SPENGLER v. USA, No. 1:2015cv00794 - Document 35 (Fed. Cl. 2016)

Court Description: REPORTED OPINION and ORDER denying 34 Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment pursuant to Rule 59 and/or RCFC 60(b). Signed by Judge Elaine D. Kaplan. (dls) Copy to parties. (Plaintiff served via certified mail; Article No. 7012 3460 0001 7791 6930)

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SPENGLER v. USA Doc. 35 0Rl0lillAt lJn tbt@nftr! $ltatts @ourtot fr[erul @luimg FILED No. 15-794C (Filed: Septemb er 26, 20 | 6) stP 2 6 2016 U,S. COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS ANDREW R. SPENGLER, Keywords: RCFC 59; RCFC 60; Motion for Reconsideration; Subject Matter Jurisdiction; Fiduciary Duty; Prison Mailbox Rule; Commissary and Welfare Fund Plaintiff, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant. Andrew R. Spengler, Fort Worth, TX, Plaintiff, pro se. Alexis J. Echols,Trial Attomey, with whom were Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attomey General, Robert E. Kirschman, Jr., Director, and Deborah A. Bynum, Assistant Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendant. OPINION AND ORDER KAPLAN, Judge. This case is currently before the Court on Plaintiff s motion for reconsideration pursuart to Rules of the Court ofFederal Claims (RCFC) 59 and 60(b). The pro se plaintiff, Andrew Spengler, seeks reconsideration ofthis Court's July 19,2016 Opinion and Order granting the govemment's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to RCFC 12(bX1). See Spengler v. United States, No. 15-794C, 2016 WL 3947954 (Fed. Cl. July 19,2016). Because Mr. Spengler has failed to timely file his motion for reconsideration under RCFC 59 and has failed to establish the existence of grounds for reliefunder RCFC 60(b), his motion is DENIED. BACKGROUND As set forth in detail in this Court's earlier decision, Mr. Spengler, who is cunently serving a fifteen-year sentence in the Federal Correctional Institution in Fort Worth, Texas, claims that he is a beneficiary of the Commissary and Welfare Fund for federal prisoners (hereinafter "the Commissary Fund" or "the Fund"), which is designated as a "trust" fund pursuant to 31 U.S.C. g 132I(a)(22). Compl. at l, Doc. ?01a 3qb0 0081, ??9r t1l0 Dockets.Justia.com No. I . In his complaint, Mr. Spengler alleges that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) breached its fiduciary duties to inmates by using monies from the Commissary Fund for what he claims are improper purposes, including in particular to fund the creation and operation of the Trust Fund Limited Inmate Computer System (TRULINCS) and the Trust Fund Inmate Telephone System (TRUFONE). As relief, Mr. Spengler sought, among other things, orders directing the United States to provide an accounting ofthe Fund and to restore billions ofdollars to it. He also asked the Court to award damages to him personally for, among other things, costs he has inctured to pay for clothing at the prison commissary, his expenses ofcopying documents, artd the costs he incurred for the use of the TRULINCS and TRUFONE systems. This Court granted the govemment's motion to dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction. 2016 WL 3947954, at *7. It noted that while the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. g 1a91(a\l), waiyes the sovereign immunity of the United States to allow a suit for money damages, Mitchell v United Srates,463 U.S. 206,212 (1983) (Mitchell ID, it does not confer any substantive rights on a plaintiff, United States v. Testan,424tJ.S.392,398 (1976).2016 WL3947954, at *2. Therefore, a plaintiff seeking to invoke the court's Tucker Act jurisdiction must identifr an independent source ofa substantive right to money damages from the United States arising out ofa contract, statute, regulation or constitutional provision. Jan's Helicopter Serv.. Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 525 F.3d 1299,1306 (Fed. Cir.2008). The Court further observed that an independent source ofa substantive right to money damages may be found where a statute "establishes specific fiduciary or other duties" and may "'fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation for damages sustained as a result of a breach of the duties [the governing law] impose[s].'" 2016 WL 3947954, at *3 (quoting United States v. Navajo Nation (I.