CALDERON LOPEZ v. PROFESSIONAL SERVICES CORPORATION, No. 1:2023cv00214 - Document 3 (D.D.C. 2023)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM AND OPINION. Signed by Judge Tanya S. Chutkan on 4/12/2023. (zrtw)

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CALDERON LOPEZ v. PROFESSIONAL SERVICES CORPORATION Doc. 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RICARDO JOSE CALDERON LOPEZ DBA Starlight Consulting Services Corp., Plaintiff, v. PROFESSIONAL SERVICES CORPORATION, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-00214 (UNA) MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter is before the court on its initial review of the purported pro se notice of removal, ECF No. 1, and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2, filed by Ricardo Jose Calderon Lopez d/b/a Starlight Consulting Services. For the reasons explained below, the court will deny the motion for leave to proceed IFP and dismiss this action. Plaintiff seeks to “remove” a civil case from the Superior Court for the District of Columbia to this court, but faces several insurmountable hurdles. First, Plaintiff attempts to remove Lopez v. Prof. Servs. Corp., Case No. 2020-CA-001366-B (D.C. Super. Ct. filed 2/26/2020), but there is no case to remove because that matter was dismissed for failure to prosecute over two and a half years ago, see id. at Feb. 28, 2020 Dkt. Entries. Indeed, a civil case must be removed 30 days after the defendant receives notice of the case, rendering this attempted removal untimely. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). Second, “only a defendant may remove a case from a state court to federal court.” Wallace v. Saffa, No. 06-402, 2007 WL 1020791, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a), 1446(a)). “This proscription exists because the plaintiff having submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the state court, [is] not entitled to avail himself of a right of removal conferred only Dockets.Justia.com on a defendant who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Shamrock Oil & Gas Co. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 106 (1941) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “The rationale [underlying this rule] is that the plaintiff who brings a federally cognizable action in state court was free to choose his forum and selected the state forum.” Id. (citation omitted). Third, Plaintiff seeks to proceed in this matter on behalf of a corporation. But a nonindividual cannot proceed under the IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); the Supreme Court has interpreted that provision as applicable “only to individuals” or “natural persons,” not “artificial entities.” Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 201–07 (1993); see Franklin v. Vilsack, No. 11–0206 (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2011) (denying IFP status to plaintiff in his capacity as an officer of a development corporation which, as an artificial entity, cannot proceed IFP). Nor can plaintiff proceed, IFP or otherwise, on the corporation’s behalf because he is not licensed counsel. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654; see also see Greater Southeast Cmty. Hosp. Found., Inc. v. Potter, 586 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Rowland, 506 U.S. at 201–02) (“It has been the law for the better part of two centuries, for example, that a corporation may appear in the federal courts only through licensed counsel.”); Am. Airways Charters, Inc. v. Regan, 746 F.2d 865, 873 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[A] corporation, which is an artificial entity that can only act through agents, cannot proceed pro se.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Diamond Ventures, LLC v. Barreto, 452 F.3d 892, 900 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (same); Bristol Petroleum Corp. v. Harris, 901 F.2d 165, 166 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (same); see also Fromm v. Duffy as Tr. of Gary Fromm Family Tr., No. 19-cv1121, 2020 WL 109056, at *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 9, 2020) (noting that “[c]ourts have interpreted [§ 1654] to preclude a non-attorney from appearing on behalf of another person or an entity such as a corporation, partnership, or trust”). Finally, in essence, Plaintiff has attempted to open a civil matter without filing an actual complaint, which he may not do. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 3; In re Sealed Case No. 98-3077, 151 F.3d 1059, 1069 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting that a civil action “must be initiated by complaint”) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 3); see also Adair v. England, 193 F. Supp. 2d 196, 200 (D.D.C. 2002) (“A party commences a civil action by filing a complaint. . . [and] [w]hen no complaint is filed, the court lacks jurisdiction[.]”) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 3). Consequently, for all of these reasons, the motion for leave to proceed IFP is denied, and this case is dismissed. A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion. Date: April 12, 2023 Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge

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