Evans Hotel, LLC et al v. Unite Here! Local 30 et al, No. 3:2018cv02763 - Document 113 (S.D. Cal. 2022)
Court Description: ORDER Denying Defendants: (1) Motion For Reconsideration And (2) Request For Oral Argument [ECF Nos. 100 , 111 , 112 ]. Signed by Judge Linda Lopez on 1/28/2022. (ddf)
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Evans Hotel, LLC et al v. Unite Here! Local 30 et al Doc. 113 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 EVANS HOTELS, LLC, a California limited liability company; BH PARTNERSHIP LP, a California limited partnership; EHSW, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, ) ) ) ) ) ) Plaintiffs, ) v. ) ) UNITED HERE! LOCAL 30; BRIGETTE ) BROWNING; SAN DIEGO COUNTY ) BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION ) TRADES COUNCIL, AFL-CIO; TOM ) LEMMON, an individual; and DOES 1 ) through 10, ) Defendants. ) Case No.: 3:18-cv-02763-LL-AHG ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’: (1) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION and (2) REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT [ECF Nos. 100, 111, 112] 22 I. INTRODUCTION 23 Plaintiff EVANS HOTEL, LLC, a California limited liability company; BH 24 PARTNERSHIP LP, a California limited partnership; and EHSW, LLC, a Delaware 25 limited liability company (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring this action against Defendants 26 UNITED HERE! LOCAL 30 (“Unite Here!”); BRIGETTE BROWNING (“Browning”); 27 SAN DIEGO COUNTY BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION TRADES COUNCIL, 28 AFL-CIO (“SDCBCTC”); and TOM LEMMON, an individual (“Lennon”) (collectively, -13:18-cv-02763-LL-AHG Dockets.Justia.com 1 “Defendants”) along with DOES 1 through 10,1 alleging that Plaintiffs engaged in conduct 2 qualifying as unfair labor practices in violation of the Labor Management Relations Act, 3 29 U.S.C. § 187(a) (the “LMRA”). Before the Court are Defendants’ (1) Motion for Reconsideration, ECF No. 100, 4 5 and (2) Request for Oral Argument, ECF No. 111. The motions were submitted on the 6 papers without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1) and Rule 78(b) of the 7 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 110. After considering the papers submitted, 8 supporting documentation, and applicable law, the Court DENIES the motions. 9 II. BACKGROUND 10 A. Statement of Facts 11 The Court incorporates the detailed factual history from its August 26, 2021 order 12 denying the motions to dismiss and strike in this matter set forth in ECF No. 93. 13 B. Procedural History 14 On December 7, 2018, Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this matter, alleging, (1) 15 unlawful secondary boycott; (2) attempted monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) neither authorize nor prohibit the use of fictitious parties; however, FRCP 10 requires a plaintiff to include the names of all parties in his complaint. See Keavney v. Cty. of San Diego, No. 3:19-cv-01947-AJB-BGS, 2020 WL 4192286, at *4-5 (S.D. Cal. July 21, 2020) (Battaglia, J.). Plaintiffs’ complaint includes allegations against Does 1 through 10. Naming doe defendants also implicates FRCP 4, requiring service of the complaint. Id. (noting that “it is effectively impossible for the United States Marshal or deputy marshal to fulfill his or her duty to serve an unnamed defendant”). “A plaintiff may refer to unknown defendants as Defendant John Doe 1, John Doe 2, John Doe 3, and so on, but he must allege specific facts showing how each particular doe defendant violated his rights.” Keavney, 2020 WL 4192286 at *4-5. Where a plaintiff fails to link any alleged wrongful act to a specific doe defendant, the court must dismiss those individuals, especially when they have not been served. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m) (providing that “[i]f a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time.”); see also S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 41.1(a); Keavney, 2020 WL 4192286 at *4-5 (dismissing a plaintiff’s first amended complaint). Thus, all doe defendants are dismissed without prejudice for want of prosecution pursuant to FRCP 4(m). 1 -23:18-cv-02763-LL-AHG 1 Sherman Act; (3) conspiracy to monopolize in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act; 2 (4) violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (the “RICO 3 Act”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962; (5) violation of the RICO Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), by conspiring 4 to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); (6) violation of the RICO Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), by 5 conspiring to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a); (7) violation of the RICO Act, 18 U.S.C. § 6 1962(d), by conspiring to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b); (8) interference with prospective 7 economic advantage; and (9) attempted extortion. ECF No. 1. 8 On February 15, 2019, Defendants timely filed motions to dismiss pursuant to 9 FRCP 12(b)(6) and special motions to strike under California’s anti-Strategic Lawsuit 10 Against Public Participation (“anti-SLAPP”) statute, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16. 