Eguia et al v. ARC Imperial Valley et al, No. 3:2013cv00501 - Document 19 (S.D. Cal. 2013)
Court Description: ORDER granting 10 Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand to State Court (Certified copy sent to State Court via US Mail Service.); denying 10 Motion for Attorney Fees. The Clerk of the Court is directed to remand this action to the Imperial County Superior Court. Signed by Judge M. James Lorenz on 8/22/2013. (sjt)
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Eguia et al v. ARC Imperial Valley et al Doc. 19 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 14 OFELIA EGUIA, et al., 15 Plaintiffs, 16 v. 17 ARC IMPERIAL VALLEY, et al., 18 19 20 Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. 13-cv-501-L(PCL) ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO REMAND [DOC. 10] On March 4, 2013, Defendants ARC Imperial Valley, Arturo Santos, Martha Carillo, 21 Hector Gutierrez, and Carmen Agundez removed this action from the Imperial County Superior 22 Court. The Notice of Removal is based on federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 23 and 1441(a). (Removal Notice ¶ 8.) Plaintiffs Ofelia Eguia and Rosalinda Magallanes now move 24 to remand. Defendants oppose. 25 The Court found this motion suitable for determination on the papers submitted and 26 without oral argument. See Civ. L.R. 7.1(d.1). (Doc. 16.) For the following reasons, the Court 27 GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion. (Doc. 10.) 28 // 13cv501 Dockets.Justia.com 1 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY1 2 On January 31, 2012, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) in the 3 Imperial County Superior Court, asserting only state-law causes of action including wrongful 4 termination, harassment, discrimination, and infliction of emotional distress. (Removal Notice ¶ 5 1.) Plaintiffs based these causes of action on public-policy grounds, violations of the California 6 Government Code §§ 12940(h) and 12653, and violations of California Labor Code § 1102(f). 7 (Removal Notice Ex. 1 at 37–65.) On March 1, 2012, Defendants filed an answer to the FAC, 8 and on March 9, 2012, filed an amended answer asserting an affirmative defense under the 9 federal-enclave doctrine. (Removal Notice Ex. 1 at 88, para. 15.) 10 On May 9, 2012, Defendants filed their first Notice of Removal, premised on the 11 applicability of the federal-enclave doctrine. This Court denied the motion without prejudice 12 because Defendants’ documents did not qualify under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) as “other papers” 13 because the documents originated from their own records. See Eguia v. ARC Imperial Valley, 14 12-CV-1132-L(PCL), 2012 WL 6061323, at *3-4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2012). 15 The subsequent Notice of Removal, filed on March 4, 2013, is once again premised on 16 the applicability of the federal-enclave doctrine. (Doc. 1.) Defendants offer documents that they 17 contend establish that the actions Plaintiffs allege occurred at the West Port of Entry, a federal 18 enclave. Defendants also allege that certain documents constitute “a copy of an amended 19 pleading, motion, order or other paper” from which it can be first determined that the case is 20 removable. (Removal Notice ¶ 11.) 21 On April 5, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand this action to the Imperial County 22 Superior Court. (Doc. 10.) Plaintiffs also request attorney’s fees and costs. Defendants oppose. 23 24 II. LEGAL STANDARD 25 The Court addresses the issue of subject matter jurisdiction first as “[t]he requirement that 26 jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter ‘spring[s] from the nature and limits of the 27 28 1 remand. Francisco Javier Martinez is a named defendant but is not involved in this motion to 2 13cv501 1 judicial power of the United States’ and is ‘inflexible and without exception.’” Steel Co. v. 2 Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-94 (1998) (quoting Mansfield, C & L. M. Ry. Co. v. 3 Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)). 4 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 5 Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “They possess only that power authorized by Constitution or 6 statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Id. (internal citations omitted). “It is to 7 be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction and the burden of establishing the 8 contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id. (internal citations omitted); see also 9 Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006). 10 Consistent with the limited jurisdiction of federal courts, the removal statute is strictly 11 construed against removal jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992); 12 see also Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002); O’Halloran v. University 13 of Wash., 856 F.2d 1375, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). “The strong presumption against removal 14 jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is 15 proper.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566; see also Nishimoto v. Federman-Bachrach & Assoc., 903 F.2d 16 709, 712 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990); O’Halloran, 856 F.2d at 1380. 17 “The propriety of removal . . . depends on whether the case originally could have been 18 filed in federal court.” Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 163 (1997). “Federal 19 jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” 20 Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. The court’s removal jurisdiction must be analyzed on the basis of the 21 pleadings at the time of removal. See Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 22 159 F.3d 1209, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998). 23 Defendants may remove any action filed in state court over which federal district courts 24 have original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Generally speaking, a party may bring a case 25 within the jurisdiction of the federal courts by demonstrating the existence of either: (1) diversity 26 of citizenship, under 28 U.S.C. § 1332; or (2) a federal question, under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 27 Defendants removed this action based on federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 28 Pursuant to the statute, federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction of “all civil actions arising 3 13cv501 1 under the Constitution, laws, or treatises of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 2 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), a defendant must file a notice of removal either (1) “within 3 thirty days after the receipt by the defendant . . . of a copy of the initial pleading,” or (2) “if the 4 case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within thirty 5 days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended 6 pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one 7 which is or has become removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). 