Ibanga v. Holder, No. 3:2013cv02546 - Document 13 (S.D. Cal. 2014)
Court Description: ORDER Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. It is Ordered that Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, (ECF No. 1 ), is Denied. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter Final Judgment accordingly and to Terminate this case. Signed by Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel on 5/13/2014. (srm)
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Ibanga v. Holder Doc. 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 13 14 15 ELIJAH SAMUEL IBANGA, v. Petitioner, ERIC H. HOLDER, United States Attorney General, Respondent. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. 3:13-cv-2546-GPC (WVG) ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (ECF NO. 1) 16 17 18 INTRODUCTION 19 Petitioner Elijah Samuel Ibanga (“Petitioner”), proceeding with counsel and in 20 forma pauperis, is currently in the custody of the Department of Homeland Security 21 (“DHS”) pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (“Section 1226(c)” or “§ 1226(c)”). (ECF No. 22 8, Ex. D, at 30.) On July 22, 2013, Petitioner filed in the United States Court of 23 Appeals for the Ninth Circuit a petition for review of an order entered by the Board of 24 Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) on June 21, 2013, reinstating Petitioner’s removal 25 proceedings for a second time. (ECF No. 1 at 1.) The Ninth Circuit construed the 26 petition as an original petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 27 § 2241 (“Petition”), and transferred the Petition to this Court. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) Eric 28 H. Holder (“Respondent”) filed a return, asserting the petition should be dismissed. 3:13-cv-2546-GPC (WVG) Dockets.Justia.com 1 (ECF No 8 at 2.) Petitioner filed a traverse. (ECF No. 10.) After a thorough review of 2 the issues and the documents presented, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court 3 DENIES the petition for writ of habeas corpus. BACKGROUND 4 5 I. Procedural History 6 The facts underlying the Petition are largely undisputed. Petitioner, a native and 7 citizen of Nigeria, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident on 8 October 22, 1980. (ECF No. 8, Ex. A at 17.) On December 4, 1992, Petitioner was 9 convicted of violating California Penal Code (“CPC”) § 288(b) for Forcible Lewd Acts 10 on a Child under 14 and CPC § 288.5(a) for Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child and 11 sentenced to twenty-four years in prison. (ECF No. 8, Ex. B at 18.) On January 13, 12 2009, DHS served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) and transferred 13 Petitioner from a state psychiatric hospital to the custody of DHS. (ECF No. 8 at 2.) 14 DHS commenced removal proceedings against Petitioner as an aggravated felon. (ECF 15 No. 8, Ex. D at 28.) On September 9, 2010, an immigration judge (“IJ”) terminated 16 Petitioner’s removal proceedings, finding DHS had not served Petitioner with the NTA 17 in accordance with DHS regulations regarding service of process on individuals with 18 mental competency issues. (ECF No. 8 at 2.) DHS appealed the IJ’s decision, and on 19 March 7, 2011, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed the appeal. (ECF No. 20 8 at 2.) 21 On March 11, 2011, DHS re-served Petitioner with the NTA. (ECF No. 10 at 3.) 22 On December 7, 2011, the IJ again terminated removal proceedings, with prejudice, 23 after finding the DHS again failed to properly serve the NTA on Petitioner as someone 24 with mental competency issues. The IJ specifically found Petitioner was “not capable 25 of pleading to charges” and “incompetent mentally.” (ECF No. 8-1 at 29.) DHS 26 appealed to the BIA. (ECF No. 8 at 3.) 27 On June 21, 2013, the BIA vacated the IJ’s December 7, 2011 decision, 28 reinstated removal proceedings, and remanded the case to the IJ. (ECF No. 8 at 3.) On 2 3:13-cv-2546-GPC (WVG) 1 July 22, 2013, Petitioner filed his petition in the Ninth Circuit for review of the BIA’s 2 June 21, 2013 decision. (ECF No. 1.) 3 On August 27, 2013, the IJ administratively closed Petitioner’s removal 4 proceedings per the petition for review before the Ninth Circuit. (ECF No. 8, Ex. K.) 5 DHS appealed the IJ’s order to the BIA and that appeal remains pending. (ECF No. 8 6 at 3.) On October 21, 2013, the Ninth Circuit found it did not have jurisdiction to 7 review the BIA’s June 21, 2013 order because it was not a final order of removal. (ECF 8 No. 1 at 4.) The Ninth Circuit construed Petitioner’s argument that failure to review the 9 interlocutory BIA order may implicate the Suspension Clause as an original petition 10 for habeas corpus and transferred it to this Court. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) 11 II. Franco-Gonzalez Class Action 12 In 2013, Petitioner was named a member of the Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder class 13 action. (ECF No. 10 at 3.) There, plaintiffs, representing a class of mentally 14 incompetent individuals in DHS custody without counsel, claimed the right to 15 appointed counsel, the right to release under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and 16 the right to a detention hearing. Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV 10-02211, 2013 17 WL 3674492, at *2 (C.D. Cal Apr. 23, 2013). On April 23, 2013, the court overseeing 18 the class action ordered that (1) plaintiffs were entitled to appointment of a “qualified 19 representative” to assist them in their removal and detention proceedings, and (2) all 20 class members be afforded a bond hearing before an IJ after 180 days in detention, at 21 which the government must justify further detention by proving the alien is a flight risk 22 or danger to the community. (ECF No. 8, Ex. H, at 51, 56.) As a result, the Executive 23 Office for Immigration Review appointed Petitioner a “qualified representative,” (ECF 24 No. 10 at 4), and on May 21, 2013, petitioner was afforded an IJ bond hearing, at which 25 the IJ denied bond after finding Petitioner posed too great a danger to the community. 26 (ECF No. 8 at 3.) Petitioner appealed the custody decision to the BIA on the basis that 27 he had demonstrated good cause for a continuance of his bond hearing. (ECF No. 8 at 28 3.) 3 3:13-cv-2546-GPC (WVG) 1 On November 7, 2013, the BIA sustained Petitioner’s appeal of his bond 2 decision and remanded the matter to the IJ for Petitioner to “be given a further 3 opportunity to present any evidence in support of his release on bond.” (ECF No. 8 at 4 3.) On January 30, 2014, the IJ again found that Petitioner was a danger to the 5 community and denied bond. (ECF No. 12 at 3.) 6 On February 4, 2014, an IJ held a master calendar hearing in Petitioner’s removal 7 proceedings, which was continued to March 12, 2014 upon Petitioner’s attorney’s 8 request. (ECF No. 12 at 1.) DISCUSSION 9 10 Respondent contends Petitioner seeks review of an interlocutory order of the 11 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) reinstating his removal proceedings and 12 remanding the matter to the immigration judge, and under the REAL ID Act, this Court 13 lacks jurisdiction to review challenges to decide legal questions “arising from” removal 14 proceedings. (ECF No. 8 at 2.) 15 Petitioner responds that he filed a petition for review mainly out of concern for 16 his prolonged and possibly indefinite detention while DHS grapples with its own 17 service of process rules regarding persons with mental competency issues. (ECF No. 18 10 at 7.) Petitioner contends the lack of judicial review available to him while trapped 19 in this indefinite cycle of terminating and reinstating his removal proceedings violates 20 the Suspension Clause, and, as such, this Court has jurisdiction over the matter as an 21 original petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Id.) 22 Respondent counters that, to the extent Petitioner is challenging his detention, 23 the petition should be dismissed because (1) Petitioner has already sought and obtained 24 relief relating to his detention as a class member in the Franco-Gonzalez action, and 25 (2) he has not exhausted his administrative remedies. (ECF No. 8 at 2.) 26 Petitioner responds that (1) his issues are distinct from those presented in the 27 Franco-Gonzalez action, and (2) because the exhaustion requirement is prudential and 28 not jurisdictional, the Court should review the Petition despite his failure to exhaust 4 3:13-cv-2546-GPC (WVG) 1 administrative remedies. (ECF No. 10 at 7-10). 2 I. Legal Standard 3 “A federal district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus if, as Petitioner 4 contends here, the prisoner is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 5 treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Espinoza v. Aitken, No. 13-CV- 6 00512, 2013 WL 1087492, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2013). 7 Petitioner is currently detained under Section 1226(c), which “subjects certain 8 aliens who are deportable or inadmissible on account of their criminal history to 9 mandatory detention pending proceedings to remove them from the United States.” 