DoDots Licensing Solutions LLC v. Lenovo Holding Co., Inc. et al, No. 1:2018cv00098 - Document 52 (D. Del. 2019)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Maryellen Noreika on 7/12/2019. (mdb)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
DoDots Licensing Solutions LLC v. Lenovo Holding Co., Inc. et al Doc. 52 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE DODOTS LICENSING SOLUTIONS LLC, Plaintiff, V. LENOVO HOLDING COMPANY, INC., LENOVO (UNITED STATES) INC. and MOTOROLA MOBILITY LLC, Deendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) C.A. No. 18-098 (MN) MEMOANDUM OPINION Brian Farnan, Michael J. Fanan, FANAN LLP, Wilmington, DE; Peny Goldberg, PROGESS LLP, Los Angeles, CA attoneys for Plaintiff Frederick L. Cotrell, III, Renee M. Mosley, ICHADS, LAYTON & FINGER, P.A., Wilmington, DE; Charanjit Brahma, Anup M. Shah, Oscar A. Figueroa, TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP, San Francisco, CA attoneys for Defendants July 12, 2019 Wilmington, Delaware Dockets.Justia.com Presently before the Comt is Deendnts Lenovo (United States) Inc.'s, Lenovo Holding Co., Inc.'s, and Motorola Mobility LLC's (collectively, "Deendants" or "Lenovo") partial motion to dismiss (D.I. 33) the Second Amended Complaint (D.I. 30) or ailure to state a claim on the grounds that Plaintif DoDots Licensing Solutions LLC ("Plaintiff') does not plausibly allege induced inringement of the asseted patents. For the reasons set o1th below, he Court GRANTS IN-PART and DENIES-IN-PART Deendants' motion. I. BACKGROUND This is the second time that the Court is addressing the suficiency of Plaintiffs inringement allegations. On December 19, 2018, the Comt granted-in-part and denied-in-part Defendants' partial motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), inding that Plaintif ailed to plausibly allege various theories of direct and indirect inringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 9,369,545 ("the '545 Patent"), 8,020,083 ("the '083 Patent") and 8,510,407 ("the '407 Patent") ( collectively, "the Patents-in-Suit"). (See D.I. 28 & 29). 1 Although Plaintiff had adequately pleaded direct infringement of the '083 and '407 Patents, the Comt dismissed Plaintiffs claim of direct inringement of the '545 Patent based on any activity other than Deendants' use of the accused products.2 (See D.I. 28 at 4-6). As to indirect infringement, the Comt dismissed the claims of induced inringement or each of the Patents-in-Suit because Plaintif failed to plausibly allege that Deendants possessed the requisite knowledge of infringement or the specific intent to induce inringement. (Id at 8-9). The procedural history beore the iling of Second Amended Complaint is set forth in the Cort's prior opinion. (See D.I. 28 at 1). 2 The '545 Patent contains only method claims, and direct inringement of a method claim under§ 27l(a) requires perormance of every step of the claimed mehod. On January 9, 2019, and in response to the Cout1's order dismissing certain claims of direct and indirect inringement, Plaintiff iled a Second Amended Complaint, which continues to allege that Deendants directly and indirectly inringe various claims of the Patents-in-Suit. (See D.I. 30). As to direct infringement, Plaintif now alleges only that Deendants inringe the '545 Patent by using the accused products (see D.I. 30 r 32), and the allegations of direct inringement of the '083 and '407 Patents remain the same. As to induced infringement, the Second Amended Complaint includes additional allegations regarding Deendants' purported knowledge of infringement and speciic intent to induce inringement. (Compare D.I. 30 r 29, with D.I. 15 r 29). On January 28, 2019, Deendants filed the present motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), claiming that the Second Amended Complaint still fails to plausibly allege induced inringement of any of the three Patents in-Suit. (See D.I. 33 & 34). II. LEGALSTANDADS In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all well-pleaded actual allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light most avorable to the plaintif. See Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 201O); see also Phillps v. Cny. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232-33 (3d Cir. 2008). "[A] court need not 'accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit,' such as the claims and the patent speciication." Secured Mail Sols. LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc., 873 F.3d 905, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Anderson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 570 F. App'x 927, 931 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Nor is the Court required to accept as true bald assertions, unsupported conclusions or unwarranted inferences. See TriPlay, Inc. v. WhatsApp Inc., No. 13-1703-LPS CJB, 2018 WL 1479027, at *3 (D. Del. Mar. 27, 2018). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is only appropriate if a complaint does not contain "suficient actual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a 2 claim to relief that is plausible on its ace."' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,570 (2007)); see also Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,210 (3d Cir. 2009). This plausibility standard obligates a plaintif to provide "more than labels and conclusions, and a ormulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Instead, the pleadings must provide suicient actual allegations to allow the Court to "draw the reasonable inference that the deendant is liable or the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 506 U.S. at 678. III. DISCUSSION A. Plaintiffs Claims of Post-Suit Induced Infringement As with the prior pleading, the Second Amended Complaint includes allegations that Deendants indirectly inringe "one or more claims" of each of the Patents-in-Suit. (See D.I. 30 rr 32, 38, 44; see also D.I. 15 rr 32, 38, 44 (First Amended Complaint)). As to induced inringement, Plaintif now alleges: As alleged below, Defendants induce infringement of the Patents in-Suit by their customers, and intend to do so, through their marketing materials, brochures, product manuals, and other materials such as their website, https://www.lenovoappexplorer.com/en_us/, with knowledge of the Patents-in-Suit and their customers' inringement of them. Lenovo actively mrkets its "Lenovo App Explorer," which it touts at the Lenovo App Explorer website as a "one stop shop to discover, evaluate, choose and install apps." Lenovo lso states at that website that Lenovo gives users a selection of the "most popular" apps, which shows that Lenovo not only nows its customers are using the apps but Lenovo encourages the use by providing the selection of popular apps directly to the customers. For the same reasons that Lenovo knows its own use infringes he patents-in-suit, Lenovo also knows that its customers' use likewise infringes the patents-in-suit. Lenovo has been aware of all three patents-in-suit since at least the iling of the First Amended Complaint in this action, yet continues its own infringing activity as well as its inducement of inringement by its customers. On inormation and belief,Lenovo in fact has been aware of all three patents-in-suit even beore the iling the First 3 Amended Complaint, at least rom shortly ater the filing of the original Complaint. (D.I. 30 i 29). The Second Amended Complaint does not include any other theories of indirect inringement liability and there are no urther allegations of inducement.3 Induced inringement under§ 27l(b) requires that "the alleged inducer knew of the patent, knowingly induced the inringing acts, and possessed a specific intent to encourage another's inringement of the patent." Vita-Mix C01p. v. Basic Holding, Inc., 581 F.3d 1317, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2009). To give rise to inducement liability, the accused inringer must know that the induced acts constiute inringement of another's patent. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011). Thereore, to state a claim of inducement sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, a plaintif must plead acts that plausibly support an inference that the accused inducer "speciically intended [another] to inringe the [patent] and knew that the [induced] acts constituted inringement." In re Bill ofLading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014). A plaintiff must also plead facts that support an inerence that an underlying act of direct inringement has occurred. See i. at 1336; see also Linear Tech. Corp. v. Impala Linear Corp., 379 F.3d 1311, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("There can be no inducement or contributory infringement without an underlying act of direct inringement."). As mentioned above, the claims of induced infringement in the First Amended Complaint were previously dismissed because Plaintiff did not adequately plead the requisite knowledge and specific intent elements necessary to support a claim of inducement. The Second Amended 3 In its Second Amended Complaint, Plaintif again ails to identiy whether its indirect infringement allegations stem from § 271(b) or (c), which was an issue in he prior pleading. (See D.I. 28 at 7 n.5). Despite being on notice that the Court did not consider contributory inringement under§ 271(c) to be at issue in this case, Plaintif has not added allegations directed to that theory of inringement in its Second Amended Complaint. Thereore, Plaintiff's indirect allegations continue to be limited to inducement. 