Riazati v. Public Storage Inc. et al, No. 3:2018cv00183 - Document 4 (S.D. Cal. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER Granting 3 Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis; Dismissing Complaint Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); and Denying as Moot 2 Motion to Appoint Counsel. The Court grants Plaintiff's motion to proceed IFP. The Court dismisses Plaintiff's ADA claim without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. As such, the Court denies as moot Plaintiff's motion to appoint counsel. Signed by Judge Michael M. Anello on 2/5/2018. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(rmc) (sjt).
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Riazati v. Public Storage Inc. et al Doc. 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA Case No.: 18cv183-MMA (KSC) MANOUCHEHR RIAZATI, v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS; Plaintiff, [Doc. No. 3] PUBLIC STORAGE INC.; PSCC INC.; BRIAN BERG, DISMISSING COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Defendants. [Doc. No. 1] 15 AND DENYING AS MOOT MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL 16 [Doc. No. 2] 17 18 19 Plaintiff Manouchehr Riazati (“Plaintiff’), proceeding pro se, has filed the instant 20 action against Defendants Public Storage Inc., PSCC Inc., and Brian Berg (collectively, 21 “Defendants”). See Doc. No. 1. Plaintiff simultaneously filed motions to proceed in 22 forma pauperis (“IFP”) and for appointment of counsel. See Doc. Nos. 3, 2. 23 24 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IFP All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 25 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 26 $400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 27 prepay the entire fee only if she is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 28 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). “To proceed in -1- 18cv183-MMA (KSC) Dockets.Justia.com 1 forma pauperis is a privilege not a right.” Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 2 1965). 3 A party need not be completely destitute to proceed in forma pauperis. Adkins v. 4 E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339–40 (1948). But “the same even- 5 handed care must be employed to assure that federal funds are not squandered to 6 underwrite, at public expense, either frivolous claims or the remonstrances of a suitor 7 who is financially able, in whole or in material part, to pull his own oar.” Temple v. 8 Ellerthorpe, 586 F. Supp. 848, 850 (D.R.I. 1984). 9 Here, Plaintiff submits an affidavit which indicates that he has not received any 10 income from employment during the past twelve months. See Doc. No. 3 at 1. Plaintiff 11 reports that he receives $337.00 per month in public-assistance funds. See id. at 2. 12 Plaintiff indicates that he owns no real property or other assets, but claims that his 13 monthly expenses total $334.00. See id. at 4-5. The Court finds that the IFP application 14 sufficiently indicates that Plaintiff cannot afford to pay the filing fee. Accordingly, the 15 Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed IFP. 16 17 18 19 SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 1. Legal Standards a. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) When a plaintiff proceeds IFP, the complaint is subject to mandatory screening and 20 the Court must order the sua sponte dismissal of any case it finds “frivolous, malicious, 21 failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeking monetary relief from 22 a defendant immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 23 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not 24 limited to prisoners.”). 25 “[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as 26 true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most 27 favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). In 28 addition, the Court has a duty to liberally construe a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings. See id. -2- 18cv183-MMA (KSC) 1 In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se complaint, however, the court may not “supply 2 essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” See Ivey v. Board of Regents of 3 the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 4 Under the “notice pleading” standard of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a 5 plaintiff’s complaint must provide, in part, a “short and plain statement” of the plaintiff’s 6 claims showing entitlement to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see also Paulsen v. CNF, 7 Inc., 559 F.3d 1061, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009). A complaint should be dismissed for failure to 8 state a claim if, taking all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, it does not contain 9 “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Coto Settlement 10 v. Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 11 1937, 1949 (2009)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 12 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 13 for the misconduct alleged.” Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 14 806, 812 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). 15 The Court is not only allowed to, but is required to screen IFP complaints. See 16 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000); Ogunniyi v. Sw. Reg’l Maint. 17 Ctr., No. 14CV2904 BEN (NLS), 2015 WL 10857499, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2015) 18 (“The sua sponte screening is mandatory.”). “A trial court may dismiss a claim sua 19 sponte under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). . . . Such dismissal may be made without notice 20 where the claimant cannot possibly win relief.” Omar v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d 21 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987); see Wong v. Bell, 642 F.2d 359, 36162 (9th Cir. 1981). 22 b. