HARRIS v. USA, No. 1:2014cv00229 - Document 7 (Fed. Cl. 2014)
Court Description: REPORTED MEMORANDUM OPINION and FINAL ORDER granting 6 Motion for Summary Dismissal. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment. Signed by Judge Susan G. Braden. (dls) Copy to parties.
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ORl$l'- L lJn tbe @nfte! $.tutes [.ourt of JfeDers[ @lsfms FILED No. 14-229 C Filed: July 30,2014 * :t :i ** :i ** + ****** + :l * * * *,I,{. * *,} * * * * * * * * * * * * * JUL 3 0 * 2014 U.S. COUBTOF FEDEMLC|jIIff} MICHAEL HARRIS, Jurisdiction; Motion to Dismiss, RCFC l2(b)(l); Pro Sei 28 U.S.C. $ 2s01. Plaintiff, pro se, THE I.INITED STATES, Defendant. **** + * * :l {. :} :* ** :1. * :t * * :i l. {. * * * *'} * :i :lr ** {r * :i * :l' :} {. :i * Michael Harris, Lake City, Florida, Plaintiff, pro se. Anna Bondurant Eley, United States Department of Justice, Trial Attomey, Washington, D.C., Counsel for the Govemment. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND FINAL ORDER BRADEN, Jzdge. I. RELEVANTBACKGROUND.' On December 1,2000, Michael Harris ("Plaintiff') filed a Complaint against Conections Corporation of America C'CCA) and Prison Realty Trust C'PRT) in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Jacksonville Division ("United States District Court"), alleging that his employer, CCA, engaged in employment discrimination in violation of Title VII rThe relevant facts discussed herein were derived from: an April 8,2014 Amended ("Am. Compl."), including appendices attached thereto ("Am. Compl. App. l-2"); an Complaint April 8, 2014 Notice Of Directly Related Cases ("P1. Notice"); Plaintiff s December 1, 2001 Complaint filed in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida ("Dist. Compl."); CCA's November 24,2003 Renewed Motion For Judgment As A Matter Of Law or, in the altemative, a Motion For New Trial or a Motion To Alter Or Amend Judgment ("11/2412003 CCA Dist. Mot."); and the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida's March 10, 2004 Order ("3/10/2004 Dist. Order"). of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. $ 200e er seq. See Harris v. Corrections Corp of lm., No. 3:00-cv-01297-UATC-MCR (M.D. Fla. 2004). That Complaint alleged that Plaintiff was passed over for promotions and denied pay raises on the basis of his race, he was treated unfairly in various situations on the basis of his race, his grievances regaxding harassment and discrimination were ignored by CCA, he was ultimately terminated by CCA in retaliation for both "filing a complaint with [Equal Employment Opporhmity Commission] and receiving Worker[s'] Compensation benefits," and as a result he suffered "ineparable damage [to his] career and . . . reputation." Dist. Compl. flll 1, 2,3,24;see generally Dist. Compl.; Dist. Compl. at4. Prior to trial, the United States District Court required both parties to proffer stipulations, in lieu of offering evidence at trial. Am. Compl. 2. CCA provided stipulations, to which Plaintiff objected. Am. Compl. 2. The District Court convened a jury trial on November 3, 2003 through November 5, 2003. 3/1012004 Dist. Order 1. At trial, the District Court took care to explain the proposed stipulations to Plaintiff, who thereafter initialed the document to "show The Stipulated Agreement ("Agreement") contained [his] approval." Am. Compl. background factual information conceming Plaintiff s employment at CCA aad the chronology of events leading up to his termination. See generally Am. Compl. App. 2. After both parties had initialed the Agreement, the District Court read the stipulations to the jury. 3/10/2004 Dist. Order 2. On November 5,2003, the jury retumed a verdict for Plaintiff, finding that CCA "had retaliated against Plaintiff for exercising his rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964," 42 U.S.C. $ 2000e-5. 3/1012004 Dist. Order 1. The jury awarded Plaintiff $600,000 in back pay and $150,000 for "emotional pain and mental anguish." 3/10/2004 Dist. Order 1. The jury also found that Plaintiff had not established that CCA "discriminated against him on the basis of his race in the terms of his employment or that [CCA] had created a racially hostile working environment." 3110/2004 Dist. Order l. On Novembet 6, 2003, the District Court entered judgment on the jury verdict. 