Lewis v. CoreCivic of Tennessee, LLC et al, No. 3:2021cv01385 - Document 10 (S.D. Cal. 2022)
Court Description: ORDER Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 6 ). Signed by Judge John A. Houston on 7/14/2022. (smy1)(jrd)
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Lewis v. CoreCivic of Tennessee, LLC et al Doc. 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARVA LEWIS, an individual, Case No.: 21-cv-1385 JAH BGS Plaintiff, 12 13 v. 14 CORECIVIC OF TENNESSEE, LLC, a Tennessee limited liability company doing business in the state of California; CORECIVIC, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company doing business in the state of California; CORECIVIC, INC., a Maryland corporation doing business in the state of California; and DOES 1-20, inclusive, 15 16 17 18 19 20 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 6). Defendants. 21 22 Pending before the Court is Defendant CoreCivic of Tennessee, LLC, CoreCivic, 23 LLC, and CoreCivic, Inc. (“Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. 24 (“Motion”, ECF No. 6). 25 opposition to the Motion on October 10, 2021, (“Opp’n” ECF No. 7), and Defendants filed 26 a reply in support of their Motion on October 20, 2021, (“Reply”, ECF No. 8). For the 27 reasons set forth below, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant’s Motion 28 to Dismiss. Plaintiff Marva Lewis, (“Plaintiff”) filed the response in 1 21-cv-1385 JAH BGS Dockets.Justia.com 1 I. BACKGROUND 1 2 Plaintiff Marva Lewis was an employee of CoreCivic, a private-prison in San Diego. 3 (“Complaint”, ECF No. 1 at 4). During her employment as a Treatment Counselor, Plaintiff 4 alleges she was denied meal and rest breaks, was not paid overtime, and was not provided 5 with accurate wage statements. (Id. at ¶ 11). 6 In 2018, Plaintiff was diagnosed with stress-induced psychological trauma and 7 severe gastrointestinal inflammation. (Id at ¶ 13). Her condition escalated to the point that 8 CoreCivic’s human resources manager suggested she see a doctor and take Family and 9 Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) leave if needed. (Id. at ¶¶ 14, 15). On or about April 23, 10 2019, Plaintiff informed human resources of her intent to take medical leave. (Id. at ¶ 15). 11 Her leave was approved, and she was provided a packet of FMLA documents to be signed. 12 (Id. at ¶ 16). Plaintiff was then told by human resources to disregard the FMLA paperwork, 13 as CoreCivic would handle her medical leave as a worker’s compensation claim, rather 14 than FMLA. (Id.) Accordingly, Plaintiff did not turn her FMLA paperwork over to her 15 physician to be signed. (Id. at ¶ 18). On or about April 29, 2019, Plaintiff signed the 16 paperwork to initiate a worker’s compensation claim. (Id.) Plaintiff subsequently received 17 a letter from CoreCivic informing her that her FMLA leave had been approved, despite 18 being told by human resources to disregard the FMLA paperwork. (Id. at ¶ 19). On or 19 about June 10, 2019, her worker’s compensation claim was denied because her injuries 20 were not work-related, but when she inquired, human resources informed her that they had 21 no knowledge of her claim being denied. (Id. at ¶ 20). 22 Plaintiff challenged the denial of her worker’s compensation claim, and in the course 23 of that challenge, signed a Compromise and Release (“CR”). (Motion at 8). The CR 24 included “employment” and “earnings” claims agreed to be released and settled without 25 litigation. (Id. at 12-14). Plaintiff received two more letters informing her that she had 26 27 1 28 This is a recitation of pleaded facts for the purposes of this motion and not to be construed as findings of fact by this Court. 2 21-cv-1385 JAH BGS 1 failed to provide documentation for her FMLA leave and that her FMLA leave had been 2 exhausted, both of which she was told to disregard by human resources. (Complaint at ¶ 3 24-25). However, on November 4, 2019, Plaintiff’s employment was terminated for not 4 responding to the second letter sent on September 30, 2019, warning that her FMLA leave 5 had been exhausted, and for not expressing an intention to return to work. (Id. at ¶¶ 24, 6 26). 