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 23 It is well-established that a federal court cannot reach the merits of any dispute 24 until it confirms its own subject matter jurisdiction. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 25 Environ., 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998). “Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in 26 any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only 27 function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” 28 Id. Accordingly, federal courts are under a continuing duty to confirm their jurisdictional -3- 18cv183-MMA (KSC) 1 power and are “obliged to inquire sua sponte whenever a doubt arises as to [its] 2 existence. . . .” Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278 3 (1977) (citations omitted). 4 Federal courts are of limited jurisdiction. Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 5 479 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2007). Federal courts possess only that power authorized by 6 the Constitution or a statute: cases involving diversity of citizenship, a federal question, 7 or a case to which the United States is a party. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. 8 Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). “Federal courts are presumptively without jurisdiction 9 over civil actions and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party 10 asserting jurisdiction.” Navarro v. UCSD School of Medicine, 2012 WL 4848977, at *1 11 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2012) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 12 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). 13 2. Plaintiff’s Allegations 14 Plaintiff generally alleges that Defendants illegally entered his storage unit and 15 sold his property without his consent. See Doc. No. 1 at 4. Additionally, Defendants 16 “prohibit[ed] [Plaintiff] from eating or drinking or taking [his] medication” while 17 working in his storage unit. See id. Defendants then “ceased [sic] my property, and 18 prevented me from accessing my medication which was stored at their facility, and 19 finally they sold my I90 and other immigration papers which are property of [the] federal 20 government.” Id. The items in Plaintiff’s storage unit are worth “over $10 million in 21 value to [Plaintiff].” Id. Plaintiff also alleges Defendants violated the “Federal disability 22 Act by not providing [him] with accommodation saw [sic] in that Act, but barring me to 23 eat or take medication and water while I work on my storage in their facility and 24 prohibiting me from resting in my private car while on their premise[.]” Id. at 12. 25 26 27 28 3. Analysis a. Diversity Jurisdiction Plaintiff indicates that the Court has jurisdiction over this action on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. See Doc. No. 1 at 3. The Court, however, finds that Plaintiff fails -4- 18cv183-MMA (KSC) 1 to meet his burden of establishing that diversity jurisdiction exists. Pursuant to Title 28 2 of the United States Code, section 1332(a)(1), a federal district court has jurisdiction over 3 “all actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, 4 exclusive of interest and costs,” and the dispute is between citizens of different states or 5 citizens of a state and citizens or subjects of a foreign state. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)-(2). 6 The Supreme Court has interpreted § 1332 to require “complete diversity of citizenship,” 7 meaning each plaintiff must be diverse from each defendant. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 8 519 U.S. 61, 67-68 (1996). 9 Here, the Court is unable to determine whether the parties are diverse for purposes 10 of diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff asserts that he is a citizen of Iran, while Plaintiff 11 alleges that Brian Berg and Public Storage Inc. are citizens of California. See Doc. No. 1 12 at 3-4. In his motion to proceed IFP, however, Plaintiff states “San Diego, California, 13 USA” is the city and state of his legal residence. Doc. No. 3 at 5. Additionally, Plaintiff 14 alleges that Defendants sold his “immigration documents.” Doc. No. 1 at 11. Given 15 these discrepancies, the Court is unable to determine whether Plaintiff has been lawfully 16 admitted for permanent residence in the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) 17 (noting that district courts “shall not have original jurisdiction under [§ 1332(a)(2)] of an 18 action between citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state who are 19 lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States and are domiciled in the 20 same State[.]”). Moreover, Plaintiff fails to address the citizenship of defendant PSCC 21 Inc. altogether. 22 Further, the Court is not persuaded that Plaintiff’s Complaint satisfies the amount 23 in controversy requirement. Plaintiff indicates that the amount in controversy exceeds 24 $75,000 because the items in his storage unit “are over $10 million to me.” Doc. No. 1 at 25 4. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “contributed to stress which led to my 26 hospitalization with medical bill[s]” totaling “over $250,000[.]” Id. at 5. Plaintiff’s 27 allegations, however, do not include any facts from which the Court may draw a plausible 28 inference that the total amount of damages exceeds $75,000. Accordingly, the Court -5- 18cv183-MMA (KSC) 1 finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden of establishing that the Court has diversity 2 jurisdiction over this action. See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377 (noting that courts must 3 presume a lack of jurisdiction until the plaintiff sufficiently pleads otherwise). As such, 4 the Court proceeds to determine whether the Court has federal question jurisdiction over 5 this action. 