Woodward et al v. County of San Diego et al, No. 3:2017cv02369 - Document 18 (S.D. Cal. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER Denying 9 , 11 Motions to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Janis L. Sammartino on 7/9/2018. (mpl)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 10 BESSIE WOODWARD; and EDWARD WOODWARD, 13 14 ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO DISMISS Plaintiffs, 11 12 Case No.: 17-CV-2369-JLS (KSC) v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; and DOES 1-20, (ECF Nos. 9, 11) Defendants. 15 16 17 Presently before the Court are two Motions to Dismiss, one by Defendant the County 18 of San Diego, (“County MTD,” ECF No. 9), and one by Defendant Trevor Newkirk, 19 (“Newkirk MTD,” ECF No. 11). Also before the Court is Plaintiffs Bessie Woodward and 20 Edward Woodward’s Opposition to the Motions, (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 13), and Defendants 21 have filed a joint Reply in Support of their Motions, (“Reply,” ECF No. 14). The Court 22 took the Motion under submission without oral argument. (ECF No. 15.) After considering 23 the Parties’ arguments and the law, the Court rules as follows. 24 BACKGROUND 25 Plaintiffs Bessie Woodward and Edward Woodward filed a Complaint against the 26 County of San Diego and Trevor Newkirk, (“FAC,” ECF No. 5). Plaintiffs are the 27 surviving parents of Lyle Woodward (“Lyle”), who is deceased. (Id. ¶¶ 5–6.) Lyle was 28 arrested in late 2016 and was booked at the San Diego Central Jail. (Id. ¶ 11.) Lyle “was 1 17-CV-2369-JLS (KSC) 1 African-American and had no tattoos” and “was suffering from mental illness.” (Id. ¶ 12.) 2 The jail personnel, including Defendant Newkirk, knew of Lyle’s mental illnesses due to 3 Lyle’s “medical evaluations and behavior during previous periods of incarceration” and 4 his “evaluation and ongoing symptoms of mental illness in November and December 5 2016.” (Id.) Lyle also exhibited uncontrolled speech and behavior that, “to a reasonable 6 correctional officer, would antagonize other inmates with mental illness or a propensity for 7 violence.” (Id. ¶ 13.) Lyle was placed in a general population gang with inmate Thinn, “a 8 violent member of the white supremacist prison gang known as the Aryan Brotherhood.” 9 (Id. ¶ 14.) Thinn’s behavior demonstrated to the correctional officers that he was a danger 10 to African-American inmates and “would pose a substantial risk of serious bodily harm to 11 Lyle Woodward if the two men were confined to the same cell.” (Id. ¶ 15.) 12 On December 3, 2016, Thinn strangled Lyle. Plaintiffs allege: 13 19 At the time of the attack, jail personnel received radio intercom communication from the cell block indicating that an inmate was seriously injured and needed immediate medical attention. But jail personnel did not immediately call medical personnel. Instead, jail personnel waited an unreasonably long amount of time and then dispatched non-medical jail personnel to check on the cell, providing no indication of any potential medical emergency or medical issue. Correctional officers, including Defendant Newkirk, walked to the cell. No medical personnel were summoned. (Id. ¶ 16.) When Newkirk and other officers responded, Lyle was alive but not conscious 20 or responsive, and had blood pooled around his head. Newkirk “neither administered aid 21 to Woodward nor summoned medical care.” (Id. ¶ 17.) The officers secured Thinn and 22 Lyle remained unresponsive lying on the ground. (Id. ¶ 18.) After “an unreasonably long 23 amount of time had passed,” the officers called medical personnel and Lyle was taken to 24 the hospital. He died on December 10, 2017 from his injuries. (Id. ¶19.) 14 15 16 17 18 25 Plaintiffs bring five causes of action: (1) a survival claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 26 (2) a deprivation of familial relationship claim under § 1983; (3) negligence; (4) failure to 27 summon medical care; and (5) wrongful death. All causes of action are brought only 28 against Newkirk, except for the third cause of action, which is brought only against the 2 17-CV-2369-JLS (KSC) 1 County. 2 LEGAL STANDARD 3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the 4 defense that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” 5 generally referred to as a motion to dismiss. The Court evaluates whether a complaint states 6 a cognizable legal theory and sufficient facts in light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7 8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 8 entitled to relief.” Although Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . it 9 [does] demand more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 10 accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 11 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In other words, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide 12 the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and 13 a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 14 at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). A complaint will not suffice 15 “if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 16 at 677 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 17 In order to survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual 18 matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Id. (quoting 19 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A claim is facially plausible 20 when the facts pled “allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 21 liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 22 556). That is not to say that the claim must be probable, but there must be “more than a 23 sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. Facts “‘merely consistent with’ 24 a defendant’s liability” fall short of a plausible entitlement to relief. Id. (quoting Twombly, 25 550 U.S. at 557). Further, the Court need not accept as true “legal conclusions” contained 26 in the complaint. Id. This review requires context-specific analysis involving the Court’s 27 “judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 678 (citation omitted). “[W]here the well- 28 pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, 3 17-CV-2369-JLS (KSC) 1 the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to 2 relief.’ ” Id. 3 ANALYSIS 4 Both Defendants moved to dismiss various causes of action asserted. The Court will 5 first address the County’s Motion. 6 I. County’s Motion to Dismiss 7 The County moves to dismiss the one claim brought against it: failure to summon 8 medical care under California Government Code section 845.6. Generally, a public entity 9 is not liable for injury caused by the failure of a public employee to obtain medical care for 10 a prisoner in his custody. However, when a public employee is acting within the scope of 11 his employment, the public entity is liable “if the employee knows or has reason to know 12 that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and he fails to take reasonable action 13 to summon such medical care.” Cal. Gov. Code § 845.6. 14 The County moves to dismiss this claim because it argues Plaintiffs acknowledge 15 that: “(1) deputies responded to Decedent’s cell and immediately secured the other 16 occupants in the cell so that medical care could be administered to Decedent by jail medical 17 personnel; (2) deputies summoned medical personnel for Decedent; and (3) medical care 18 was rendered by medical personnel to Decedent.” (County MTD 2.) Further, Lyle was 19 transported to the hospital and received medical care. (Id.) 20 The County cites to Watson v. State of California, 21 Cal. App. 4th 836, 842 (Ct. 21 App. 1993), where the court held liability under section 845.6 “is limited to those situations 22 where the public entity intentionally or unjustifiably fails to furnish immediate medical 23 care.” The County argues there is no evidence it intentionally or unjustifiably failed to 24 furnish medical care because the officers summoned medical personnel who administered 25 care to Lyle. 26 What the County glosses over from Watson is the word “immediate.” Plaintiffs have 27 alleged that the officers received communication that Lyle was injured, then “walked to 28 the cell,” and, by the time they arrived, blood had pooled around Lyle’s head. (FAC 4 17-CV-2369-JLS (KSC) 1 ¶ 16.) The officers’ first action was to secure Thinn, while Lyle remain lying on the ground 2 unconscious and bleeding. Officers then summoned medical care. (Id. ¶ 19.) Whether 3 this was a “reasonable” course of action under the statute, at this stage, cannot be decided. 4 See Hart v. Orange Cnty., 254 Cal. App. 2d 302, 308 (Ct. App. 1967) (finding “the factual 5 question of actual or constructive knowledge of need for immediate care by an employee 6 acting within the scope of his employment and of reasonable action to summon immediate 7 medical care were properly questions for the jury”). Taking Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, 8 the officers failed to “immediately” summon medical care to Lyle, and the Court does not 9 decide at this stage whether the officers’ actions were reasonable. The Court DENIES the 10 County’s Motion to Dismiss. 11 II. Newkirk’s Motion to Dismiss 12 Defendant Newkirk first moves to dismiss the fourth cause of action, brought under 13 § 845.6. (Newkirk MTD 3.) Plaintiffs do not assert this cause of action against Newkirk, 14 so the Court does not consider Newkirk’s Motion to Dismiss this claim. The Court first 15 addresses Newkirk’s argument that Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring a survival 16 action. 17 A. Standing 18 Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a decedent’s survivors may bring a claim for the violation 19 of their substantive constitutional rights or those of the decedent. See, e.g., Conn v. City of 20 Reno, 591 F.3d 1081, 1096 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 21 (1994)). A § 1983 claim survives the decedent if it accrued before the decedent’s death 22 and if applicable state law permits a survival action. See Tatum v. City & Cnty. of San 23 Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1093 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006). “The party seeking to bring a survival 24 action bears the burden of demonstrating that a particular state’s law authorizes a survival 25 action and that the plaintiff meets that state’s requirements for bringing a survival action.” 26 Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 159 F.3d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation 27 omitted). 28 Under California law, “a cause of action for . . . a person is not lost by reason of the 5 17-CV-2369-JLS (KSC) 1 person’s death, but survives.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.20(a). “[W]here there is no 2 personal representative for the estate, the decedent’s ‘successor in interest’ may prosecute 3 the survival action.” Tatum, 441 F.3d at 1093 n.2 (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 377.20). 4 A successor in interest who “seeks to commence an action or proceeding” on behalf 5 of a decedent “shall execute and file an affidavit” that conforms with the enumerated 6 requirements of § 377.32(a). See Wishum v. California, No. 14–cv–1491–JST, 2014 WL 7 3738067, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2014) (“Section 377.32 requires any party seeking to 8 commence an action as a decedent’s successor in interest to file an affidavit or declaration 9 stating the basis for that designation.”). Plaintiffs filed declarations, (ECF Nos. 5-1; 5-2), 10 but Newkirk argues “the declarations do not provide facts that allow the Court to determine 11 whether Decedent died intestate, or leaving a valid will, or without issue, or whether 12 plaintiffs are Decedent’s sole beneficiaries.” (Newkirk MTD 9.) The Court requested that 13 Plaintiffs file updated declarations addressing these deficiencies, (ECF No. 16), and 14 Plaintiffs complied, (ECF No. 17). Newkirk no longer contests that Plaintiffs have 15 standing to bring this case because he did not respond to the updated declarations. The 16 Court agrees Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged they have standing to bring a survival 17 action. 