11 ECF Nos. 15, 16, 17, 18. However, on March 7, 2019, these motions were mooted by 12 Plaintiffs’ filing of a First Amended Complaint (the “FAC”), alleging essentially the same 13 claims as in their original complaint aside from adding SDCBCTC to the First Claim for 14 Relief. See ECF Nos. 19, 24. 15 On April 15, 2019, Defendants again filed motions to dismiss the FAC, see ECF 16 Nos. 29, 31, while Browning and Unite Here! Moved to strike Plaintiffs’ eighth and ninth 17 claims for relief, ECF No. 32. On January 7, 2020, the Court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss, dismissing 18 19 the FAC without prejudice and denying the pending motion to strike as moot. ECF No. 20 60. The Hon. William Q. Hayes found that Plaintiffs had failed to allege specific facts 21 showing that Defendants’ conduct was not protected under the Noerr-Pennington 22 doctrine.2 Id. The Court granted Plaintiffs thirty days to request leave to amend. Id. On 23 2 The Noerr–Pennington Doctrine provides immunity to private entities from liability 24 under federal or state antitrust laws for conduct related to petitioning any branch of 25 government in an attempt to influence the passage or enforcement of laws that might have anticompetitive effects. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1047 (9th Cir. 26 2015); Sosa v. DIRECTTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 942 (9th Cir. 2006). The doctrine arises 27 out of the belief that antitrust laws should not be applied in the political arena, and that the First Amendment protects political speech. See Microsoft, 795 F.3d at 1047 (“The doctrine 28 originated in two Supreme Court antitrust cases holding that the Petition Clause of the First -33:18-cv-02763-LL-AHG 1 February 4, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s order granting 2 the Defendants’ motions to dismiss. ECF No. 61. Two days later, on February 6, 2020, 3 Plaintiffs also filed a motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint (the “SAC”). 4 ECF No. 62. On April 20, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file the 5 SAC while denying Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration of the Court’s order granting 6 Defendants’ motions to dismiss. ECF No. 76. 7 On April 21, 2020, Plaintiffs filed the operative SAC, which removed the sixth and 8 seventh claims for relief for violation of RICO by conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. §§ 9 1962(a)–(b) and added a new claim for unfair competition pursuant to California’s Unfair 10 Competition Law, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200 et seq. (the “UCL”), against all 11 Defendants. ECF No. 76. On May 19, 2020, Defendants again moved to dismiss and 12 strike the complaint. ECF Nos. 79, 80, 81. 13 On August 26, 2021, the Hon. Todd W. Robinson granted-in-part Defendants’ 14 motions to dismiss based on the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine and for failure to state a 15 claim, while denying in part the SDCBCTC’s anti-SLAPP motion. ECF No. 93. Judge 16 Robinson dismissed all claims for relief except for Plaintiffs’ First Claim for Relief for 17 secondary boycott, and granted Plaintiffs “one final opportunity to amend their complaint” 18 by allowing them to file a Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) within fourteen (14) days 19 of the order. ECF No. 93 at 61. 20 On September 3, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a motion for extension of time to file their 21 TAC due to, inter alia, Defendants notifying Plaintiffs they intended to file a motion for 22 reconsideration of the Court’s order, ECF No. 94 at 2,3 which the Court granted on 23 Amendment prohibits imposing liability under the Sherman Act for ‘attempt[ing] to 24 persuade the legislature or the executive to take particular action.’”); see also E. R.R. 25 Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136 (1961); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965). Courts have expanded the 26 doctrine “to ensure that ‘those who petition any department of the government,’ including 27 the courts, ‘are immune from . . . liability for their petitioning conduct.’” Microsoft, 795 F.3d at 1047. 28 3 Unless otherwise indicated, all page number references are to the ECF-generated -43:18-cv-02763-LL-AHG 1 September 8, 2021, ECF No. 95. 2 On September 23, 2021, Defendants filed the instant Motion for Reconsideration, 3 arguing, inter alia, that “Judge Robinson’s Order [dismissing the SAC] contradicted Judge 4 Hayes’ legal reasoning [in the order dismissing the FAC] without explanation or 5 justification on key points.” ECF Nos. 100, 111. On December 15, 2021, Plaintiffs 6 opposed. ECF No. 107. On December 29, 2021, Defendants replied. ECF No. 108. 7 On January 4, 2022, the case was transferred to the Hon. Linda Lopez, who vacated 8 the hearing on this matter, advising that if the hearing was not reset, it would be submitted 9 on the papers. ECF No. 110. On January 7, 2022, Defendants requested oral argument 10 on this matter. ECF No. 111. On January 12, 2022, Plaintiffs responded to that request, 11 advising that they did not oppose Defendants’ request so long as it did not interfere with 12 the Court’s prompt resolution of the motion. ECF No. 112. 