2. On November 24,2003, CCA filed a Renewed Motion For Judgment As A Matter Of Law, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1), or, in the altemative, a Motion For New Trial or a Motion To Alter Or Amend Judgment ("11/24/2003 CCA Dist. Mot."). In its motion, CCA argued that Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence at trial that "would support a finding of unlawful retaliation against [CCA]" and also made improper closing arguments which confused the jury. 1112412003 CCA Dist. Mot. tffl 6, 18. In addition, CCA contended that, even if Plaintiff s unlawful retaliation claim was supported by credible evidence, the damage award was clearly enoneous. 1l/2412003 CCA Dist. Mot. 6. On March 10,2004, the District Court granted CCA's November 24,2003 Renewed Motion For Judgment As A Matter Of Law and found that Plaintiff failed to adduce admissible evidence sufficient to establish the elements of an unlawfirl retaliation claim entitling to damages, so the jury award was "based upon pure speculation ." 311012004 Dist. Order 6, 8, 12. consequently, the District court vacated the November 6, 2006 Judgment for the plaintiff. The District court also stated that it would grant ccA's Motion For A New Trial, if the judgment for ccA was reversed on appeal, but denied ccA's Motion To Alter or Amend Judgment. 3110/2004 Dist. Order 12-13. On March 11,2004,the District Court entered Judgment in favor ofCCA. On April 9,2004, Mr. Harris filed a Notice Of Appeal in the District Court, regarding the District Court's March 10, 2004 Order. On April 22,2004, the District Court granted Plaintiffs April9,2004 Notice of Appeal. on August 4,2005, the united states court of Appeals for the Eleventh circuit affirmed the District court's grant ofjudgment in favor of ccA, as a matter of law. Harris v. Corrections Corp. of America, 139 Fed. App'x 156 (l lth Cir. 2005). In the following seven to eight years, "plaintiff [] filed numerous post-trial motions unsuccessfully seeking to reinstate the jury verdict." 7123/2013 Dist. order. on August 22, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Motion For Relief For Fraud ("sl2zl2o07 pl. Dist. Mot."), alleging thai CCA and tlre District Court Clerk's Office conspired to back-date CCA's 11/2412003 post-trial motion to ensure that it was timely. 8/2212007 pl. Dist. Mot. 2-3. on october 26, i007, the District Court also denied Plaintiff s August 22, 2007 Motion For Relief For Frau d (10/2612007 Dist. Order"), because the "record clearly and unequivocally establishes that no fraud was perpetrated on the lDistrict] Court and Plaintiff|.l" 10/26/2007 Dist. Order 2. on June 26, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Motion To compel Enforcement of courr order. Therein, Plaintiff specifically argued that, although the District Court's 3/10/2004 Order ruled in favor of CCA on the Title VII retaliation claim, it ruled in Plaintiff s favor with resDect to his Workers' Compensation retaliation claim. Nevertheless, the United States Distiict Court reversed the entire damages award, not simply the damages corresponding to Title VII retaliation claim. Thus, Plaintiff argues, he is entitled to at least half the jury a*id.. 6/26/2013 pl. Dist. Mot. see also Am. compl. 2 n. 2 ("There were two [c]laimi oi retaliation that [b]oth parties _1-2; stated needed no further proof. Harris Title vII and state workers' compensation 1c1iaims.f . On July 23, 2013, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied Plaintiffs June 26, 2013 Motion To compel Enforcement of court order for lack of jurisdiction. The District Court held that it "lost jurisdiction to consider matters related to the merits of Plaintiff s case when he filed his Notice of Appeal [on April g,2004].. 7/23/2013 Dist. Order. on August 8,2013, Plaintiff filed a Motion For Reconsideration And Enforcement of Stipulated Fact Agreement challenging the District court's July 23,2013 order and argued, for the first time, that CCA violated the 1l/312003 Pre-trial Statement when it filed the November 24,2003 post-trial Motion For Judgment As A Matter of Law. plaintiff also argued that ccA conceded each element necessary to prove plaintiff s Title vII and workers, -compensation retaliation claims when it agreed to the stipulations and was judicially estopped from re-arguing those issues in its post-trial motion. 