Thomas v. County of San Diego, San Diego Health and Human Services Agency et al, No. 3:2018cv01466 - Document 14 (S.D. Cal. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER Granting 9 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. The Court finds that Plaintiff insufficiently pleads a violation of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant's motion and dismisses Plaintiff's Complaint without prejudice and with leave to amend. Plaintiff must file an amended complaint that cures the deficiencies addressed herein on or before 12/11/2018. Signed by Judge Michael M. Anello on 11/26/2018. (rmc)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KIMBERLY THOMAS, Case No.: 18cv1466-MMA (NLS) Plaintiff, 12 13 v. 14 SAN DIEGO HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY; ADRIANNA VALDEZ; CLAUDIA BELL; and COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, 15 16 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT [Doc. No. 9] Defendants. 17 18 19 On June 27, 2018, Plaintiff Kimberly Thomas (“Plaintiff”) filed this action 20 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Adrianna Valdez (“Valdez”), Claudia 21 Bell (“Bell”), and County of San Diego1 (“County”) alleging violations of Plaintiff’s First 22 and Fourteenth Amendment rights and raising a claim for municipal liability against the 23 County under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S 658 (1978). Doc. No. 1 24 (“Compl.”). Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule 25 of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Doc. No. 9-1 (“MTD”). Plaintiff filed an opposition [Doc. 26 27 The County was also erroneously sued as San Diego Health and Human Services Agency (“HHSA”). Doc. No. 9-1 at 1. 1 28 1 18cv1466-MMA (NLS) 1 No. 11 (“Oppo.”)], to which Defendants replied [Doc. No. 12 (“Reply”)]. The Court 2 found the matter suitable for determination on the papers and without oral argument 3 pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. Doc. No. 13. For the reasons set forth below, the 4 Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 5 BACKGROUND2 6 In June of 2016, Plaintiff gave birth to Zane Wolfgang Thomas (“Zane”) at 35 7 weeks gestation. Compl. ¶ 11. Zane was admitted to the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit 8 (“NICU”) at Scripps Memorial Hospital, Encinitas, because he was exposed to drugs in 9 utero and born prematurely. Id. After several meetings between County social workers 10 and Plaintiff, “it was determined that Zane would be placed in voluntary out-of-home 11 placement while Plaintiff received inpatient and/or outpatient substance abuse treatment.” 12 Compl. ¶ 12. Plaintiff provided the County and hospital social workers with her 13 preferred caregivers, including her mother, Maria Thomas (“Maria”), and family friends. 14 Id. 15 The County, through social workers Valdez and Bell, placed Zane into the custody 16 of foster parents Carmen and John Richards (“the Richards”) on June 27, 2016. Compl. ¶ 17 13. Plaintiff alleges that at that time, the County knew the Richards were in their 18 seventies, had several other small children placed with them, that Mr. Richards suffered 19 from dementia and was incapable of caring for Zane, and that an infant had previously 20 died in the Richards’ care. Id. Plaintiff further alleges that the County knew Zane would 21 require “exceptional care and supervision following hospital discharge” as a premature, 22 drug-addicted infant, and that the Richards did not receive training in the proper care and 23 supervision of such infants. Id. As a result, Plaintiff contends the County knew or 24 should have known that placing Zane with the Richards would overwhelm them and that 25 26 27 28 2 Because this matter is before the Court on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true the allegations set forth in the Complaint. See Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976). 2 18cv1466-MMA (NLS) 1 they would not be able to provide adequate care and supervision to Zane. Id. According 2 to Plaintiff, she and her family members requested on numerous occasions that the 3 County place Zane with a responsible relative or Non-Related Extended Family Member 4 (“NREFM”) caregivers. Compl. ¶ 14. The County, Valdez, and Bell allegedly ignored 5 these requests and instead “falsely represented . . . that the [County] was in the process of 6 investigating placement alternatives . . . .” Id. 7 During July and August of 2016, Maria was allowed extended visitation with Zane. 8 Compl. ¶ 15. “On all such occasions, it was reported to the [County], . . . [Valdez,] and 9 [Bell] that [the Richards] were overwhelmed and that Zane was not receiving adequate 10 attention or care, including missing doctors’ appointments.” Id. Despite these reports, 11 the County, Valdez, and Bell, allegedly left Zane in “the overwhelmed and overburdened 12 household of the Richards.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that the County, Valdez, and Bell’s 13 “intentional and/or reckless” behavior resulted in Zane not receiving the care and 14 supervision required. Compl. ¶ 16. On September 8, 2016, the Richards allegedly placed 15 Zane in his crib on his stomach to sleep and left him unsupervised and unmonitored. Id. 16 “Hours later, Zane died.” Id. Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that Zane’s 17 death is a “direct result of being placed on his stomach to sleep.” Id. 18 Based on these allegations, Plaintiff alleges that Valdez and Bell violated her First 19 and Fourteenth Amendment rights to familial association with Zane by failing “to provide 20 reasonable safety and minimally adequate care to, and safeguard the well-being of, 21 Zane.” See Compl. ¶¶ 21-22. Plaintiff also brings one cause of action against the County 22 for municipal liability (“Monell”). 