate plaintifps Lanham Act, Hobbs Act. Or RICO Act Claims. The November 14,2016 Complaint alleges that the Government violated the Lanham Act, Hobbs Act, and RICO Act. Compl. at2,4,5,6,7. The court, however, does not have jurisdiction over Lanham Act claims, because l 5 u. s.c. gt-"ltl exclusive jurisdiction to th; united States District court and territorial 9-lJ?i courts. s'ee l5 U'S'c $ l12l(a) ("The district and territorial courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction and the courts ofappeal of the united States (other than the united States coul of Appeals for the Federal circuit) shall have appellate jurisdiction, ofall actions arisinf unoer lthe L,gftam Act.l"); see arso proxtronics Dosiieily Lic v. united states, r2g Fed. cr. 656, 672 (2016) ("It is an unremarkable proposition that the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurlJi"iion ou", Act claims. congressional authorization to entertain claims arising urra". G Lanham !d* Act extends only to district and tenitorial courts.',.). In addition, the court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the November 14,2016 Complaint's Hobbs Act or RICO Act claims, because the Hobbs Act and RICO Act are criminal statutes under United States Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure. See Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d378,379 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("The [United States Court of Federal Claims] has no jurisdiction to adjudicate any claims whatsoever under the federal criminal code[.]"). For these reasons, the court has determined that it does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the November 14,2016 Complaint's Lanham Act, Hobbs Act or RICO Act claims. f. The United States Court Of Federal Claims Does Not Have Jurisdiction To Review A Decision By The United States Court of Appeals For The Federal Circuit. The November 14,2016 Complaint also requests reconsideration of a different complaint alleging an "assault on the Morgan family[,]" Plainiiff does allege any facts that identify the case of concem. Compl. at 6. The court, however, believes that the comilaint referred to is Morgan, No' 16-937' On October 24, 2016, the United States Court of Federal Claims dismissed the complaint in Morgan, No. 16-937 for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction . see Morgan, No. 169.37 ECF. N.9. 13-. on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Ciiuit affirmed ' the court's dismissal. see Morgan, No. 16-937, ECF No. 2b. The court does not have jr,6isdiction to review decisions of the United Slates court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See iilda In4us., Inc. v. united stares, 5il F.3d 1348, 1350 (Fed. cii. 2008) (,,ordinarily, the act orfiiing a notice of appeal confers jurisdiction on an appellate court and divests the triai court ofiu.irai"'tron ou.'. matters related to the appeal.',). For this reason, the court has determined that it does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the November 14,2016 Complaint's request for reconsideration of Mor[an,No. 16_937. g. The United States Court Of Federal Claims Does Not Have Jurisdiction To Adjudicate plaintiff s Conspiracy To Commit Fraud Claim. Plaintiffs claim that "the DEMoGRATIC NATIONAL coNVENTIoN in consprracy to the FEDERAL couRT of cLA IMS_plan to deny any claim[,]', was improperty raiseJin piaintifrs May 2,2017 Response' see 35A c.l.s. tzoril g :lz 1"rurti"s um"na *ei. co.pruints through briefing or oral advocac{. Thur, a comptaini "arulot may not be amended by the iriefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss[.]"). But, even if the conspiracy-to-commif fraud claim was properly raised, the court must d-ismiss it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, because it sounds in tort. Pl. Reply at 3. See Huffordv. United Stares,gZ fea. Ct. eSe,nefZOOqii;if,. b"".t Federal claims does not have jurisdiction over . . . claims of fraud, . . . because these claims sound in tort."). "f For these reasons, the court has determined that the conspiracy-to-commilfraud craim alleged in Plaintiff s May 2,2017 Response must Ue aismissea. .. h. Plaintiffs Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and CDA Claims Do Not State A Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted. To the extent that the November 14,2016 Complaint alleges a Takings Clause claim or a Breach-of-Contract claim, no facts are alleged from which the court can ascertain whether a plausible claim for relief exists. Compl. a|4,5,6. The November 14,2016 Complaint states that "no person shall be deprived oflife liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." compl. at 5. Because the November 14,2016 Complaint's Takings claim does not identify any property interest that was taken, rt must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Adsms v, lJnited states,391 F.3d 1212,1218 (Fed. cir. 2004) (,,[A] claimant under ihe Takings clause must show that the govemment, by some specific action, took a private property inteiest for a public use without just compensation."); see also Am. pelagic ttiihing co., i.p.-r. unitrd stotes',379 F,3d 1363' 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining that as a threshold matter, a plaintiff allegini a taking, must allege a legally cognizable property interest or the court's determination of uilio tatins cannot continue) i The November 14, 2016 complaint states that "the Defendants have created multiple of contract, by misconduct that continues[.]" compl. at 5. This Breach-of-contract claim, however, does not alrege any of the requisite elementi of contract formation: (l) offbr, @^acceptance, and (3) consideration. ,See Maier v. United States,314 F.3d 600; A; fted. Cir. 2002) Nor does it identifu any express or implied contracts between plaintiffand the Government. Therefore, the November 14,2or5 compiaint's Breach-of-contract claim does not .,contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to reliefthat is plausible on it, fu.".,,, Iqbal,556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Twombty,550 U.S. at 570j. breaches For these reasons' the court has determined that the Novem ber 14,2016 compraint,s Taking clause and Breach-of-contract claims do not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. IV. CONCLUSION. For these reasons' the Government's January 13,20ri Motion To Dismiss is granted. sce rhe crerk is directed r+, i!l%lfli?li,];.r2(bx6). t;'",'t;,r;ls;;;;;ilJi"il"'N:#i,ue. IT IS SO ORDERED. /e",4,4/f '4 SUSAN G. BRADEN, Chief Judge -"t-'-
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