Macias et al v. Clinton et al, No. 3:2013cv00201 - Document 23 (S.D. Cal. 2014)
Court Description: ORDER Denying 11 Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel on 02/18/2014. (srm)
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Macias et al v. Clinton et al Doc. 23 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 MAREL MACIAS and JOEL BELTRAN ANGULO, Plaintiffs, 11 12 13 14 15 16 Case No. 13cv0201-GPC-JMA vs. JOHN F. KERRY, Secretary of the Department of State; JANICE JACOBS, Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs; DAVID DONAHUE, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Visa Services; IAN BROWNLEE, Consul General of the U.S. Consulate Ciudad Juarez, 17 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [Dkt. No. 11.] Defendants. 18 19 Pending before the Court is Defendants John F. Kerry, Janice Jacobs, David 20 Donahue, and Ian Brownlee’s (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion for Reconsideration 21 (“Motion for Reconsideration”). (Dkt. No. 11.) Defendants seek reconsideration of the 22 Court’s July 18, 2013, Order (“July 18th Order”), (Dkt. No. 9), which denied 23 Defendants’ April 2, 2013, Motion to Dismiss (“Motion to Dismiss”), (Dkt. No. 6). The 24 Motion for Reconsideration has been fully briefed. (Dkt. Nos. 16, 20.) 25 Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), the Court has found this matter suitable 26 for adjudication without oral argument. (Dkt. No. 21.) Having reviewed the parties’ 27 briefs and relevant legal authority, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion for 28 Reconsideration. -1- 13cv0201-GPC-JMA Dockets.Justia.com BACKGROUND 1 On January 13, 2011, Plaintiff Marel Macias (“Plaintiff Macias”), a citizen 2 3 and resident of the United States, filed a petition to immigrate her husband, Plaintiff 4 Joel Beltran Angulo (“Plaintiff Angulo”), a citizen and resident of Mexico, to the 5 United States. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2, ¶ 5.)1 Plaintiff Angulo’s immigrant visa application 6 (“Application”) was denied pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C) in or around 7 October 2012. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2, ¶ 7.) On January 25, 2013, Plaintiff Macias and Plaintiff Angulo (collectively, 8 9 “Plaintiffs”) filed the instant action seeking judicial review of the denial of Plaintiff 10 Angulo’s Application (“Complaint”). (Dkt. No. 1.) On April 2, 2013, Defendants 11 moved to dismiss the Complaint on the ground that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim 12 because the reason Plaintiff Angulo’s Application was denied was both facially 13 legitimate and bona fide. (Dkt. No 6 at 8.) The Court denied Defendants’ Motion to 14 Dismiss on July 18, 2013. (Dkt. No. 9.) By the present motion, filed on August 7, 2013, Defendants move the Court 15 16 to reconsider the July 18th Order and dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint. (Dkt. No. 11 at 17 6.) Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to Defendants’ Motion for 18 Reconsideration on September 29, 2013, (Dkt. No. 16), and Defendants filed a reply 19 on October 24, 2013, (Dkt. No. 20). LEGAL STANDARDS 20 21 A. Motion for Reconsideration 22 A motion for reconsideration is “appropriate if the district court (1) is 23 presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial 24 decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in 25 controlling law.” School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 26 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). Whether to grant or deny a motion for 27 28 1 All references to the docket are to the CM/ECF assigned page numbers. -2- 13cv0201-GPC-JMA 1 reconsideration is within the sound discretion of the court. Navajo Nation v. Norris, 2 331 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Kona Enter., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 3 229 F.3d 887, 883 (9th Cir. 2000)). Although the court may reconsider and amend a 4 previous order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), “the rule offers an ‘extraordinary 5 remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial 6 resources.’” Kona, 229 F.3d at 890 (quoting 12 James W. Moore et al., Moore’s 7 Federal Practice § 59.30[4] (3d ed. 2000)). 8 B. 9 Motion to Dismiss As stated in the July 18th Order, a motion to dismiss brought under Fed. R. 10 Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 11 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “[F]or a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non- 12 conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be 13 plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret 14 Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 15 678 (2009)). The court must assume the truth of all factual allegations and construe 16 all inferences from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 17 Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). 