Garcia et al v. Alpine Creekside, Inc. et al, No. 3:2013cv00259 - Document 39 (S.D. Cal. 2013)
Court Description: ORDER Granting Defendants' Motions to Dismiss re: Documents 24 , 26 . Based on the information stated herein, the Court Grants Defendants' Motions and Dismisses Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is instructed to terminate this case. Signed by Judge Michael M. Anello on 6/25/2013. (leh)
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Garcia et al v. Alpine Creekside, Inc. et al Doc. 39 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 VALERIE GARCIA, ESTHER SULLIVAN, 11 v. 12 NO. 13-CV-259-MMA (JMA) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT Plaintiffs, 13 14 ALPINE CREEKSIDE, INC, et al., [Doc. Nos. 24, 26] Defendants. 15 16 Plaintiffs Valerie Garcia and Esther Sullivan (respectively, “Garcia” and 17 “Sullivan”) bring this disability discrimination case against Defendants Alpine 18 Creekside, Inc., Willmark Communities, Inc., and Sandra Aramburo (respectively, 19 “Alpine Creekside,” “Willmark,” and “Aramburo”). Defendants now move to 20 dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) for failure to state a claim 21 upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 22 See Doc. Nos. 24, 26. Plaintiffs filed oppositions to the motions, to which 23 Defendants replied. See Doc. Nos. 30, 34, 36, 37. For the following reasons, the 24 Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss. 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// -1- 13CV259 Dockets.Justia.com BACKGROUND1 1 2 Esther Sullivan resides within the Creekside Meadows Apartment complex in 3 Alpine, California. She is 88 years old, and suffers from terminal cancer, among 4 other debilitating ailments. Sullivan has lived in Creekside Meadows for 5 approximately 15 years. Defendant Alpine Creekside owns the complex, which is 6 managed by Defendant Willmark. In 2011, Sullivan’s daughter, Mason–not a party 7 to this action–was added to the lease agreement and moved in with Sullivan to serve 8 as her in-home care provider. In October 2012, Sullivan’s treating physician, Dr. 9 Gilberto Cota, told Plaintiff Garcia, another daughter of Sullivan’s, that he suspected 10 Mason had been physically abusing Sullivan. Dr. Cota contacted Adult Protective 11 Services, who sent an investigator on at least three occasions to check on Sullivan. 12 After speaking with Dr. Cota, Garcia went to Sullivan’s apartment and confronted 13 Mason concerning the allegations. Garcia demanded that Mason remove herself 14 from the apartment. Mason refused and contacted the Sheriff’s Department in an 15 attempt to force Garcia from the premises. When the deputies arrived, Garcia 16 informed them of the suspected abuse. In response, the deputies told Mason that she 17 needed to remove herself from the apartment or they would forcibly remove her. 18 Subsequently, Defendants served Mason and Sullivan with notice that they 19 were required to vacate their rental within 60 days or face eviction. The notice 20 stated: 22 During the course of your tenancy you have materially violated the lease agreement or, in the alternative, the landlord has “other good cause” as defined in the lease, as follows: 23 a. 21 24 25 Over the course of your tenancy, there has been substantial in-fighting between you, your guests, relatives, and/or frequent visitors, consisting of loud arguments, yelling, screaming, and fighting, resulting in numerous complaints by other residents of the apartment community. This behavior has resulted in trips to the apartment by Adult Protective Services and numerous call to, and 26 27 Because this matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question. Hospital Bldg. Co. 28 v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976). All facts cited are taken from Plaintiffs’ FAC unless otherwise noted. 1 -2- 13CV259 visits incident reports by, San Diego County Sheriff deputies. Further, this behavior causes concern for the general welfare of other residents of the community. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 b. Creekside Meadows management has been called on to listen to and mediate disputes between Valerie Garcia and Kathleen Mason. Management cannot be placed in a position of being responsible for o r ensuring the health and safety of the elderly Esther Sullivan under the circumstances presented. [FAC ¶ 20.] In response to receiving the notice, Garcia contacted Dr. Cota and asked him 8 to provide her with a written statement concerning the fact that he was treating 9 Sullivan for her disabilities. Dr. Cota wrote a letter dated October 15, 2012 stating: 10 To whom it might concern: 11 Mrs. Sullivan is a 85 y.o female who is under my care at Alpine Family Medicine. Mrs. Sullivan has multiple conditions as hypertension, sever low back pain, arthritis, anxiety, h.o colon cancer now status post colostomy and on colostomy bag, congestive heart failure, insomnia, chronic kidney disease and coronary artery disease. She has had falls and lacerations, [which is the] reason why I suspect some kind of elderly abuse and called Adult Protective Services. [It] [s]eems like she has changed caregivers and now feel[s] safe. Mrs. Sullivan has multiple medical conditions [and] moving out could cause a lot of emotional stress and negatively impact in (sic) her health. 