Edwards v. Shakiba et al, No. 3:2018cv00179 - Document 18 (S.D. Cal. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER Denying 11 Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment; Granting in Part and Denying in Part 14 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The Court denies Plaintiff's motion for default judgment and grants in part and denies in part Defenda nts' motion to dismiss. The Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint on or before 9/28/2018. Plaintiff's amended complaint must cure the deficiencies noted herein, must be complete in itself without reference to the original complaint. Any claims not re-alleged in the amended complaint will be considered waived. Signed by Judge Michael M. Anello on 8/13/2018. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(rmc)
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Edwards v. Shakiba et al Doc. 18 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Plaintiff, 12 13 Case No.: 3:18-cv-00179-MMA (JMA) ALLEN EDWARDS, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT; vs. 14 15 16 P. SHAKIBA, et al., [Doc. No. 11] Defendants. GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 17 18 19 [Doc. No. 14] 20 21 Plaintiff Allen Edwards, a California inmate proceeding pro se, brings this civil 22 rights action against officials at R. J. Donovan Correctional Facility for violation of his 23 Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff moves for default judgment against 24 all defendants. See Doc. No. 11. Defendants Scharr and Shakiba move to dismiss 25 Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Doc. No. 14. 26 In lieu of a response to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff has submitted a letter brief in which 27 he states that he has been transferred between facilities in retaliation for filing this action. 28 See Doc. No. 16. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion 1 3:18-cv-00179-MMA (JMA) Dockets.Justia.com 1 for default judgment and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ 2 motion to dismiss. 3 BACKGROUND1 4 Plaintiff claims he is “developmentally disabled,” participates in the Enhanced 5 Outpatient Program (“EOP”), and suffers from a “serious medical condition in his hip” 6 requiring his use of a cane and a medically-authorized lower tier/bunk assignment. Doc. 7 No. 1 at 3-4. As a result, in 2011, Plaintiff was prescribed a permanent lower tier/bunk 8 chrono. See Ex. E, Doc. No. 1 at 29-32.2 However, on December 9, 2016, Plaintiff was 9 awakened at 11:30 p.m. by Officer Brown,3 who informed him Defendant Scharr was 10 ordering his transfer to an upper tier/ bunk in “General Population Building 3” because 11 “space was needed for another EOP inmate,” and “because he did not have a lower 12 tier/lower bunk chrono.” Id. Plaintiff objected, and was threatened with a disciplinary 13 transfer to Administrative Segregation, so he complied, but spent the night on the floor 14 “in much distress.” Id. 15 On December 10, 2016, Plaintiff was “rushed to [an] outside hospital for … 16 abdominal pain,” but remained assigned to the top tier/bunk. Id. at 5. The next day, 17 Plaintiff fell while attempting to navigate the stairs with his cane, and was transported by 18 ambulance to the medical clinic. He was returned to “EOP Bldg. 1,” on December 12, 19 2016, where he was re-authorized for a lower tier/bunk assignment by Defendant 20 Shakiba, but for “5 days only.” Id. Plaintiff claims he then “began to have extreme pain 21 in his right shoulder after the fall down the stairs and the problems in his hip got worse,” 22 23 24 1 25 26 27 28 In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court presumes the plaintiff’s factual allegations are true. See Young v. United States, 769 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2014). 2 Citations to electronically filed documents in the record refer to the pagination assigned by the CM/ECF system. 3 Officer Brown is named as a defendant in Plaintiff’s complaint, but has not been served with the summons and complaint. See Doc. No. 9. 2 3:18-cv-00179-MMA (JMA) 1 so he sought medical attention, but Defendant Shakiba told him “there was nothing 2 wrong with him,” denied him care, and “refused” to re-authorize his lower tier/bunk 3 assignment until an MRI conducted on March 10, 2017 revealed a tear in Plaintiff’s 4 shoulder tendon. Id. at 5-6, see also Ex. F, Doc. No. 1 at 33. 5 Plaintiff contends Defendants Scharr and Shakiba acted with “deliberate 6 indifference” to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and 7 violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection by “removing [him] from 8 EOP housing without a classification or mental health committee action,” and thereby 9 treating him differently than “similarly situated EOP prisoners” who must be provided 10 notice “when their chronos are expired and/or removed.” Id. at 7. 11 PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT 12 As an initial matter, Plaintiff moves for default judgment against Defendants. 13 However, obtaining a default judgment is a two-step process. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 14 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986). First, a party must obtain a clerk’s entry of default 15 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a); thereafter, the party may seek entry of 16 default judgment under Rule 55(b). See Symantec Corp. v. Global Impact, Inc., 559 F.3d 17 922, 923 (9th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff has not requested nor obtained entry of default by the 18 Clerk of Court as to Defendants. As such, Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment is 19 procedurally improper and subject to denial on this basis alone. 20 Even if the Court were to liberally construe Plaintiff’s motion as requesting entry 21 of default by the Clerk of Court pursuant to Rule 55(a), entry of default is appropriate 22 only “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed 23 to plead or otherwise defend.” Defendants Scharr and Shakiba have appeared and filed a 24 motion to dismiss under Rule 12. Thus, Defendants have “otherwise defended” against 25 Plaintiff’s claims within 60 days after March 28, 2018, in compliance with Federal Rules 26 of Civil Procedure. Defendant Brown has not been served. See Doc. No. 9 (summons 27 returned unexecuted as to Defendant Brown). Entry of default by the Clerk of Court is 28 not appropriate as to any of the named defendants. Accordingly, the Court DENIES 3 3:18-cv-00179-MMA (JMA) 1 Plaintiff’s motion. 2 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 3 Defendants Scharr and Shakiba move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 4 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). As noted above, Plaintiff has not filed a 5 response to Defendants’ motion. However, the Court construes Plaintiff’s letter brief as a 6 general opposition to the dismissal of his claims. 7 8 9 1. Legal Standard A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 10 Plaintiffs must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 11 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The 12 plausibility standard thus demands more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 13 cause of action, or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement. Ashcroft v. 14 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Instead, the complaint “must contain allegations of 15 underlying facts sufficient to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend 16 itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). 