Collins v. San Diego Metropolitan Transit System et al, No. 3:2013cv00960 - Document 31 (S.D. Cal. 2014)
Court Description: ORDER granting Defendant's 24 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Plaintiffs claims against Officer D. Belvis and MTS are dismissed without leave to amend. Signed by Judge Anthony J. Battaglia on 6/4/14. (cge)
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Collins v. San Diego Metropolitan Transit System et al Doc. 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 VICTOR COLLINS, an Individual, 9 10 v. Plaintiff, SAN DIEGO METROPOLITAN TRANSIT SYSTEM; OFFICER D. 12 BELVIS; OFFICER F. MOYA; UNIVERSAL SERVICES OF 13 AMERICA, INC.; AND DOES 1-10, INCLUSIVE, 11 14 Defendants. 15 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO. 3:13-cv-0960-AJB-WMC ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS [Doc. No. 27] 16 Presently before the Court is Defendants San Diego Metropolitan Transit System 17 18 (“MTS”) and Officer D. Belvis’ (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 19 24) Plaintiff Victor Collins’ (“Plaintiff”) Fourth Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (Doc. No. 20 23). For the third time, Defendants seek a dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to 21 state a claim. For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 The instant action arises from an incident that occurred on April 12, 2012, on the 24 San Diego Blue Line trolley. (Doc. No. 23 at 2.) Plaintiff alleges that Officer Belvis, an 25 employee of MTS, and Officer Moya, an employee of Universal Services of America, 26 conducted a fare inspection of Plaintiff’s ticket. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that, after 27 he provided a valid ticket, Officer Belvis hesitated to return the ticket and Officer Moya 28 1 13cv960 AJB (WMC) Dockets.Justia.com 1 told Plaintiff “I will deny you service.” Officers Belvis and Moya then escorted Plaintiff 2 off the trolley at the subsequent stop. (Id. at 2-3.) 3 As the officers escorted Plaintiff off the trolley, Officer Moya allegedly took 4 Plaintiff’s computer case, dropped it on the floor with unnecessary force, and then used 5 extreme force while applying hand restraints on Plaintiff. (Id. at 3) According to Officer 6 Belvis’s report, he had been attempting to conduct a welfare check on Plaintiff, who was 7 combative and non responsive. (Id. at 4.) After restraining Plaintiff, the officers then 8 asked if there were any illegal drugs or weapons in the computer case, if Plaintiff was the 9 subject of any outstanding warrants, and if he was under the influence of drugs, alcohol, 10 or medication. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff further claims that at this time, he declared to Officer 11 Belvis that he wanted to speak to an attorney and elected not to respond any questions. 12 (Id.) After fifty minutes, Officer Williams of the San Diego Police Department arrived 13 and Plaintiff was cited for failure to comply with a lawful order. (Id.) On October 19, 14 2012, Plaintiff appeared at a state trial to argue the citation. (Id. at 4.) The state court 15 ordered Plaintiff to pay a $275 fine by working at a non-profit organization. (Id.) 16 Plaintiff appealed and on June 7, 2013, “an Order was signed reversing the judgment by 17 the trial court, by unanimous decision of the reviewing judges.” (Id. 9.) An examination 18 of the appellate court decision shows that the panel reversed the lower court judgment 19 and remanded for further proceedings. (Doc. No. 17 at Ex. A, Minute Order, Appellate 20 Case Number: CA244035.) 21 Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on May 7, 2013, alleging five 22 causes of action: (1) malicious prosecution; (2) abuse of process; (3) violation of civil 23 rights; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (5) damage to personal 24 property. (Doc. No. 5.) After several rounds of motions to dismiss filed by Defendants, 25 Plaintiff’s only remaining claim is a violation of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 26 1983 as to all Defendants. Defendants once again seek a dismissal of this claim under 27 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s FAC is 28 “confusing and uncertain in that it fails to adequately put defendants on notice of the 2 13cv960 AJB (WMC) 1 claims asserted against them.” (Doc. No. 24 at 2.) The Court agrees with this 2 characterization. 3 II. DISCUSSION 4 A. Legal Standard for a Motion to Dismiss Dismissal is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) when a 5 6 plaintiff’s allegations fail “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. 7 Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must “accept all material 8 allegations of fact as true and construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the 9 non-moving party.” Vasquez v. L.A. Cnty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007). 10 However, courts are not “bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual 11 allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009). 