8/g/2013 pl. Mot. zn-zs. on-eugusi zs, zotl, plaintiff amended the August 8, 2013 Motion to add that the District court Jecision was not final, because the District court never calculated pre-judgment intere st. g/g/20l3pl. Am.Mot.22_24. on october 10,2013, the District court denied the plaintiffs amended August g, 2013 Motion for lack ofjurisdiction, as the matter was on appeal. II, PROCEDURALHISTORY. On March 25, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the United States Court of Federal claims, together with two Appendices: (1) thJ Agreement ("compl. App. B"); and (2) verification that the Agreement was admitted by and part of the United States District Court,s record. The Agreement contained the following factual stipulations: o r Plaintiff is an African-American aad a member of VII. Compl. App. A fl B. a protected class under Title Plaintiff was employed by ccA at its correctional fac ity in Lake city, Florida and supervised by chief of Security Steve Lister from Janu ary 6, 1997 until his employment was terminated by warden David Eads on iprit 17, 2000. Compl. App. B fl B, C, E. o Plaintiff was promoted to Shift supervisor in late J,i,y 1997 and remained in that capacity until his termination. Compl. App. B']f I. o From September g, 1999 to May g, 2000, plaintiff filed ,.at least three,, discrimination claims against ccA with the United States Equar e-proy-lnt Opportunity Commission C,EEOC). Compl. App. B D. tf o On September 16, 1999, plaintiff was injured during his employment, after which he was put on leave from September 19, 19991o Uarct tj, 2000, ;; received ,,medial and wage loss benefits from CCA,s workers, msurance carrier." Compl. App. B L, M. "";p;;;;ti; f o on December 27 1999; while on leave, praintiff ',went to work for the Florida ' Departrnent of Corrections" as a corrections ofncer, lntenaing one-year probationary period of employment with the Floridi o"p".t Corrections and to thereafter quit hii employmenr with "rt "r CCA." A;; B fl N_P. ;.,;;;il;; C;ili o . On March 13, 2000, plaintiff retumed to work at CCA. Compl. App. B fl R. Over the following month,. Warden Eads repeatedly attempted to discuss Plaintiffs employment with the Florida Department of iorrectio"r; ;;, Plaintiff rebuffed his-inquiries, calling the .utt". u ,,workers, *,np irru":; Compl. App. B tTR_U. o on April 17 2000, warden Eads terminated plaintifps emproyment, because ' of his unwillingness to provide the information requested. Compl. App. B !f The March 25' 2014 Complaint, filed in the united states court of Federal claims, alleges claims for: breach of conrracr; a violarion of the seventh t iur; and a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment rigrrt io due process. compl. The compraint also alleges that ccA retaliated after he filed air.?-inuiion claims and engaged in ,.fraud on the plaintiff seeks a jury t.i"i [c]ourt'" compl. ,a:"ai"ate a breach of the Agreement, a-*a-."t.igr,iiJJj*v r. 1. i" enforcement of the Agreement, and payment of damages for pain and suffering caused CCA's and PRT's breach and for "misleading the [District Court] into [taking] actions against [Plaintiffl." Compl.4. The March 25,2014 Complaint alleges that CCA violated the Agreement by filing the November 24, 2003 Renewed Motion For Judgment As A Matter of Law, or in the altemative, a Motion For New Trial or a Motion To Alter or Amend Judgment. The District court also breached the Agreement, to which it was also bound, by granting ccA's post-trial motion. Compl. 3-4; see also 3/1012004 Dist. Order. The Complaint further alleges that the breach by CCA and by the District Court violated Plaintiffs Seventh Amendment rights and his right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In addition, Plaintiff suffered considerable harm to his reputation for appearing in court, for which he seeks damages. Compl. 3-4. Finally, the Complaint alleges that the statute of limitations does not apply in this case, because the District court's judgment never became final and ccA is still in violation of the Agreement. Compl. 