Albert v. Colvin, No. 3:2015cv01973 - Document 24 (S.D. Cal. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER Denying 12 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Granting 20 Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Anthony J. Battaglia on 9/8/2016. (dls)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Albert v. Colvin Doc. 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Case No.: 15cv1973 AJB(JMA) ALMA M. ALBERT, Plaintiff, 12 13 v. 14 CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 15 Defendant. 16 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 12] AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 20] 17 18 Plaintiff Alma M. Albert (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of Defendant 19 Social Security Acting Commissioner Carolyn W. Colvin’s (“Defendant”) 20 determination that she is not entitled to disability insurance and supplemental 21 security income (“SSI”) benefits. The parties have filed cross-motions for 22 summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion for 23 summary judgment is DENIED and Defendant’s cross-motion for summary 24 judgment is GRANTED. 25 26 27 28 I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff was born on June 16, 1953 and was age 58 when she filed her applications for benefits. (Id. at 186.) She attended school in Mexico and 1 15cv1973 AJB(JMA) Dockets.Justia.com 1 dropped out in or after tenth grade. (Id. at 54-55.) She has worked in the past as 2 a cashier, gardener, janitor, phone answerer, home caregiver, and salesperson 3 at Sears Roebuck. (Id. at 249-56.) She last worked in 2010. (Id. at 55-56.) 4 On December 2, 2011, Plaintiff filed applications for SSI and disability 5 insurance benefits, alleging a disability onset date of October 26, 2011. (Admin. 6 R. at 186-96; 197-200.)1 Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially on May 29, 7 2012, and again upon reconsideration on January 9, 2013. (Id. at 135-39, 141- 8 45.) On February 12, 2013, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing. (Id. at 9 147-48.) A hearing was conducted on November 22, 2013 by Administrative Law 10 Judge (“ALJ”) George W. Reyes, who determined Plaintiff was not disabled. (Id. 11 at 20-31.) Plaintiff sought review of the ALJ decision, which the Appeals Council 12 for the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied, making the ALJ’s decision 13 the final decision of the Commissioner. (Id. at 1-6.) Plaintiff then commenced this 14 action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 15 16 II. MEDICAL RECORDS 17 A. November-December 2011 18 Dr. Louis Blumberg of Imperial County Behavioral Health performed an 19 intake assessment of Plaintiff on November 18, 2011. (Id. at 474-77.) Plaintiff 20 reported “feeling very sick” without Citalopram (also referred to as Celexa), an 21 anti-depressant she had been taking since 2006. (Id. at 474.) She stated her 22 mental problems began at age 7 when she was raped by a stranger. (Id.) She 23 experienced problems with panic attacks, hyperarousal, anger, sleep, 24 concentration, trust, guilt, flashbacks, avoidance behaviors, suicidal thoughts, 25 and depression, but had never talked about the incident until twenty years after it 26 27 28 Plaintiff’s disability onset date was later amended to November 25, 2010. See Admin. R. at 20, 79, 90. 1 2 15cv1973 AJB(JMA) 1 occurred. (Id.) She stated she had dropped out of school after tenth grade and 2 was raped again at age 22 by a stranger, which caused further post-traumatic 3 stress. (Id.) Plaintiff reported she had been hospitalized for two weeks after a 4 suicide attempt at age 25, again at age 38 for one month, and a third time at age 5 40 for three days. (Id.) She complained of chronic worry, sleep disturbance, lack 6 of appetite, poor concentration, irritability, lethargy, suicidal thoughts, inability to 7 cry, social isolation, and occasional panic attacks. (Id.) She had begun hearing 8 voices telling her “she’s no good” a week before her visit. (Id.) She admitted to 9 using marijuana daily. (Id. at 475.) Dr. Blumberg diagnosed prolonged post- 10 traumatic stress disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder, and 11 major depressive disorder recurrent, severe with psychotic features. (Id. at 476.) 12 His treatment plan included a medication support assessment and an expedited 13 referral to therapy. (Id. at 477.) 14 Plaintiff presented to Dr. Peter Csapoczi of Clinicas de Salud del Pueblo, 15 Inc., her primary care provider, on November 30, 2011. (Id. at 465-68.) She 16 complained of anxiety and required a refill of Citalopram. (Id. at 465.) Plaintiff’s 17 list of chronic problems included bipolar disorder, unspecified, and depressive 18 disorder, not elsewhere classified. (Id.) 19 Plaintiff saw Dr. Alfred French of Imperial County Behavioral Health 20 Services on December 5, 2011. (Id. at 479-80.) Plaintiff stated, “[I]f something 21 goes wrong, I flip,” leading to “episodes” lasting multiple days. (Id. at 479.) She 22 stated she felt anxious most of the time. (Id.) Upon examination, Dr. French 23 reported Plaintiff was “intense, very controlling, moderately high intensity, and 24 shift[ed] continually from one system to another.” (Id.) In addition to Citalopram, 25 which had worked best in the past for Plaintiff, Dr. French prescribed Keppra 26 due to Plaintiff’s history of depression with “episodic ego-dystonic agitation.” 27 28 3 15cv1973 AJB(JMA) 1 (Id.)2 Dr. French planned to see Plaintiff frequently due to the complexity of her 2 disorder. (Id.) 3 B. January-July 2012 4 On January 9, 2012, Dr. French reported an improvement in Plaintiff’s 5 irritability and anxiety, as well as Plaintiff’s relationship with her boyfriend. (Id. at 6 478.) Dr. French described Plaintiff as alert, cooperative, and able to speak 7 coherently. (Id.) There was no evidence of thought or mood disorder and Plaintiff 8 reported she had “overall a good life with friends” and was “delighted with her 9 three dogs [and] gardens.” (Id.) 10 In February 2012, Dr. Mark Zink of Imperial County Behavioral Health 11 Services took over Plaintiff’s psychiatric care. She reported “feeling bad” and 12 stated she had cut her dosage of Celexa in half, to 10mg, because it was easier 13 on her stomach. (Id. at 499.) Dr. Zink increased Plaintiff’s dosage of Celexa back 14 to 20mg and recommended she continue taking Keppra. (Id.) Plaintiff reported 15 improvement the following month, even though she had discontinued Keppra on 16 her own because of negative side effects. (Id. at 496.) Overall, she felt “much 17 better” than she had been, and had improved sleep and appetite. (Id.) Dr. Zink 18 noted Plaintiff appeared to be benefitting from therapy. (Id.) Despite this, 19 Plaintiff had discontinued going to therapy by the following month, even though it 20 was helping her, because she had “too many appointments.” (Id. at 495.) 