10 Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2013). The government’s 11 “statutory mandatory detention authority” under § 1226(c) is “limited to a six month 12 period subject to a finding of flight risk or dangerousness.” Id. at 1133. Detention 13 becomes “prolonged” at six months, at which time the government must provide the 14 detainee with a bond hearing. Id. At 1139. 15 II. Analysis 16 A. Jurisdiction 17 Pursuant to the REAL ID Act of 2005, a petition for review to the appropriate 18 court of appeals is the “sole and exclusive means for judicial review” of a final order 19 of removal, deportation, or exclusion, and district courts do not have statutory or non- 20 statutory habeas jurisdiction over such orders. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252; Martinez–Rosas 21 v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 926, 928-29 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, Petitioner’s removal 22 proceedings are still ongoing, and there has been no final order of removal. (ECF No. 23 10 at 5.) However, the REAL ID Act only eliminates habeas review over challenges to 24 removal orders; it does not preclude habeas review over challenges to detention that 25 are independent of challenges to removal orders. (ECF No. 10 at 6) (citing H.R. Rep. 26 No. 109-72, at 175 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 240, 300). 27 Respondent argues that Petitioner is “asking this Court to review legal issues that 28 ‘arise from’ his ongoing removal proceedings,” construing the petition as to “primarily 5 3:13-cv-2546-GPC (WVG) 1 challenge the interlocutory BIA decision to reinstate removal proceedings,” and not as 2 an “independent challenge to [Petitioner’s] detention.” (ECF No. 8 at 4-5.) The focus 3 of the Petition, however, is not the BIA’s decision itself, but rather Petitioner’s 4 “continued detention despite his removal case having been twice terminated.” (ECF 5 No. 10 at 7.) Petitioner is challenging the “cycle of continued removal proceedings” 6 as raising “serious constitutional concerns” under the Suspension Clause. (ECF No. 10 7 at 9, 11.) Petitioner’s habeas challenge to the ongoing cycle itself is an independent 8 challenge to Petitioner’s detention, and does not “arise from” his ongoing removal 9 proceedings. Accordingly, the Court has federal habeas jurisdiction over the Petition 10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 11 B. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies 12 Respondent further asserts the Court should dismiss the Petition because 13 Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. (ECF No. 8 at 2.) Petitioner 14 responds that the exhaustion requirement is prudential rather than jurisdictional, and 15 as such, because of the circumstances of Petitioner’s case, the Court should waive the 16 exhaustion requirement. (ECF No. 10 at 11.) 17 28 U.S.C. § 2241 “does not specifically require petitioners to exhaust direct 18 appeals before filing petitions for habeas corpus.” Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 997 19 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir.2001)). 20 Nonetheless, courts “require, as a prudential matter, that habeas petitioners exhaust 21 available judicial remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Id. Although courts 22 “have discretion to waive the exhaustion requirement when it is prudentially required, 23 this discretion is not unfettered.” Id. Prudential considerations that weigh in favor of 24 requiring agency exhaustion are whether “(1) agency expertise makes agency 25 consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) 26 relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the 27 administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to 28 correct its own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review.” Noriega-Lopez 6 3:13-cv-2546-GPC (WVG) 1 v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874, 881 (9th Cir. 2003). 2 In Noriega-Lopez, after the IJ found DHS had failed to prove by clear and 3 convincing evidence that the petitioner had been convicted of the felony for which he 4 was being deported under 8 U.S.C. § 1227, the BIA reversed this finding and sua 5 sponte ordered the petitioner be removed from the United States. Id. at 877. The 6 petitioner filed a habeas petition, which the district court denied on the merits despite 7 the fact that petitioner had failed to file a motion for reconsideration before the BIA. 8 Id. The Ninth Circuit found the district court had properly waived the exhaustion 9 requirement where (1) there was a proper record available, (2) there was “no deliberate 10 bypass of the administrative scheme,” and (3) the only avenue of relief available to the 11 petitioner “was not available as of right, so there [was] no basis for concluding that the 12 filing of such a motion [for reconsideration] would likely have precluded the need for 13 judicial review.” Id. at 881. Similarly, in Marquez v. I.N.S., the petitioner, originally 14 from Cuba, had been detained indefinitely because Cuba would not accept his 15 repatriation, despite case law limiting detention without a bond hearing to a six-month 16 period. 