{avajo Nation I), 537 U.S. 488, 506 (2003), and Mitchell II,463 U.S. at 219) (alterations in original). To establish that the United States has accepted a particular fiduciary obligation, "[a plaintiff] must identifu statutes or regulations that both impose a specific obligation on the United States and 'bear[] the hallmarks ofa conventional fiduciary relationship. "' Hopi Tribe v. United States, 782 F.3d 662,667 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Navajo Nation fNavajo Nation II), 556 U.S. 287 ,301 (2009)) (alteration in original). In this case, the Court held that neither the language, history, nor purposes of 31 U.S.C. $ 1321(a)(22) suggested that-in classifying the Commissary Fund as a,.trust fund"-{ongress intended to impose specific fiduciary obligations on the United States that would subject it to a claim for monetary damages for their breach. 2016 WL 3947954, at *3-*5. Therefore, the Court held that it lacked iurisdiction over Mr. Spengler's claims for money damages. Id. at *5. The Court also ruled that it lacked jurisdiction over his claims for injunctive reliefbecause they were not incidental to a claim for monetary reliefproperly before the Court. Id. (citing James v. Caldera, 159 F.3d 573, 580 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). Further, the Court declined to transfer Mr. Spengler's claims to a district cou( pursuant to 28 U.S.C. $ 1631. 2016 WL 3947954, at *5_*7 .It concluded that such a transfer would be inappropriate because Mr. Spengler had failed to meet his burden of demonstrating exhaustion of administrative remedies with respect to the claims made in this case as required by 42 U.S.C. g 1997e(a). Id. Mr. Spengler now moves that the Court reconsider both its dismissal of his complaint and its denial of his request that his claims be transferred. He argues that reconsideration is warranted because the Court erred in its interpretation ofthe Sixth Circuit's decision in Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093 (6th Cir. 1994). pl.'s Req. to Alter J. at 2. In addition, he argues that he did exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to at least two of the claims he is asserting in this case, as evidenced by additional documents submitted in connection with his motion for reconsideration. Id. at 5-7. DISCUSSION I. Timeliness of Mr. Spengler's Motion Under RCFC 59 The first avenue through which Mr. Spengler seeks reconsideration is RCFC 59. Pl.'s Req. to Alter J. at 1. That rule provides that, except for a motion for new trial or reconsideration on the grounds that any fraud, wrong, or injustice has been done to the United States (grounds not alleged here), a motion for new trial or reconsideration "must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry ofjudgment." RCFC 59(bXl); see also RCFC 59(e) (stating that "[a] motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry ofthe judgment"). Additionally, "[t]he court must not extend the time to act under RCFC . . . 59(b), (d), and (e)." RCFC 6(b)(2); see also Johnson v. United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 558, 560 (2016) (holding that because ofRCFC 6(b) the court could not consider plaintiffs untimely motion for reconsideration); Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 119, 120 (2005) ("plike the parallel Federal rules, this court's rules do not countenance a motion to extend the time for filing a reconsideration motion subject to the timing provision of RCFC 59(b).'). Here, Mr. Spengler states that he received the Court's order dismissing his case on July 26, 2016. Pl.'s Req. to Alter J. at 1. Citing Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (19SS), Mr. Spengler then alleges that he filed his motion for reconsideration "in accordance witlt the 'Prison Mail Box Rule' on 8/22/2016;'Pl.'s Req. to Alter J., Proof of Filing & Service. In Houston, the Court held that when a pro se prisoner frles a criminal or habeas corpus appeal, his notice of appeal is deemed filed at the time he delivers it to prison authorities for forwarding to the court clerk. See Houston,487 U.S. at 269J6.1 ' Since the Supreme Court's decision in Houston, federal courts have moved in the direction ofextending this "prison mailbox rule" to all pro se prisoner district court filings. See Sharpe v. United States, 111 Fed. C|.334,336-37 (2013), and cases cited therein. Indeed, the Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit, in an unpublished table decision, has applied the "prison mailbox rule" to an incarcerated pro se plaintiff s motion for reconsideration. See Bernaugh v. United States, 168 F.3d 1319 (table), No. 98-5059, 1998 WL 537723, at *2 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (per curiam). And in Sharpe, rhe "prison mailbox rule" was applied to an incarcerated pro se plaintiffs complaint filed in the Court ofFederal Claims. 