21 Plaintiff saw Dr. Csapoczi, her primary care doctor, in March and April 2012, at 22 which time she reported abdominal pains, pelvic pains, not feeling well, poor 23 appetite, and urinary incontinence. (Id. at 526-29, 534-46.) 24 At the request of the Department of Social Services, Dr. Ernest Bagner of 25 26 27 28 Keppra is an anti-seizure medication which is used off-label as an adjunctive treatment for anxiety disorders. See MedMerits, http://www.medmerits.com/index.php/article/levetiracetam/P3 (last visited Aug. 26, 2016). 2 4 15cv1973 AJB(JMA) 1 S&L Medical Group performed a Complete Psychiatric Evaluation of Plaintiff on 2 April 21, 2012. (Id. at 487-91.) Dr. Bagner assessed Plaintiff’s mood as 3 “depressed and anxious,” and her affect as “blunted.” (Id. at 489.) Although 4 Plaintiff stated she was experiencing auditory hallucinations, Dr. Bagner did not 5 report her to have any delusions. (Id.) Dr. Bagner listed Plaintiff’s diagnoses as 6 bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, cannabis dependence, and 7 alcohol dependence, full remission, and determined her Global Assessment of 8 Functioning (“GAF”) score to be 60. (Id. at 490.)3 Dr. Bagner assessed Plaintiff 9 as mildly limited in following simple oral and written instructions; moderately 10 limited in following detailed instructions, interacting with the public, coworkers, 11 and supervisor, complying with job rules, responding to changes in a routine 12 work setting, and in her daily activities; and severely limited in responding to 13 work pressure in a usual work setting. (Id. at 490-91.) Dr. Bagner concluded 14 that Plaintiff’s prognosis was guarded from a psychiatric standpoint. (Id. at 491.) 15 On May 9, 2012, Plaintiff reported to Dr. Zink she had started taking 16 Keppra again as she believed it helped her irritability and sensitivity more than 17 Celexa. (Id. at 493.) Dr. Zink increased Plaintiff’s dosage of Keppra to 250mg 18 and decreased Celexa to 10mg per day. (Id.) In July 2012, Plaintiff was “feeling 19 a bit better with the medications,” but was still facing numerous personal 20 difficulties. (Id. at 593.) Plaintiff described having issues with her boyfriend, her 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 The GAF scale is a numeric scale (0 through 100) used by mental health practitioners to rate social, occupational, and psychological functioning, with lower numbers representing more severe symptoms, difficulties, or impairments. The scale is presented in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th Edition, Text Revision (“DSM-IV-TR”). A GAF score of 51-60 indicates moderate symptoms (e.g., flat affect and circumstantial speech, occasional panic attacks) or moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., few friends, conflicts with peers or co-workers). American Psychiatric Association, DSM-IV-TR (2000). The GAF is no longer included in the 5th Edition of the DSM. See Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law Online, http://www.jaapl.org/content/42/2/173.full (last visited Aug. 26, 2016). 3 5 15cv1973 AJB(JMA) 1 chihuahua puppy had died, and she was afraid to walk alone in her 2 neighborhood “for fear of retribution from [an] ex-neighbor.” (Id.) Plaintiff 3 requested to continue on the same the medication regimen. (Id.) 4 Dr. Heather Barrons, Psy.D, a non-examining physician, prepared a report 5 dated May 23, 2012 regarding her examination of Plaintiff’s records. (Id. at 82- 6 89, 93-100.) Dr. Barrons noted that Plaintiff had begun mental health treatment 7 in November 2011 and by January 2012, had shown improvement with 8 treatment, including “improved social relationships and good life with friends.” 9 (Id. at 85.) She found Plaintiff had a good prognosis so long as she remained 10 compliant with treatment. (Id.) Dr. Barrons considered Listings 12.05 (affective 11 disorders), 12.09 (substance addiction disorders), and 12.06 (anxiety disorders) 12 of the Listing of Impairments, but found the medical evidence did not establish 13 the presence of the “C” criteria of these listings. (Id.)4 Dr. Barrons determined, 14 inter alia, that Plaintiff was capable of understanding and remembering simple 15 instructions and procedures as well as work place locations; capable of 16 maintaining concentration, pace and persistence for simple routines throughout 17 a normal workday and workweek; able to interact with co-workers and 18 supervisors; capable of public contact; and able to adapt to a work environment. 19 (Id. at 88.) Dr. Barrons believed Plaintiff’s condition was expected to improve 20 and would not result in significant limitations in her ability to work. (Id. at 89.) Dr. 21 22 23 24 4 25 26 27 28 The Listing of Impairments sets forth certain impairments which are considered to be of sufficient severity to prevent the performance of any gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(a). To meet a Listing, the evidence of record must be sufficient to establish the existence of every medical and other finding specified for that Listing. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(d); Key v. Heckler, 754 F.2d 1545, 1549-50 (9th Cir. 1985). The paragraph C criteria of the mental disorder listings describe impairment-related functional limitations that are incompatible with the ability to do any gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00 A. 6 15cv1973 AJB(JMA) 1 Barrons concluded Plaintiff’s condition was not so severe as to prevent work for 2 twelve months in a row and therefore, Plaintiff was not disabled. (Id.) 3 In July 2012, Dr. Zink completed an impairment questionnaire in which he 4 indicated Plaintiff had marked limitations in her abilities to sustain work activities 5 in a competitive work environment. (Id. at 548-54.) He assessed Plaintiff as 6 being incapable of tolerating even low work stress as she was fragile, 7 pessimistic, easily overwhelmed, easily irritated, and lacked persistence. (Id. at 8 554.) 