23 LEGAL STANDARDS 24 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the claims made in the 25 complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). A pleading must 26 contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 27 relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However, plaintiffs must also plead “enough facts to 28 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 3 18cv1466-MMA (NLS) 1 544, 570 (2007); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The plausibility standard demands more than 2 “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” or “naked assertions devoid 3 of further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal 4 quotations and citations omitted). Instead, the complaint “must contain sufficient 5 allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to 6 defend itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). 7 In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must assume the truth 8 of all factual allegations and must construe them in the light most favorable to the 9 nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). 10 The court need not take legal conclusions as true merely because they are cast in the form 11 of factual allegations. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). 12 Similarly, “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to 13 defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). 14 Where dismissal is appropriate, a court should grant leave to amend unless the 15 plaintiff could not possibly cure the defects in the pleading. Knappenberger v. City of 16 Phoenix, 566 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2009). 17 DISCUSSION 18 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, 19 ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be 20 subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof 21 to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 22 laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under 23 § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) he or she was deprived of a right secured by the 24 United States Constitution or federal laws; and (2) the deprivation was caused by a 25 person acting under color of state law. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), 26 overruled in part on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986). 27 28 Here, the parties do not contest that Defendants were acting under the color of state law; rather, the parties question whether Plaintiff was deprived of a right secured by the 4 18cv1466-MMA (NLS) 1 First and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, Defendants argue that the Court should 2 dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint because Plaintiff fails to allege violations of her 3 constitutional rights, Valdez and Bell are entitled to qualified immunity, 3 and Plaintiff 4 insufficiently pleads her Monell claim. See generally, MTD; see also Reply. 5 A. 6 Defendants Valdez and Bell First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not plausibly allege violations of her 7 First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to familial association. Specifically, Defendants 8 contend that Plaintiff insufficiently pleads causation4 and deliberate indifference. MTD 9 at 8-16. Plaintiff opposes both assertions. See Oppo. at 9-11. “To amount to a violation [of Plaintiff’s right to familial association with her son, 10 11 the social workers’] harmful conduct must ‘shock[] the conscience’ or ‘offend the 12 community’s sense of fair play and decency.’” 5 Rosenbaum v. Washoe Cnty., 663 F.3d 13 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952)). 14 “Conduct that ‘shocks the conscience’ is ‘deliberate indifference to a known or so 15 obvious as to imply knowledge of, danger.’” Tamas v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 16 630 F.3d 833, 844 (9th Cir. 2010). As applied to this case, deliberate indifference 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 In light of Plaintiff’s failure to sufficiently plead a constitutional violation, the Court declines to analyze qualified immunity. However, The Court notes that at the time of the alleged constitutional deprivation, the rights to familial association and to reasonable safety and minimally adequate care in foster homes were both clearly established. See Tamas v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 630 F.3d 833, 847 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding the right to reasonable safety and minimally adequate care in foster homes clearly established); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 685 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that “[i]t is well established that a parent has a ‘fundamental liberty interest’ in ‘the companionship and society of his or her child’ and that ‘the state’s interference with that liberty interest without due process of law is remediable under [42 U.S.C. §] 1983’” under both the First and Fourteenth Amendments). 4 The Court also declines to analyze causation in light of Plaintiff’s failure to sufficiently plead a constitutional violation. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ requests for judicial notice because it did not rely on the documents in ruling on the instant motion. Doc. No. 9-2; Ruiz v. City of Santa Maria, 160 F.3d 543, 548 n.13 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that judicial notice is inappropriate where the facts to be noticed are not relevant to the disposition of the issues before the court). 5 The right to familial association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments are analyzed in the same manner. See Mann v. City of Sacramento, -- Fed. App’x --, No. 17-17048, 2018 WL 4268534, at *2 (9th Cir. Sept. 7, 2018); see also Lee, 250 F.3d at 686. 