DOVER v. MEDSTAR WASHINGTON HOSPITAL CENTER et al, No. 1:2013cv00670 - Document 20 (D.D.C. 2013)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION to the Motion to Dismiss, the Motion for Sanctions and the Motion to Amend. Signed by Judge Gladys Kessler on 10/30/13. (CL, )
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ROBERTA DOVER, Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 13-670 (GK) v. MEDSTAR WASHINGTON HOSPITAL CENTER, INC., et al.,: Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION On 4, May "Plaintiff") 2012, brought Plaintiff action an Roberta D.C. in ("Dover" Dover Superior Court or against her former employer Defendant Medstar Washington Hospital Center ( "WHC") and Defendants Paul Higgins, Boursiquot, WHC "Defendants"). employees On May 9, William Mullins, managers and 2013, Defendants and Marie (collectively, removed the case to this court. The Motion matter for Defendants' is Leave Motion presently to for Amend before the Section the Complaint 1927 Court [Dkt. Sanctions Upon consideration of the Motions, Oppositions, entire record herein, and for the on reasons Plaintiff's No. [Dkt. 12] No. 13]. and Replies, stated and the below, Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint is granted in part and denied in part, and Defendants' Motion for Sanctions is denied. I. BACKGROUND On May 4, D.C. 2012, Superior Plaintiff filed her initial Complaint in Court. The Complaint alleged intentional interference with prospective advantage and economic expectancy (Counts. I and intentional II), and defamation (Count IV). misrepresentation (Count III), Plaintiff sought an injunction, back pay, compensatory damages, and punitive damages. On April 22, 2013, after the original date for the close of discovery, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint adding several factual allegations and seven new claims. Her new claims alleged wrongful discharge breach III), (Count of (Count I), breach of contract the covenant faith and fair dealing (Count VI), and intentional interference with business relations (Count IX) . Her original intentional interference claims became Count VII and VIII. 1 On May 9, 2013, arguing that (Count V), good negligent supervision IV), negligence of (Counts II and Defendants removed the case to this Court, the new claims required an interpretation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement ( "CBA") between MedStar and the Nurses United of the National Capital Region 1 ("Nurses United"). Plaintiff did not include her original defamation or intentional misrepresentation claims in the Amended Complaint. -2- Defendants argued that the common-law claims were preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), thus requiring removal to this Court. On May 16, Complaint [Dkt. 2013, No. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the 3]. They sought to dismiss Claims I-VI, arguing that the claims should be dismissed under the LMRA for failure to file within the statute of limitations, failure to allege a breach of the duty of fair representation by a union, and failure to exhaust remedies under the CBA prior to bringing suit. Plaintiff's Opposition was due June 3, 2013, but no opposition was filed. Instead, a month and a half after the Opposition was due, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint [Dkt. No. 12]. Plaintiff's proposed Second Amended Complaint consists of five claims: negligent supervision (Count I), overtime under et D.C. Code 32-1301, §§ intentional interference with expectancy, and relations business filed an Opposition [ Dkt. No. seq. prospective 14] (Counts failure to pay (Count II), advantage, III-V) . and economic Defendants and Plaintiff filed a Reply [Dkt. No. 16]. The matter is now ripe for -consideration. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 (a) to amend a pleading "shall be -3- freely provides that leave given when justice so requires." The Supreme Court has noted that a district court should grant leave to amend a complaint "[i]n the absence of any apparent or declared reason - such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, cure deficiencies by amendments repeated failure to previously undue allowed, prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc." Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). However, "[w] ithin these bounds, a district court has discretion to grant or deny leave to amend under Rule 15(a) ." Atchinson v. Dist. of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1996). III. ANALYSIS A. Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint Defendants object to the two new claims Plaintiff raises in her proposed Second Amended Complaint. First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claim for negligent supervision (Count I) was conceded when Plaintiff failed to respond to arguments raised in Defendants' negligent Defendants overtime Motion to supervision argue (Count Dismiss in that II) is the against a similar claim First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff's time-barred, claim and, for thus, complaint to include this claim would be futile. address each issue in turn. -4- failure for Second, to pay amending the The Court will 1. Negligent Supervision Defendants argue that Count I of the proposed Second Amended Complaint for "Negligent Supervision" parallels Count VI of the First Amended Complaint. They argue that Plaintiff conceded that claim lacked merit when she failed to oppose the arguments raised against it in Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Although Defendants recognize that discretion to treat the absence of a under Local Rule Defendants' argument Supervision in the that 7 (b) ' against First this response as a is rule Plaintiff's Amended Court has broad concession inapplicable claim Complaint for was here. Negligent that it was "based upon and/ or related to the CBA and the LMRA." See Pl.'s Reply to Opposition to Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint at 5 [Dkt. No. 16]; Mem. in Support of Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss Counts I, II, III, IV, V, and VI for Failure to State Claims Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted at 7 [ Dkt. No. . VI require[s] and [is] 3-1] (noting that "Count [] interpretation of the provisions of the CBA also preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA"). Because the proposed Second Amended Complaint no longer bases its claims on the CBA, Defendants' Negligent the Court finds Motion to Dismiss Supervision claim that as the are raised not in arguments raised in applicable to the Amended Second the Complaint. Thus, Defendants have failed to identify a persuasive -5- reason why Plaintiff should not be allowed to pursue her claim, and the Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint shall be granted as to Count I. 2. Failure to Pay Overtime Defendants argue Amended Complaint, that a Count claim for II of the proposed Second Failure to Pay Overtime under D.C. law, should be denied as futile because it is time-barred. Plaintiff's seq., known as claim the arises D.C. from Wage D.C. Code Payment and ( "DCWPCL") . See Ventura v. Bebo Foods, Inc., 20 §§ 32-1301, Collection et Law 738 F. Supp. 2d 8, (D.D.C. 2010). The statute of limitations for such claims is three years. See D.C. Code at 30 § 32-1013; Ventura, ("The statute of limitations under . 738 F. Supp. 2d the DCWPCL . is only three years."). No party disputes that 25, 2009, argue the that date that Plaintiff's Plaintiff's claim accrued on June Plaintiff Motion for was terminated. Leave to Amended Complaint was filed over four years File later, Defendants her Second and, thus, the claim is time-barred. An amendment to a complaint that raises an otherwise timebarred claim may yet be timely if the amendment "relates back" to the date of the original complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). See Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F. 3d 670, 674 -6- (D.C. Cir. 2009). That Rule provides, among other things, that an amendment relates back if it "asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, at tempted to be set transaction, out-in the or occurrence set out-or original pleading." Fed. R. of Civ. P. 15(c) (1) (B). Relation back is improper when the amended claim "asserts a new ground for relief supported by facts that differ in both time and type from those the original pleading set forth." Mayle v. 67 4 Felix, 545 U.S. ("[A] n 644, amendment 650 that (2005); see also Jones, 'attempts to introduce 557 F.3d at a new legal theory based on facts different from those underlying the timely claims' "[t] he does Inc. the would v. (citation back.") question notified plaintiffs Meijer, relate underlying adequately the not is whether defendants later Biovail original the Instead, complaint of the basis in advance Corp., omitted). the amended 533 F.3d 857, for 866 liability complaint." (D.C. Cir. any facts 2008) . Plaintiff's original Complaint related to wages or overtime. Plaintiff had supervisors; harassment." Compl. p. original did Complaint wrongful "gross 3 [Dkt. not not allege The only facts "experienced namely, did give -7- 1, Ex. by her disparagement and treatment" wrongful No. alleged were that 3]. Defendants Consequently, notice that the they might face liability for reason, Plaintiff cannot because it is wage payment include time-barred and her violations. claim at therefore For late this futile. this date Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint shall be denied as to Count II. 3. Undue Delay, Prejudice, and Bad Faith A district court may deny leave to amend a complaint if the moving party demonstrates "undue delay, motive on the Atchinson, part 73 F.3d of at the 426. movant," Defendants bad faith, among argue or dilatory other that things. permitting Plaintiff to amend her Complaint at all at this late date will result in undue delay and prejudice, counsel is acting in bad faith and that in seeking the Plaintiff's amendment. The Court disagrees. Any undue delay in this case was caused by Plaintiff's original Amended Complaint, which added claims that were clearly insufficient under the LMRA. to the forward Court in that good However, Plaintiff's faith in the at this point, counsel best is attempting interests of rather than attempting to delay the case further. above, four Complaint of may the move five claims forward. raised Thus, -8- it appears the in the Court his to move client, As discussed Second Amended finds that the attempt to amend the complaint is neither motivated by an attempt to further delay the case or bad faith. Even if there was undue delay, to such delay is insufficient justify denying leave to amend in the that the Broad. 1084 opposing Sys., (D.C. party Ltd. Cir. V. 1998) abused discretion absence of will Cable of prejudice. Wireless & (discussing in denying showing suffer P.L.C., cases leave prejudice). absence of a to See 148 where showing Caribbean F.3d 1080, district court amend based on delay in There is no prejudice here because Defendants are free to seek to re-open discovery on the new claim in D.C. Superior Court after the case is remanded, as discussed below. Thus, Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint is denied as to Count II and granted as to all other claims. 2 B. Remand to Superior Court This claims case that was the removed CBA was to this violated Court meant because that claims were pre-empted by federal law, namely, point, Plaintiff no longer alleges 2 or bases her Plaintiff's common-law the LMRA. At this any claims on the Because the Court grants in part Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. No. 3] the original complaint is dismissed as moot. See Johnson v. Panetta, F. Supp. 2d 2013 WL 3742495, at *5 (D.D.C. July 17, 2013) (granting motion for leave to amend complaint and, "in doing so," noting that motion to dismiss became moot). -9- CBA. Thus, there is no longer federal jurisdiction over this case. The over Court the declines remaining to claims exercise pursuant supplemental to 28 jurisdiction U.S.C. § 1367 (c) (3) because they all relate to local District of Columbia law. Shekoyan v. (noting trial, Sibley Int'l, that if "all 409 F.3d 414, federal-law 423-24 claims (D.C. are Cir. dismissed See 2005) before the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine-judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity-will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the Uni v. v. removed remaining Cohill, from state-law 4 8 4 U.S. state court claims") 34 3, 350 no longer (quoting Carnegie-Mellon n. 7 ( 1988) ) . contains When a any case basis for federal court jurisdiction, remanding the case to state court is the proper course of action. 