12 A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal “can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory 13 or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. 14 Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). To survive a motion to 15 dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 16 its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Plausibility does 17 not equate to probability, but it requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant 18 has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664. “A claim has facial plausibility when the 19 plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 20 the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Dismissal of claims that fail to 21 meet this standard should be with leave to amend unless it is clear that amendment could 22 not possibly cure the complaint’s deficiencies. See Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 23 F.3d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1998). In determining whether to permit the opportunity to 24 amend a complaint, the Court considers the delay caused by repeated amended 25 complaints, prejudice to defendants, futility, and bad faith. See; Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d 26 1363, 1370 (9th Cir. 1994); DCD Programs v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 27 1987). 28 // 3 13cv960 AJB (WMC) 1 B. Section 1983 Claim Against Officer Belvis 2 Plaintiff’s FAC claims that “Defendants, while acting ‘under color of state law’, 3 intentionally deprived the Plaintiff of rights under the Constitution of the United States 4 such as the First, Fourth, or other Bill of Rights or for a substantive violation of the Due 5 Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (Doc. No. 23 at 6-7) (emphasis added). 6 Moreover, Plaintiff claims that the Defendants “intentionally violated his civil rights to 7 freedom and possession of his personal property by abusing their authority . . . acting 8 outside the scope of their duty . . . forcefully restraining him, and damaging his personal 9 property . . . .” (Id.) The Court previously dismissed this claim where Plaintiff had failed 10 to even merely isolate “the precise constitutional violation with which the defendant is 11 charged,” let alone provide a sufficient factual basis to put the Defendants on notice with 12 the conduct they are being charged with. (See Order Dismissing, Doc. No. 22.) 13 Plaintiff’s FAC shows little improvement. Indeed, Plaintiff ignored the Court’s clear 14 instructions on how to organize, frame, and support his civil rights claims. 15 Though he names five specific Amendments to the United States Constitution: (1) 16 First Amendment; (2) Fourth Amendment; (3) the Fifth Amendment; (4) Eighth 17 Amendment; and (5) Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process, Plaintiff only 18 attempts to provide factual allegations supporting a potential Fourth Amendment 19 violation.1 (Doc. No. 23 at 6.) As an initial matter, the Court declines to address 20 Plaintiff’s claims where he fails to identify the precise constitutional right allegedly 21 violated. As noted in its previous orders dismissing, the Court cannot grant relief for a 22 violation of some “general right to freedom,” as opposed to a clearly established 23 constitutional right. 24 25 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show: (1) a person acting “under color of state law” committed the conduct at issue, and 26 1 27 28 Plaintiff appears to allude to other possible Constitutional violations, the Court declines to entertain the possibility that Plaintiff is pleading “other” violations of civil rights. It is not the place of the Court to substitute its judgement and hypothesize what other claims Plaintiff meant to plead. The Court uses the word “attempt” very liberally. 4 13cv960 AJB (WMC) 1 (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by 2 the Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Shah v. County of Los 3 Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 746 (9th Cir. 1986). Section 1983 claims must also conform to 4 Rule 8's pleading standards. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8. A complaint must contain more 5 than “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 6 conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Rule 8 is designed to provide 7 defendants with fair notice of the claims and the factual allegations supporting those 8 claims. See McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). 9 The United States Supreme Court has explained that any § 1983 claim must begin 10 by isolating “the precise constitutional violation with which the defendant is charged.” 11 Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979). The FAC does not meet this requirement 12 for any alleged First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment, and barely meets the 13 requirement for the alleged Fourth Amendment violation, which albeit requires a very 14 careful reading to filter through the muddled allegations. 