3 5 18cv1466-MMA (NLS) 1 requires: (1) “a showing of an objectively substantial risk of harm” and (2) “a showing 2 that the officials were subjectively aware of facts from which an inference could be 3 drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed and that either the official actually 4 drew that inference or that a reasonable official would have been compelled to draw that 5 inference.” Id. at 845. 6 Defendants contend that Plaintiff does not allege that Valdez and Bell were aware 7 of facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 8 existed. MTD at 12. Plaintiff counters that she adequately “alleges the social worker 9 defendants knew about her son’s fragile condition, knew or should have known that the 10 Richards were incapable of providing him with the care that he needed, and knew the 11 Richards were not taking her son to critical doctor’s appointments.” Oppo. at 10. 12 According to the allegations in the Complaint, Valdez and Bell “decided to place 13 Zane into the custody” of the Richards. Compl. ¶ 13. Thereafter, Plaintiff and her family 14 members requested on numerous occasions that Zane be placed with a responsible 15 relative or NREFM caregivers, but Valdez and Bell “ignored such requests,” and instead 16 “falsely represented . . . that the [County] was in the process of investigating placement 17 alternatives. . . .” Compl. ¶ 14. Following Maria’s several visits with Zane, “it was 18 reported to . . . [Valdez] and [Bell] that [the Richards] were overwhelmed and that Zane 19 was not receiving adequate attention or care, including missing doctors’ appointments.” 20 See Compl. ¶ 15. Despite these reports, Valdez and Bell “failed and refused” to remove 21 Zane from the Richards’ care and “left Zane in the[ir] overwhelmed and overburdened 22 household.” Id. 23 Based on these allegations, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not adequately 24 pleaded that Valdez and Bell were subjectively aware of facts from which an inference 25 could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm to Zane in the Richards’ care 26 existed. For example, Plaintiff does not allege that Valdez and Bell knew that the 27 Richards were in their seventies, that they had several other small children placed with 28 them, that Mr. Richards suffered from a form of dementia, that an infant had died 6 18cv1466-MMA (NLS) 1 inexplicably in the Richards’ care in the past, or that the Richards had not received 2 training in the proper care and supervision of premature and drug-addicted infants. See 3 Compl. ¶ 13. Moreover, as noted by Defendants, Plaintiff does not allege that Valdez 4 and Bell knew the Richards’ placed Zane on his stomach to sleep. See Compl.; see also 5 Reply at 4. Rather, Valdez and Bell would have had to draw an inference that a 6 substantial risk of harm to Zane in the Richards’ care existed from the fact that the 7 Richards’ were overwhelmed and that Zane had missed doctors’ appointments. See 8 Compl. ¶ 15. While Plaintiff also alleges that Valdez and Bell received reports that Zane 9 was not receiving adequate care or attention, there are no specific factual allegations 10 explaining how Valdez and Bell knew that Zane’s care was inadequate or inattentive 11 beyond missing some doctor’s appointments. See id. These facts do not support a 12 plausible inference that a substantial risk of serious harm to Zane existed by remaining in 13 the Richards’ care. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded that Valdez and 14 Bell acted with deliberate indifference, and therefore, Plaintiff also has not sufficiently 15 pleaded a violation of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 16 B. 17 Defendant the County Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Monell claim fails for several reason, 18 including that Plaintiff fails to allege the deprivation of a constitutional right. Mtn. at 17- 19 18. For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a violation of her 20 First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Moreover, the allegations relating to Plaintiff’s 21 Monell claim lack factual specificity and are conclusory. See Compl. ¶¶ 27-34; Iqbal, 22 556 U.S. at 678; Pareto, 139 F.3d at 699. Thus, Plaintiff’s municipal liability claim 23 brought pursuant to Monell fails. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 24 (1986) (“[N]either [Monell], nor any other of our cases authorizes the award of damages 25 against a municipal corporation based on the actions of one of its officers when in fact 26 [the factfinder] has concluded that the officer inflicted no constitutional harm.”); 27 Quintanilla v. City of Downey, 84 F.3d 353, 355 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[A] public entity is not 28 liable for § 1983 damages under a policy that can cause constitutional deprivations, when 7 18cv1466-MMA (NLS) 1 the factfinder concludes that an individual officer, acting pursuant to the policy, inflicted 2 no constitutional harm to the plaintiff.”); Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25 F.3d 804, 808 3 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a “finding that the arrests did not involve the use of 4 unreasonable force . . . . moot[s] the question of whether the city’s policy authorized the 5 use of constitutionally excessive force”). CONCLUSION 6 7 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff insufficiently pleads a 8 violation of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Accordingly, the Court 9 GRANTS Defendant’s motion and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint without prejudice 10 and with leave to amend. Plaintiff must file an amended complaint that cures the 11 deficiencies addressed herein on or before December 11, 2018. 12 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: November 26, 2018 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8 18cv1466-MMA (NLS)
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
