Crawford v. San Diego City Community College et al, No. 3:2018cv00831 - Document 4 (S.D. Cal. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER Granting Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, Screening and Dismissing Complaint, and Denying Motion for Appointment of Counsel. The IFP motion (Dkt. 2 ) is granted. The Complaint does not state a claim, and is dismissed as required by 28 U.S. C. § 1915(e)(2). The claims he is attempting to raise on behalf of other students, or against schools he is not attending, are dismissed without leave to amend, for lack of standing. The remaining claims are dismissed without prejudice. The Cour t finds no exceptional circumstances exist in this case to warrant appointment of counsel, and the motion to appoint counsel (Dkt. 3 ) is denied. If Crawford believes he can successfully amend his complaint to cure the defects identified in this order, he may do so by filing an amended complaint no later than 8/17/2018. Signed by Judge Larry Alan Burns on 7/31/2018. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(jdt)
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Crawford v. San Diego City Community College et al Doc. 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOE DEAN CRAWFORD, CASE NO. 18cv0831 Plaintiff, 12 vs. 13 14 SAN DIEGO CITY COMMUNITY COLLEGE, et al., 15 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, SCREENING AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT, AND DENYING MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL Defendants. 16 17 18 19 Plaintiff Joe Dean Crawford, proceeding pro se, filed his complaint along with a 20 motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and a motion for 21 appointment of counsel. 22 IFP Motion 23 Plaintiffs must ordinarily pay a filing fee of $400 when filing a civil suit in district court; 24 a suit may proceed without payment if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant 25 to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); 26 Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). 27 28 The Court has reviewed Crawford’s IFP application, finds that he lacks the means to pay the filing fee for this action, and GRANTS his application to proceed IFP. -1Dockets.Justia.com 1 Legal Standards 2 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must screen the complaint of any plaintiff 3 proceeding IFP, and dismiss it to the extent it fails to state a claim. See Barren v. Harrington, 4 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). Because Crawford is proceeding pro se, the Court 5 construes the complaint liberally. See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 6 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The Court will not, however, supply facts he has not pled. See Ivey 7 v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 8 When conducting the mandatory screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court 9 uses the standard applicable to motions under to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Huftile v. Miccio- 10 Fonseca, 410 F.3d 1136, 1138 (9th Cir. 2005). The Court assumes the truth of all factual 11 allegations and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, drawing all 12 reasonable inferences from the allegations in his favor. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 13 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). But the Court does not accept unreasonable inferences or 14 assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations. Ileto v. Glock 15 Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 16 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981)). Vague and conclusory allegations are insufficient to withstand 17 scrutiny under this standard. Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268. 18 The Court may consider certain materials at the pleading stage, including documents 19 attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters 20 subject to judicial notice. See United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). 21 And the Court need not accept as true allegations that contradict these materials. See 22 Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 23 Discussion 24 Who the Defendants Are 25 The Complaint’s caption names as Defendants San Diego City Community College 26 (“City College”); the San Diego City Community College District; the District’s Board of 27 Trustees, and the Board members, both in their individual and official capacities. The body 28 of the Complaint also names Miramar College and Mesa College. -2- 1 The Complaint’s factual allegations only point to things City College did; it alleges 2 that on April 21, 2018, City College refused to disburse proceeds of his federal student loan 3 without giving him advance notice or an opportunity for a hearing. And it alleges the reason 4 for this was that he had already earned a bachelor’s degree – a reason he says is illegitimate 5 under federal law. 6 Claims against Defendants other than City College are inadequately supported by 7 factual allegations, and are therefore subject to dismissal. Crawford only has standing to 8 assert his own claims; to the extent he is asking the Court to enjoin a District-wide policy as 9 applied to other students, he lacks standing. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–99 10 (1975). Furthermore, because he is proceeding pro se, he has no authority to represent the 11 legal interest of a class. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995); 12 C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987); 13 Claims Against San Diego City College 14 Crawford previously received a bachelor’s degree from the University of North 15 Carolina at Asheville in 2015. 16 Community College refused to disburse his federal financial aid “on a claim that he was 17 disqualified because of having [previously] earned a baccalaureate or higher degree.” (See Compl. Ex. G.) He alleges that San Diego City 18 But exhibits Crawford cites as documenting this, which he has attached to the 19 Complaint, show that was not the reason. Exhibit D to the Complaint is an email to Crawford, 20 showing that the reason given for refusal to disburse loan proceeds was that Crawford had 21 attempted more than 90 units of credit. The email says he attempted 108 units. 1 It gave 22 him the option, if he believed there were extenuating circumstances, to appeal and submit 23 an educational plan. The email also includes a link to the required appeal form. 24 25 26 27 28 1 Exhibits to the Complaint, read together, appear to show that Crawford either transferred or attempted to transfer unused credits from the University of North Carolina at Asheville, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and two other colleges, towards his degree at City College. (See Compl., Ex. C.) The credits City College accepted appear to be unused credits that were not previously credited towards Crawford’s bachelor’s degree. (See Compl., Ex. G (University of North Carolina at Asheville undergraduate transcript).) -3- 1 Colleges that participate in federal student loan programs are required to maintain 2 policies for satisfactory academic progress, and to confirm that students who are otherwise 3 eligible for student aid under the Higher Education Act are making satisfactory academic 4 progress under those policies. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 668.16(e), 668.32(f), and 668.34. As 5 required under these regulations, City College maintains a policy which outlines the school’s 6 standards for maintaining satisfactory academic progress and provides reasons which may 7 result in a student’s disqualification from financial aid, and Crawford has attached this policy 8 to as Exhibit H to the Complaint. Under the policy, having attempted more than 90 academic 9 credits renders a student ineligible for financial aid. This policy is based on federal 10 regulations that set a maximum time frame for obtaining a degree. (See Compl., Ex. H.) 11 Because City College offers only associates’ degrees requiring 60 hours, students who have 12 attempted more than 150% of that amount (i.e., 90 hours) are ineligible. See 34 C.F.R. 13 ' 34(b) (“Maximum timeframe”). 14 Although the email offered Crawford an opportunity to appeal the decision, he alleges 15 that the appeal form “makes it clear that no appeal is provided unless and until the student 16 waives all their rights.” (Compl. at 4.) Because this allegation relies on and incorporates the 17 appeal form, the Court may consider it even though Crawford did not attach it to the 18 Complaint. Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 908. 19 The email includes a link to the appeal form. 2 Although the form requires 20 acknowledgement that a student understands and is willing to comply with certain 21 requirements, it does not include a waiver of rights. 22 allegations, Crawford had an avenue of appeal open to him, even if he did not use it. In other words, contrary to his 23 Even though Crawford’s having earned a bachelor’s degree was not the reason for 24 City College’s refusal to disburse loan proceeds, various documents do establish that 25 students at City College who already have bachelors’ degrees are normally not eligible for 26 27 28 2 <http://www.sdcity.edu/CollegeServices/StudentSupportResources/FinancialAid/ FormsDocuments>. -4- 1 financial aid. But both the policy document the appeal form explains this is because the 2 District’s community colleges offer two-year degrees, and the District asks students who 3 already have bachelor’s degrees (or higher) to explain their reasons for pursuing a two-year 4 degree. 5 Crawford cites 20 U.S.C. ' 1091(m) as requiring that he be eligible. That subsection 6 provides that “[a] student shall not be ineligible for assistance . . . because such student has 7 previously received a baccalaureate or professional degree.” But this subsection does not 8 guarantee that a student who has received a baccalaureate or higher degree will be eligible; 9 rather, it provides that having a bachelor’s or higher degree does not render a student 10 ineligible. Other requirements must be met as well, including the requirement that the 11 student be making satisfactory progress. ' 1091(a)(2) and (c). 12 Crawford claims his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated. Such 13 a claim arises when a person is deprived of a protected interest without due process of law. 14 Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 643 15 (1999). Crawford has not shown that his expectation of entitlement to the benefit of federal 16 student loans to enable him to attend City College is reasonable, so as to create a protected 17 interest in it. See Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); 18 Waugh v. Conn. Student Loan Foundation, 966 F. Supp. 141, 143–44 (D. Conn 1997). 19 Furthermore, he had an opportunity to appeal, and has not pled facts to show he was 20 deprived of this benefit without due process. See Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 642–43 (holding 21 that deprivation of a protected interest is not unconstitutional, as long as due process of law 22 is provided). 23 Although Crawford did not attempt to bring his claim directly under the Higher 24 Education Act of 1965, that statue does not create a private right of action. Waugh, 966 F. 25 Supp. at 143. 26 Having screened the Complaint, the Court finds it does not state a claim. 27 /// 28 /// -5- 1 Motion to Appoint Counsel 2 There is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case. Lassiter v. Dept. of Social 3 Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). However, a district court “may request an attorney to 4 represent any person unable to afford counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). This discretion 5 should only be exercised in “exceptional circumstances.” Aygeman v. Corrections Corp. of 6 America, 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 7 1236 (9th Cir. 1984)). A finding of exceptional circumstances requires “an evaluation of the 8 likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the merits and an evaluation of the plaintiff’s ability to 9 articulate his claims ‘in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Id. at 1103 10 (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)). 11 Crawford has not shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits of the case. 12 And although he has not yet done so, it appears he has the ability to articulate his claim. No 13 is it appropriate to appoint counsel merely so that Crawford can bring his claims as a class 14 action. The Court finds no no exceptional circumstances exist in this case to warrant 15 appointment of counsel, and the motion to appoint counsel is DENIED. 16 Conclusion and Order 17 For the reasons set forth above, the IFP motion is GRANTED. The Complaint does 18 not state a claim, and is DISMISSED as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The claims he 19 is attempting to raise on behalf of other students, or against schools he is not attending are 20 DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, for lack of standing. The remaining claims are 21 DIMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// -6- 1 If Crawford believes he can successfully amend his complaint to cure the defects 2 identified in this order, he may do so by filing an amended complaint no later than August 3 17, 2018. If he fails to do so within the time permitted, or if his amended complaint does not 4 state a claim, this action may be dismissed without further notice to him. 5 6 7 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 30, 2018 HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS United States District Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -7-
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