Taoglas Group Holdings Limited et al v. 2J Antennas USA, Corporation et al, No. 3:2018cv01277 - Document 23 (S.D. Cal. 2019)
Court Description: ORDER Granting in Part 8 Motion to Dismiss. If Plaintiffs believe they can successfully amend, they may file an amended complaint within 21 calendar days of the date this order is issued. Signed by Judge Larry Alan Burns on 3/18/2019. (jdt)
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Taoglas Group Holdings Limited et al v. 2J Antennas USA, Corporation et al Doc. 23 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 TAOGLAS GROUP HOLDINGS LIMITED, et al., Plaintiffs, 13 14 15 16 Case No.: 18CV1277-LAB (LL) ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS v. 2J ANTENNAS USA, CORPORATION, et al., Defendants. 17 18 19 Plaintiffs Taoglas Group Holdings Ltd. and Taoglas USA, Inc. (collectively, 20 “Taoglas”) are in the antenna business, and compete with Defendant 2J Antennas 21 USA, Corporation. Defendant Javier Ruben Flores Cuadras worked for Taoglas 22 USA, but left in October of 2014. Shortly before he left, he signed an agreement 23 concerning confidentiality and non-competition. He later began working for 2J 24 Antennas. Plaintiffs allege Cuadras and 2J Antennas misappropriated their trade 25 secrets and used them to compete with Plaintiffs. 26 Plaintiffs filed suit, bringing claims under the federal Defend Trade Secrets 27 Act (DTSA), California’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), and for breach of 28 contract and intentional interference with contractual relations. Because the 1 18CV1277-LAB (LL) Dockets.Justia.com 1 parties are not diverse, the Court is exercising federal question jurisdiction over 2 the DTSA claim and supplemental jurisdiction over the others. Defendants moved 3 to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The motion is fully briefed, and the Court is 4 now prepared to rule on it. 5 Legal Standards for Motions to Dismiss 6 The Court is exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law 7 claims and therefore applies state substantive law but federal procedural law. 8 Cortez v. Skol, 776 F.3d 1046, 1054 n. 8 (9th Cir. 2015). Because pleading 9 standards are procedural, the Court therefore applies federal rather than state 10 pleading standards to all claims. See Hatton v. Bank of America, N.A., 2015 WL 11 6739137, at *3 (E.D. Cal., Nov. 2, 2015) (citing Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 12 317 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2003)). 13 A motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 14 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a 15 right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 16 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[S]ome threshold of plausibility must be crossed at the 17 outset” before a case is permitted to proceed. Id. at 558 (citation omitted). The 18 well-pleaded facts must do more than permit the Court to infer “the mere possibility 19 of conduct”; they must show that the pleader is entitled to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 20 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 21 When determining whether a complaint states a claim, the Court accepts all 22 allegations of material fact in the complaint as true and construes them in the light 23 most favorable to the non-moving party. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. National 24 League of Postmasters of U.S., 497 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation 25 omitted). At the pleading stage, the Court may consider not only the complaint 26 itself, but also documents it refers to, whose authenticity is not questioned, and 27 matters judicially noticed. Zucco Partners LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 28 990 (9th Cir. 2009). The Court is “not required to accept as true conclusory 2 18CV1277-LAB (LL) 1 allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint,” and 2 does “not . . . necessarily assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because 3 they are cast in the form of factual allegations.” Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, 4 Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 5 To meet the ordinary pleading standard and avoid dismissal, a complaint must 6 plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 7 U.S. at 570. 8 New or expanded allegations in opposition to a motion to dismiss are 9 considered when deciding whether to grant leave to amend, but are not considered 10 when ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion. See Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 11 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). See also Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 12 1026 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). 