7 miscommunication, CoreCivic refused to reverse their position. (Id. at ¶ 26) When Plaintiff reached out to CoreCivic about the matter and the alleged 8 On August 2, 2022, Plaintiff filed her Complaint against Defendants alleging twelve 9 causes of action: (1) Interference in Violation of the FMLA 29 U.S.C. § 2615; 29 C.F.R. § 10 825.220; (2) Interference in Violation of the California Family Rights Act (“C.F.R.A.”) 11 Gov. Code § 12945, et seq.; (3) Retaliation in Violation of the C.F.R.A. Gov. Code § 12 12945, et seq.; (4) Disability Discrimination in Violation of the Fair Employment and 13 Housing Act (“FEHA”) Gov. Code § 12940(a); (5) Failure to Provide Reasonable 14 Accommodation in Violation of the FEHA Gov. Code § 12940(m); (6) Failure to Engage 15 in the Interactive Process in Violation of the FEHA Gov. Code § 12940(n); (7) Failure to 16 Prevent Unlawful Discrimination/Harassment Gov. Code § 12940(k); (8) Wrongful 17 Termination in Violation of Public Policy; (9) Failure to Provide Uninterrupted Meal and 18 Rest Breaks Labor Code §§ 226.7, 512; (10) Failure to Pay Regular and Overtime Wages 19 Labor Code §§ 204, 510, 1194; (11) Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements 20 Labor Code § 226, and; (12) Unfair Business Practices Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq. 21 II. LEGAL STANDARD 22 A motion to dismiss can be granted when there is no claim upon which relief can be 23 granted. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6). In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts 24 as true the facts alleged in the complaint and draws all inferences in the light most favorable 25 to the non-moving party. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). However, the Court 26 is not bound to accept as true legal conclusions presented as allegations of fact. Id. While 27 recitation of the elements of a cause of action is not sufficient, a well-pleaded complaint 28 3 21-cv-1385 JAH BGS 1 may proceed even if the likelihood of recovery is remote. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 2 550 U.S. 544, 555-556 (2007). 3 4 III. A. DISCUSSION Judicial Notice 5 Defendants request that this Court take judicial notice of the Compromise and 6 Release signed by Plaintiff Marva Lewis on January 29, 2020, the State of California 7 Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board (“WCAB”) Order Approving the Compromise and 8 Release, and all other documents attached to the Declaration of Stacy Bickler of Siegel, 9 Moreno & Stettler, APC. (ECF 6-2 at 2). The Parties do not dispute the authenticity of 10 these documents. The Court may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of 11 public record. Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 12 2006). Judicial notice is also appropriate for records from administrative bodies. United 13 States v. 14.02 Acres of Land More or Less in Fresno County., 547 F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir. 14 2008). 15 compensation claim are appropriate. 16 B. Therefore, judicial notice of these documents pertaining to the worker’s Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 17 i. 18 Defendants argue that the CR signed by Plaintiff bars all twelve of her claims 19 because they all arise from “employment” or “earnings” and were released when she signed 20 the CR. (Motion at 11). A CR is enforceable when the person with the capacity of reading 21 and understanding signs without fraud and is subsequently estopped from claiming 22 provisions are against the individual’s intent or understanding. Jefferson v. California 23 Dept. of Youth Authority, 28 Cal.4th 299, 303 (2002). The Court balances the public policy 24 interest in enforcing strict CR’s that have been subject to oversight from the WCAB with 25 protecting the interests of workers who sign releases without full knowledge of what future 26 claims might arise. Id. at 304. Defendants rely on Skrbina v. Fleming Companies, 45 27 Cal.App.4th 1353 (1996) in arguing that the CR is enforceable. (Motion at 12). Compromise and Release 28 4 21-cv-1385 JAH BGS 1 In Skrbina, the plaintiff filed a complaint for unlawful discrimination and wrongful 2 discharge. Id. at 1360. The plaintiff had signed a prior CR release in order to receive 3 severance benefits that released claims arising from employment, including “any and all 4 claims under state or federal employment laws”. Id. at 1359-1360. As the language of the 5 release was specific to employment law, the court found that the release barred the 6 plaintiff’s claims arising from the Fair Employment and Housing Act. Id. at 1369-1370. 