8 Notice of removability under § 1446(b) is determined through examination of the four 9 corners of the applicable pleadings, not through the subjective knowledge or a duty to make 10 further inquiry. Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 694 (9th Cir. 2005). Section 11 1446(b)’s first thirty-day requirement, thus, is triggered by the defendant’s receipt of an “initial 12 pleading” that reveals a basis for removal. Id. If no ground for removal is evident in the initial 13 pleadings, the case is “not removable” at that stage. Id. In this circumstance, the notice of 14 removal may be filed within thirty days after the defendant receives “an amended pleading, 15 motion, order or other paper from which it can be ascertained from the face of the document that 16 removal is proper.” Id. 17 In cases where the action may be removable despite defendant never having “received” 18 any pleading or “other paper” demonstrating removability, § 1446(b)’s “other paper” language is 19 read so as to not include a defendant’s own records. B.C. v. Blue Cross of Cal., No. CV 1120 08961, 2012 WL 12782, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2012) (“We now conclude that notice of 21 removability under § 1446(b) is determined through examination of the four corners of the 22 applicable pleadings, not through subjective knowledge or a duty to make further inquiry.”). The 23 rationale behind this reading is that when the evidence suggests that a defendant is or should be 24 on notice of an action’s removability despite it not being “plain” on the face of the complaint, 25 defendants are effectively granted permanent removal power. Kohan Prods. Ltd. v. Comerica 26 Bank, No. CV 10-0034, 2010 WL 956402, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2010). As such, a removal 27 filed before a plaintiff has served a paper on the defendant demonstrating removability is 28 premature. B.C., 2012 WL 12782, at *7. 4 13cv501 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), a defendant must file a notice of removal either (1) “within 3 thirty days after the receipt by the defendant . . . of a copy of the initial pleading.” Because the 4 parties agree that the FAC, served on January 31, 2012, does not disclose the grounds for 5 removal (Pls.’ Mot 2; Defs.’ Opp’n 3), the Court must analyze the language in any “amended 6 pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one 7 which is or has become removable” to determine whether removal is proper. 28 U.S.C. § 8 1446(b). 9 Plaintiffs base their motion on the untimeliness of Defendants’ removal. They contend 10 that Defendants filed their removal at least 69 days late because they possessed documentation 11 of federal-question jurisdiction on December 27, 2012. Defendants respond that there are no 12 defects in the removal and that their removal is based on the California Department of Fair 13 Employment and Housing (“DFEC”) Charge (Defs.’ RJN Ex. 4 at 141), initially provided to 14 Defendants’ counsel prior to their first removal. 15 Defendants contend that the DFEC Charge establishes that the alleged sexual harassment 16 occurred at the West Port, thereby invoking federal-question jurisdiction through the federal17 enclave doctrine. (Defs.’ Opp’n 4.) Defendants provide the DFEC Charge in order to establish 18 jurisdiction, and do not dispute that they received this document at the very latest on December 19 27, 2012, 69 days prior to their removal. (Id.) Further, Defendants were in possession of the 20 Charge a full ten months prior to Plaintiffs filing the lawsuit, and should have been on notice 21 that there was federal jurisdiction at that time. The Court accepts Defendants’ contention that the 22 document demonstrates federal jurisdiction, establishing December 27, 2012 as the latest 23 possible date Defendants could have received the Charge. Consequently, Defendants filed their 24 notice of removal 69 days after Plaintiffs demonstrated removability, which is 39 days later than 25 the 30-day period permitted for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).2 26 27 2 Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs were untimely in filing the motion to remand. Plaintiffs filed their motion on April 5, 2013, which is 32 days after Defendants filed their notice 28 of removal. However, the filing of Plaintiffs’ motion is dependent on Defendants properly 5 13cv501 1 IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER 2 In light of the foregoing, the Court must remand the case to the state court because 3 Defendants did not timely remove this action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) (“[T]he notice of 4 removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the 5 defendant . . . of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may 6 first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.”). 7 Plaintiffs also seek attorney’s fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Courts may 8 require costs and actual expenses, including attorneys’ fees, incurred as a result of removal when 9 removal is objectively unreasonable. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 10 U.S. 132, 140-41 (2005). Here, Defendants’ untimeliness does not rise to the level of 11 objectively unreasonable. See Martin, 546 U.S. at 140-41. 12 In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion to remand, and DENIES 13 Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees and costs. The Clerk of the Court is directed to remand this 14 action to the Imperial County Superior Court. 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 17 DATED: August 22, 2013 18 19 M. James Lorenz United States District Court Judge 20 COPY TO: 21 HON. PETER C. LEWIS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 22 23 ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL 24 25 26 27 28 removing to this court; as discussed above, Defendants’ removal is defective. Therefore, Defendants’ untimeliness argument is moot. 6 13cv501
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