13 In federal court, plaintiffs seeking relief for misappropriation of trade secrets 14 must identify what they are, and should describe them with sufficient particularity 15 to separate them from either matters of general knowledge in the trade or of special 16 knowledge of those skilled in the trade. Imax Corp. v. Cinema Technologies, Inc., 17 152 F.3d 1161, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 1998). Imax dealt with a summary judgment 18 motion, however, and this requirement is generally applied in a more relaxed form 19 at the pleading stage. 20 ProSciento, Inc., 2017 WL 1198992, at *5 (S.D. Cal., Mar. 31, 2017). 21 Factual Allegations Profil Institut fur Stoffwechselforschung GmbH v. 22 Taoglas, founded in 2004, is a multinational company headquartered in 23 Ireland. Its main in-house production facility is in Taiwan. It also has technology 24 centers in the U.S. and Germany. It invests substantial time, effort, and money to 25 research, develop, and improve its products, and has a portfolio of international 26 patents. The Complaint alleges in a general way the steps Taoglas takes to protect 27 its trade secrets. 28 /// 3 18CV1277-LAB (LL) 1 In March of 2008, Taoglas hired Cuadras as a radio frequency and antenna 2 engineer. Around 2009, Taoglas opened an office in San Diego and Cuadras 3 began working there. His role at Taoglas expanded over time. In July of 2011, he 4 was promoted to Engineering Manager, where he was responsible for managing 5 all engineers and engineering projects in North and South America. In this role, he 6 was involved in some fashion with most of Taoglas’ products sold in the U.S. from 7 2011 to 2014. 8 applications, including over 12 issued patents. By October of 2014, he knew and 9 understood Taoglas’ confidential and engineering information better than nearly 10 He was a named inventor on over 34 of Taoglas’ patent anyone else at the company. 11 In October of 2014, Cuadras left Taoglas, saying he was going to pursue a 12 doctorate in engineering. Before he left, he executed a confidentiality agreement 13 (“Confidentiality Agreement” or “Agreement”) that Taoglas has attached to the 14 complaint. Some time after he left, but before August of 2015, he started working 15 for 2J Antennas’ parent corporation. He then helped open the company’s San 16 Diego office and signed 2J Antennas’ articles of incorporation. He now works for 17 2J Antennas as its Engineering Manager, heading its engineering and business 18 operations in the U.S. and helping to grow its domestic business. 19 Taoglas alleges that 2J has a pattern of selling knockoffs of Taoglas designs 20 beginning well before Cuadras joined. In the three years since Cuadras began 21 working for 2J, Taoglas alleges that 2J began using Taoglas’ trade secrets. The 22 complaint gives several examples. 23 Taoglas says it learned in May of 2016 that 2J and Cuadras had contacted 24 one of Taoglas’ customers to sell it an antenna “designed exactly to the nonpublic 25 specifications” of an antenna Taoglas had previously sold that customer. (Compl., 26 ¶ 30.) 27 Taoglas alleges that in August of 2016, it learned that 2J and Cuadras had 28 contacted one of Taoglas’ parts suppliers in Taiwan, attempting to persuade it to 4 18CV1277-LAB (LL) 1 sell 2J the same parts it had supplied to Taoglas. “The supplier refused to interact 2 with Cuadras, knowing that the requested part was proprietary to Taoglas.” (Id., 3 ¶ 31.) 4 Taoglas sent a letter to 2J around October 6, 2016, warning 2J that Cuadras’ 5 Confidentiality Agreement prohibited him from disclosing or using Taoglas’ trade 6 secrets. After this, Taoglas alleges that 2J began marketing and selling several 7 antennas that were intentional knockoffs of Taoglas’ antennas, and made use of 8 trade secrets to do so. (Compl., ¶¶ 33, 35–38.) The Complaint describes how 9 clients bought one of these, based on its lower price. (Id., ¶ 34.) Taoglas believes 10 2J has used Cuadras’ inside knowledge to create knockoffs of many other 11 products, but without discovery cannot allege what those are. 12 Judicial Notice 13 Defendants have asked the Court to take judicial notice of various 14 documents from Taoglas’ website, which they argue are matters of public record. 15 Information on websites can sometimes be judicially noticed. But, with exceptions 16 not applicable here, federal have been reluctant to take judicial notice of 17 information on the website of one of the parties to the litigation. See Gerritsen v. 18 Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1030–31 (C.D. Cal., 19 2015) (declining to take judicial notice of material on Warner Brothers’ website). 