9 C. September-December 2012 10 In September 2012, Plaintiff called the registered nurse at Imperial 11 County Behavioral Health Services, stating, “My neighbor told me you guys were 12 over here and that you told him all my business and everything about me.” (Id. at 13 590.) Plaintiff had visited the emergency room, where she was given Xanax. 14 (Id.) Plaintiff reported feeling “depressed, discouraged, desperate,” and claimed 15 her neighbor was “shouting at her through the walls during the middle of the 16 night.” (Id.) She told Dr. Zink, “I just want somebody to help me, please,” and 17 stated she was in a hostile dependent situation with her boyfriend “until I get my 18 SSI.” (Id.) Dr. Zink reported Plaintiff to have “poor insight into her apparently 19 paranoid/psychotic condition,” and a “depressed, discouraged, fearful, and 20 despondent” mood. (Id.) He assessed Plaintiff as having “presumed auditory 21 hallucinations” and prescribed her Seroquel-XR, used to treat schizophrenia, 22 bipolar disorder, and major depressive disorder. (Id.) 23 Plaintiff was much improved a week later. (Id. at 588.) However, while 24 Plaintiff reported improved sleep and appetite, Dr. Zink still assessed her as 25 psychotic and paranoid in regard to her neighbor. (Id.) A couple of weeks later, 26 in October 2012, Plaintiff reported that she was feeling “a lot better” and was 27 sleeping “real good” with her medicine regimen. (Id. at 587.) Plaintiff expressed 28 more interest in gardening, painting, and sewing. (Id.) Dr. Zink instructed Plaintiff 7 15cv1973 AJB(JMA) 1 to continue with her medications, including Keppra, Citalopram, and Zyprexa, 2 which she had been taking in lieu of Seroquel. (Id.) Plaintiff continued to report 3 improvement on November 7, 2012, at which time she reported “feeling really 4 good” and stated the medicine was helping a lot. (Id. at 586.) Her sleeping had 5 improved, she was less depressed, and Dr. Zink noted she had fewer paranoid 6 and psychotic symptoms. (Id.) Her troublesome neighbor had moved out, and 7 Plaintiff was taking care of her dogs and exercising. (Id.) Dr. Zink noted he might 8 reduce Plaintiff’s dosage of Zyprexa on Plaintiff’s next visit. (Id.) 9 On November 14, 2012, Dr. Zink wrote a “To Whom It May Concern” 10 letter regarding Plaintiff’s condition. (Id. at 577.) He reported that it had become 11 apparent during the course of treatment that “the disabling impairments suffered 12 by [Plaintiff] are much more severe than previously considered.” (Id.) He 13 indicated Plaintiff’s diagnoses were bipolar disorder and psychosis. (Id.) While 14 Dr. Zink noted Plaintiff’s “symptoms have responded significantly to 15 medications,” he opined that Plaintiff remained completely disabled from 16 working. (Id.) 17 In December 2012, Plaintiff reported continued improvement with her 18 medication. (Id. at 584.) Plaintiff stated, “I don’t get upset about things like I did, 19 like when my boyfriend says hurtful things.” (Id.) Dr. Zink kept Plaintiff on the 20 same medication dosages, but again noted that Plaintiff’s dosage of Zyprexa 21 might be reduced on her next visit. (Id.) 22 D. January-March 2013 23 Dr. Daniel Funkenstein, a non-examining physician, prepared a report on 24 January 4, 2013 regarding his examination of Plaintiff’s records. (Id. at 107-16, 25 121-30.) Dr. Funkenstein assessed Plaintiff as not disabled. (Id. at 114.) While 26 Dr. Funkenstein did not believe Plaintiff could perform her past job as a 27 salesperson, he assessed Plaintiff as capable of other work. (Id. at 114-15.) 28 Dr. Morteza Rahmani of Imperial County Behavioral Health Services took 8 15cv1973 AJB(JMA) 1 over Plaintiff’s psychiatric care from Dr. Zink in January 2013. (Id. at 665.) 2 Between January and August 2013, Plaintiff reported feeling good, but did not 3 feel comfortable around people because of what had happened with her 4 neighbor, who had harassed her. (Id. at 662-66.) At times, she still heard the 5 voice of her neighbor. (Id. at 664.) Plaintiff stated she spent her time doing 6 house chores, did not interact with others, and mostly stayed at home. (Id. at 7 663.) In June 2013, she was worried about her physical health as she had 8 recently visited the emergency room for a stomach problem, had lost a couple of 9 pounds, and was scheduled to see a GI specialist. (Id. at 662.)5 Throughout this 10 period, Plaintiff’s diagnosis was listed as “bipolar disorder most recent episode 11 depressed, severe with psychotic features.” (Id. at 662-66.) Plaintiff continued 12 taking her medications regularly, including Keppra, Citalopram, and Zyprexa. 13 (Id.) 14 In March 2013, Dr. Csapoczi, Plaintiff’s primary care doctor, completed a 15 questionnaire reflecting his opinion that Plaintiff could sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour 16 workday, stand or walk for 4 of 8 hours, would likely experience an increase in 17 symptoms if placed in a competitive work environment, could tolerate moderate 18 stress, and could work a full time competitive job that required activity on a 19 sustained basis, but would have psychological limitations. (Id. at 609-16.) 20 21 III. 22 THE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING The ALJ conducted an administrative hearing on November 22, 2013. (Id. 23 at 20, 39.) 24 // 25 26 27 28 A CT scan performed in July 2013 showed colonic diverticulosis without acute diverticulitis. (Admin. R. at 667-68.) In August 2013, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Theodore Affue, M.D. for evaluation of a kidney lump or mass. (Id. at 688-90.) 5 9 15cv1973 AJB(JMA) 1 A. Plaintiff’s Testimony 2 Plaintiff testified she became disabled on November 25, 2010. (Id. at 42.) 3 Although she had not worked since that date, she had looked for work and had 4 received unemployment benefits from the State of California from 2010 until the 5 third quarter of 2012, which had required her to state that she was capable of 6 working during that period. (Id. at 42-43.) She testified she was unable to work 7 because of mental problems as well as physical problems, including stomach 8 issues, a lump in her kidney, and a weak bladder. (Id. at 43-44, 46.) 