6 7 b. Federal Question Jurisdiction On page 12 of his Complaint, Plaintiff summarily asserts that Defendants violated 8 the “Federal disability Act by not providing me with accommodation saw [sic] in that 9 Act, but barring me to eat or take medication and water while I work on my storage in 10 their facility and prohibiting me from resting in my private car while on their premise. . .” 11 Doc. No. 1 at 12. 12 Here, in construing Plaintiff’s allegations liberally, the Court presumes Plaintiff 13 seeks to assert a cause of action under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). 14 Congress enacted the ADA “to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards 15 addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2). 16 As such, assuming Plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated that the Court has jurisdiction 17 on the basis of federal question, the Court proceeds to sua sponte screen Plaintiff’s ADA 18 claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 19 20 c. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) Screening Upon review of Plaintiff’s allegations in support of his “Federal disability Act” 21 claim, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 22 granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (noting that when a plaintiff proceeds IFP, the 23 complaint is subject to mandatory screening and the Court must order the sua sponte 24 dismissal of any case it finds fails to state a claim for relief). 25 26 27 28 Title III1 of the ADA “prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in the 1 “The ADA contains five titles: Employment (Title I), Public Services (Title II), Public Accommodations and Services Operated by Private Entities (Title III), Telecommunications (Title IV), -6- 18cv183-MMA (KSC) 1 ‘full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 2 accommodations of any place of public accommodation’ with a nexus in interstate 3 commerce.” Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 654 F.3d 903, 904 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 4 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a(b), 12182(a)). “[A]ny person who owns, leases (or leases to), or 5 operates a place of public accommodation” is liable for discriminating against an 6 individual on the basis of disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 7 Here, Plaintiff does not allege any facts indicating the nature of Plaintiff’s 8 disability. Additionally, it is unclear how Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff on 9 the basis of such disability. Further, Plaintiff does not explain how Defendants’ conduct, 10 in allegedly preventing Plaintiff from eating or taking medication while in the storage 11 unit, violates the ADA. In construing these allegations in the light most favorable to 12 Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim under the ADA. 13 See Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A 14 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court 15 to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”) 16 (citation omitted). Therefore, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s ADA claim without 17 prejudice. 18 19 d. Supplemental Jurisdiction Plaintiff’s remaining claims appear to arise under California state law. Pursuant to 20 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), district courts have supplemental jurisdiction over “all claims that 21 are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part 22 of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 23 U.S.C. § 1367(a). However, “retention of supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims 24 . . . is discretionary.” Acri v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997). 25 26 27 28 and Miscellaneous Provisions (Title V).” Hopkins v. Army, 2015 WL 4574803, at *2 n.6 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2015). Upon review of Plaintiff’s allegations, it does not appear that Titles I, II, IV or V apply to the case at bar. As such, the Court only analyzes a claim under Title III of the ADA. -7- 18cv183-MMA (KSC) 1 The district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under [§ 2 1367(a)] if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original 3 jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). When all federal claims are dismissed before trial, 4 a district court must weigh the following factors before declining or choosing to exercise 5 pendent jurisdiction: judicial economy, comity, convenience, and fairness. See Bryant v. 6 Adventist Health System/W., 289 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Carnegie- 7 Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)). 8 9 Here, in weighing the relevant factors, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims. It appears that Plaintiff’s 10 remaining claims are state tort claims governed by California law. “Thus, there is no 11 federal interest served by proceeding with the state law causes of action in federal court, 12 and the interest of comity would be served by permitting the state court to decide issues 13 relating to the remaining state law claims and defenses.” Hill v. Peterson, 2017 WL 14 35574, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2017). Regarding convenience and fairness, the Court 15 finds that neither factor weighs against declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction “as 16 the case is in its infancy, and no answer has yet been filed.” Id. 17 18 CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP. 19 The Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s ADA claim without prejudice for failure to state a 20 claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and 21 DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. 22 As such, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 25 26 27 28 Dated: February 5, 2018 _____________________________ HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO United States District Judge -8- 18cv183-MMA (KSC)
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