20 Furthermore, it appears that the Court is being asked to take notice, not just of 21 material on the website, but to accept the truth of facts contained in that material. 22 This material might be proper at the summary judgment stage, but Defendants 23 have not shown that it is properly noticeable under Fed. R. Evid. 201. The request 24 for judicial notice is DENIED. 25 Discussion 26 Several claims depend on a breach of duty by Cuadras. The Complaint 27 alleges that this arose under the Confidentiality Agreement. In their opposition 28 brief, Plaintiffs also argue that Cuadras had a fiduciary duty to Taoglas even in the 5 18CV1277-LAB (LL) 1 absence of any agreement. They cite Hong Que, Inc. v. Luu, 150 Cal. App. 4th 400 2 (Cal. App. 6 Dist. 2007) for this principle. But Cuadras is not alleged to have taken 3 trade secrets improperly during his employment with Taoglas, or to have 4 committed any misappropriation then. Rather, the Complaint seeks to hold 5 Cuadras to a fiduciary duty after he left Taoglas’ employment. But in the absence 6 of some kind of covenant, agreement, or other source of a duty, former employees 7 do not owe a fiduciary duty to their former employers. See Restatement (Second) 8 of Agency § 396; see also Fowler v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 196 Cal. App. 34, 41 9 (Cal. App. 6 Dist. 1987) (holding that employees owe a duty of undivided loyalty to 10 their employer during the term of employment). Compare Global Medical 11 Solutions, Ltd. v. Simon, 2013 WL 12065418, at *23 (C.D. Cal., Sept. 24, 2013) 12 (holding that former employee could be liable for breach of fiduciary duty, because 13 he failed to return media containing confidential information he had been asked to 14 return while still an employee). Furthermore, even while employed, an employee 15 can make some preparations to compete before resigning. Huong Que, 150 Cal. 16 App. 4th at 414. 17 18 Under the DTSA, a trade secret includes information of various kinds, provided: 19 (A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret; and 20 (B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, another person who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the information. 21 22 23 24 25 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3). California law is nearly identical, defining trade secrets to include information 26 27 that: 28 /// 6 18CV1277-LAB (LL) 1 2 (1) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and 3 4 (2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 5 6 Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.1(d). 7 Trade secrets do not include an employee’s own skill and knowledge, or 8 information that is publicly available. See Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 101 Cal. 9 App. 4th 1443, 1453 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 2002); Morlife, Inc. v. Perry, 56 Cal. App. 4th 10 1514, 1519 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1997). Information contained in patents is considered 11 public. Ultimax Cement Mfg. Corp. v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp., 587 F.3d 1339, 12 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Information obtained independently or by reverse 13 engineering is ordinarily not a trade secret. See Aqua Connect, Inc. v. Code Rebel, 14 LLC, 2012 WL 469737, at *2 (C.D. Cal., Feb. 13, 2012). 15 DTSA 16 Because the parties are not diverse, jurisdiction depends on Plaintiff’s one 17 federal claim, under the DTSA. 18 Defendants’ motion to dismiss points out that the by its terms, the DTSA 19 applies only to acts of misappropriation on or after May 11, 2016. Defendants 20 argue that any alleged acts of misappropriation occurred before that date—or at 21 least, Taoglas has failed to allege otherwise. Because the statute creates this 22 cause of action, see 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1), Plaintiffs must allege facts showing 23 that 2J’s or Cuadras’ actions, or both, occurred on or after the operative date. See 24 Iqbal, 677–78 (holding that pleadings must show that the pleader is entitled to 25 relief). It is not enough to plead facts to show that Defendants’ misappropriation 26 could have occurred after the operative date. Id. at 678 (pleading facts that are 27 “merely consistent with” defendants’ liability is insufficient); Cave Consulting Grp., 28 Inc. v. Truven Health Analytics Inc., 2017 WL 1436044, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 7 18CV1277-LAB (LL) 1 2017) (dismissing DTSA claim, where “plaintiff [made] no specific allegations that 2 defendant used the alleged trade secrets after the DTSA’s May 11, 2016 3 enactment”). 