9 Plaintiff testified she could walk two blocks in five minutes before needing 10 to rest for approximately three minutes. (Id. at 47-48.) She stated she could 11 stand for an hour, sit for fifteen minutes, and lift and carry sixty pounds in each 12 arm. (Id. at 48-49.) Plaintiff initially testified that she had used marijuana on a 13 daily basis for only the previous six months before the hearing, but then 14 amended her testimony after the ALJ quoted from a treatment note from April 15 2012 which indicated she was then using marijuana on a daily basis. (Id. at 52- 16 54.) She used marijuana because it helped her relax and helped her depression. 17 (Id. at 52.) She testified she had attended school in Mexico through ninth grade, 18 and had not finished tenth grade notwithstanding a previous statement in her 19 medical records indicating that she had. (Id. at 54-55.) When asked if she could 20 perform the work of a salesperson, as she had for Sears Roebuck in 2003 and 21 2004, she testified, “Probably I could, yes. Yes.” (Id. at 56-57.) 22 Plaintiff stated her “mental problems” included a fear of people, fear of 23 walking alone, hearing voices in her head, and depression. (Id. at 58-59.) She 24 felt depressed three times per week, at which time she wanted to cry, did not 25 want to eat, did not want to get cleaned up, and did not want to go anywhere or 26 do anything. (Id. at 59.) This feeling would last a day or two until her medication 27 assisted her. (Id.) Plaintiff had been in a relationship with her boyfriend for six 28 years, but they did not do anything for fun because she refused to go anywhere. 10 15cv1973 AJB(JMA) 1 (Id. at 60.) She experienced flashbacks of being raped as a 7-year-old 2 approximately every two weeks. (Id. at 61-62.) She did not have difficulty being 3 in public places such as the grocery store or bank, but did not feel comfortable if 4 she walked in the streets. (Id. at 63.) She did not like to be around people and 5 did not smile often. (Id. at 68-69.) Being around her two dogs made her happy. 6 (Id. at 69.) 7 Plaintiff stated even though she had testified she could do the work of a 8 salesperson, she had lost her previous salesperson job because of her 9 depression. (Id. at 63.) Specifically, she had had an argument with the manager 10 and quit. (Id.) She had previously worked out at a gym, but had stopped 11 because she had “been so sick.” (Id. at 66.) She testified she had problems 12 remembering dates and places. (Id. at 66-67.) 13 B. 14 Vocational Expert’s Testimony Vocational expert (“VE”), Mary E. Jesko, testified at the administrative 15 hearing. (Id. at 70.) The ALJ presented a hypothetical question involving a 16 claimant who could perform medium work, could not use ladders, ropes, or 17 scaffolds, who was limited to simple, routine tasks, and could not perform such 18 tasks in a fast-paced production environment. (Id. at 71.) The hypothetical 19 claimant was also limited to only occasional interaction with supervisors and 20 coworkers, and to brief, intermittent, and superficial public contact. (Id.) 21 Additionally, the hypothetical claimant could concentrate for two-hour periods of 22 time throughout a typical eight-hour workday, must have brief access to a 23 bathroom every 2 to 2½ hours, and must be able to use incontinent protection. 24 (Id. at 72.) The hypothetical claimant was sixty years old, had a tenth grade 25 education in Mexico, and was able to speak fluent English. (Id. at 72.) 26 The VE testified the hypothetical claimant would be unable to work as a 27 salesperson. (Id. at 72.) Such a hypothetical claimant could, however, work as a 28 sweeper cleaner, a floor waxer, or as a laundry worker. (Id. at 73.) The VE 11 15cv1973 AJB(JMA) 1 stated that in these occupations, a person could be off task for six minutes per 2 hour and absent three times per month and still sustain employment. (Id. at 73- 3 74.) The VE testified further the hypothetical claimant could not perform the 4 three jobs she had identified without being able to stand for six hours in an eight- 5 hour workday. (Id. at 74-75.) 6 7 IV. THE ALJ DECISION 8 After considering the record, the ALJ made the following findings: 9 .... 10 2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 25, 2010, the alleged onset date [citations omitted]. 3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety disorder and depressive disorder [citations omitted]. 11 12 13 14 .... 15 4. 16 17 .... 18 5. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in [the Social Security Regulations]. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) and 416.967(c) except the claimant cannot use ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She is further limited to simple routine tasks, and cannot perform such tasks in a fast-paced production environment. She is limited to only occasional interactions with supervisors and coworkers and further limited to only brief, intermittent and superficial public contact. She can attend and concentrate for two-hour blocks of time throughout an 8-hour workday with the 2 customary 10 to 15 minute breaks and the customary 30 to 60 minute lunch period. The claimant should also be allowed to work in a job that allows brief access to a bathroom every 2 to 2 ½ hours throughout the workday. She is limited to jobs that allow her to use incontinent protection. .... 28 12 15cv1973 AJB(JMA) 6. 1 2 .... 3 10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform [citations omitted]. .... 4 5 6 7 11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined by the Social Security Act, from November 25, 2010, through the date of this decision [citations omitted]. 8 9 10 The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work [citations omitted]. (Admin. R. at 22-31.) 11 12 V. STANDARD OF REVIEW 13 To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, an applicant 14 must show: (1) he or she suffers from a medically determinable impairment that 15 can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last 16 for a continuous period of twelve months or more, and (2) the impairment renders 17 the applicant incapable of performing the work that he or she previously 18 performed or any other substantially gainful employment that exists in the 19 national economy. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), (2)(A). An applicant must meet 20 both requirements to be “disabled.” Id. Further, the applicant bears the burden of 21 proving that he or she was either permanently disabled or subject to a condition 22 which became so severe as to disable the applicant prior to the date upon which 23 his or her disability insured status expired. Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 24 1432 (9th Cir. 1995). 25 A. 26 Sequential Evaluation of Impairments The Social Security Regulations outline a five-step process to determine 27 whether an applicant is "disabled." The five steps are: (1) Whether the claimant is 28 presently working in any substantial gainful activity. If so, the claimant is not 13 15cv1973 AJB(JMA) 1 disabled. If not, the evaluation proceeds to step two. (2) Whether the claimant’s 2 impairment is severe. If not, the claimant is not disabled. If so, the evaluation 3 proceeds to step three. (3) Whether the impairment meets or equals a specific 4 impairment listed in the Listing of Impairments. If so, the claimant is disabled. If 5 not, the evaluation proceeds to step four. (4) Whether the claimant is able to do 6 any work he has done in the past. If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the 7 evaluation continues to step five. (5) Whether the claimant is able to do any other 8 work. If not, the claimant is disabled. Conversely, if the Commissioner can 9 establish there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy that the 10 claimant can do, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; see also 11 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1999). 12 B. Judicial Review 13 Sections 205(g) and 1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act allow 14 unsuccessful applicants to seek judicial review of the Commissioner's final 15 agency decision. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). The scope of judicial review is 16 limited. The Commissioner’s final decision should not be disturbed unless the 17 ALJ's findings are based on legal error or are not supported by substantial 18 evidence in the record as a whole. Schneider v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 19 223 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2000); Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th 20 Cir. 2014). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla but less than 21 a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 22 as adequate to support a conclusion.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 23 (9th Cir. 1995). The Court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both 24 the evidence that supports and detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion. See Mayes v. 25 Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir. 2001); Desrosiers v. Sec'y of Health & 26 Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). “The ALJ is responsible for 27 determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving 28 ambiguities.” Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing 14 15cv1973 AJB(JMA) 1 Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039). Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one 2 rational interpretation, the ALJ’s decision must be affirmed. Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 3 591 (citation and quotations omitted). 4 Section 405(g) permits this Court to enter a judgment affirming, modifying, 5 or reversing the Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The matter may 6 also be remanded to the SSA for further proceedings. Id. 7 8 VI. DISCUSSION 9 Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in granting little or no weight to the mental 10 function opinions of Dr. Zink, treating psychiatrist, and Dr. Bagner, examining 11 psychiatrist. (Pl.’s Mot. at 13-20.) 12 “In disability benefits cases . . . physicians may render medical, clinical 13 opinions, or they may render opinions on the ultimate issue of disability–the 14 claimant’s ability to perform work.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 15 1998). There are three types of physicians in such cases: “(1) those who treat the 16 claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the 17 claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the 18 claimant (nonexamining physicians).” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 19 1995). As a general matter, opinions of treating physicians are given controlling 20 weight when supported by medically acceptable diagnostic techniques and when 21 consistent with other substantial evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. 22 § 404.1527(d)(2); SSR 96-2p. Further, the opinion of a treating physician is 23 entitled to greater weight than that of an examining physician, and the opinion of 24 an examining physician is entitled to greater weight than that of a non-examining 25 physician. Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). 26 “The weight afforded a non-examining physician’s testimony depends on the 27 degree to which he provides supporting explanations for his opinions.” Id. (citing 28 § 404.1527(d)(3)). 15 15cv1973 AJB(JMA) If a physician’s opinion in the record is contradicted by another doctor’s 1 2 opinion, the ALJ must provide “specific and legitimate reasons that are supported 3 by substantial evidence” in order to reject the opinion. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 4 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). “An ALJ can satisfy the ‘substantial evidence’ 5 requirement by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and 6 conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making 7 findings.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012 (quotations and citation omitted). Opinions 8 of nonexamining medical advisors may serve as substantial evidence when they 9 are supported by other evidence in the record and are consistent with it. Morgan 10 v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 11 Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041). 12 In the case at hand, the medical opinions of Dr. Zink and Dr. Bagner were 13 contradicted by substantial evidence in the record. Their opinions were 14 contradicted by non-examining psychiatrists, Dr. Barrons and Dr. Funkenstein, 15 both of whom determined Plaintiff was not disabled and whose opinions were 16 consistent with the medical notes of Dr. Rahmani, who saw Plaintiff from January 17 to August 2013 and reported continual improvement. In April 2013, Dr. Rahmani 18 assessed Plaintiff to be “stable on her meds” and did not detect any manic or 19 psychotic symptoms, mood swings, or suicidal or homicidal ideation. (Id. at 663.) 