4 Complaint now alleges that Deendants have knowledge of the Patents-in-Suit and knowledge of the purported infringement of the Patents-in-Suit since at least the iling of the First Amended Complaint. (D.I. 30129). Although briely mentioned in reply (D.I. 38 at 4), Defendants do not seriously challenge the suficiency of Plaintif's allegations of knowledge based on the filing of the First Amended Complaint. Instead, Defendants argue that Plaintif's claims of inducement must fail because there are no acts to support the allegation hat Deendants possess the requisite speciic intent to induce inringement. (D.I. 34 at 6-7; see also D.I. 38 at 1-3). The Court disagrees. In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintif alleges that Deendants have knowledge of the Patents-in-Suit rom the First Amended Complaint, nd Plaintiff also alleges that the infringement allegations rom that earlier pleading provide suicient notice of how use of the accused products by Deendants (or their customers) constitutes inringement of the Patents-in Suit. (D.I. 30 1 29). Further, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are continuing their marketing activities despite receiving notice of these allegations rom the First Amended Complaint. (I.). Given that the First Amended Complaint provided Deendants with knowledge of the Patents-in Suit and also with knowledge of the purpmted infringement caused by using the accused products in conjunction wih certain applications, one plausible inerence for Deendants' continued mrketing of those products and applications is that Defendants speciically intend to induce their customers to infringe the Patents-in-Suit. 4 See Bill of Lading, 681 F.3d at 1340 ("Nothing in 4 To the extent that Deendants take issue with Plaintif not identifying a speciic application offered on the "Lenovo App Explorer" (see D.I. 34 at 7), the Court is unpersuaded under the present acts. In alleging that the accused products satisfy each limitation of select claims of the Patents-in-Suit, Plaintif identiies "the weather app" as an example application that satisies certain claim elements. (See D.I. 30 11 24, 26, 28). One of the "Lenovo App Explorer" applications highlighted on the website cited by Plaintif is a weather application. Moreover, Plaintif is not required to allege that use of al applications ofered on the "Lenovo App Explorer" would result in inringement of the Patents-in-Suit, as Deendants seem to suggest. (D.I. 34 at 7). 5 Twombly or its progeny allows a comt to choose among competing inerences as long as there are suficient acts alleged to render the non-movant's asserted inerences plausible."). Indeed, other courts in this District have reached similar conclusions, inding a speciic intent to induce to be suficiently pleaded where a plaintiff alleges that the defendant continues marketing the accused products despite receiving notice of an asserted patent and its purported inringement rom an earlier pleading. See ReeEdge Networs, LLC v. Juniper Networs, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d 455,460 (D. Del. 2014) ("ReeEdge's allegations of Juniper's marketing activities and instructions to customers to use the accused products in an infringing manner, even ater Juniper had actual notice of the alleged infringement by speciic accused products as a result of the iling of the original complaint, pleads speciic intent to induce inringement with suficient particularity."); see also Telecomm Innovations, LLC v. Ricoh Co., 966 F. Supp. 2d 390, 395 (D. Del. 2013). Plaintifs allegations in the Second Amended Complaint may be borderline in terms of suiciency,but the Comt inds that Plaintif has pleaded just barely enough to render plausible the inference that Deendants specifically intend to induce inringement of the Patents-in-Suit. Thus, because the Second Amended Complaint plausibly alleges