4 Defendants correctly point out that most of the allegations merely identify the 5 time when Taoglas learned about the misappropriation, leaving open the distinct 6 possibility that it occurred before the operative date and is therefore not actionable 7 under this statute. But Defendants incorrectly read the statute as applying only to 8 initial disclosures, and not to later use of secrets disclosed before the operative 9 date. The DTSA in fact defines misappropriation as including use of trade secrets 10 acquired under certain circumstances. See § 1839(5)(B)(ii). These include use 11 without consent of trade secrets by someone who: at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that the knowledge of the trade secret was— 12 13 14 (I) derived from or through a person who had used improper means to acquire the trade secret; (II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain the secrecy of the trade secret or limit the use of the trade secret; or (III) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain the secrecy of the trade secret or limit the use of the trade secret . . . . 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 § 1839(5)(B)(i)(I)–(III). 23 Taoglas does not allege Cuadras used improper means to acquire the trade 24 secrets. See § 1839(5)(B)(i)(I). Rather, it claims he was under an obligation not 25 to misuse the trade secrets he had acquired during his employment with Taoglas. 26 See § 1839(5)(B)(ii)(II)–(III). The Complaint alleges use of the trade secrets, when 27 2J Antennas began selling knockoffs after receiving Taoglas’ letter in October of 28 /// 8 18CV1277-LAB (LL) 1 2016. The allegations appear to bring 2J Antennas’ use of the information it 2 acquired through Cuadras within the provisions set forth in § 1839(5)(B)(ii)(II)–(III). 3 Defendants cite Avago Techs. U.S. Inc. v. Nanoprecision Prods., Inc., 2017 4 WL 412524 at *9 (N.D. Cal., Jan. 31, 2017) to argue that the later use of trade 5 secrets disclosed before the DTSA’s enactment is not actionable. 6 however, addressed a situation where allegedly secret information was disclosed 7 in a patent application before the DTSA’s enactment, and the defendant continued 8 to use it to prosecute the patent. In that case, the information had already lost its 9 status as a trade secret before the DTSA’s enactment, due to its inclusion in a Avago, 10 patent application. Id. at *8–9. Furthermore, Avago acknowledges that acts 11 occurring after the DTSA’s enactment can be actionable, even if they involve trade 12 secrets misappropriated before its enactment. Id. (citing Adams Arms, LLC v. 13 Unified Weapon Sys., Inc., 2016 WL 5391394, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 2016)). 14 The Complaint alleges the information necessary to create some of the 15 claimed knockoffs, which it calls the “2J Ceramic Antennas” was non-public and 16 could not have been acquired except by misappropriation. (See Compl., ¶¶ 35– 17 37.) Taoglas does not claim that all of the similarities between its antennas and 18 the “2J Ceramic Antennas” are the result of misappropriation, only that some of 19 them are. (See id., ¶ 38 (alleging that 2J relied in part on a One of the similarities 20 between Taoglas’ antennas and the “2J Ceramic Antennas,” however, is alleged 21 to be the result of 2J relying on a patent, which is public information. (Id., ¶ 38.) As 22 to others, however, the Complaint merely alleges they are so similar that Cuadras 23 must have been involved in the development of the knockoff. (Id., ¶¶ 33–34.) 24 Cuadras’ attempt to sell an antenna to one of Taoglas’ customers and the 25 proprietary parts 2J Antennas attempted to order from the Taiwanese supplier are 26 not alleged to have occurred after the DTSA’s effective date. But even if 27 they had been, these two incidents are not adequately alleged to have involved 28 /// 9 18CV1277-LAB (LL) 1 misappropriation of trade secrets. Both incidents are also consistent with 2J’s and 2 Cuadras’ use of information that are not trade secrets. 3 Furthermore, the Complaint does not allege facts showing that Taoglas knew 4 or had reason to know, before October of 2016, that Cuadras had entered into the 5 Confidentiality Agreement. One of the requirements for a claim under 6 § 1839(5)(B)(ii) is that the alleged misappropriator “knew or had reason to know” 7 at the time that the person it got the trade secret from was under a duty to maintain 8 secrecy. The allegations at most show that 2J might have known that Cuadras 9 was subject to confidentiality obligations. 