346 F.3d 892, 896 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit found that, under these 17 circumstances, the district court properly waived exhaustion. See id. at 897. 18 Conversely, in Leonardo v. Crawford, the government had afforded the 19 petitioner a bond hearing, at which the IJ denied bond. 646 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 20 2011). Rather than appeal this decision to the BIA, the petitioner “pursued habeas 21 review of the IJ’s bond determination.” Id. The court found such a short cut 22 “improper,” and held that the petitioner “should have exhausted administrative 23 remedies by appealing to the BIA before asking the federal district court to review the 24 IJ’s decision.” Id. at 1160. 25 Here, at Petitioner’s second bond hearing, the IJ again denied bond, finding 26 Petitioner to be a “danger to the community.” (ECF No. 12 at 1.) “Once an alien has 27 received a bond hearing before an IJ, he may appeal the IJ’s decision to the BIA.” 28 Leonardo, 646 F.3d at 1159. If an alien is “dissatisfied with the BIA’s decision, he may 7 3:13-cv-2546-GPC (WVG) 1 then file a habeas petition in the district court, challenging his continued detention.” 2 Id. Thus, because Petitioner sought habeas review prior to appealing the IJ’s second 3 bond determination, Petitioner has not satisfied the exhaustion requirement. 4 Petitioner argues, however, that, “provided the length of his detention and the 5 lack of remedies available to him, his case [weighs] in favor of waiving [the 6 exhaustion] requirement.” (ECF No. 10 at 10.) Furthermore, because Petitioner’s case 7 has already been before the BIA on numerous occasions, not only is there a “proper 8 record available,” but waiving the requirement here would not “encourage the 9 deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme.” Noriega-Lopez, 335 F.3d at 881. 10 Similar to Marquez and Noriega-Lopez, where further administrative review likely 11 would have obviated the need for judicial review, further administrative review here 12 is not going to “preclude the need for judicial review” because Petitioner is challenging 13 the continuous and indefinite cycle of administrative review itself. Id. Accordingly, the 14 Court concludes Petitioner here has “demonstrated grounds for excusing the exhaustion 15 requirement.” Leonardo, 646 F.3d at 1161. 16 C. Petitioner’s Participation in the Franco-Gonzalez Litigation 17 “When a complainant is a member in a class action seeking the same relief as the 18 individual complaint, a district court may dismiss those portions of the complaint 19 which duplicate the class action’s allegations and prayer for relief.” Pride v. Correa, 20 719 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890, 893 (9th 21 Cir. 1979)). “A court may choose not to exercise its jurisdiction when another court 22 having jurisdiction over the same matter has entertained it and can achieve the same 23 result.” Crawford, 599 F.2d at 893. A district court may not, however, dismiss 24 allegations in an overlapping complaint that “go beyond the allegations and relief 25 prayed for in the class action.” Pride, 719 F.3d at 1133. 26 In Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, the court addressed a habeas class action brought 27 on behalf of individuals with “a serious mental disorder or defect that may render them 28 incompetent to represent themselves in detention or removal proceedings, who 8 3:13-cv-2546-GPC (WVG) 1 presently lack counsel in their detention or removal proceedings,” and “who ha[d] been 2 detained for more than six months.” 2013 WL 3674492, at *2. The court held that: (1) 3 the “plaintiffs are entitled to the reasonable accommodation of 4 appointment of a Qualified Representative to assist them in their removal 5 and detention proceedings,” and (2) 6 “class members who are detained beyond a reasonable period are entitled 7 to a custody redetermination hearing, at which the Government bears the 8 burden of justifying their continued detention by clear and convincing 9 evidence.” Id. at *9, 13. 