13 III. LEGAL STANDARD 14 Under the FRCP, there are no “motions for reconsideration.” Rather, Rule 59 of 15 the FRCP sets forth the procedures for filing “[a] motion to alter or amend a judgment 16 [which] must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of judgment,” while FRCP 60 17 governs “Relief from a Judgment or Order,” and must be filed no more than one year after 18 the entry of the judgment or order. “[A] ‘motion for reconsideration’ is treated as 19 a motion to alter or amend judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 59(e) if 20 it is filed within ten days of entry of judgment.” Am. Ironworks & Erectors, Inc. v. N. 21 Am. Const. Corp., 248 F.3d 892, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Arrieta v. Cty. of Kern, 22 161 F. Supp. 3d 919, 931 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (treating a motion filed “well after the ten day 23 deadline” as a FRCP 60(b) motion); Harvest v. Castro, 531 F.3d 737, 745-46 (9th Cir. 24 2008) (noting that “[n]omenclature is not important” as “[t]he label or description that a 25 party puts on its motion does not control whether the party should be granted or denied 26 relief”); In re Montano, 501 B.R. 96, 112 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013) (“Because Montano’s 27 28 page number contained in the header of each ECF-filed document. -53:18-cv-02763-LL-AHG 1 motion for reconsideration was filed within fourteen days after entry of the Summary 2 Judgment Order, the motion should be treated as one to alter or amend the Summary 3 Judgment Order under Rule 9023, which incorporates Civil Rule 59(e).”). 4 Reconsideration under FRCP 59(e) is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used 5 sparingly.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). It 6 may be appropriate if “(1) the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, 7 (2) the district court committed clear error or made an initial decision that was manifestly 8 unjust, or (3) there is an intervening change in controlling law.” United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. 9 Spectrum Worldwide, Inc., 555 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citation(s?) 10 omitted). “Clear error occurs when ‘the reviewing court on the entire record is left with 11 the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Smith v. Clark Cty. 12 Sch. Dist., 727 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 13 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). “[A] Rule 59(e) motion may not be used to ‘raise arguments 14 or present evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier 15 in the litigation.’” Rishor v. Ferguson, 822 F.3d 482, 492 (9th Cir. 2016). 16 Where a motion is filed later than ten days, as is the case here, it is treated as a Rule 17 60(b) motion for relief from a judgment or order. Am. Ironworks, 248 F.3d at 898-99. 18 The moving party seeking relief under FRCP 60(b) “is entitled to relief from judgment 19 for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) 20 newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an 21 adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 22 discharged; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 23 judgment.” Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)). With respect to “other reason[s] justifying 24 relief,” courts have held that “[i]n civil cases, a motion to reconsider must set forth ‘some 25 valid reason why the court should reconsider its prior decision’ and set ‘forth facts or law 26 of a strongly convincing nature to persuade the court to reverse its prior 27 decision.’” United States v. Kauwe, 467 F. Supp. 3d 940, 945 (D. Nev. 2020). “[A] 28 motion for reconsideration is not an avenue to re-litigate the same issues and arguments -63:18-cv-02763-LL-AHG 1 upon which the court already has ruled.” Id. 2 Further, Local Rule 7.1(i)(1) requires an affidavit to be filed along with any motion 3 pursuant to Rule 59 or 60 of the FRCP: Whenever any motion . . . for any order or other relief has been 4 made to any judge and has been refused in whole or in part . . . 5 and a subsequent motion or application or petition is made for the same relief in whole or in part upon the same or any alleged 6 different state of facts, it will be the continuing duty of each party 7 and attorney seeking such relief to present to the judge to whom any subsequent application is made an affidavit of a party or 8 witness . . . setting forth the material facts and circumstances 9 surrounding each prior application, including inter alia: (1) when and to what judge the application was made, (2) what ruling or 10 decision or order was made thereon, and (3) what new or 11 different facts and circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist, or were not shown, upon such prior application. 