10 While Plaintiffs’ opposition briefing identifies various categories of trade 11 secrets (Opp’n at 11:5–20), most are not alleged with enough specificity to show 12 that they are trade secrets. For example, while customer lists are often trade 13 secrets, the Complaint does not allege that the identities of two of Taoglas’ 14 customers is a secret, or was adequately protected. Allegations about “pricing 15 strategy” are likewise too generalized; the only clear allegation is that 2J competed 16 successfully by offering a lower price on a similar antenna. Both of these could be 17 trade secrets, and 2J’s and Cuadras’ use of them could amount to 18 misrepresentation. But the allegations are equally consistent with the use of 19 information that is not a trade secret. For example, any competitor, not just one in 20 possession of a trade secret, could have identified one or two customers without 21 the use of customer lists, and could have obtained pricing information or 22 specifications from the customer. While the Confidentiality Agreement identifies 23 certain categories of information Cuadras was forbidden to use or disclose, the 24 information to be kept confidential is broader than trade secrets. 25 The briefing focuses on whether Taoglas adequately protected its trade 26 secrets. The only trade secrets that are both adequately pled and the subject of an 27 adequately-pled claim are those relating to non-public information concerning the 28 design and manufacture of the “2J Ceramic Antennas.” The briefing alleges that 10 18CV1277-LAB (LL) 1 one of the protective measures Taoglas took was to require employees, 2 contractors, consultants, vendors, customers, and manufacturers to sign 3 confidentiality agreements. As Defendants have correctly pointed out, this cannot 4 be completely accurate as to the time period when Cuadras worked, because he 5 was not required to sign such an agreement until shortly before he left. The 6 Complaint alleges other measures Taoglas took, however, including limiting 7 access to information. 8 circumstances cannot be decided at the pleading stage. See Learning Curve Toys, 9 Inc. v. PlayWood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 724-25 (7th Cir. 2003) (whether 10 measures taken to protect trade secrets were reasonable is generally a question 11 of fact for the jury, and only in extreme cases can be decided as a matter of law). 12 As discussed above, the only adequately-alleged claim concerns the design, 13 manufacture, and marketing of “2J Ceramic Antennas,” all of which the Complaint 14 alleges 2J began marketing after October of 2016. Because the Complaint does 15 not allege any act by Cuadras in connection with these antennas on or after May 16 11, 2016, this claim is properly pled as to 2J Antennas only. Whether these measures are reasonable under the 17 UTSA 18 Claims under California’s UTSA are similar in most respects to DTSA claims, 19 except that they need not have arisen on or after May 11, 2016. The only 20 adequately-pled claims are those related to the “2J Ceramic Antennas.” Because 21 Taoglas need not show when Cuadras disclosed proprietary information about how 22 to make these antennas, this claim can is properly pled as to him as well as to 2J 23 Antennas. The remaining claims, as discussed above, are not. 24 Contract Claims 25 Plaintiffs bring a breach of contract claim against Cuadras, and an intentional 26 interference with contract claim against 2J Antennas. The briefing focuses on 27 whether the Confidentiality Agreement is enforceable, or whether it fails for want 28 of consideration. It also focuses on whether Defendants knew about the contract 11 18CV1277-LAB (LL) 1 and intentionally breached it. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 50 2 Cal.3d 1118, 1126 (1990) (setting forth elements of intentional interference with 3 contractual relations). 4 Cuadras signed the Agreement on October 2, 2014, which is the same 5 month he left Taoglas. 6 Employee’s employment or continued employment” with Taoglas. The Agreement 7 required Cuadras to keep trade secrets confidential, and prohibited him from 8 soliciting any of Taoglas’ customers for a period of two years after he left 9 employment there. It also required him to advise any future employer about the 10 The Agreement says it is “made as a condition of Agreement’s restrictions before accepting employment there. 