15 1. Fourth Amendment Violation 16 The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and 17 seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment “provides an explicit textual 18 source of constitutional protection against . . . physically intrusive government conduct, 19 including excessive force during a search or seizure.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 20 395 (1989). Moreover, this protection extends to unreasonable searches and seizures of 21 both property and the person. See Soldal v. Cook Cnty., Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 62 (1992). 22 In what appears to be a copy and paste job on the law of the Fourth Amendment, 23 Plaintiff’s FAC explains that a Fourth Amendment violation may be established by 24 factual omissions in a search warrant to render the warrant invalid. (Doc. No. 23 at 7.) 25 As to his allegations, Plaintiff claims that he was restrained unnecessarily and his 26 property searched without reasonable cause. Moreover, Plaintiff believes that he was a 27 victim of racial profiling when Officer Belvis “maliciously and intentionally lingered 28 with the intent to racially profile Plaintiff despite having received proof of valid ticket 5 13cv960 AJB (WMC) 1 fare . . . instigated a negative response from Plaintiff to then retaliate by restraining him 2 and damaging his personal property.” (Doc. No. 23 at 8.) Due the haphazard way 3 Plaintiff pieces his Complaint together, the Court has difficulty making heads or tails of 4 exactly what Plaintiff alleges. 5 Based upon the factual allegations, Plaintiff was stopped during a ticket 6 inspection. A process by which MTS officers obviously would not have a warrant for. 7 The Court is thus hard pressed to understand why Plaintiff’s Complaint would even 8 include any statements about a warrant and the lack of material facts in the warrant.2 It is 9 not the Court’s role to attempt to read Plaintiff’s mind and determine exactly what he 10 intended to do. Is Plaintiff pleading a Fourth Amendment violation based upon a search 11 and/or seizure without a warrant? Is Plaintiff arguing that Officer Belvis and Moya 12 needed a warrant to conduct a fare inspection? The Court cannot answer these questions 13 for Plaintiff. The Court has already twice instructed Plaintiff on exactly what is needed 14 to state a viable claim of civil rights violation, the Court’s patience is wearing thin. 15 The only factual allegations that may potentially support a Fourth Amendment 16 violation go towards whether the two officers used excessive force in restraining and 17 escorting Plaintiff off of the trolley as well as taking his laptop and dropping it on the 18 ground with “unnecessary force.” (Doc. No. 23 at 2-3). 19 “Claims of excessive force in the making a . . . seizure of the person . . . is properly 20 analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard.” Scott v. 21 Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 22 “Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is reasonable under the 23 Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature of and quality of the 24 intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing 25 governmental interests at stake.” The test of reasonableness under the Fourth 26 Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. See Bell v. 27 28 2 The Court highly recommends Plaintiff’s counsel to read the brief for clarity and consistency before filing with the Court. 6 13cv960 AJB (WMC) 1 Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). Its proper application requires careful attention to 2 the facts and circumstances of each particular case. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 3 1, 8-9 (1985) (stating the question is “whether the totality of the circumstances justifie[s] 4 a particular sort of . . . seizure”). As in other Fourth Amendment contexts, however, the “reasonableness” inquiry in 5 6 an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers' actions 7 are “objectively reasonable” in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, 8 without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. See Scott v. United States, 436 9 U.S. 128, 137–139, 98 S. Ct. 1717, 1723–1724. An officer's evil intentions will not 10 make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor 11 will an officer's good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force 12 constitutional. Id. at 138, 98 S. Ct., at 1723. Subjective inquiries, like malicious intent, 13 have no proper place under the Fourth Amendment inquiry. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 14 399. 