7 However, Plaintiff argues that Claxton v. Waters is the more analogous case. 8 (Response at 5). In Claxton, the plaintiff filed a worker’s compensation claim for injury to 9 the psyche from sexual harassment, as well as a civil action for sexual harassment in 10 violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act. Claxton v. Waters, 34 Cal.4th 367, 11 371 (2004). In settling the worker’s compensation claim, plaintiff signed a mandatory CR 12 that released “all claims and causes of action, whether now known or ascertained, or which 13 may hereafter arise or develop as a result of said injury, including any and all liability of 14 said employer”. Id. This CR was approved by a worker’s compensation judge. Id. Based 15 on this release, the defendants argued that the civil action was barred. Id. at 372. The court 16 found that the release applied only to claims within the scope of the worker’s compensation 17 system, and not separate civil actions unless there is extrinsic evidence of intent to release 18 claims outside of the worker’s compensation system. Id. at 376. 19 The facts in Claxton are closer to the facts of this case, as both pertain to releases 20 signed in worker’s compensation proceedings rather than a release signed to receive 21 benefits as in Skrbina. Further, many of the facts the court in Claxton found persuasive are 22 present in this case. Like in Claxton, there is no reference to releasing claims in other civil 23 actions in the CR, with the language instead providing that “Execution of this form has no 24 effect on claims that are not within the scope of the workers' compensation law or claims 25 that are not subject to the exclusivity provisions of the workers' compensation law, unless 26 otherwise expressly stated”. (ECF No. 6-1 at 12). Further, like in Claxton, there is no 27 attached extrinsic evidence demonstrating an intent for this release to apply to claims 28 outside the worker’s compensation system. 5 21-cv-1385 JAH BGS 1 Claxton also distinguishes from Jefferson v. California Dept. of Youth Authority, 28 2 Cal.4th 299 (2002), another case the Defendants rely on to support their position. 3 Defendants argue that per Jefferson, Plaintiff must expressly exempt any claim from the 4 general release. (Motion at 11). However, as the court in Claxton explains, the rule in 5 Jefferson was not that only in “extraordinary circumstances” are claims not released by the 6 general release form. Claxton, 28 Cal.4th at 375. Rather, the release in Jefferson barred 7 the claim outside the scope of worker’s compensation because there was an attachment to 8 the release that went beyond the standard language of the release which demonstrated an 9 intent to release that claim, and there was no extrinsic evidence countering that intent. Id. 10 at 376. Because in this case the CR contains only the standard language with no further 11 attachments, the general rule of the release barring claims within the worker’s 12 compensation system applies. 13 A claim is within the scope of the worker’s compensation system when it arises from 14 the course of employment and the statutory conditions for compensation are met. Claxton, 15 34 Cal.4th at 372-373. However, claims arising from conduct “contrary to fundamental 16 public policy” are not subject to exclusivity requirements and may be subject to both 17 worker’s compensation actions and other civil actions. Id. Given that Plaintiff’s claims 18 are grounded in her allegations of discrimination on the basis of disability, the public policy 19 concerns of her claims coupled with the need to protect the interests of workers signing 20 releases, the CR does not bar Plaintiff’s claims and the Defendants’ motion to dismiss all 21 twelve causes of action based on the CR is denied. 22 23 ii. Failure to Provide Uninterrupted Meal and Rest Breaks and Failure to Pay Regular and Overtime Wages 24 Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state claims for Failure to Provide 25 Uninterrupted Meal and Rest Breaks and Failure to Pay Regular and Overtime Wages, as 26 Plaintiff has not alleged specific instances of being denied meal and rest breaks and 27 overtime pay. (Motion at 14, 16). In making a claim of unpaid overtime, the plaintiff must, 28 at minimum, allege working over forty hours in a workweek and that there was no overtime 6 21-cv-1385 JAH BGS 1 compensation within that workweek. Landers v. Quality Communications, Inc., 771 F.3d 2 638, 645 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding that because the plaintiff did not allege any specific 3 instance that would show at least one workweek of not being paid overtime, the plaintiff 4 failed to state a plausible claim). Similarly, a plaintiff must allege some facts in making a 5 claim of a denial of meal and rest breaks. Guerrero v. Haliburton Energy Services, Inc., 6 231 F.Supp.3d 797, 805 (E.D. Cal. 2017) (finding that alleging denial of meal and rest 7 breaks without specific facts and details was conclusory and fell short of plausibly stating 8 a claim). 