12 13 S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(i)(2) further provides that “[e]xcept as may be allowed under Rules 14 59 and 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any motion or application for 15 reconsideration must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days after the entry of the ruling, 16 order or judgment sought to be reconsidered.” IV. DISCUSSION 17 Defendants state that they move for reconsideration on the below grounds: 18 Defendants move for reconsideration on the grounds that five 19 aspects of the Order were manifest error and contrary to settled precedent: (1) the conclusion the Second Amended Complaint 20 (“SAC”) sufficiently alleges that Local 30’s February 28 and 21 May 11, 2018 letters constituted “sham petitioning”; (2) the conclusion that the SAC adequately alleges that Defendants 22 alleged threats against SeaWorld constituted “sham petitioning”; 23 (3) the legal conclusion that otherwise protected or non-coercive conduct may violate National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) 24 Section 8(b)(4)(ii) if it threatens “ruin or substantial economic 25 loss”; (4) the conclusion that the SAC sufficiently alleged that the Building Trades Defendants had the “object” of obtaining an 26 agreement that would violate NLRA Section 8(e); and (5) the 27 conclusion that the SAC alleges facts sufficient to preclude dismissal of the Sherman Act claims on the basis of the non28 -73:18-cv-02763-LL-AHG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 statutory labor exemption. ECF No. 100 at 3:8-19. In their opposition, Plaintiffs point out that “Defendants present no new facts, no change in law, and no clear error to justify their request for reconsideration.” ECF No. 107 at 9:3-4. Plaintiffs also point out that Defendants fail to submit the required affidavits required by the Southern District’s Local Rule 7.1(i)(2). Id. at 9:4-9. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ motion “does nothing more than seek an improper second bite at the apple, accuse this Court of manifest error without justification, invite the application of erroneous legal standards, and unnecessarily delay to the resolution of the merits of the case.” Id. at 9:24-27. In their reply brief, Defendants argue that the Court should not deny the motion solely due to their failing to attach the affidavit and attach the missing affidavit to the brief. See ECF No. 108 at 3:10-16; see also Rule 7.1 Affidavit of Paul L. More in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, ECF No. 108-1 at 2-4. Defendants also argue that grounds exist for the motion because the Court committed a manifest error. Id. at 4:17-23. First, the Court finds that the motion should be denied due to Defendants’ failure to follow the local rules by filing the required affidavit. See S.D. Cal. Civ. 7.1(i)(2). To the extent Defendants submitted the affidavit in their reply brief, the Court notes that a moving party may not raise new arguments or evidence in a reply brief. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Giles v. Sardie, 191 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1127 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (noting that “[i]t is improper for a moving party to introduce new facts or different legal arguments in the reply brief than those presented in the moving papers”); see also Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 894-95 (1990). Where a party presents new evidence in a reply brief, the district court should decline consideration of the new evidence unless it provides the non-moving party an opportunity to respond to such evidence. Dutta v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 895 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Understanding the potential for unfairness inherent in an unusual submission of new factual matter, the practice rules contemplate relief for the opposing party, but such relief is not limited to simply striking the new matter from consideration.”). Here, because the Court finds that Defendants’ substantive motion lacks -83:18-cv-02763-LL-AHG 1 merit, it finds that allowing Plaintiffs an opportunity to respond to the affidavit, which 2 would be the only way the Court could properly consider it, would prove to be an exercise 3 in futility and would not serve the interests of judicial economy. 4 Second, as to the merits of this motion, the Court notes that Defendants argue their 5 motion is proper because the Court committed a manifest error. See ECF No. 108 at 4:176 23. The manifest error standard for a motion for reconsideration only applies to FRCP 7 59(e) motions to alter or amend a judgment, which must be filed within ten days of the 8 order or judgment of which a party seeks reconsideration. See, e.g., Arrieta, 161 F. Supp. 9 3d at 931 (treating a motion filed “well after the ten day deadline” as a FRCP 60(b) motion). 10 Here, the order Defendants ask the Court to reconsider, see ECF No. 93, was filed on 11 August 26, 2021, and Defendants filed their motion for reconsideration exactly 28 days 12 later, or on September 23, 2021. Thus, the Court treats the motion as FRCP 60(b) motion 13 rather than a motion pursuant to FRCP 59(e). While motions for reconsideration pursuant 14 FRCP 59(e) allow for reconsideration if, inter alia, “the district court committed clear error 15 or made an initial decision that was manifestly unjust,” Spectrum, 555 F.3d at 780, motions 16 for reconsideration pursuant to FRCP 60(b) have no such ground for relief. Rather, the 17 moving party must show (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) 18 newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse 19 party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; 20 or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Am. 21 Ironworks, 248 F.3d at 898-99 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)). Here, Defendants do not 22 argue for relief on the basis of (1) any party or the Court making a mistake or was subject 23 to inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud, 24 misrepresentation, or other misconduct by Plaintiffs; or (4) the order or judgment being 25 void.4 As to the final ground, “any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 26 judgment,” the Court finds Defendants’ arguments unconvincing. 