Nadolski v. Winchester et al, No. 3:2013cv02370 - Document 35 (S.D. Cal. 2014)
Court Description: ORDER Granting Motions to Dismiss 13 , 14 , 15 with prejudice. Signed by Judge Larry Alan Burns on 8/6/14. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(kas)
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Nadolski v. Winchester et al Doc. 35 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOSEPH NADOLSKI, CASE NO. 13-CV-2370-LAB-DHB Plaintiff, 12 ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS vs. 13 14 MARY WINCHESTER, et al., Defendants. 15 16 17 Plaintiff Joseph Nadolski alleges that his constitutional rights were violated during a 18 dispute in family court, and he has sued a number of parties under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 whom 19 he believes are responsible. Now before the Court are their motions to dismiss. 20 I. Introduction 21 On August 22, 2012, Nadolski’s ex-wife obtained a TRO against him in San Diego 22 Superior Court. The TRO, which was issued by Defendant Judge Gregory Pollack, restricted 23 Nadolski’s contact with his ex-wife and two children. It also required him to surrender his 24 firearms. Nadolski’s claims arise out of his dissatisfaction with this TRO. 25 Nadolski alleges that during the TRO hearing Defendant Victoria Rothman, who was 26 the attorney for Nadolski’s ex-wife, and Defendant Mary Winchester, who was an investigator 27 for Defendant Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), provided “false and 28 histrionic” testimony that led to the TRO being granted. (Compl. ¶ 28.) Nadolski also alleges -1Dockets.Justia.com 1 that, prior to the hearing, a mediator who Nadolski has identified as John Doe interviewed 2 the children and helped prepare false and unethical declarations. 3 Nadolski also alleges that HHS’s investigation of alleged child abuse wasn’t thorough. 4 Winchester conducted the investigation, and Defendants Asoera and Weathersby 5 supervised her. Nadolski maintains that their supervision was insufficient, and that 6 Defendant Nick Macchione, the Director of the Department of Health and Human Resources, 7 failed to staff the Department with competent investigators. Finally, he claims that “The 8 Superior Court of California, San Diego County also did not provide the Plaintiff with the 9 same resources it provides to protect Plaintiff’s constitutional rights the court deprived him 10 of, but provided resources to aid in violating those rights.” (Compl. ¶ 2.) Nadolski doesn’t 11 specify how the court’s resources were unfairly distributed. 12 On September 11, 2012, Judge Pollack conducted a second hearing and concluded 13 that a permanent restraining order wasn’t necessary. Nadolski’s jumble of allegations also 14 include that another judge, Defendant Judge Trentacosta, violated his constitutional rights, 15 but he never explains how or identifies what role Judge Trentacosta played in the TRO 16 process. (Compl. ¶ 49.) 17 II. Legal Standard 18 A 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim challenges the legal sufficiency 19 of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court must accept 20 all factual allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to Nadolski. 21 Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Nat’l League of Postmasters of U.S., 497 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 22 2007). To defeat the Defendants’ motions to dismiss, Nadolski’s factual allegations needn’t 23 be detailed, but they must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative 24 level . . . .” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). That is, “some threshold 25 of plausibility must be crossed at the outset” before a case can go forward. Id. at 558 26 (internal quotations omitted). A claim has “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 27 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 28 the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility -2- 1 standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility 2 that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. 3 While the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in Nadolski’s favor, it need not 4 “necessarily assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form 5 of factual allegations.” Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 6 2003) (internal quotations omitted). In fact, the Court does not need to accept any legal 7 conclusions as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A complaint does not suffice “if it tenders naked 8 assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Nor 9 does it suffice if it contains a merely formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action. 10 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 11 Because Nadolski is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his pleadings liberally, 12 and affords him the benefit of any doubt. See Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 13 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). Of course, “[p]ro se litigants must follow the same rules of 14 procedure that govern other litigants.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 15 III. Discussion 16 Nadolski claims that, by their actions, each Defendant violated his constitutional rights 17 under § 1983. Three separate motions to dismiss have been filed. The first is from Judge 18 Pollack, Judge Trentacosta, and the California Superior Court. They argue that Nadolski’s 19 claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, and that they are immune from suit. The 20 second motion to dismiss is from HHS, Winchester, Asoera, Macchione, Weathersby, and 21 San Diego County. They also argue that Nadolski’s claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman 22 Doctrine, and also that he has failed to plead a sufficient cause of action under § 1983. The 23 final motion to dismiss is from Rothman, who makes the same two arguments. 