9 Like in both Landers and Guerrero, Plaintiff does not allege specific facts or 10 instances in which she was denied meal breaks, rest breaks, or overtime. Further, Plaintiff 11 points to no authority in arguing that the claim is sufficiently pled, arguing only that breaks 12 and overtime pay were denied on multiple occasions and those denials, taken as true, would 13 entitle Plaintiff to relief. (Response at 9-10). Therefore, because there must be some facts 14 alleged in asserting these claims, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims of Failure to 15 Provide Uninterrupted Meal and Rest Breaks and Failure to Pay Regular and Overtime 16 Wages is granted without prejudice. 17 iii. 18 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s cause of action for Failure to Provide Accurate 19 Itemized Wage Statements is time barred by the statute of limitations. (Motion at 16). 20 Plaintiff agrees that pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 340(a), the claims for 21 statutory penalties are barred for being outside the one-year statute of limitations. 22 (Response at 9). However, Plaintiff argues that pursuant to California Labor Code § 23 226(e), which provides that the plaintiff may seek “the greater of all actual damages or fifty 24 dollars ($50) for the initial pay period in which a violation occurs and one hundred dollars 25 ($100) per employee for each violation in a subsequent pay period”, the claim for actual 26 damages is not barred. (Id. at 9-10). Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements 27 Defendants concede that a claim for actual damages would not be barred. (Reply at 28 8). However, they argue that the claim should still be dismissed because Plaintiff has not 7 21-cv-1385 JAH BGS 1 alleged any actual damages. (Id.) Because the complaint alleges only that Plaintiff is 2 entitled to recover the statutory penalties under California Labor Code §226(e) and does 3 not allege actual damages, the Defendant’s motion to dismiss the claim of Failure to 4 Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements is granted without prejudice. 5 IV. 6 7 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part. Accordingly, 8 (1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint in its entirety is DENIED; 9 (2) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Ninth Cause of Action for Failure to Provide 10 Uninterrupted Meal and Rest Breaks and Tenth Cause of Action for Failure to Pay 11 Regular and Overtime Wages is GRANTED; and, 12 (3) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Eleventh Cause of Action for Failure to 13 Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements is GRANTED. 14 (4) If Plaintiff wishes to amend the Complaint to cure the deficiencies noted, Plaintiff 15 shall file an Amended Complaint no later than thirty (30) days from the filing date 16 of this Order. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without 17 reference to his original pleading. Defendants not named and any claims not re- 18 alleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See S.D. CAL. 19 CIVLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 20 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. 21 Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (noting that claims dismissed with leave to 22 amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be “considered waived 23 if not repled.”) 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 8 21-cv-1385 JAH BGS 1 If Plaintiff does not file an Amended Complaint within thirty days from the filing of 2 this Order, then this action will proceed without the dismissed claims. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 DATED: July 14, 2022 5 6 7 _________________________________ JOHN A. HOUSTON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 9 21-cv-1385 JAH BGS
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