4. On April 8,2014, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (,.Am. Compl.',) in the United states court of Federal claims to: (1) conect a citation to vanDesande v. (Jnited states, 673 F.3d 1342 (Fed. cir. 2012); (2) further clarify the breach of contract claim; and (3) request appoinftnent of counsel. Attached thereto were Appendix 1 and Appendix 2. In addiiion, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Directly Related cases, pursuant to RCFC 40.2, to inform the court of the prior litigation in the united States District court for the Middle District of Florida. on May 20,2014 the Govemment filed a Motion For Summary Dismissal, pursuant to RCFC l2(bx1), arguing that the united states court of Federal claims doei not have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims alleged in either the March 25,2014 complaint and April g. 2014 Amended Complaint (Gov't Mot."). To date, Plaintiff has not filed a Response. III. DISCUSSION. A. Jurisdiction. The United states court of Federal claims has jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 2g 1491, "to render judgment upon any claim against the united States founded either upon the constitution, or any Act of congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated in cases not sounding in tort." 28 u.s.c. $ 1491(a)(1). The Tucker Act, however, is ,,a lamages jurisdictional statute; it does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages. . . . [T]he Act merely confers jurisdiction upon united states lihe court of Federal claims] whenever the substantive right exists.', unirca stutes v. Testan, 424 u.s.c. $ u.s. 392, 398 (1976). Therefore, to pursue a substantive right under the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must identifu and plead an independent contractual relationship, constitutional provision, federal statute, and,/,or executive agency regulation that provides a substantive righi to money damages. see Todd v. united states, 386 F.3d 1091, 1093-94 (Fed, cir. zoo4; 1,,14urisaiction rinder the Tucker Act requires the litigant to identifu a substantive right for money damages against the united states separate from the Tucker Act . . . ."); see also Fisher v. united states,402 F.3d 1167' 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) ("The Tucker Act . . . does not create a substantive cause of action; . . . a plaintiff must identifr a separate source of substantive law that creates the risht to money damages. . . . [T]hat source must be 'money-mandating."'). Specifically, a plainiiff must demonsuate that the source of substantive law upon which he ielies ,,can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Govemment." (Jnited States v. Mitchell, 463 u.s. 206,217 (1983) (quoting Testan,424 u.s. at 400). And, the plaintiffbears the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. see'Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. serv.,846F.2d,746,74g (Fed. cir. 19gg) (,,[o]nce the [trialicourt's subjecr matter jurisdiction [is] put in question . . . - [the plaintiff] bears'the 6urd"n oi"st blishing subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance ofthe evidence."j. B. Standard Of Review For pro Se Litigants. The pleadings of a pro se plaintiff are held to a less stringent standard than those of litigants represented by counsel. si.e Haines v. Kerner,404 u.s. sio, szo ffiaing mat pro se complaints' "however inartfully pleaded," are held to "less stringent stanaarls than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers"). It has been the tradition of this court to examine the record ,.to see if fa pro sel plaintiff has a cause of action somewhere displayed.,, Ruderer v. inilea States, 412 F.2d' 1285, 1292 (ct. cl. 1969). Nevertheress, while the'court plaintiff s complaint, the court "does not excuse -uy """u." a-Iiguiti"s in a l:o ,t" united states,60 [a compraint,s]-'failures.,, Henke v. F.3d 795, 7g9 (Fed. cir. 1995). (leil C. Standard Of Review For A Motion To Dismiss pursuant To RCFC l2(bxl). A challenge to the united states court ofFederal claims, ,.general power to adiudicate in specific areas of substantive law . i, prop"rry *ir"d by"; iRu1."j"iitiliil"."r,"n.,, Patmerv. {Jnited states, 168 F.3d 1310,. l3i3 cr.. .,gr; ;ee l2(ox1) (allowing a party to assert, by motion, "lack or suu)"ci-mutter jurisdiction,,). wien insiaering whether to dismiss an action for lack of subject ,iun., iuriroirtion, the court ir::outigut.a to allegations [of the complaint] to u. t-e and to .ass11e 3ll-fagtual draw all reasonable infbrences in plaintiff s favor.', Henke,60F.3dat7g7. . ir"i. D' "i""-i6i6 The Government's May 20r20r4,Motion For Summary Disrnissar Complaint. l. of pro se The Government,s Argument. The Govemmenr argues that bgih the March 25,2014 Amended Complaint fail to allege a claim within .Complaint and the April B, 2014, this court's jurisdiction. Gov,t Mot. cCA and PRT cannot be sued in the united States cou.t-oir"a"ral claims, because the court,s jurisdiction is limited to claims against the Utt"a Siat"s. Cov,t Mot. 2_3. L