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 [FAC ¶ 23.] Garcia provided a copy of Dr. Cota’s letter to Defendant Aramburo, the on- 19 site community manager. Aramburo allegedly told Garcia that she would fax a copy 20 of it to her employer, presumably Willmark, and that she would talk to the 21 management company concerning the contents of Dr. Cota’s letter. On several 22 occasions thereafter, Garcia asked Aramburo if she had received a response from 23 Willmark regarding rescinding the eviction notice. Aramburo indicated each time 24 that she had not received a response. Meanwhile, in mid-November, 2012, Mason 25 removed herself from the apartment. Garcia moved in and became Sullivan’s in- 26 home care provider. 27 On December 13, 2012, pursuant to the eviction notice, Defendants filed an 28 Unlawful Detainer action against Sullivan and Mason in state court. Trial was set -3- 13CV259 1 for February 1, 2013. On the day of the trial, Plaintiffs filed the present suit, seeking 2 to enjoin the pending eviction. On February 19, 2013, Defendants dismissed the 3 unlawful detainer action after Mason stipulated to canceling her tenancy and 4 removing her name from the lease.2 Accordingly, Sullivan was never evicted from 5 the apartment and continues to reside there with Garcia. LEGAL STANDARD 6 7 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion 8 the defense that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be 9 granted,” generally referred to as a motion to dismiss. The Court evaluates whether 10 a complaint states a cognizable legal theory and sufficient facts in light of Federal 11 Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the 12 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although Rule 8 “does not 13 require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ it [does] demand[] more than an unadorned, 14 the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 15 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 16 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). In other words, “a 17 plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires 18 more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 19 cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 20 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986)). “Nor does a 21 complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual 22 enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 23 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 24 matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. 25 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A claim is 26 facially plausible when the facts pled “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable 27 28 This fact is taken from the “Stipulation For Entry of Dismissal” filed on February 19, 2013 in the unlawful detainer action in state court. As discussed below, the Court takes judicial notice of the facts contained in this document. 2 -4- 13CV259 1 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing 2 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). That is not to say that the claim must be probable, but 3 there must be “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” 4 Id. Facts “‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of a plausible 5 entitlement to relief. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 6 Further, the Court need not accept as true “legal conclusions” contained in the 7 complaint. Id. This review requires context-specific analysis involving the Court’s 8 “judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679 (citation omitted). “[W]here 9 the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility 10 of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the 11 pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. 12 Where a motion to dismiss is granted, “leave to amend should be granted 13 ‘unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the 14 challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.’” DeSoto v. Yellow 15 Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. 16 v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). In other words, 17 where leave to amend would be futile, the Court may deny leave to amend. See 18 Desoto, 957 F.2d at 658; Schreiber, 806 F.2d at 1401. DISCUSSION 19 20 A. Judicial Notice 21 In support of their motion to dismiss, Defendants Willmark and Alpine 22 Creekside request that the Court take judicial notice of seven documents filed on the 23 record in California state court proceedings. [See Doc. No. 24-2.] Plaintiffs do not 24 oppose Defendants’ request. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), a district court 25 may take notice of facts not subject to reasonable dispute that are “capable of 26 accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 27 reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). The Court finds that the accuracy 28 of the documents filed in state court cannot reasonably be questioned because they -5- 13CV259 1 are publically filed court documents. Thus, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ 2 request for judicial notice. 