1l I Fed. Cl. at 337-38; cf. Brown v. United States,74Fed. But even assuming that the "prison mailbox rule" applies to Mr. Spengler's motion for reconsideration, it would still be out of time under RCFC 59 because that rule requires that the motion be filed within twenty-eight days of the entry ofjudgment.2 Here, judgment was entered July 20,2016. Judgment, Doc. No. 31. Accordingly, a motion pursuant to RCFC 59 was due to be filed no later than August 18, 2016. RCFC 59(b), (e). Mr. Spengler states, however, that he filed his motion under the "prison mailbox rule,,' on August 22, 2016 (by which the Court assumes that he is asserting that he placed the motion in the prison mail system on that date). See Pl.'s Req. to Alter J., Proof of Filing & Service. The motion is thus out of time. II. Mr. Spengler's Motion Pursuant to RCFC 60(b) Mr. Spengler altematively requests relieffrom the Court's earlierjudgment on the basis ofRCFC 60(b). That rule states that the Court "may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding" for six enumerated reasons: l) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 2) Newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under RCFC 59(b); Fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; The judgment is void; The judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or Any other reason that justifies relief. 3) 4) 5) 6) RCFC 6o(b). provision, Rule 60(b) is to be ,liberatly construed for the purpose of doing substantial justice."' Patton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Health & Human Servs., i5 F.3d 1021, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing 7 James W. Moore & Jo Desha Lucas, Moore's "As a remedial Cl. 546, 550-51 (2006) (reviewing the application ofthe,,prison mailbox rule,'in determining whether action filed in court of Federal claims should be transferred to district court). 2 To the extent that Mr. Spengler may be suggesting that the date he received a copy of the Court's opinion (July 26,2016) is the date from which his time to file a motion to reconsider runs, he is incorrect. The operative event under RCFC 59 is the "entry ofthe judgment," RCFC 59(bXl), (e), which occurs when the clerk enters the judgment in the civil docket and it is set out in a separate document. RCFC 58(c). Federal Practice flfl 60.18[8],60.19 (2d ed. 1993)). At the same time, "[t]he United States Supreme Court has'cautioned that the Rule should only be applied in extraordinary circumstances."' Perry v. United States, 558 F. App'x 1004, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Liljebers v. Health Servs. Acquisition Com.,486 U.S. 847, 864 (1988)) (alterations omitted). Therefore, in ruling on a motion under RCFC 60(b), a court must strike "a proper balance between the conllicting principles that litigation must be brought to an end and that justice should be done." Hutchins v. Zoll Med. Corp. , 492 F .3d 1377 , 1386 (Fed. Cir.2007) (quoting I 1 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure $ 2851 (2d ed. 1995)). Here, Mr. Spengler does not identify a specific subsection ofRCFC 60(b) pursuant to which he requests that the Court grant him relief from its earlier judgment. However, his motion asserts two arguments: 1) that the Court relied upon ,,inconect facts" in interpreting the holding of Washington v. Reno; and 2) that additional evidence reveals he has in fact exhausted his administrative remedies. See generally Pl.'s Req. to Alter J. These arguments would, at best, implicate the grounds for reliefset forth in RCFC 60(bX1) and (b)(2), or the carchall provision, (b)(6). With respect to Mr. Spengler's arguments, RCFC 60(b)(l) fails ro provide any basis for relief from judgment on the grounds of "mistake" or ,,inconect facts" as alleged in his motion. When this case was before the Court on the govemment's motion to dismiss, Mr. Spengler cited Washington v. Reno in support of his argument that the United States has taken on fiduciary duties toward the inmates with respect to its administration of the Commissary Fund. The Court held, however, that Reno was inapposite because the reliefdiscussed therein was purely injunctive in nature. 