20 By September 2013, Plaintiff did not did not have any problems with sleep, 21 hallucinations, delusions, or mood swings. (Id. at 666.) Additionally, she rated her 22 depression a three out of ten and claimed to have a good relationship with her 23 boyfriend. (Id.) Thus, because Dr. Zink and Dr. Bagner’s opinions were 24 contradicted by medical evidence in the record, the ALJ must provide specific 25 and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in order to discount or 26 reject their opinions. See, e.g., Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216. 27 A. 28 Dr. Zink Plaintiff contends the ALJ’s reasons for giving Dr. Zink’s opinion only little 16 15cv1973 AJB(JMA) 1 weight were legally insufficient and factually inaccurate. (Pl.’s Mot. at 14.) The 2 ALJ articulated the following reasons for granting only little weight to Dr. Zink’s 3 opinion that Plaintiff was completely disabled from working: (1) Dr. Zink’s opinion 4 was inconsistent with the objective medical evidence of record which, in the 5 ALJ’s opinion, supported that Plaintiff would only have the marked limitations 6 found by Dr. Zink “if working in a more skilled/stressful environment”; (2) Dr. Zink 7 lacked a longitudinal history as he only saw Plaintiff between February and 8 December 2012; (3) the records showed Plaintiff had a positive response to 9 medications; and (4) notwithstanding Plaintiff’s lack of credibility, Dr. Zink 10 accepted “just about everything” Plaintiff said. (Admin. R. at 28.) The Court will 11 address each of these reasons in turn. 12 13 1. The ALJ Properly Found Dr. Zink’s Opinion was Inconsistent with Objective Medical Evidence of Record 14 The ALJ found the objective medical evidence in the record indicated 15 Plaintiff would only have “marked” functional limitations if she worked “in a more 16 skilled/stressful environment,” and accordingly determined Dr. Zink’s opinion that 17 Plaintiff was completely disabled from working was inconsistent with the record 18 as a whole. (Id.) Plaintiff argues this was not a specific and legitimate reason to 19 reject Dr. Zink’s opinion as the ALJ failed to identify the information supporting 20 his determination. (Pl.’s Mot. at 15.) 21 In providing specific and legitimate reasons to reject a treating physician’s 22 opinion, an ALJ should set out “a detailed and thorough summary of the facts 23 and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making 24 findings.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012 (quotations and citation omitted). The ALJ 25 did so here. First, the ALJ summarized and interpreted the medical opinions of 26 Dr. French and Dr. Rahmani, two of Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrists. The ALJ 27 noted Dr. French described Plaintiff as “alert” and “cooperative,” and reported 28 she had “an overall good life with friends.” (Admin R. at 26.) Additionally, Dr. 17 15cv1973 AJB(JMA) 1 French reported Plaintiff spoke “in length and [in] well-organized paragraphs with 2 a variety of themes, maintaining coherence.” (Id.) The ALJ also discussed Dr. 3 Rahmani’s treatment notes. Dr. Rahmani, who assumed Plaintiff’s psychiatric 4 treatment immediately following Dr. Zink, reported Plaintiff to be stable on her 5 medications. (Id.) In sessions with Dr. Rahmani, Plaintiff denied having any 6 hallucinations, delusions, or mood swings, and rated her depression a three out 7 of ten. (Id.) Dr. Rahmani assessed Plaintiff as being “oriented times three,” as 8 having fair hygiene, and exhibiting no agitation or retardation. (Id.) The ALJ 9 regarded Dr. French and Dr. Rahmani’s opinions as evidence that “[Plaintiff’s] 10 symptoms were essentially controlled by medications and exacerbations were 11 due to noncompliance, unusual event triggers or medication adjustments as 12 needed.” (Id.) 13 Second, the ALJ analyzed Plaintiff’s self-reported daily activities. Plaintiff 14 reported she could care for her personal needs, care for her pet dogs, prepare 15 simple meals, do household chores, shop for groceries and necessities, garden, 16 watch television, and talk on the phone with friends. (Id.) The ALJ found these 17 activities were indicative of Plaintiff maintaining “a somewhat normal level of 18 daily activity and interaction.” (Id. at 27.) The ALJ assessed “the physical and 19 mental requirements of these household tasks and social interactions” and 20 concluded they “are consistent with a significant degree of overall functioning.” 21 (Id.) Evidence establishing that a claimant can carry out daily activities may be 22 used to discount a physician’s opinion of disability. See, e.g., Morgan, 169 F.3d 23 at 601-02. 24 The ALJ acknowledged and accounted for Plaintiff’s functional limitations 25 by limiting the type of work she could perform to simple routine tasks, not in a 26 fast-paced production environment, with only occasional interactions with 27 supervisors and co-workers, and only brief, intermittent, and superficial public 28 contact. (Id. at 24.) As the ALJ thoroughly summarized the record, stated his 18 15cv1973 AJB(JMA) 1 interpretation of the facts, and made findings (see Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012), 2 the ALJ’s determination that Dr. Zink’s opinion was inconsistent with the 3 objective medical evidence in the record constitutes a specific and legitimate 4 reason to discount his opinion regarding Plaintiff’s functional abilities. 5 6 7 2. The ALJ Properly Found that Dr. Zink Lacked Longitudinal History The ALJ’s second proffered reason for discounting Dr. Zink’s opinion was 8 that Dr. Zink lacked a longitudinal history as he only saw Plaintiff between 9 February and December 2012. (Id. at 28.) Plaintiff argues this did not constitute 10 an adequate reason to discount Dr. Zink’s opinion, as Dr. Zink treated Plaintiff 11 the most and over the longest period of time, and thus his opinion should have 12 been given more weight. (Pl.’s Mot at 15-16.) 13 In analyzing and weighing treating physicians’ medical opinions, an ALJ will 14 consider several factors, including the length of a physician’s treatment and the 15 frequency of his or her examinations. Generally, an ALJ will give a physician’s 16 opinion more weight the longer he or she has treated the claimant and the more 17 times the physician has seen the claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)(i). 