Further' even if the compraint and Amended complaint were construed as alreging claims against the Govemment,^th. .ou.t r""n 1*iJi.tln to adjudicate the alleged claims. Firsr' with respecr [o the District cou.t'. gr*rin;.iicZ:e:, post-trial motion, ailegedly in breach of the Agreement, the court "does not hai j".ir[i.,i"r t" *"iew the decisions of district courts.,, Gov't Mot. 3 (quoting Vereda, Ltda. v. United States,2Tl F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (intemal quotation omitted)). Second, the court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims under the Seventh Amendment, Gov't Mot. 3 (citing webster v. united states,74 Fed,. cl. 439, 444 (2006)), or under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Gov't Mot. 3 (citing LeBlanc v. united states, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. cir. 1995)). Lastly, in response ro Plaintiffs assertions that his reputation was damaged, he was subject to retaliation, or he was the victim of a "fraud on the court," these are tort claims. Gov't Mot. 3 (quoting Am. compl. l); see also id. (citing 28 U.S.C. $ 1a91(a)(1) ("The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the united states . . . in cases not sounding in tort.")). 2. The Plaintiff s Response. Plaintiff did not respond to the Government's May 20, 2014 Motion For Summary Dismissal Of Pro Se Complaint. 3. The Court's Resolution. a. The United States Court Of Federal Claims Does Not Have Jurisdiction To Adjudicate Claims Against private Entities. proper defendant in the United states court of Federal claims is the _ The only 28 U.S.C. g Govemment. See la91(a)(l); see also Gump v. United States,482 Fed. App,x 5gg, cir. 2012) ("The United states is the only appropriate defendant in the bourt of Federal claims."). Therefore, all claims against ccA and FR'l-must be dismissed, because these are private entities. Although Ptaintiff indicates tlere are other defendants by injudint ,,er af ,, in the case caption, neither the March 2s, 2014 complaint nor the April"g, ioi+ -i."ro"a Complaint identiff those entities or individuals. To the ixtent "et al." indicates that this case is directed against the District Court Judge or an officer of the District Court for gr-ting Cca'. post-trial motion, such a claim must be dismissed. see Brown v. (Jnited states, 105 F.3d 621, 624 (Fed'. Cir. 1997) ("The Tucker Act grants the Cout of Federal Claims jurisdiction over suits against the united states, not against individual federal officials:,); see iso conre v. united states, 42 Fed. cl. 144, l4g (199s) ("The court of Federal claims does not have jurisdiction over individuals; it only has jurisdiction over suits against the united states.,,). ro trre Plaintiff seeks review of the District Court's decision, Plaintiff s remedy fi." #tf, "*t"nt t" tf," United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. "pp"^f 590 (Fed. b. The United States Court Of Federal Claims Does Not Have Jurisdiction To Adjudicate Plaintiffs Contract Breach Claim Because The Stipulation Agreement Did Not Constitute A Contract With The United States Government. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that ,,to invoke jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must identifu a contractual relaiionstrip, constitutional provision, statute, regulation that provides a substantive .rgt i io -orr"y -o^r, damages." Khan v. united states,20r F.3d 1357 , 1377 (Fed. cir. 2000); see c so Fodd, 386 F .3d at 1094 ("[Jlurisdiction under the Tucker Act requires the litigant to ijentifl, a,ul.iantiue .igt t for money damages against the United States separate from the Tucker Act itself."). our appellate court, however, has discussed the difference between contract claims and claims based on federal statutes, constitutional provisions, or regulations. See Holmes v. United States,657 F.3d 1303, 1313-14 (Fed. cir. 2011) ("In our view, when referencing the money-mandating inquiry for Tucker Act jurisdiction, the cases logically put to one side contracfbased ctaims.";] see also Tippet v. united states,l35 F.3d 1250, 1254-55 (Fed. cir. 1999) (,,when a contract is not involved, to invoke jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must identify a constitutional provision, a.sta:u1:, or a regulation that provides a substantive right to money damages."). This court's jurisdiction ovei claims in the latter category dependi, in part, on whether the source of the substantive