27 Instead, the Court 4 In fact, the judgment cannot be void because Plaintiffs were granted leave to amend, 28 meaning the case is still pending, and no final judgment has been entered. -93:18-cv-02763-LL-AHG 1 echoes the sentiments of two other judges in this District that “motions for reconsideration 2 should not be used as merely as an intermediate ‘appeal’ before taking a disputed ruling to 3 the Ninth Circuit”: The Court cannot emphasize strongly enough that the Rules 4 allowing for motions for reconsideration are not intended to 5 provide litigants with a second bite at the apple. Rather, reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly 6 in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial 7 resources.” Kona Enterprises, Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). In an adversarial system such as ours, 8 more often than not one party will win and one will 9 lose. Generally, it follows that the losing party will be unhappy with the Court’s decision. Rarely does the losing party believe 10 that its position lacked merit, or that the Court was correct in 11 ruling against it. Rather than either accept the Court’s ruling or appeal it, it seems to have instead become de rigueur to file a 12 motion for reconsideration. The vast majority of these motions 13 represent a simple rehash of the arguments already made, although now rewritten as though the Court was the opposing 14 party and its Order the brief to be opposed. It is easy for each 15 litigant to consider only his or her own motion, and the seemingly manifest injustice that has been done to them. But the 16 cumulative effect is one of abuse of the system and a drain on 17 judicial resources that could be better used to address matters that have not yet been before the Court once, let alone twice. 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 This is not to say that a motion for reconsideration is never welltaken. A litigant should not shy from bringing to the Court’s attention changes in facts and circumstances that render a ruling no longer logical, an intervening change in controlling authority, or other critical matters that the Rules provide should be brought to the Court’s attention in this way. On this basis, motions for reconsideration should be few, far between, and narrowly focused. When this is the case, the Rules work as they were intended, and the Court can focus on the business of justice. Holtz v. Powazek, No. 3:21-cv-01401-CAB-JLB, 2021 WL 5448981, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2021) (Bencivengo, J.) (quoting Strobel v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, No. 3:04-cv01069-BEN-BLM, 2007 1053454, at *3-4 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2007). Here, Defendants’ -103:18-cv-02763-LL-AHG 1 motion does not meet the description of a proper motion for reconsideration as outlined in 2 Strobel. This Court considered the entirety of the SAC as well as all the arguments 3 Defendants reiterate in their motion when Judge Robinson granted Defendants’ motion to 4 dismiss and is not persuaded that his order was incorrect. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion 5 is DENIED.5 6 V. CONCLUSION 7 For the above reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows: 8 1. All doe defendants are dismissed without prejudice. 9 2. Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration, ECF No. 100, is DENIED. 10 3. Defendants’ Request for Oral Argument, ECF No. 111, is DENIED as moot 11 given this order provides a decision on the issue on which Defendants seek oral argument. 12 See Tur v. YouTube, Inc., 562 F.3d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting “that an issue 13 is moot when deciding it would have no effect within the confines of the case itself”). 14 4. Plaintiffs must file their Third Amended Complaint within ten (10) days of 15 this order. Absent a motion demonstrating good cause, that complaint must not contain 16 any new claims for relief. 17 5. The parties are cautioned against filing further motions for reconsideration 18 that a lack a meritorious basis under the law. IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 20 DATED: January 28, 2022 HON. LINDA LOPEZ United States District Judge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Tangentially, the Court notes that Defendants’ request for reconsideration is odd and potentially moot for two reasons: First, Defendants were the prevailing party—save for one undismissed claim for relief—with respect to the order of which the seek reconsideration. Second, because Plaintiffs were granted leave to amend, Defendants may move still to dismiss that remaining claim provided they belief a good faith basis for doing so exists. Thus, reconsideration of the order seems to be an improper remedy to secure the relief Defendants seek (i.e., dismissal of the entire case). 5 -113:18-cv-02763-LL-AHG
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