that Deendants possess the requisite knowledge and speciic intent to induce infringement since the First Amended Complaint was iled, Plaintif has suiciently stated a claim of post-suit inducement or the Patents-in-Suit. B. Plaintiffs Claims of Pre-Suit Induced Inringement Alhough the Court finds that Plaintif has adequately pleaded induced inringement since the iling of the First Amended Complaint,the Cowt agrees with Deendants that the allegations regarding pre-suit inducement are deficient. (See D.I. 34 at 8-9; D.I. 38 at 4-5). As with the prior pleading, the Second Amended Complaint still includes no actual allegations that plausibly suggest Deendants possessed the requisite knowledge of infringement of any of the Patents-in- 6 Suit prior to iling the original Complaint or the First Amended Complaint.5 Indeed, despite being on notice that the allegations of pre-suit lmowledge were deficient (D.I. 28 at 8-9), Plaintiff added only the following conclusory assertion in the Second Amended Complaint: "On inormation and belief, Lenovo in fact has been aware of all three patents-in-suit even beore the iling the First Amended Complaint, at least rom shortly ater the iling of the original Complaint" (D.I. 30, 29). The Court is not required to accept as true such unsupported allegations, especially as related to the '083 and '407 Patents, which were not accused in the original Complaint. See HSM Porfolio LLC v. Fujitsu Ltd, No. 11-770-RGA, 2012 WL 2580547, at *1 (D. Del. July 3, 2012) ("Stating that the deendant was on notice of a patent as of a certain date is insuicient to provide a actual basis or alleging knowledge [to support a claim of inducement]."). There are no other allegations relating to pre-suit knowledge or any of the Patents-in-Suit. Because the Second Amended Complaint does not adequately plead that Deendants possessed the requisite knowledge prior to Plaintif asse1iing the Patents-in-Suit, any claim of pre-suit inducement must be dismissed. Plaintif argues that the Comi should not "chop of' the claim of pre-suit inducement at this stage; instead, according to Plaintif, the Court should allow the case to proceed with pre-suit inducement at issue as long as the post-suit claim is ound to be adequately pleaded. (See D.I. 36 at 5-6). Plaintiff does not cite any case to support the argument that a claim of induced infringement should proceed as to all time periods simply because post-suit inducement may be suiciently pleaded. Indeed, other courts in this District have come to the opposite conclusion, 5 Plaintiff only asserted the '545 Patent in the original Complaint (see D.I. 1 ,, 20-24), and the '083 and '407 Patents were added to the case in the First Amended Complaint (see DJ. 15 ,, 36-47). Therefore, as Deendants point out, the cut-of for pre-suit inducement for the '545 Patent is the date of he original Complaint, whereas the cut-of or pre-suit inducement or the '083 and '407 Patents is the date of the First Amended Complaint. (See D.I. 34 at 8-9; see also D.I. 38 at 4-5). 7 paring inducement claims down by time period when Plaintif ails to adequately plead pre-suit inducement. See, e.g., ReeEdge, 29 F. Supp. 3d at 459-60 ( dismissing pre-suit inducement claims but allowing Plaintif to proceed with post-suit inducement claims); see also Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Lindsay Corp., No. 15-042-LPS-CJB, 2018 WL 503255, at *3-4 (D. Del. Jan. 22, 2018). Regardless of the suiciency of Plaintifs allegations or post-suit inducement, the Court will not allow Plaintiff to pursue a claim of pre-suit inducement where there are insuicient allegations to render that claim plausible. Thereore, Plaintiffs claim of induced infringement of the '545 Patent is limited to the time since the original Complaint was iled, and Plaintifs claims of induced inringement of the '083 and '407 Patents are limited to the time since the First Amended Complaint was iled. If Plaintif later discovers acts that plausibly suggest Deendants possessed the requisite knowledge of the Patents-in-Suit to support a claim of pre-suit inducement, Plaintif may, if appropriate, seek leave to urther amend its complaint. 6 IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Deendants' partial motion to dismiss (DJ. 33) is GRANTED IN-PART and DENIED-IN-PART. An appropriate order will ollow. 6 For Plaintiff to request such leave to amend, it should ollow the Court's procedure or doing so. 8
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