right a plaintiff asserts fairty'be interpreted as "cai mandating. compensation by the . . . Govemment for the damages sustained.i Hoh";,657 F.3d at 1313 (citing Testan, 424 u.S. at 400 (quoting Eastport s.s. Corp. v. unrted states, zll p.za 1002 1009 (Fed. cir. l 967))). In contraci claims, however, tt . .,-on"y---auting ."quo.'n"nt for Tucker Act jurisdiction normally,is satisfied by the presumption that money damages are available for breach of contmct[.]" Hormes, 657 F.3d yet, this .oui rnuf properry require a plaintiff to show that the contract ai issue ^: fairly be "could int.rp."t"a u. money damages" for breach, where the contract,,could "onlmplating involve refief, or "expressly disavow[s] mon11j.1ma,Bes. )'. Id. at 1314-15; see alsi Saniers v. Uni:ted'States,252 F.3d, 1329, 1334 (Fed. cir. 2001). In this case, plaintitr claim must be failed to show, among ottrer.-thjr-rs.s, thar the ag.."-"rt ..courd dismissed because he has fairly be interpreted as contemplating money damages.,' Holmes, 657 F 3d,;t :.315. l?*. p*"lt;;;;iJy* with this background in mind, the court must determine whether plaintiff, in fact, had a Formation |nJffii:#i* $;,":ilr",-'"*t' of an express contract with the coue--eni requires (1) mutuality of intent to. contract; (2) lack of ambiguity in offer and acceptance; (3) considerationt r"pr"r"niuti-* -1 I got:--"nt bind the United States lolcontract. m il;t;;;ffi ;ilJ#; Anderson v. (Jnited states,344 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. cir. 2003); states' 166 F.3d 1r84, l188 (Fed. cir. r e6r1-( 'tainy 'ug;.n'"n, see arso Mqssie v. Ilnited can be a contract within the meaning of the Tucker Act, provided trrut ii irrJo."quirem"nt. for a contract with the (quoting rrqima serv. crp. ,. uniri'stotis, ...ir 104 fiil"rff*,,," F.3d t3ii, i;;;1r.a. cr. To contractually bind.:le-,9ove:r,rTenj,lrs reprg:enlarive .,must have actual aurhority to enter into .oe contract.,' Jy.nalt v. Fed. CL ;03;-;;-A;;;. Such a representative has actual authority to'nited'Statei,90 bind the cou.-.*, ,,only when the constitutron, a statute, or a regulation grants it to that agent in *uri-iguou. terms.,, /d (intemal quotation omitted;; see citv of Et cenrro v..un*ed Sia*t,nieii'ito,r20 (Fed. cir. iirin-ii:ir'j;,.;** rs not whether some authoriry.exis* tttut rrom obligating rhe Govemmenr m contract; rather, the issue is v 'vnetner lthe agent] had been granted the authority to affirmatively ouLgate'th; Gov;;j,;. p.o*ffii;il,J The Agreement in this case, however, is between private parties: plaintiff and plaintiffs former emplover, ccA. see genrittv But, the Districr courr did not have t^.'ci^pL;;;.;. actual authority to bind the Government, who was not a party to the litigation. see Jumqh, 90 Fed. Cl. at 612. Instead, the District court approved the Agreement for purposes of trial and is responsible for overseeing and enforcing the stipulations. see Ring & pinion serv. Inc. v. ARB Corp.,743 F.3d 831, 836 (Fed. cir. 2014) ("A stipulation of fact that is fairly entered into is controlling on the parties and the court is generally bound to enforce it.,'). As such, to the extent ccA's post-trial motion violated the Agreement, the proper remedy was to object to that filing with the District Court and if that effort was not successful, to file an app"ul to the Eleventh circuit, which Plaintiff did and the District court's ruling was affirmed. see Harris v. Corrections corp. of America, 139 Fed. App'x 156 (l1th cir. 2005). The United States court of Federal Claims, by contrast, "does not have jurisdiction to review the decisions of the district colrts." vereda,271 F.3d at 1375 (quoting Joshua v. united states,lT F.3d 378, 3g0 (Fed. cir. 1ee4)). Even assuming, arguendo, that the Agreement is a contract between the District Court and Plaintiff, and the District Court had actual authority to contractually bind the Govemment and purported to do so, Plaintiffs breach claim must still be dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction because the Agreement cannot "fairly be interpreted as contemplating money damages for breach." Holmes,657 F.3d at 1315. As mentioned, the court may properly require plaintiff to show that the contract at issue "can fairly be interpreted as contemplaiing'rnon"y damages for breach," where the contract "could involve purely nonmonetary relieil.]" rh" Agr""."nt ut id issue contains factual background information conceming ptaintiifs employm"ent and a of events leading up to his termination. see geneialy Arn. compl.ipp. 2. 