18 DISCUSSION 19 To warrant reconsideration, Defendants must demonstrate the July 18th 20 Order: (1) showed clear error of law; (2) was manifestly unjust; or (3) warrants 21 reconsideration as a result of newly discovered facts or an intervening change in 22 controlling law. School Dist. No. 1J, 5 F.3d at 1263. Defendants make no showing 23 of new facts or law or that the July 18th Order was manifestly unjust. See id. 24 Defendants argue the Court committed clear error because the July 18th Order is 25 “not in accord” with the Ninth Circuit’s holdings in Din v. Kerry, 718 F.3d 856 (9th 26 Cir. 2013), and Bustamante v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2008). (Dkt. No. 27 11 at 7-8.) 28 Specifically, Defendants argue: (1) according to Din, “a consular officer’s -3- 13cv0201-GPC-JMA 1 citation to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C) constitutes, on its own, a facially legitimate 2 reason to deny an [immigrant visa] application,” (Dkt. No. 11 at 7) (citing Din, 718 3 F.3d at 862-63); and (2) “Plaintiffs have not produced evidence to establish that the 4 consular decision was made in bad faith” and therefore was not bona fide, (Dkt. No. 5 11 at 8). As a result, Defendants request that the Court reconsider its July 18th 6 Order and grant Defendants’ initial Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. No. 11 at 6.) 7 A. 8 9 Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ initial Motion to Dismiss argued Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently state a claim upon which relief may be granted because the government’s reason for 10 denying Plaintiff Angulo’s Application was both “facially legitimate” and “bona 11 fide.” (Dkt. No 6 at 8.) Specifically, Defendants argued: (1) the government 12 provided Plaintiff Angulo with a facially legitimate justification for the denial of his 13 Application by “providing Mr. Angulo the statutory basis for the denial of his visa;” 14 and (2) Plaintiffs’ allegation that the government acted in bad faith, without further 15 elaboration, does not withstand the bona fide inquiry pleading requirement. (Dkt. 16 No. 6 at 21-22.) 17 To survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs seeking judicial review of an 18 immigrant visa application denial must sufficiently allege the government’s reason 19 for the denial was: (1) not facially legitimate; and (2) not bona fide. See Din, 718 20 F.3d at 860. Taking the factual allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint as true and 21 construing them in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the Court held 22 Plaintiffs’ Complaint satisfied both criteria. The Court reasoned that: (1) a citation 23 to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C) without any assertion of facts is not a facially legitimate 24 reason for denying an immigrant visa application, (Dkt. No. 9 at 7-8) (citing Din, 25 718 F.3d 863-64); and (2) without a facially legitimate reason for the denial of 26 Plaintiff Angulo’s Application it is nearly impossible for the Plaintiffs to satisfy the 27 bona fide inquiry pleading requirement, (Dkt. No. 9 at 9). Based on the facts alleged 28 in Plaintiffs’ Complaint, the Court declined to make the “bona fide” inquiry -4- 13cv0201-GPC-JMA 1 requirement an impossible hurdle for the Plaintiffs. (Dkt. No. 9 at 9.) Accordingly, 2 the Court denied Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 3 B. 4 Motion for Reconsideration As stated above, Defendants seek reconsideration of their Motion to Dismiss 5 on the ground that the Court’s July 18th Order constitutes clear error for two 6 reasons. First, Defendants argue, pursuant to Din, the government’s reason for 7 denying Plaintiff Angulo’s Application was facially legitimate because “a consular 8 officer’s citation to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C) constitutes, on its own, a facially 9 legitimate reason to deny an [immigrant visa] application.” (Dkt. No. 11 at 7) (citing 10 Din, 718 F.3d at 861-62). Second, Defendants argue the consular officer’s reason 11 for denying Plaintiff Angulo’s Application was bona fide because “Plaintiffs have 12 not produced evidence to establish that the consular decision was made in bad 13 faith.” (Dkt. No. 11 at 8.) For the reasons below, the Court DENIES Defendants’ 14 Motion for Reconsideration. 