3 Plaintiffs also request the Court to take judicial notice of two documents 4 promulgated by government agencies.3 [See Doc. No. 31.] Defendants do not 5 oppose Plaintiffs’ request. The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ request as the accuracy 6 of these publically available documents issued by governmental agencies cannot 7 reasonably be questioned. 8 B. Standing 9 Defendants first request that the Court dismiss Plaintiffs’ FAC on the ground 10 that Sullivan and Garcia lack standing to pursue a disability discrimination claim. 11 The crux of this discussion involves whether Plaintiffs suffered any palpable injury 12 in light of the fact that they were never evicted and the eviction proceeding has been 13 dismissed. The Court finds that the question of whether Plaintiffs suffered injuries 14 is unavoidably intertwined with the substantive analysis of Plaintiffs’ claims. Thus, 15 the Court proceeds to consider Plaintiffs’ individual claims. 16 C. Individual Claims 17 1. Claim One–Violation of FHHA 18 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants discriminated against them on the basis of 19 Sullivan’s disability in violation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act (“FHAA”), 20 42 U.S.C. § 3604, et seq. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Dr. Cota’s letter was a 21 request for “reasonable accommodation” which was subsequently denied when 22 Defendants refused to withdraw the eviction notice and proceeded to file the 23 unlawful detainer action. Defendants argue that Dr. Cota’s letter did not constitute a 24 reasonable accommodation request at all; instead, it was a “demand that Defendants 25 waive their rights under the law when a legitimate basis for good cause termination 26 Plaintiffs also request that the Court take judicial notice of a document containing portions of the Code of Federal Regulations. However, the Court need not take judicial notice of the C.F.R. in order to consider it when ruling on this 28 motion. 3 27 -6- 13CV259 1 existed.” [Reply at 6, Doc. No. 37 (emphasis in original).]4 2 “The FHAA provides that it is unlawful to discriminate against disabled 3 persons in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to 4 any buyer or renter because of a handicap” of that buyer or renter. Giebeler v. M & 5 B Associates, 343 F.3d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)). 6 “The FHAA’s definition of prohibited discrimination encompasses ‘a refusal to 7 make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when 8 such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to 9 use and enjoy a dwelling.’” Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1146 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 10 3604(f)(3)(B)). 11 The Court begins its analysis by questioning whether Defendants’ alleged 12 actions here even implicate the FHAA. It is undisputed that Sullivan and Garcia 13 continue to reside in Sullivan’s apartment within the Alpine Creekside complex. 14 Nor were they at any time removed from the premises. Thus, there has been no 15 denial of housing. Plaintiffs essentially claim that the threatened eviction and 16 refusal to withdraw the eviction notice constituted a failure to reasonably 17 accommodate Sullivan’s disability. The Court finds no authority to support 18 Plaintiffs’ interpretation of “reasonable accommodation” law. “To make out a claim of discrimination based on failure to reasonably 19 20 accommodate, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he suffers from a handicap as 21 defined by the FHAA; (2) defendants knew or reasonably should have known of the 22 plaintiff’s handicap; (3) accommodation of the handicap may be necessary to afford 23 plaintiff an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; and (4) defendants 24 refused to make such accommodation.” Id. at 1147 (quotations omitted). “The 25 FHAA defines ‘handicap’ as ‘a physical or mental impairment which substantially 26 Defendant Aramburo raises additional arguments in her separate motion to dismiss [Doc. No. 26]. Because the Court finds that the following analysis applies equally to the claims against Aramburo, the Court does not individually address the 28 additional arguments raised by Aramburo. 4 27 -7- 13CV259 1 limits one or more of such person’s major life activities.’” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2 3602(h)(1)). 3 There is no dispute that Sullivan is handicapped or that Defendants knew of 4 this fact. Instead, the flaws in Plaintiffs’ reasonable accommodation claim arise in 5 elements three and four. Element three involves demonstrating that the 6 accommodation is necessary to afford plaintiff an equal opportunity to use and enjoy 7 the dwelling. To establish necessity, “[p]laintiffs must show that, but for the 8 accommodation, they likely will be denied an equal opportunity to enjoy the housing 9 of their choice.” Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1155 (quoting Smith & Lee Assoc., Inc. v. 10 City of Taylor, Mich., 102 F.3d at 781, 795 (6th Cir. 1996)). 