9hr9no_logy Nothing in the language contained therein indicates money damales were contemplated as a remedy fbr breach. See id. The Agreement at issue here serves as a trial management toor and is readily distinguishable ftom vanDesande, the case Plaintiff cites to buttress his contention that this court has jurisdiction to adjudicate his claims. This case is also distinguishable fuom Holmes. The stipulation agreement in vanDesande v. united states, 6"13 F.3d 1342, 1343 Ct' 2012), "result[ed] from a settlement of an earlier personnel case" between the plaintiff(Fed. and the united States Postal Service. 1d It included ,,compensation for back puy oi"rti-"; rort sick and annual leave; interest payments; tax consequence payments; payments for pain and suffering; medical and other expenses; and . . . a rump sum payment in exchange for Ms. VanDesande's resignation." Id. at 1351 n.4. Such an agreement, by its terms, clearly contemplated monetary damages in the event of breach by Ms. vanDes-a"', ,.". ",ofioy"., ISiling t9 make the payments agreed upon. Moreover, the issue in vanDesande was whether the United States Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction to adjudicate a contract claim alleging breach of a settlement agreement, which was incorporated ln a consent decree, or if the forum that issued the decree retains exclusive jurisdiction. See id. at 134H7. The Federal Circuit not explicitly address the question of whether the settlement agreement ;,.ouia-ai.ry did u" as contemplating money damages for breach." Hormes,Esz p.za" see id. at 1351 (footnote omitted) (intemar quotation marks omitted) (,.Furthermore, the circ'trmstances under which the Agreement yas. entgreg into by the parties to it, and its extensiverf detailed terms, leave little doubt about its legal character. Thus, we agree with the opinion of Lother of _ -J r:t:pt*a i:ii, our sister circuits that a settlement agreement, even one embodied in a decree, is a conrracr within the meaning of the Tucker Act."). Likewise, in Holmes, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the united states court of Federal claims had jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 2g u.s.c. $ 1491, over a suit alleging breach of two Title vII settlement agreements, m part, because each could "fairly be interpreted as mandating the payment of money damages for breach by the govemment ;' Holmes, 657 F.3d at 1306, 13 12. under the irst settlement agreement-the 1996 Agreement-the Navy "agreed to document Mr. Holmes's [office Personnel Folder] to show that he had resigned on luly 22, 1994 for personal reasons.', .Id. at 1315 (citations omitted). Under the second settlement agreement-the 2001 Agreement-the Navy agreed to "take the necessary steps, within a reasonable time, to from [Mr. "*pung. Holmes'sl Official Personnel File, the fourteen-day suspension and to provide ihe -Marine Index Bureau . . . with a neutral reference for [Mr. Holmes].- Id at 13 15-16. The Federal Circuit held that because both agreements "inherently relate to monetary compensation through relationship to^ Mr. Holmes's future employment" each could "fairly be interprited as mandatirig the payment of money damages for breach by the government." Id. at1306,1316. The Agreement in this case, however, is simply a list of stipulated facts. ,See generalry 2. It is not a settlement agreement providing ior various paymelnts as in vanDesande and it does not "relate to monetary compinsation through [its] reiationship to [PlaintifPs] future employment." vanDesande, ais p.za- at 1351 n.4; Holmes,657 F.3d at 1316; Am. compl. App. 2. Nor is it even an agreement between plaintiff and the Govemment. C/. Vandesande,6T3 F.3d at 1343. Thus, for the aforementioned reasons, plaintiffs contract breach claims must be dismissed for lack of iurisdiction. Am. compl. App. c. The United States Court Of Federal Claims Does Not Have Jurisdiction To Adjudicate Tort Claims. The April 8,2014 Amended - terminating his employment, by Complaint also alleges that CCA retaliated against plaintiff, for bringing Title VI-I discrimination claims jn th" lirt i"t gortr and that his reputation has suffered considerabre damage ,,by the actions o, in[*too, or the [District court], for which he seeks damages. Am. compl. 