24 The Court finds three problems with Nadolski’s claims. First, the claims are 25 inadequately pled. All that is clear from Nadolski’s complaint is that he believes the issuance 26 of the TRO violated his rights. The problem might be corrected with an amended complaint, 27 but that leads to a discussion of the other two problems. These are: (1) that his claims are 28 barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; and (2) that Judge Pollack, Judge Trentacosta, and -3- 1 the California Superior Court enjoy immunity from being sued on account of their judicial 2 functions. 3 A. 4 Nadolski alleges that the Defendants “violated his constitutional rights under the color 5 of law.” (Compl. ¶ 2.) The claim lacks specificity. Section 1983 is not a source of substantive 6 rights. Rather, it creates liability for those who deprive another of rights or privileges secured 7 by the U.S. Constitution or federal law while acting under the color of state law. Albright v. 8 Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1992). Failure to Plead a Sufficient Cause of Action Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 9 In this case, Nadolski has vaguely alleged that his Second, Fourth, Fifth, and 10 Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated, but it’s unclear how he arrives at those claims 11 from his factual contentions, namely that Winchester and Rothman made false and 12 damaging statements, that The Department of Health and Human Services has a generally 13 inadequate investigations process, and that the Superior Court did not provide him with the 14 same resources that it provided to others. His complaint fails to make the connection. The 15 claims he alleges against each Defendant simply re-allege and incorporate by reference the 16 preceding facts and then state ““Plaintiff claims damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the 17 injuries set forth above against [Defendant] for violation of his constitutional rights under 18 color of law.” This is conclusory form language that is insufficient for pleading purposes. 19 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 at 663 (“[T]he tenet that a court must accept a complaint's allegations 20 as true is inapplicable to threadbare recitals of a cause of action's elements, supported by 21 mere conclusory statements.”). 22 Even if the Court disregards the conclusory nature of Nadolski’s claims, and instead 23 attempts to piece his claims together for him, the facts that Nadolski alleges are similarly 24 conclusory and unsupported. For instance, Nadolski explains that Defendant Winchester 25 sent him a letter indicating that the charge of general abuse against him was substantiated, 26 but that the letter was silent about the other charges against him that were investigated. 27 (Compl. ¶ 31.) Nadolski claims that this indicates “clearly Ms Winchester continues to abuse 28 her power. She clearly is trying to falsely testify or mislead the court in this case and -4- 1 continues to infringe on the constitutional rights of this family.” (Compl. ¶ 31). But that 2 doesn’t logically follow. Nadolski has simply arrived at the legal conclusion that Winchester 3 intentionally misled the family court and infringed upon the constitutional rights of him and 4 his family without providing a clear factual basis for the charge. Similarly, Nadolski’s 5 assertion that “The Superior Court of California, San Diego County also did not provide the 6 Plaintiff with the same resources it provides to protect Plaintiff’s constitutional rights the court 7 deprived him of, but provided resources to aid in violating those rights” is completely bare. 8 (Compl. ¶ 2.) Nadolski offers no facts that explain what resources he was denied, or how 9 the resources he was given were comparatively inadequate. 10 Even if Nadolski alleged a more robust set of facts, his claims would still be 11 problematic. For example, there is no legal remedy available to Nadolski for his claims that 12 Defendants Rothman and Winchester testified falsely, because a “false testimony” 13 constitutional claim does not exist under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 14 325, 327 n.1 (1983) (“The Court . . . has not held that the false testimony of a police officer 15 in itself violates constitutional rights.”). Furthermore, the claim that HHS has an inadequate 16 investigations process also presents no clearly cognizable constitutional violation. 17 18 In sum, the Court agrees that Nadolski’s claims are inadequately pled, which subjects them to dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 19 B. 20 Were the Court to give Nadolski leave to amend his complaint to correct the noted 21 deficiencies, there is still a larger, jurisdictional problem. Under the Rooker-Feldman 22 doctrine, federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to hear what are in essence appeals 23 from state court judgments. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus Corp., 544 U.S. 24 280, 283-84 (2005); Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 778 (9th Cir. 2012) (“It is a forbidden 25 de facto appeal from state-court judgment, under Rooker–Feldman doctrine, when plaintiff 26 in federal district court complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court, 27 and seeks relief from the judgment of that court.”). 28 federal court action are “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s decision such that the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine -5- Furthermore, If claims raised in the 1 adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or require the district court 2 to interpret the application of state laws, then the federal complaint must be dismissed for 3 lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003). 4 This doctrine even applies when the challenge to the state court’s decision involves federal 5 constitutional issues. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468, 1471–72 (9th Cir.1985). In this case, Nadolski seeks damages and injunctive relief based on the outcome of 6 7 proceedings in San Diego Superior Court. This falls squarely into the jurisdictional 8 prohibition of Rooker-Feldman. It is well-established that when a plaintiff brings a claim to 9 federal court that challenges the outcome of proceedings in family court, such a claim is 10 barred by the doctrine. See Phifer v. City of New York, 289 F.3d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 2002) 11 (holding that a mother’s constitutional claims attacking a custody decision made in state 12 court were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Mellema v. Washoe County Dist. Atty, 13 2012 WL 5289345 at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2012) (holding that a plaintiff’s claims against the 14 county seeking cancellation of child support payments and a reversal of a custody decision 15 in state court were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Prater v. City of Philadelphia 16 Family Court, 2014 WL 2700095 at *2 (3d Cir. June 16, 2014) (holding that a father’s claims 17 against the family court that refused to give him custody of his child were barred by the 18 Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Stratton v. Mecklenburg County Dept. of Social Services, 521 19 F. App’x. 278, 292 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that the plaintiff’s constitutional claims were, in 20 essence, an attempt to reverse the state court decision that required him to relinquish 21 custody of his children, and thus were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine). Nadolski’s 22 claims are a similar attempt to challenge, here in federal court, an adverse family court ruling 23 in state court. These claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 24 C. 25 In additional to Nadolski’s claims being barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the 26 claims against the California Superior Court, Judge Pollack, and Judge Trentacosta are 27 barred due to their immunity. 28 // Eleventh Amendment and Judicial Immunity -6- 1 The Eleventh Amendment bars lawsuits against an arm of the state under principles 2 of sovereign immunity. Franceschi v. Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1995). California 3 superior courts are classified as arms of the state, and therefore are protected by this 4 immunity. Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 5 2003); Greater Los Angeles Council of Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 6 1987). 7 Judicial officers are also, for the most part, immune from civil liability for acts 8 performed in their judicial capacity. Mireles v. Waco , 502 U.S. 9 (1991) (per curiam); Mullis 9 v. United States. Bankr. Ct., 828 F.2d, 1385, 1394 (9th Cir. 1987). A judge can be 10 considered to be acting in his judicial capacity when the act is a function normally performed 11 by a judge, and the plaintiff dealt with the judge in his or her judicial capacity. Stump v. 12 Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978). The only situations in which this immunity does not 13 apply are when the judge’s actions are (1) nonjudicial; or (2) judicial in nature, but taken in 14 the complete absence of jurisdiction. In this case, Nadolski dealt with Judge Pollack solely 15 in his judicial capacities at the family court proceedings. It is unclear from the complaint what 16 the nature of Judge Trentacosta’s actions were that caused Nadolski dissatisfaction, but the 17 Court will assume that any dealings between Nadolski and Judge Trentacosta were solely 18 judicial. Judicial immunity, therefore, bars Nadolski’s claims against Judge Pollack and 19 Judge Trentacosta. 20 D. 21 Nadolski, in his prayer for relief, seeks a finding that the “Lautner” Amendment, which Second Amendment Claim 22 presumably means the Lautenberg Amendment, is unconstitutional. 23 Amendment bans possession of firearms by individuals who have had a restraining order 24 issued against them because of accusations of domestic violence. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). 25 As a result of the TRO issued against Nadolski, officers forced him to surrender or sell his 26 firearms, and Nadolski is unhappy with this. He has failed, however, to name a proper 27 defendant for this claim, and instead he merely requests that the Court “[e]nter an order 28 declaring the Lautner amendment unconstitutional and portions of California law 273.5. The -7- The Lautenberg 1 statues forcing the sale or confiscation of firearms without due process violates the 2nd 2 amendment of the United States.” If Nadolski believes his Second Amendment rights have 3 been violated, he must bring a proper claim against the proper defendant, rather than 4 request a declaratory constitutional finding in his prayer for relief. 5 IV. Conclusion 6 Nadolski’s complaint fails to state a claim against any of the listed Defendants for 7 which relief may be granted. His claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not allege any violation 8 of his constitutional rights by Defendants Winchester, Weathersby, Rothman, Asoera, Doe, 9 Macchione, San Diego County, and the Department of Health and Human Services, and 10 even if his complaint were amended to allege more specific facts, his claims would still be 11 barred by the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. Their motions to dismiss are therefore GRANTED 12 and Nadolski’s claims against these Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The 13 Superior Court of California is protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity and Judge 14 Pollack and Judge Trentacosta are protected by judicial immunity. Their motions are also 15 GRANTED and Nadolski’s claims against these Defendants are DISMISSED WITH 16 PREJUDICE. 17 18 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: August 6, 2014 20 21 HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -8-
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