2016wL 3947954, at *4-*5. Therefore, the court observed, the sixth circuit "had no occasion to address the issue before this court, which concerns whether congress-in characterizing the Commissary Fund as a 'trust' for purposes of 3l U.S.C. $ 1321-intended to impose specific fiduciary obligations on the united states that would subiect the united staies to a claim for monetary damages for its breach.,'ld. at *5. In his motion for reconsideration, Mr. Spengler argues that the Court,s interpretation was based on "incorrect facts." Pl.,s Req. to Alter J. at 2. He draws the court's attention to the settlement agreement that the parties ultimately executed in Reno, in which the united states agreed to credit $4,000,000 to the commissary Fund as part of the resolution ofthe plaintiffs' claims in that case. But even assuming that this observation alleges a "mistake," it is not the type of mistake upon which RCFC 60(bX1) relief may be premised. Rule 60(b) is not a substitute for appeal; legal error alone does not warrant its relief. United States v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d zg2,2gg (3d cir. 2003); see also Cashner v. Freedom Stores. Inc., 98 F.3d 572,5j6 (lOth Cir. 1996). Rule 60(b)(l) does not provide grounds for relief where a party is merely rearguing the legal issue already considered by the court. Cashner, 98 F.3d at 576. !! . In any event, the govemment's agreement to credit the Commissary additional moneys to settle pending Fund with litigation in Reno is not relevant to the court,s interpretation of the sixth circuit's decision in Reno. The bottom line is that the sixth circuit did not address the issue ofrucker Act jurisdiction that is before this court. In _ the fact, to the extent that the plaintiffs in Reno requested reimbursement ofmoneys to the Commissary Fund in addition to the broad injunctive reliefthey sought in that case, jurisdiction over their claims would most likely have been based on the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. $g 702 and 704, and not the Tucker Act. See Kanemoto v. Reno, 4l F.3d 641, 645 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (discussing Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879 (1988)). Therefore, the decision contains no reasoning that undermines any aspect of this Court's analysis, which was based on the language, history, and purposes of 3 1 U.S.C. $ 1321(a)(22), as well as the reasoning ofthe Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court in several Indian trust cases that were decided a number ofyears after the Sixth Circuit issued its decision in Reno. Mr. Spengler's motion thus has failed to show sufficient grounds for reliefunder RCFC 60(bXl). Nor does RCFC 60(bX2) provide any basis for the Court to grant Mr. Spengler the judgment based upon the additional documents he has appended to his motion. That provision authorizes relief from judgment where the movant supplies "newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under RCFC 59(b)." RCFC 60(bX2). ,,ln order to prevail on a Rule 60(bX2) motion, a movant must demonstrate . . . that the evidence is material and controlling and clearly would have produced a different result if presented before the original judgment." Venture Indus. Com. v. Autoliv ASP. Inc.,457 F.3d 1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Good v. Ohio Edison Co., 148 F.3d 413,423 (6th Cir. 1998)) (omission in original). relieffrom First, Exhibits B and C to Mr. Spengler's motion, which consist of the record of two grievances that he filed, contain documents that were available to Mr. Spengler before the time to move for a new trial under RCFC 59(b) had expired. Exhibit B involves a grievance Mr. Spengler filed in October of20l5, in which he complains ofa shortage of towels at the prison laundry and also notes that the cost ofthe laundry is improperly being subsidized by the "Trust Fund." Pl.'s Req. to Alter J. App. 5th (pl.'s App.) Ex. B at 34-35. After receiving unfavorable responses from the prison Warden and the regional office, Mr. Spengler appears to have submitted an appeal to the Central Office (the final authority) on March 30,2016.Id,. at44.It further appears that a response was due to Mr. Spengler from the Central Office on May 21,2016. Id. at 45.3 Mr. Spengler states that because no response was received, he has now exhausted his remedies with respect to that claim. Pl.'s Req. to Alter J. at 6. But Mr. Spengler knew of the existence ofthe documents he would now have this Court consider, as well as their