4-5; ,r, c/so Am. compl. App. 2 fltf A, D. It arso aileges that "these acts" committed by cca, pRT, and the Districr court, constitute "a fraud on the Court." Am. Compl. l i, Plaintiffs first craim-that the District court's actions and inactions caused him reputational damage, or constituted defamation- must be dismissed, as the court aoes not t aue jurisdiction to adjudicate tort claims. ,See 28 U.S.C. g l49l (,,The united States Court of Federal claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim . ror tiqurdated or unliquidated damages . . . in cases.not- tounding in tort."); Frawley v. united statiiJ+'cr. ct. 766' 767-68 (1988) (dismissing plaintiffls claim-for damale to reputation as a tort claim beyond the jurisdiction of the united states court of Federal c"laims); see arso Matthews v. united states, 72 Fed.. cl. 274,279 (2006) (dismissing plaintif|s claims for libel and defamation as tort claims beyond the jurisdiction of the united stites court of Federal claims). 10 Plaintiffs fraud claim appears to arise from Plaintiffs perception that CCA and the District Court Clerk's Office conspired to back-date CCA's post-trial motion to ensure that it was timely. 8/22/2007 Pl. Dist. Mot. 2-3; see also 10/2612007 Dist. order l-2. Fraud is a tort and, as such, that claim also must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The United States District Court is the proper forum to bring tort claims. See 28 U.S.C, g 13a6@)(1) (,.tTlhe district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Govemment while acting within the scope of his office or employment[.]"); see also 2g u.s.c. g 1491 (,,The united states court of Federal claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim . . . for liquidated damages . . . in cases not sounding in tort.',). d. The United States Court Of Federal Claims Does Not Have Jurisdiction To Adjudicate Claims Arising From Violations Of The Seventh Amendment Or Violations Of The Due process Clause Of The Fourteenth Amendment The April 8, 2014 Amended complaint also alleges that ccA and the Dishict court violated Plaintiff s Seventh Amendment rights when the District Court allowed CCA to argue, in its post-trial motion, matters in the Agreement. Am. compl. 3. Again, this court,s _stipulated jurisdiction is limited to claims based on a substantive right to money aurn'ug., against the Federal Govemment' See Todd,386 F.3d at 1094. The sourie of the substantive"right:heed not explicitly govide that the right or duty it creates is enforceable through a suit for dfrages, but it triggers liability only if it 'cqyfairly be interpreted as mandating co'mpensation uy it"e rea"rat Govemrnent."' Holmes, 6s7 F,3d at 1309 (quoring lJnited stais v. 'N*rii u.s. 287,290 (2009). i.iLr,lso A violation of the Seventh Amendment does not, however, ,,explicitly or impricitry [G]ovemment to pay damages[ .]- Jaffer v. inited' statei, No. ss-s r zz, 9!lig"f !] the {Flederal *2 1995. wL 592017, at (Fed. cir. oct. 6, r9g5).- accoiaingly, the court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims arising from a violation or due irocess. rrrer"tii", piuintirr. Seventh Amendment claim must be dismissed. ^ Plaintiffs April 8,2014 Amended complaint also alleges that ccA and court violated PlaintifPs due. process rights under the Fourte-enth emendment, the District when cca breached the Agreement by filing its post-trial motion. Am. Compl. 3. as an initial matte., ttre Fourteenth Amendment is only applicable against the states, not the Federal Govemment. More significantly, a violation of the Due process clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth em"nJ-ent ooe, not "mandate paymenr of money by the [G]ovemment.', LeBranc v. united statis,ii nsi rozs, 102.8_ (Fed. cir' 1995); see arso cottins united states, 67 F.3d,2g4,2gg ri"a. bir. rcssr (holding the same with respect to violations of the Fifth Amendment), a""o.jngiy, ih. does not have jurisdiction to adjudicale.craims arising from "oun a violaiion Colliw'67 F'3d at 288. Therefore, plaintifps d,re p.oce"r, claim must be or au" dismissed.' i irl""rr. s* u w. coNcLUsIoN. For these rcasons, the United States Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the causes of action alleged in Plaintiffs complaint and Amended complaint. Therefore, the Government's May 20, 2014 Motion For Summary Dismissal of pro se complaint is granted. see RCFC l2OXl). Accordingly, the clerk is directed to dismiss the April 8,2014 Amended Complaint. ITISSOORDERED. G.BRADEN Judge 12
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