18 Additionally, the ALJ will give a medical source more weight when the source has 19 seen a claimant “long enough to have obtained a longitudinal picture of [her] 20 impairment.” Id. Here, the ALJ’s discounting of Dr. Zink’s opinion due to a lack of 21 longitudinal history constituted a specific and legitimate reason supported by 22 substantial evidence in the record. The ALJ explained, “Dr. Zink lacks a 23 longitudinal history and the records show the claimant has a positive response to 24 medications. Dr. Zink only saw the claimant approximately ten times between 25 February 22, 2012 and December 5, 2012.” (Admin R. at 28.) While it is correct, 26 as Plaintiff observes, that Dr. Zink treated Plaintiff the most and for the longest 27 period of time, Dr. Zink stopped treating Plaintiff in December 2012. After 28 December 2012, Plaintiff continued to experience a positive response to 19 15cv1973 AJB(JMA) 1 medication and her condition further improved. (Id. at 26.) The ALJ noted Dr. 2 Rahmani’s reports from August 2013, which stated Plaintiff did not have any 3 delusions, hallucinations, or mood swings. (Id.) Additionally, Plaintiff rated her 4 depression a three out of ten and Dr. Rahmani stated she was “stable on her 5 current medications.” (Id.) Analyzing the medical evidence as a whole, the ALJ 6 determined that through August 2013, Plaintiff’s “symptoms were essentially 7 controlled by medications.” (Id.) 8 As Dr. Zink stopped treating Plaintiff in December 2012, and Plaintiff had 9 continual improvement and success controlling her symptoms with medication 10 after that point, the ALJ could properly find Dr. Zink did not have a longitudinal 11 picture of Plaintiff’s condition and level of impairment. 12 3. 13 The ALJ Properly Discounted Dr. Zink’s Opinion Based on Plaintiff’s Positive Response to Medications 14 The ALJ discounted Dr. Zink’s opinion regarding Plaintiff’s level of 15 impairment, as Plaintiff’s medical records showed she had a positive response to 16 medications. (Id. at 28.) Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in doing so, as she asserts 17 that any improvements she experienced were either short-lived or incomplete. 18 (Pl.’s Mot. at 16.) Plaintiff further argues that even allowing that her condition 19 periodically improved with medication, the ALJ erroneously presumed the 20 improvements were so dramatic in scope and duration that her impairments 21 would no longer significantly impact her ability to function in a workplace. (Id. at 22 17.) 23 When considering the effect of medication on a claimant’s well-being, it is 24 error for an ALJ to deny a claimant is disabled merely because she has shown 25 improvement or experienced cycles of improvement. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1017. 26 An ALJ must interpret improvement in mental health issues “with an 27 understanding of the patient’s overall well-being” and “with an awareness that 28 improved functioning while being treated and while limiting environmental 20 15cv1973 AJB(JMA) 1 stressors does not always mean that a claimant can function effectively in a 2 workplace.” Id. In analyzing an individual’s overall well-being, the ALJ may 3 consider Plaintiff’s daily activities, treating therapist notes, and evidence 4 suggesting she has responded well to treatment. Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 5 254 (9th Cir. 1996). If an ALJ finds an impairment can be controlled with 6 treatment or medication, the impairment cannot be considered disabling. Warre 7 v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006). 8 9 The ALJ reviewed the record and determined Plaintiff’s symptoms were effectively controlled by medication. (Admin R. at 26.) First, the ALJ discussed 10 Plaintiff’s earlier improvements with treating psychiatrist, Dr. French. (Id.) Dr. 11 French reported Plaintiff responded positively to medications and that, after 12 prescribing Keppra, she experienced a “reduction in the target symptoms of 13 irritability and anger.” (Id.) The ALJ next analyzed the medical records of 14 Plaintiff’s later treating psychiatrists, Dr. Rahmani and, indeed, Dr. Zink, which 15 continued to show Plaintiff’s symptoms were “essentially controlled by 16 medications and exacerbations were due to noncompliance, unusual event 17 triggers or medication adjustments as needed.” (Id.) In August 2013, Dr. 18 Rahmani noted Plaintiff was taking her medications regularly, was aware she 19 would feel depressed or irritable without her medications, and, most importantly, 20 was stable on her medications. (Id.) The ALJ also analyzed Plaintiff’s daily 21 activities. (Id. at 26-27.) Plaintiff reported doing daily activities such as caring for 22 her personal needs, caring for her two pet dogs, doing household chores, 23 shopping for groceries, and talking on the phone with friends. (Id. at 26.) The ALJ 24 determined Plaintiff “has maintained a somewhat normal level of daily activity 25 and interaction” and the “household tasks and social interactions are consistent 26 with a significant degree of overall functioning.” (Id. at 27.) 27 28 The Court finds the ALJ’s discounting of Dr. Zink’s opinion due to Plaintiff’s positive response to medication constituted a specific and legitimate reason 21 15cv1973 AJB(JMA) 1 2 3 4 based on substantial evidence in the record. 4. The ALJ Properly Discounted Dr. Zink’s Opinion as it Relied on Plaintiff’s Credibility In a footnote, the ALJ articulated a fourth reason for discounting Dr. Zink’s 5 opinion: because it appeared Dr. Zink “accepted just about everything” Plaintiff 6 said, notwithstanding her lack of credibility. (Admin. R. at 28.) 7 If a claimant’s credibility is properly discounted, an ALJ may reject a 8 treating physician’s opinion if it is significantly based on a claimant’s self-reports. 9 Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008). In analyzing 10 credibility, an ALJ considers specific factors such as the claimant’s reputation for 11 truthfulness, inconsistencies in testimony or between testimony and conduct, 12 claimant’s daily activities, and work record, and testimony of physicians and third 13 parties. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, the ALJ 14 expressed concern about Plaintiff’s use of cannabis, commenting, “The credibility 15 of an individual who breaks laws by using/abusing illegal substances is always 16 suspect.” (Admin. R. at 27.) He also observed the inconsistency between 17 Plaintiff’s hearing testimony about her marijuana use−that she had last used 18 marijuana a month prior, but before that had not smoked marijuana for twenty 19 years−and the contrary information in her medical records that she uses 20 cannabis on a daily basis. (Id.) The ALJ also discussed Plaintiff’s application for 21 unemployment benefits, in which she stated she was able to work, and denied 22 being too sick or injured to work, during her period of alleged disability. (Id.) 23 Moreover, she testified that she had looked for work after her alleged onset date. 24 (Id.) The ALJ found these facts to be contradictory and a negative indication of 25 Plaintiff’s credibility. (Id.) 26 Plaintiff does not dispute the ALJ properly discounted her credibility. The 27 Court finds the ALJ had proper grounds to discount Dr. Zink’s opinion on the 28 grounds it relied heavily on Plaintiff’s self-reports. See Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 22 15cv1973 AJB(JMA) 1 1041. 2 B. 3 Dr. Bagner Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in discounting Dr. Bagner’s medical opinion 4 because he did not adequately explain how Dr. Bagner’s opinion was 5 inconsistent with the record as a whole, and because he could not properly 6 discount Dr. Bagner’s opinion simply because he was a non-treating source. 7 (Pl.’s Mot. at 18-19.) 8 As set forth above, Dr. Bagner assessed Plaintiff as mildly limited in 9 following simple oral and written instructions; moderately limited in following 10 detailed instructions, interacting with the public, coworkers, and supervisor, 11 complying with job rules, responding to changes in a routine work setting, and in 12 her daily activities; and severely limited in responding to work pressure in a usual 13 work setting. (Admin. R. at 490-91.) When rating the degree of functional 14 limitations, the SSA uses the following five-point scale: none, mild, moderate, 15 marked, and extreme. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a, 416.920a. Only functional 16 limitations of “marked” or higher are considered to be of sufficient degree of 17 limitation to satisfy the functional criterion equating to a severe impairment. See, 18 e.g., 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00 (requiring marked impairment- 19 related functional limitations to satisfy paragraph B criteria in mental disorder 20 listings). A “marked” degree of limitation exists when the impairment interferes 21 seriously with the ability to function independently, appropriately, effectively, and 22 on a sustained basis. Id. at § 12.00(C). 23 Dr. Bagner found Plaintiff had only one “severe” (i.e., “marked” or 24 “extreme”) functional limitation: her ability to respond to work pressure in a usual 25 work setting. (Admin. R. at 491.) The rest of her functional limitations were mild 26 or moderate. (Id. at 490-91.) It is not at all clear, as Plaintiff presumes, that 27 crediting Dr. Bagner’s opinion would lead to a finding of disability. Indeed, Dr. 28 Bagner found Plaintiff had a GAF score of 60, indicative of only moderate 23 15cv1973 AJB(JMA) 1 symptoms and difficulties. See supra note 3. Additionally, it is important to note 2 the ALJ did not discount the entirety of Dr. Bagner’s opinion. Rather, he stated, 3 4 5 6 7 8 Due consideration is given to the opinion of the consultative examiner, Dr. Bagner. Elements of the doctor’s opinion appear too restrictive based on the record as a whole. The medical consultant examined the claimant on a one-time basis and had no treating relationship with the claimant, which renders his opinions less persuasive [citations omitted]. The doctor’s opinion, to the degree that it is consistent with the objective medical evidence and consistent with the RFC [residual functional capacity] outlined in today’s Decision, is reflected in the RFC. 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (Admin. R. at 28.) While Plaintiff is arguably correct that the ALJ failed to identify specific evidence contradicting Dr. Bagner’s opinion, any such error was harmless. Plaintiff has failed to show that Dr. Bagner’s opinion would affect the RFC formulated by the ALJ or that it would help Plaintiff establish disability, as Dr. Bagner did not find that Plaintiff was disabled. Rather, he found she had functional limitations, only one of which−her ability to respond to work pressure in a usual work setting−he deemed “severe.” (Id. at 491.) The ALJ acknowledged and accounted for this and other limitations by restricting the type of work Plaintiff could perform to simple routine tasks, not in a fast-paced production environment, with only occasional interactions with supervisors and co-workers, and only brief, intermittent, and superficial public contact. (Id. at 24.) Furthermore, as the ALJ noted by observing that Dr. Bagner saw Plaintiff on only one occasion, Dr. Bagner did not have a longitudinal picture of Plaintiff’s impairments. Dr. Bagner evaluated Plaintiff in April 2012. According to the medical notes of Dr. Zink and Dr. Rahmani, Plaintiff’s condition improved thereafter. (See id. at 584-97, 662-66.) Dr. Bagner’s opinion, therefore, does not reflect an accurate depiction of Plaintiff’s condition, giving the ALJ sufficient grounds to discount it. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)(i). 24 15cv1973 AJB(JMA) The ALJ satisfied the substantial evidence requirement by “setting out a 1 2 detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, 3 stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 4 1012 (quotations and citation omitted). The Court concludes, after a thorough 5 review of the record as a whole, that there was substantial evidence supporting 6 the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical evidence, formulation of Plaintiff’s RFC, and 7 finding that Plaintiff is not disabled. 8 9 10 11 12 13 VII. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED and Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: September 8, 2016 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 25 15cv1973 AJB(JMA)
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