11 Plaintiffs fail to establish this element for two reasons. First, Plaintiffs do not 12 allege that Defendants’ policy denied Sullivan an equal opportunity to use and enjoy 13 the Creekside Apartments. Instead, the relevant portion of the FAC states: “The 14 reasonable accommodation was necessary for plaintiff SULLIVAN to be able to 15 continue residing in the RENTAL UNIT, as moving her would have had a 16 substantial negative impact on her physical and emotional well being because of her 17 disabilities.” [FAC ¶ 53.] Conspicuously absent is any mention of equal 18 opportunity.5 Erasing this key component of a disability discrimination claim 19 effectively places upon landlords a general duty to assist the disabled. This is not 20 what the FHAA demands. Instead, the FHAA requires landlords to make reasonable 21 accommodations in an effort to provide disabled individuals equal opportunity to 22 reside in the home of their choice. See City of Edmonds v. Wash. State Bldg. Code 23 Council, 18 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1994). 24 Second, the requested accommodation is not “necessary” because it fails the 25 requirement that an accommodation be linked to the inability to use or enjoy the 26 premises because of a disability. See Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1146. Several examples 27 28 The words “equal opportunity” appear twice in the FAC (see ¶¶ 64 & 73) but only as statements of law, not as factual allegations. 5 -8- 13CV259 1 from the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Department of 2 Justice involving reasonable accommodations crystalize this requirement:6 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Example 1: A housing provider has a policy of providing unassigned parking spaces to residents. A resident with a mobility impairment, who is substantially limited in her ability to walk, requests an assigned accessible parking space close to the entrance to her unit as a reasonable accommodation. There are available parking spaces near the entrance to her unit that are available to all residents on a first come, first served basis. The provider must make an exception to its policy of not providing assigned parking spaces to accommodate this resident. Example 2: A housing provider has a policy of requiring tenants to come to the rental office in person to pay their rent. A tenant has a mental disability that makes her afraid to leave her unit. Because of her disability, she requests that she be permitted to have a friend mail her rent payment to the rental office as a reasonable accommodation. The provider must make an exception to its payment policy to accommodate this tenant. Example 3: A housing provider has a “no pets” policy. A tenant who is deaf requests that the provider allow him to keep a dog in his unit as a reasonable accommodation. The tenant explains that the dog is an assistance animal that will alert him to several sounds, including knocks at the door, sounding of the smoke detector, the telephone ringing, and cars coming into the driveway. The housing provider must make an exception to its “no pets” policy to accommodate this tenant. [Joint Statement at 6-7.] Each of these examples involve policies that directly limit an individual’s ability to use and enjoy the leased premises because of the individual’s disability. Not so here. The policy that Sullivan contests is that of “serving tenants with an eviction notice, and then filing an Unlawful Detainer action for the express purpose of removing Plaintiffs from the RENTAL UNIT . . . .” [FAC ¶ 54.] Unlike the examples provided above, the policy of evicting tenants who violate provisions of their lease does not prevent disabled tenants from using the premises because of their disability. Rather, these tenants are prevented from using 23 24 25 26 Joint Statement of the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Department of Justice, Reasonable Accommodations Under the Fair Housing Act 28 (May 17, 2004) (“Joint Statement”), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/ about/hce/joint_statement_ra.pdf (last visited June 19, 2013). 27 6 -9- 13CV259 1 the premises simply because they violated their lease.7 There is thus no link between 2 this policy and Sullivan’s disability. While eviction forecloses a tenant’s ability to 3 use the premises in the most basic sense of the word, eviction absent discrimination 4 does not violate the FHAA. 5 In sum, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that accommodation of the handicap in 6 the method requested was necessary to afford Sullivan an equal opportunity to use 7 and enjoy the dwelling. Sullivan has an equal opportunity to use and enjoy her 8 apartment: she alleges no policies which make it more difficult for her to use and 9 enjoy the premises than non-disabled tenants. 10 Plaintiffs’ case is also missing another fundamental element: a refusal to 11 accommodate. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants “did not respond to the request for a 12 reasonable accommodation,” [FAC ¶ 53] but they do not allege that Defendants 13 refused the request. Likely, this is because Sullivan was never evicted from the 14 premises and still resides there. Unless a request for a reasonable accommodation is 15 denied, Plaintiffs have not been discriminated against. See 42 U.S.C. § 16 3604(f)(3)(B). And unless there is or is about to be an occurrence of discrimination, 17 Plaintiffs do not have a cause of action. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A). While the 18 threat of eviction should not be taken lightly, this threat did not run afoul of 19 Plaintiffs’ federal rights. 