18 B. Familial Association Claim Under § 1983 19 Plaintiffs bring a claim for deprivation of familial relationship under the Fourteenth 20 Amendment. Newkirk moves to dismiss this claim under Rule 12(b)(6). 21 “The substantive due process right to family integrity or to familial association is 22 well established. A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in companionship with his or 23 her child.” Rosenbaum v. Washoe Cnty., 663 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal 24 quotation marks and citation omitted). As another district court in this state has explained: 25 The due process claim protects the right to familial relations between family members. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (“The integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”) (citing Meyer v. Nebraksa, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). However, only official conduct that “shocks the conscience” is 26 27 28 6 17-CV-2369-JLS (KSC) 1 7 cognizable as a due process violation. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172–73 (1952)). The threshold question in such cases is “whether the behavior of the governmental officer is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847 n.8. The type of conduct which is most likely to rise to the “conscience-shocking level” is “conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest.” Id. at 849. Conduct which was not intentional, but rather was deliberately indifferent, may nevertheless rise to the conscience-shocking level in some circumstances. Id. at 849–50. 8 Willard v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., No. 1:14–cv–760–BAM, 2014 WL 6901849, at 9 *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2014); see also Cotta v. Cnty. of Kings, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1148, 1176 2 3 4 5 6 10 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (same). 11 Plaintiffs acknowledge they must claim conscious-shocking behavior on behalf of 12 Newkirk, but argue they have done so. Plaintiffs have alleged that Newkirk was aware of 13 Thinn’s background and the danger he would pose to Lyle. (FAC ¶¶ 12–14.) Plaintiffs 14 have alleged that Newkirk nonetheless placed Lyle in Thinn’s cell. Plaintiffs argue this 15 cell assignment shocks the conscience. (Opp’n 15.) The Court does not determine here 16 whether Newkirk’s actions shocked the conscience nor whether Plaintiffs will ultimately 17 be able to show that Defendants’ actions rose to the level required. But, the Court finds, at 18 this stage and after accepting all facts alleged as true, that the allegations state a Fourteenth 19 Amendment violation. See Cotta, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 1179 (analyzing cases and determining 20 that “it appears that the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit hold that the determination of 21 whether conduct ‘shocks the conscience’ may be an issue of law that the Court may decide 22 based on the undisputed facts”).1 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Newkirk’s Motion to 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 The court in Cotta further recognized there are two standards that may apply in this situation: the deliberate indifference standard or the purpose to harm standard. 79 F. Supp. 3d at 1177. “The ‘purpose to harm’ standard generally applies only to situations where a government actor must make ‘snap judgments because of an escalating situation’ because actual deliberation is not practical. Id. (quoting Gantt v. City of Los Angeles, 717 F.3d 702, 707 (9th Cir. 2013)). The deliberate indifference standard “is satisfied . . . by conduct that either consciously or through complete indifference disregards the risk of an unjustified deprivation of liberty.” Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Tatum v. Moody, 768 F.3d 806, 820–21 (9th Cir. 2014)). Plaintiffs have not alleged that Newkirk was forced to make a quick 7 17-CV-2369-JLS (KSC) 1 Dismiss this claim. 2 C. Allegations on Information and Belief 3 Newkirk argues that the Complaint should be dismissed because it is premised on 4 information and belief. (Newkirk MTD 8.) 5 “The Twombly plausibility standard . . . does not prevent a plaintiff from pleading 6 facts alleged upon information and belief where the facts are peculiarly within the 7 possession and control of the defendant or where the belief is based on factual information 8 that makes the inference of culpability plausible.” Soo Park v. Thompson, 851 F.3d 910, 9 928 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. Further, “[a]llegations that begin with ‘on information and belief’ are not 10 2010)). 11 automatically insufficient, and are advantageous when the factual issues are ambiguous or 12 unclear between the parties.” Bernstein v. Health Net Life Ins. Co., No. 12-CV-717 AJB 13 (JMA), 2013 WL 12095240, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2013) (citing Hightower v. Tilton, No. 14 C08-1129-MJP, 2012 WL 1194720, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2012)). 15 Here, the relevant facts are primarily within the possession of Defendants and the 16 officers at the jail who were present at the relevant time. At this stage, pleading facts on 17 information and belief is sufficient. The Court DENIES Newkirk’s Motion to Dismiss on 18 this ground. 19 CONCLUSION 20 The Court DENIES both the County and Newkirk’s Motions to Dismiss. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 Dated: July 9, 2018 23 24 25 26 27 28 judgment in placing Newkirk in Thinn’s cell, so the purpose to harm standard does not apply here. Plaintiffs therefore need not prove that Newkirk intended to harm Lyle. The deliberate indifference standard applies here. 8 17-CV-2369-JLS (KSC) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 9 17-CV-2369-JLS (KSC)
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