10 On May 21, 2013, the government afforded Petitioner an IJ bond hearing, at 11 which the IJ denied bond after finding Petitioner posed too great a danger to the 12 community. (ECF No. 8 at 3.) Petitioner appealed, and on November 7, 2013, the BIA 13 sustained the appeal and remanded the bond proceedings to the IJ for Petitioner to “be 14 given a further opportunity to present any evidence in support of his release on bond.” 15 (ECF No. 8 at 3.) On January 30, 2014, the IJ again found that Petitioner was a danger 16 to the community and denied bond. (ECF No. 12 at 3.) 17 Here, while Petitioner is again challenging his prolonged detention under § 18 1226(c), Petitioner also argues the Suspension Clause is implicated because the “cycle 19 of continued removal proceedings is problematic” and “allows the Government to 20 continue to re-serve the NTA unless and until [Petitioner] is either required to move 21 forward with removal proceedings despite his mental state, or is issued an order of 22 deportation, all while remaining detained.” (ECF No. 10 at 9.) It is thus clear that 23 Petitioner is challenging more than his prolonged detention; he is challenging his 24 indefinitely long cycle of removal proceedings, which have been twice terminated and 25 reinstated due to DHS’s failure to properly serve Petitioner with the NTA. (ECF No. 26 10 at 9.) The Court therefore concludes Petitioner is not precluded from raising his 27 Suspension Clause claim here. 28 /// 9 3:13-cv-2546-GPC (WVG) 1 D. Suspension Clause 2 The Constitution provides that “the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall 3 not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may 4 require it.” U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, Cl. 2. The Suspension Clause “ensures that, except 5 during periods of formal suspension, the Judiciary will have a time-tested device, the 6 [habeas corpus] writ, to maintain ‘the delicate balance of governance’ that is itself the 7 surest safeguard of liberty.” Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 745 (2008) (quoting 8 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004)). 9 In Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality under 10 the Suspension Clause of the 2005 Detainee Treatment Act (“DTA”) and the Military 11 Commissions Act. 553 U.S. at 732-33. The MCA mandated that “no court, justice, or 12 judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas 13 corpus.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1). The DTA provided alternative procedures under 14 which the detainees could challenge their detention and limited review of those 15 procedures to the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 16 777. Under the DTA, however, courts of appeals had “jurisdiction not to inquire into 17 the legality of the detention generally, but only to assess whether the combatant status 18 review tribunal (“CSRT”) complied with the ‘standards and procedures specified by 19 the Secretary of Defense’ and whether those standards and procedures [we]re lawful.” 20 Id. With this minimal amount of judicial review in mind, the Supreme Court held the 21 procedures set forth in the DTA for review of detainees’ status were “not an adequate 22 and effective substitute for habeas corpus,” and therefore the jurisdiction-stripping 23 provision of the MCA “operate[d] as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ [of 24 habeas corpus].” Id. at 732-33. 25 The Supreme Court explained that, to determine whether an alternative 26 procedure sufficiently “entitles the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate 27 that he is being held pursuant to ‘the erroneous application or interpretation’ of relevant 28 law,” courts should look to “the sum total of procedural protections afforded to the 10 3:13-cv-2546-GPC (WVG) 1 detainee at all stages, direct and collateral.” Id. at 779, 783. In that context, the Court 2 stated that, “for the writ of habeas corpus, or its substitute, to function as an effective 3 and proper remedy,” the court conducting “the habeas proceeding must have the means 4 to correct errors that occurred during the CSRT proceedings.” Id. at 786. Because the 5 DTA precluded the courts of appeals from admitting “newly discovered evidence that 6 could not have been made part of the CSRT record,” and because such evidence could 7 be “critical to the detainee’s argument that he is not an enemy combatant and there is 8 no cause to detain him,” the court found the DTA’s review provisions were not “an 9 adequate substitute for the writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 792. 