20 Finally, Plaintiffs’ FHAA claim also fails because they do not allege that the 21 accommodation they seek is reasonable. Under the FHAA, “only reasonable 22 accommodations that do not cause undue hardship or mandate fundamental changes 23 in a program are required.” Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1154 (emphasis added). In 24 Giebeler, the Ninth Circuit noted that the law is unsettled with respect to whether a 25 plaintiff must show that the requested accommodation “seems reasonable on its face, 26 The Court notes that Plaintiffs contest the facts cited in the eviction notice. However, the more relevant point is that Plaintiffs do not contend or allege that Defendants were evicting Sullivan because she was disabled. For purposes of this 28 motion, whether the facts in the eviction notice were true or not does not speak to whether Defendants discriminated against Plaintiffs on the basis of disability. 7 27 - 10 - 13CV259 1 i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases,” or if the plaintiff is “free to show that special 2 circumstances warrant a finding that . . . the requested accommodation is reasonable 3 on the particular facts.” Id. at 1156 (quotations omitted). 4 If the former, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ requested accommodation patently 5 unreasonable on its face. For if the FHAA required ordinarily what Plaintiffs 6 demand, the FHAA would serve as an impenetrable shield against eviction. 7 Disabled tenants could miss all rent payments, play rock music long into the night, 8 spray weed killer on the neighbor’s lawn, and throw stones at visitors yet manage to 9 stave off eviction by producing a doctor’s note indicating that the tenant will suffer 10 11 emotional stress if forced to move. If the latter, Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts to demonstrate that it was 12 reasonable for Defendants to rescind an eviction notice to allow Sullivan to remain 13 in the apartment. Plaintiffs insist in their opposition brief that Defendants could 14 have bifurcated the lease, evicting only Mason while leaving Sullivan’s tenancy in 15 tact. Yet there are no allegations in the FAC which speak to whether bifurcation or 16 another remedy was reasonable. The Court need not speculate now as to whether 17 bifurcation or another option was possible or reasonable. 18 In conclusion, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim of disability 19 discrimination under the FHAA. Because the Court finds that amendment of this 20 claim would be futile in light of the analysis above, the Court dismisses this claim 21 with prejudice. 22 2. 23 Plaintiffs second cause of action seeks recovery under 42 U.S.C. § Claim Two–Violation of Violence Against Women Act 24 1437f(c)(9)(B) which provides, “[a]n incident or incidents of actual or threatened 25 domestic violence, dating violence, or stalking will not be construed as a serious or 26 repeated violation of the lease by the victim or threatened victim of that violence and 27 shall not be good cause for terminating the assistance, tenancy, or occupancy rights 28 of the victim of such violence.” 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(9)(B) (emphasis added). - 11 - 13CV259 1 Plaintiffs claim Defendants violated this provision by attempting to remove them 2 from the premises because of the acts of domestic violence committed against 3 Sullivan. [See FAC ¶ 59.] However, the notice of eviction was not based on any 4 acts of domestic violence. Instead, the “good cause” cited by Defendants supporting 5 eviction included “substantial in-fighting between you, your guests, relatives, and/or 6 frequent visitors, consisting of loud arguments, yelling, screaming, and fighting, 7 resulting in numerous complaints by other residents of the apartment community.” 8 [FAC ¶ 20.] Additionally, Defendants did not receive Dr. Cota’s note relaying his 9 suspicions of abuse–and were thus unaware of the possible violence–until after the 10 notice of eviction was provided. Thus, no incidents of domestic violence were at 11 issue when the notice was issued. Finally, as discussed, Sullivan’s tenancy has not been terminated so there has 12 13 been no improper discrimination. Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 14 1437f(c)(9)(B). As amendment is futile, the Court dismisses this claim with 15 prejudice. 16 3. Remaining Claims 17 The Court has reviewed Plaintiffs’ remaining causes of action and finds that 18 each are premised on Defendants’ alleged disability discrimination discussed 19 previously in the Court’s analysis of Plaintiffs’ FHAA claim. Because the Court 20 finds that Plaintiffs fail to properly allege disability discrimination, these remaining 21 claims necessarily fail and are dismissed with prejudice. 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// - 12 - 13CV259 CONCLUSION 1 2 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions and 3 DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint with prejudice. The Clerk of 4 Court is instructed to terminate this case. 5 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: June 25, 2013 7 8 9 Hon. Michael M. Anello United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 - 13 - 13CV259
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