584 F. Life Supp. Ins. & 2d 10, (D.D.C. Annuity Co., (remanding case to matter 12 D.C. jurisdiction) . See Blue v. 486 2008); F. Inv. & Loan, see also Randolph v. Supp. Superior Court Accordingly, Fremont the 2d 1, due 10 to Court (D.D.C. lack of will ING 2007) subject remand the remaining claims to the D.C. Superior Court. C. Sanctions Defendants have [ Dkt. No. 13] . filed a Motion for Section 1927 Sanctions Plaintiff filed an Opposition -10- [ Dkt. No. 15] and Defendants filed a Reply [Dkt. No. 17]. That Motion is also ripe for consideration. 28 U.S.C. multiplies . who so 1927 provides that "[a]ny attorney . § the proceedings any in case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct." While it is true that our Court of Appeals "has not yet established whether the standard [for unreasonable and vexatious conduct under § 1927] should be stringent 'bad faith,'" LaPraude v. F. 3d 899, 905 'recklessness' language of Kidder, or the Peabody & Co., more 146 (D.C. Cir. 1998), it has noted that although "the § 1927 suggests [that] deliberate misbehaviour, subjective bad faith is not necessary; attorneys have been held accountable for decisions that reflect reckless indifference to the merits of a claim." Reliance Ins. Co. v. Sweeney Corp., F.2d 1137, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). 792 However, the Court of Appeals has also stated that "inadvertent I and negligent acts will not support an imposition of sanctions under section 1927." (D.C. Cir. 1992) United States v. Wallace, 964 F. 2d 1214, 1219 (quotation and citation omitted). The Court concludes that the action of Plaintiff's counsel, in filing an Amended Complaint with -11- claims that were clearly inadequate, and which he agreed he had not properly researched, simply do not Appeals has meet the very high standard that relied upon in sanctions are appropriate. been imposed in a deciding Moreover, the Court whether Section of 1927 while such sanctions have number of cases, the conduct sanctioned in those cases was dramatically different from and more egregious than what occurred in the present case. See LaPraude, supra; Robertson v. Cartinhour, Jr., 883 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D.D.C. 2012); McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 369, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), rev'd, 896 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1990). However, the Court remains extremely disturbed about the propriety of the manner in which Plaintiff's counsel has handled this case. Among other things, at no time during the nine-month discovery period did schedule depositions discovery was notice to to Plaintiff's of close opposing defense on December counsel, counsel even witnesses; 17, 2012, Plaintiff's attempt the with counsel to day that no prior requested consent to extend the Scheduling Order deadlines and the date for closing of discovery, to which Defendants did consent even at that 11th hour. Discovery was extended to March 15, 2013. On February 12, 2013, Plaintiff's counsel filed a Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint, and he neglected to send defense counsel a copy of that proposed Amended Complaint; it took him nine days -12- to provide a copy of it to defense counsel. On April 22, 2013, Plaintiff filed her first Amended Complaint in which six of the seven new claims were clearly pre-empted by section 301 of the LMRA, the 29 U.S. C. lawsuit 185, § to thereby prompting Defendants to remove federal court. Plaintiff's counsel the Status Conference on June 21, conceded at that there were "valid 2013, arguments on the defense side" to justify removal to the federal court, and he had "never had occasion related to the LMRA." Pl.'s Opp'n at ~ to deal with matters 5. Thereafter, Defendants moved to dismiss those six claims because Plaintiff did not file them within the six month statute under Section 301 of the LMRA, of limitations among other things. applicable Plaintiff's counsel never filed an Opposition to that Motion or notified the Court in any fashion that he had no opposition. What is even more troubling to the Court is that Plaintiff's counsel obtained a retainer from his client, managed to use up that retainer, spent most of his time responding to Defendants' discovery requests, and as soon as the retainer was used up, and after the Court was about to set a schedule for the filing of dispositive motions, -13- filed a "consent" motion to withdraw, leaving his client at this important juncture in the litigation without counsel. 3 However, because of the high bar for imposition of Section 1927 sanctions, as noted above, the Court is compelled to deny Defendants' Motion for Section 1927 Sanctions. IV. CONCLUSION Upon consideration of the and the entire record herein, this Memorandum Opinion, the Amended Complaint Motions, Oppositions, Replies, and for the reasons set forth in Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File is granted in part and denied in part, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is denied as moot, and Defendants' Motion remanded for to Section D.C. 1927 Superior Sanctions Court for is case is proceedings. An denied. further The Order shall accompany this Memorandum Opinion. G8~r/M= October 30, 2013 United States District Judge Copies to: attorneys on record via ECF 3 The "consent" referred to opposing counsel; there is nothing in the record to indicate that his client had "consented." -14-
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