10 In habeas proceedings challenging prolonged detention under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 11 and 1226, courts generally grant relief in the form of bond hearings, at which the 12 government has the burden of proof to establish that the alien is a flight risk or a danger 13 to the community to justify further detention. See, e.g., Robbins, 715 F.3d at 1133 14 (construing government’s “mandatory detention authority under 1226(c)” as limited to 15 a six-month period, at which time government must provide detainee with bond 16 hearing); Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1249 (9th Cir. 2005) (ordering government 17 to provide detainee with bond hearing); Rodriguez v. Holder, No. CV 07-3239, 2013 18 WL 5229795, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2013) (noting petitioners detained under § 19 1226(c) should be afforded bond hearings after six months of detention). If an alien 20 is dissatisfied with his or her bond determination, he or she may file a habeas petition 21 in the appropriate district court. Leonardo, 646 F.3d at 1159. 22 Having considered these procedures, the Court concludes that prolonged and 23 even indefinite detention under § 1226(c) does not violate the Suspension Clause 24 because such detention is subject to a six-month limit, at which time the government 25 must provide the detainee with a bond hearing. Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1242. And, because 26 the burden is on the government at that time to prove that the detainee is either a flight 27 risk or a danger to the community, the Court finds that such a hearing is an adequate 28 substitute for habeas corpus review. Robbins, 715 F.3d at 1133. Moreover, further 11 3:13-cv-2546-GPC (WVG) 1 judicial review is provided in that a detainee may challenge a dissatisfactory bond 2 determination by filing a habeas petition in the appropriate district court. Leonardo, 3 646 F.3d at 1159. 4 Although Petitioner has been in detention for a prolonged time period, and has 5 been subject to this cycle of removal proceedings, Petitioner has been provided with 6 two separate bond hearings. (ECF No. 12 at 3.) And Petitioner does not now challenge 7 the IJ’s determination that Petitioner poses a danger to the community. As such, the 8 Court concludes Petitioner’s detention under § 1226(c) does not violate the Suspension 9 Clause. 10 E. Evidentiary Hearing 11 The Court directed Respondent to “make a recommendation regarding the need 12 for an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the Petition.” (ECF No. 5.) Respondent 13 argues an evidentiary hearing is “unnecessary because Petitioner is not entitled to relief 14 based on the undisputed facts of this case.” (ECF No. 8 at 10) (citing McCowan v. 15 Nelson, 436 F.2d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 1970)). Petitioner does not address the legal 16 standard, but asserts that, because Petitioner’s case “presents a unique and complex 17 history,” an evidentiary hearing “would be useful to determine the remedy that would 18 be appropriate for this case where he presents with a serious mental health disorder.” 19 (ECF No. 10 at 12.) 20 “In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must 21 consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s 22 factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.” 23 Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007). If the record precludes habeas relief, 24 the Court is “not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Id.; see also McCowan, 436 25 F.2d at 761 (holding that “if on the undisputed facts it appears as a matter of law that 26 petitioner is not entitled to relief, an evidentiary hearing is not required”) (citing Wright 27 v. Dickson, 336 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1964)). 28 Here, Petitioner does not dispute the facts of the case, and presents no factual 12 3:13-cv-2546-GPC (WVG) 1 allegations that, if true, would “entitle [Petitioner] to federal habeas relief.” Landrigan, 2 550 U.S. at 474. Therefore, because “on the undisputed facts it appears as a matter of 3 law that petitioner is not entitled to relief,” McCowan, 436 F.2d at 761, the Court finds 4 that an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the Petition is not required. CONCLUSION & ORDER 5 6 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s 7 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, (ECF No. 1), is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is 8 directed to enter FINAL JUDGMENT accordingly and then to TERMINATE this 9 case. 10 11 12 DATED: May 13, 2014 HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13 3:13-cv-2546-GPC (WVG)
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