11 Under California law, “the employment relationship is fundamentally 12 contractual . . . .” Foley v. interactive Data, 47 Cal.3d 654, 696 (1988). At the time 13 he worked for Taoglas, Cuadras and Taoglas were operating under an unwritten 14 unilateral employment agreement. See Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 23 Cal.4th 1, 10 n.4 15 (2000) (“An employment contract in which the employer promises to pay an 16 employee a wage in return for the employee's work is typically described as a 17 unilateral contract.”) Such contracts can be modified by written agreement, 18 however. For example, an employer may change the existing agreement by giving 19 employees reasonable notice, and an opportunity to reject it or keep working and 20 accept it. See id. at 14–15. If they continue working, their continued employment 21 can serve as adequate consideration. Id. 22 Based on the allegations, and drawing all inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, that 23 appears to have been the case here. After signing the Confidentiality Agreement, 24 Cuadras continued to work for Taoglas, albeit for a fairly short time. If Cuadras had 25 refused to agree, Taoglas could have terminated his employment immediately, and 26 might have taken more precautions to protect their proprietary information. It is 27 also possible that the Confidentiality Agreement was in fact a termination 28 agreement. If Cuadras signed it and immediately departed, Defendants might be 12 18CV1277-LAB (LL) 1 able to show a lack of consideration. But drawing reasonable inferences in 2 Plaintiffs’ favor, he continued to work for some time, providing consideration for the 3 Agreement. 4 The alleged misappropriation described above would amount to a breach of 5 the contract, and 2J Antennas’ role in encouraging or inducing Cuadras to breach 6 his contract could amount to intentional interference with the Agreement. 7 addition, Taoglas claims that 2J and Cuadras solicited a Taoglas customer, Road 8 Track, around May of 2016 using Cuadras’ knowledge about Taoglas’ business 9 relationship with Taoglas. While this was not adequately pled as a 10 misappropriation claim, it could plausibly be a breach of the Agreement, which 11 applies to a broader class of information than trade secrets, and includes a non- 12 solicitation clause. In 13 Cuadras’ and 2J Antennas’ attempt to purchase parts from the Taiwanese 14 supplier might be a violation of the Agreement as well, although no damages 15 resulted from that because the supplier refused to sell them parts. See Pac. Gas 16 & Elec. Co., 50 Cal.3d at 1126 (listing damages as an element of an intentional 17 interference claim). 18 Because the non-solicitation clause expired October 2, 2016, Cuadras’ 19 solicitation of customers after October of 2016 did not violate this Agreement. His 20 alleged misappropriation of trade secrets as well as his alleged use of other 21 confidential information would, however, violate it even after that date. 22 Although the Agreement required Cuadras to notify 2J Antennas of the 23 Agreement’s terms, the Complaint does not allege whether he did this. The first 24 time it alleges 2J had knowledge of the Agreement was in October of 2016. 25 Therefore, although Cuadras could be liable for breach of the Agreement any time 26 after he signed it, the allegations only establish liability as to 2J Antennas for acts 27 after October of 2016. The only specific acts alleged relate to the design, 28 manufacturing, and sale of the “2J Ceramic Antennas.” 13 18CV1277-LAB (LL) 1 Conclusion and Order 2 For these reasons, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART. The 3 DTSA claim concerning the design, manufacture, and marketing of “2J Ceramic 4 Antennas,” is properly pled as to 2J Antennas only, and only for acts from October 5 of 2016 onward. The UTSA claim for the same acts is properly pled as to both 2J 6 Antennas and Cuadras, except that as to Cuadras, claims arising after October 2, 7 2014 survive as well. The breach of contract claim against Cuadras survives only 8 as to the claim concerning marketing to Road Track and the design, manufacture, 9 and marketing of “2J Ceramic Antennas.” The intentional interference claim 10 against 2J Antennas survives only as to claims for the design, manufacture, and 11 marketing of “2J Ceramic Antennas” beginning in October of 2016. In all other 12 respects, the complaint is DISMISSED. 13 If Plaintiffs believe they can successfully amend, they may file an amended 14 complaint, remedying the defects this order has identified. Otherwise, they should 15 file an amended complaint including only the claims this order has identified as 16 surviving. Whichever option they choose, their amended complaint must be filed 17 within 21 calendar days of the date this order is issued. 18 19 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: March 18, 2019 21 22 23 Hon. Larry Alan Burns Chief United States District Judge 24 25 26 27 28 14 18CV1277-LAB (LL)
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