relevance, by May 21,2016. As noted above, any motion for reconsideration under RCFC 59 was due by August 18,2016. Thus Exhibit B is not "newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time" to file a motion under RCFC 59 as required by RCFC 60(bX2). ' There is what seems to be a typographical error in the Central Office,s notice to Mr. Spengler, which is dated April 14,2016. Pl.'s App. Ex. B at 45. It erroneously lists the due date for the Central Office's response as May 21, 2014, rather than 2016, Id. Similarly, Exhibit C contains a record ofthe disposition of a grievance that Mr. Spengler filed in November of 201 5, complaining about the fact that the prison law library did not contain a full complement ofstate law resources. Pl.'s App. Ex. C at 47. Apparently, on April 20,2016, when Mr. Spengler appealed the denial ofhis grievance to the regional office, he added a claim noting that the Electronic Law Library is paid for by the "Inmate Trusf' and that failing to provide the state law volumes was a breach ofthe govemment's fiduciary obligations. Id. at 53. The final decision of the Central Office on this grievance was due on July 31, 2016. Id. at 60. Mr. Spengler states in his motion that he did not receive a timely response from the Central Office and thus that he has now also exhausted his administrative remedies as to those claims. Pl.'s Req. to Alter J. at 6. But again, the documents do not meet the criteria of Rule 60(bX2) because the receipts for Mr. Spengler's administrative appeal to the Central Office were sent to Mr. Spengler on July 20,2016, Pl.'s App. Ex. C at 58-59, well before any RCFC 59 motion was due. Thus Exhibit C does not meet the "newly discovered evidence" requirement ofRCFC 60(bx2). In any event, none ofthe documents Mr. Spengler asks the Court to consider are "material and controlling and clearly would have produced a different result ifpresented before tl-re original judgment." Venture Indus. Com. ,457 F.3d at 1328 (quoting Good, 148 F.3d at 423).In fact, the documents would not have affected in any way the Court's decision not to transfer Mr. Spengler's complaint to the district court. Even assuming that Mr. spengler has established exhaustion of remedies with respect to the claims presented in Exhibits B and C (an issue upon which the Court expresses no opinion), the central claims in his complaint before this Court were related to the use of Commissary Fund moneys to implement TRULINCS and TRUFONE. The grievances that are represented in Exhibits B and C do not involve those claims at all. Finally, there is no basis for granting Mr. Spengler relief from judgment under RCFC 60(bX6), the catchall provision. First, as the Supreme Court has held, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(bX6) (which is substantively identical to RCFC 60(bX6) is mutually exclusive of the other subsections in the Rule. See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393 (1993) (noting that Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(bxl) and 60(b)(6) are mutually exclusive and a party that fails to take timely action due to excusable neglect may not seek reliefby resorting to subsection (b)(6)). Therefore, Mr. Spengler cannot rely upon subsection (b)(6) to the extent that his reasons for requesting relief from judgment are encompassed within either subsection (b)(1) or subsection (b)(2). See paul Revere Variable Annuity Ins. Co. v. Zans,248 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating that the "residual catchall" provision ofFed. R. Civ. P. 60(bX6) may be invoked only for reasons "not encompassed by the other provisions"). Second, and in any event, ,,[t]o justifr relief under subsection KbX6)], a party must show 'extraordinary circumstances' suggesting that the party is faultless in the delay." Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 393 (citing Liljeberg, 4g6 U.S. at 863; Ackerman v. United States,340 U.S. 193,197-200 (1950); and Klapnrott v. United States, 335 U. S. 601, 613-14 ( 1949)). The arguments presented in Mr. Spengler,s motion-which he could have presented during the consideration of the govemment's motion to dismiss or within the time to file a motion under RCFC 59--do not meet these criteria. CONCLUSION On the basis ofthe foregoing, Plaintiff s Request to Alter Judgement Under RCFC 59 and/or RCFC 60(b) is DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED. fr-/( ELAINE D. KAPLAN Judge

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