Gamble v. Superior Court of Delaware, No. 1:2018cv01239 - Document 5 (D. Del. 2019)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 3/21/2019. (nmg)

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Gamble v. Superior Court of Delaware Doc. 5 Dockets.Justia.com STARK, U.S. District Judge: I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Wayne T. Gamble (APlaintiff@) filed this action on August 14, 2018. (D.I. 2) He appears pro se and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (D.I. 4) The Court proceeds to review and screen the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). II. BACKGROUND Plaintiff alleges Defendant had an illegal court proceeding without his presence when they “tried to rule him incompetent.” Plaintiff alleges Delaware Superior Court judges broke the law. He alleges that his name was on a Met-Life insurance policy “just like he wrote I before they committed a crime.” (D.I. 2) III. LEGAL STANDARDS A federal court may properly dismiss an action sua sponte under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) if Athe action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.@ Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions). The Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and his Complaint, Ahowever inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.@ Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (citations omitted). An action is frivolous if it Alacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.@ Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is Abased on an indisputably meritless legal theory@ or a Aclearly baseless@ 1 or Afantastic or delusional@ factual scenario. Neitzke, 490 at 327-28; see also Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989). The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is identical to the legal standard used when deciding Rule 12(b)(6) motions. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under ' 1915(e)(2)(B)). However, before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court must grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). A complaint may be dismissed only if, accepting the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court concludes that those allegations Acould not raise a claim of entitlement to relief.@ Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). Though Adetailed factual allegations@ are not required, a complaint must do more than simply provide Alabels and conclusions@ or Aa formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.@ Davis v. Abington Mem=l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. See Williams v. BASF Catalysts LLC, 765 F.3d 306, 315 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) and Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Finally, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that a claim has substantive plausibility. See Johnson v. City of Shelby, __U.S.__, 135 S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014). A complaint may not be dismissed for imperfect statements of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted. See id. at 346. 2 Under the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps: (1) take note of the elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2) identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth; and (3) when there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. See Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016). Elements are sufficiently alleged when the facts in the complaint Ashow@ that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Deciding whether a claim is plausible will be a Acontext-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.@ Id. IV. DISCUSSION The claim against the Superior Court fails based upon its immunity from suit. The Eleventh Amendment protects states and their agencies and departments from suit in federal court regardless of the kind of relief sought. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). “Absent a state’s consent, the Eleventh Amendment bars a civil rights suit in federal court that names the state as a defendant.” Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978)). Delaware has not waived its immunity from suit in federal court; although Congress can abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity, it did not do so through the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Brooks-McCollum v. Delaware, 213 F. App=x 92, 94 (3d Cir. Jan. 11, 2007). Following the reasoning of the Third Circuit in Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 239-40 (3d Cir. 2005), the Court concludes that the Superior Court is a state entity and, thus, immune from suit. In addition, dismissal is proper because the Superior Court is not a person for purposes of § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep=t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Calhoun v. Young, 3 288 F. App=x 47 (3d Cir. Aug. 1, 2008). Therefore, the Court will dismiss the Superior Court as it is immune from suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). Finally, Plaintiff previously named the Superior Court as a defendant and was apprised of its immunity from suit in the Court’s August 2, 2018 dismissal order. See Gamble v. Superior Court, Civ. No. 17-225-LPS (D. Del.) at D.I. 12. Plaintiff is placed on notice that future cases filed against the Superior Court of the State of Delaware will be summarily dismissed. V. CONCLUSION For the above reasons, the Court will dismiss the Complaint as legally frivolous and based upon immunity from suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (iii). The Court finds amendment futile. An appropriate Order follows. 4

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