15 As an initial matter, the only factual assertions made against Officer Belvis in the 16 detention of Plaintiff during the fare inspection transaction was that Officer Belvis, along 17 with Officer Moya, “forcefully corralled Plaintiff and escorted him off the trolley.” (Doc. 18 No. 23 at 3.) Such a vague statement, on its own, is not a sufficient factual basis that 19 would support a § 1983 claim that meets the pleading standards of Rule 8. Even 20 accepting the allegation as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, 21 the Court finds the FAC does not even rise to the level of showing a mere possibility that 22 Officer Belvis committed a Fourth Amendment violation. As such, Officer Belvis would 23 not have sufficient notice as to what his alleged unlawful act was. 24 As to any potential inference of the use of excessive force, these allegations are 25 made only against Officer Moya. According Plaintiff: (1) Officer Moya took Plaintiff’s 26 computer case and dropped it on the floor; (2) Officer Moya used “extreme force” in 27 applying the hand restraints and; (3) Officer Moya looked inside the computer case. (Id.) 28 Plaintiff claims that Officer Belvis “maliciously lingered” with racist intent. (Id. at 8.) 7 13cv960 AJB (WMC) 1 However, as stated above, such subjective inquiries have no place in the Fourth 2 Amendment inquiry. Again, Plaintiff’s FAC falls woefully short of pleading a § 1983 3 claim in accordance with the requirements of Rule 8. Using the term “forcefully” in 4 describing the way Officer Belvis escorted Plaintiff off the trolley is insufficient to plead 5 a claim of excessive force. Accordingly, the Court fails to see how Officer Belvis 6 violated any of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. 7 Instead of shedding some light as to his claims, Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition 8 completely envelops the Court in a black haze of confusion and decimates what little 9 understanding the Court had in the first place. First, Plaintiff claims that Defendants 10 moved to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 26 at 6.) That 11 is simply not the case and Plaintiff’s counsel would have known that had he actually read 12 the Motion to Dismiss. Indeed, the caption of the Motion expressly states Rule 12(b)(6). 13 Second, Plaintiff recites the elements of a malicious prosecution and abuse of process 14 claim. After three rounds of motions to dismiss, the Court is well aware of the elements 15 of these causes of action. (Id. at 7-8.) What the Court is unaware of is why Plaintiff is 16 even mentioning these causes of action as they have been dismissed without leave to 17 amend. Third, Plaintiff claims Defendants’ actions entitle him to relief under § 6701. 18 (Id. at 9). The Court has not the slightest clue as to what relief Plaintiff means as this is 19 the first mention of any § 6701 and Plaintiff does not even include the entire statute.3 20 2. First Amendment 21 Plaintiff claims Defendants violated his First Amendment rights but fails to 22 enlighten the Court as to which specific right and what conduct committed by which 23 Defendant. The Court takes a moment to play the role of a first year law school 24 constitutional law professor to inform Plaintiff’s counsel of what protections the First 25 Amendment encompasses. Among other rights, the First Amendment protects freedom 26 of speech and press. U.S. Const. amend. I. “The First Amendment protects the right of 27 28 3 The Court notes that these are only three of the more glaring deficiencies contained in Plaintiff’s Response. 8 13cv960 AJB (WMC) 1 an individual to speak freely, to advocate ideas, to associate with others, and to petition 2 his government for redress of grievances . . . . The government is prohibited from 3 infringing upon these guarantees either by a general prohibition against certain forms of 4 advocacy . . . or by imposing sanctions for the expression of particular views it opposes. 5 Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emp., Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 464, 99 S. Ct. 1826, 1827 6 (1979). Plaintiff has provided no factual allegations to support a First Amendment 7 violation during the exchange between Plaintiff and Defendants, and the Court cannot 8 even fathom one by any stretch of the imagination. 9 10 3. Eighth Amendment The Eighth Amendment states “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor 11 excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. 12 amend. VIII. As the Court explained in the previous January 31, 2014 Order, none of the 13 Eighth Amendment protections extend to Plaintiff. (See Doc. No. 22 at 12.) Plaintiff’s 14 FAC fails to address the gross deficiencies that warranted the dismissal of the TAC, 15 despite the Court’s conspicuous notations. Unlike what Plaintiff seems to imply, the 16 Eighth Amendment does not protect a person’s property from being treated with 17 “deliberate indifference.” (See Doc. No. 23 at 9.) 18 4. Fifth Amendment 19 Though Plaintiff haphazardly references the Fifth Amendment, his FAC again fails 20 to state a claim. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that suspects may not be 21 subjected to “custodial interrogations” unless they have been informed of their Miranda 22 rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 536, 478-79 (1955). Officers though, are not 23 required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. Oregon v. 24 Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977). Even assuming that Officer Belvis should have 25 administered the warnings, Miranda warnings are prophylactic only; they are not 26 constitutional rights in themselves. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985). A bare 27 Miranda, violation therefore, does not violate the Constitution. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 28 U.S. 760, 772 (2003) (“[V]iolations of judicially crafted prophylactic rules do not violate 9 13cv960 AJB (WMC) 1 the constitutional rights of any person.”). A Miranda violation only ripens into a 2 constitutional inquiry when the compelled statements are “used” in a criminal case 3 against the witness. Id. at 767. 4 Plaintiff states that his “right to remain silent” was violated when he was 5 restrained for failure to answer inquiries from Officer Belvis. Plaintiff claims that he 6 “declared to Officer Belvis that he wanted to speak to an attorney and elected not to 7 respond to the questions Officer Belvis asked.” (Doc. No. 23 at 3.) First, the allegations 8 are insufficient for the Court to construe his claim as a violation of his Miranda rights. 9 Where an individual indicates that he wishes to remain silent, the officer must 10 scrupulously honor that right and cease interrogations. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 11 U.S. 96, 100 (1975). However, given the lack of facts, the Court is unable to determine 12 whether or not Miranda warnings were warranted by the situation and whether or not 13 Officer Belvis continued questioning Plaintiff after he stated he wanted an attorney. 14 Second, even if the Court were to find Plaintiff adequately pled a Miranda violation, the 15 FAC would still be deficient in showing that the violation ripened into a constitutional 16 inquiry that would support a § 1983 claim. Plaintiff failed to allege any facts that would 17 show any statements he made were used in a criminal proceeding against him. 18 5. Substantive Due Process Rights 19 First, Plaintiff fails to identify which substantive due process right was violated 20 and how it was violated. Second, his claim involving the use of excessive force, the only 21 factual allegations made, can only be properly brought under the Fourth Amendment. 22 Graham, 490 U.S. at 394 (“Where, as here, the excessive force claim arises in the 23 context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most properly 24 characterized as one invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment . . . .”). 25 Plaintiff, once again, fails to adequately plead a § 1983 cause of action against 26 Officer Belvis that would meet the requirements of Rule 8 as interpreted by the Supreme 27 Court. As such, the civil rights claim against Officer Belvis is DISMISSED without 28 leave to amend. 10 13cv960 AJB (WMC) 1 B. MTS Liability In the Courts previous two Orders dismissing, the Court expressly stated what 2 3 Plaintiff needed to plead in order to establish liability against a local government entity 4 under §1983. (Doc. Nos. 16 at 7-8; 22 at 13.) Had Plaintiff read these Orders, he might 5 have known that he would have needed to plead facts to show either an official policy or 6 custom of violating rights, a deliberate choice made by officials responsible for 7 establishing policies, or an official ratification of a subordinate’s decision. See generally 8 Fuller v. City of Oakland, Cal., 47 F.3d 1522, 1534 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating the three 9 prongs by which a defendant may establish liability against a local government entity). 10 No factual allegations that go to any of these three prongs have been made. This is 11 Plaintiff’s fourth attempt in establishing a viable claim against MTS, even with the 12 Court’s clear guidance, Plaintiff again fails. As such, Plaintiff’s claim against MTS is 13 DISMISSED without leave to amend. 14 III. CONCLUSION 4 Plaintiff’s FAC, once again, fails to adequately plead a claim of civil rights 15 16 violations against Officer Belvis and MTS. Any further opportunities for Plaintiff to 17 amend his complaint would be an exercise in futility, prejudice the Defendants, and 18 cause unnecessary delay for all parties involved. 19 For the foregoing reason the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s 20 claims against Officer D. Belvis and MTS are DISMISSED without leave to amend. See 21 Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Where the plaintiff 22 has previously filed an amended complaint, . . . the district court’s discretion to deny 23 leave to amend is ‘particularly broad.’” (quoting Chodos v. W. Publ’g Co., 292 F.3d 992, 24 1003 (9th Cir. 2002))). 25 // 26 // 27 As the Court has, once again, dismissed Plaintiff’s claim under Rule 12(b)(6) failure to state a claim, the Court declines to address whether Defendants are entitled to immunity as moot. 4 28 11 13cv960 AJB (WMC) 1 IT IS SO ORDERED. 2 3 4 5 DATED: June 4, 2014 Hon. Anthony J. Battaglia U.S. District Judge 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12 13cv960 AJB (WMC)
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