17 In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must accept as true 18 all material allegations in the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to be drawn 19 from them, and must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 20 Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004), citing Karam v. City 21 of Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003). The court need not take legal 22 conclusions as true merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations. 23 Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). Similarly, “conclusory 24 allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to 25 dismiss.” Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). 26 Where a plaintiff appears pro se in a civil rights case, the court must construe the 27 pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los 28 Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule of liberal construction 4 3:18-cv-00179-MMA (JMA) 1 is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 2 (9th Cir. 1992). Where amendment of a pro se litigant’s complaint would be futile, 3 denial of leave to amend is appropriate. See James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th 4 Cir. 2000). 5 6 2. Eighth Amendment Claim The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment 7 and “embodies ‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity 8 and decency.’” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 9 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)). “[D]eliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious 10 illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1983.” Id. at 105. A prison official 11 violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1) the objective 12 requirement that the deprivation is “sufficiently serious,” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 13 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991); and (2) the 14 subjective requirement that the prison official has a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” 15 Id. (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298). For purposes of the instant motion, the Court finds 16 that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to satisfy the objective requirement of his Eighth 17 Amendment claim. 18 With respect to the subjective component of his Eighth Amendment claim, 19 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Scharr ordered Plaintiff transferred to an upper bunk in 20 general population housing despite Plaintiff advising Defendant regarding his lower 21 tier/bunk chrono and status as an EOP participant. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant 22 Shakiba was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by repeatedly refusing 23 to honor his permanent lower tier/bunk chrono. In the Ninth Circuit, “allegations that a 24 prison official has ignored the instructions of a prisoner’s treating physician are sufficient 25 to state a claim for deliberate indifference.” Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 26 1165 (9th Cir. 1999). The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to 27 plausibly suggest that Defendants were aware that Plaintiff’s previous treating physician 28 issued a medical chrono for a lower tier/bunk, but deliberately failed to honor it. See e.g. 5 3:18-cv-00179-MMA (JMA) 1 Brown v. Alexander, No. CV 13-6143-BRO (RNB), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110009, at 2 *20 (C.D. Cal. June 24, 2014) (finding that “plaintiff’s allegations here that defendants 3 ignored his repeated requests, and refused to take any action, to implement the order from 4 plaintiff’s treating physician that he be assigned to a lower bunk are sufficient to permit 5 the Court to draw a reasonable inference that defendants acted with deliberate 6 indifference to plaintiff’s medical needs.”). Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ 7 motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim. 8 9 3. Fourteenth Amendment Claim Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ actions violated his right to equal protection 10 under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons 11 who are similarly situated be treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 12 Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). An equal protection claim may be established in two 13 ways. The first method requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant has intentionally 14 discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of the plaintiff’s membership in a 15 protected class. See, e.g., Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001). 16 If the action in question does not involve a suspect classification, a plaintiff may establish 17 an equal protection claim by showing that similarly situated individuals were 18 intentionally treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state 19 purpose. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). In this case, 20 Plaintiff does not allege that he is a member of a protected class of inmates. Although he 21 alleges that he was treated differently than similarly situated EOP participants, he fails to 22 allege any facts to show that the treatment was intentional and without a legitimate 23 penological purpose. As such, his equal protection claim fails and the Court grants 24 Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim. 25 4. Leave to Amend 26 Leave to amend should be granted if it appears possible that the defects in the 27 complaint could be corrected, especially if a plaintiff is pro se. See Cato v. United States, 28 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his 6 3:18-cv-00179-MMA (JMA) 1 or her complaint, and some notice of its deficiencies, unless it is absolutely clear that the 2 deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”) (citing Noll v. Carlson, 3 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987)). In consideration of the Ninth Circuit’s liberal 4 amendment policy, particularly in civil rights cases where a prisoner is proceeding pro se, 5 the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint in order to cure the 6 deficiencies set forth above with respect to his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection 7 claim. 8 9 CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment 10 and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The 11 Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint on or before 12 September 28, 2018. Plaintiff’s amended complaint must cure the deficiencies noted 13 herein, must be complete in itself without reference to the original complaint. See S.D. 14 Cal. CivLR 15.1. Any claims not re-alleged in the amended complaint will be considered 15 waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 16 17 18 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. DATE: August 13, 2018 _______________________________________ HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7 3:18-cv-00179-MMA (JMA)
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