15 1. Facially Legitimate Reason 16 Defendants argue the July 18th Order constitutes clear error because it is “not 17 in accord” with the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Din that “a consular officer’s citation 18 to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C) constitutes, on its own, a facially legitimate reason to 19 deny an [immigrant visa] application.” (Dkt. No. 11 at 3) (citing Din, 718 F.3d at 20 861-62). The Court disagrees. The court in Din nowhere concluded a citation to 21 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C), alone, constitutes a facially legitimate reason for denying 22 an immigrant visa application. Instead, the court held “the identification of both a 23 properly construed statute that provides a ground of exclusion and the consular 24 officer’s assurance that he or she ‘knows or has reason to believe’ that the visa 25 applicant has done something fitting within the proscribed category constitutes a 26 facially legitimate reason.” Din, 718 F.3d at 861 (citing Am. Acad. of Religion v. 27 Napolitano, 573 F.3d 115, 126 (2d Cir. 2009)) (emphasis added). A statute is 28 “properly construed” when the reviewing court can determine from the facts -5- 13cv0201-GPC-JMA 1 provided to the plaintiff which part of the statute was construed by the government, 2 as well as how it was construed. Id. at 863. Therefore, in contrast to Defendants’ 3 interpretation, the court in Din did not hold that a citation to 8 U.S.C. § 4 1182(a)(2)(C), alone, constitutes a facially legitimate reason, but that a citation to a 5 statute that contains multiple grounds of inadmissibility,2 without some factual 6 allegation demonstrating how the government construed a specific part of the 7 statute, is not a facially legitimate reason for denying an immigrant visa application. 8 Defendants further argue that the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Bustamante, 9 upheld by Din, requires reconsideration of the Court’s July 18th Order. (Dkt. No. 11 10 at 7.) The Court again disagrees. Although the present case involves an immigrant 11 visa application denial pursuant to the same statute at issue in Bustamante, the 12 consular officer in Bustamante did not cite to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C) as the sole 13 reason for denying Jose Bustamante’s immigrant visa application. 531 F.3d at 1060. 14 Instead, the consular officer denied the application because he “had reason to 15 believe that Jose was trafficking in illegal drugs,” and he provided Jose Bustamante 16 with three specific factual allegations in support of his decision.3 Id. at 1060-61. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C) contains multiple grounds for denying an immigrant visa application. The statute provides that any alien is inadmissible when: 2 [T]he consular officer or the Attorney General knows or has reason to believe [the alien] - (i) is or has been an illicit trafficker in any controlled substance or in any listed chemical (as defined in section 802 of title 21), or is or has been a knowing aider, abettor, assister, conspirator, or colluder with others in the illicit trafficking in any such controlled or listed substance or chemical, or endeavored to do so; or (ii) is the spouse, son, or daughter of an alien inadmissible under clause (i), has, within the previous 5 years, obtained any financial or other benefit from the illicit activity of that alien, and knew or reasonably should have known that the financial or other benefit was the product of such illicit activity. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C). In support of the consulate’s decision, Jose Bustamante was: (1) informed there was evidence in support of his immigrant visa application denial, but that the evidence 27 was secret; (2) referred to a letter written by the Resident-in-Charge of the local Drug Enforcement Administration Office that contained derogatory information in support 28 of the denial; and (3) asked to become an informant in exchange for immigration 26 3 -6- 13cv0201-GPC-JMA 1 Notably, the “illicit traffick[ing] in any controlled substance” is a specific ground of 2 inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C). Therefore, when the Din court 3 referred to the “much narrower ground of inadmissibility at issue in Bustamante” as 4 a facially legitimate reason for denying an immigrant visa application, (Dkt No. 11 5 at 7) (citing Din, 718 F.3d at 862), the court was not referring to a citation to 8 6 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C), alone, but to the consular officer’s belief that Jose 7 Bustamante had violated a specific part of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C) and the three 8 specific factual allegations the consular officer provided in support of his decision 9 to deny the application. 10 Accordingly, the Court finds no reason to revise the July 18th Order. Taking 11 the factual allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint as true and construing them in the 12 light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that in denying 13 Plaintiff Angulo’s Application, Defendants provided Plaintiffs with a citation to 14 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C) without any additional information.4 (Dkt. No. 1 at 2, ¶¶ 7, 15 10.) As discussed above, a citation to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C), alone, is not a 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 benefits, which reflects the consulate officer’s sincere belief that Jose Bustamante had access to valuable information regarding drug trafficking. Bustamante, 531 F.3d at 1060-61. The Court notes that although it could be inferred from Paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs’ Complaint that Plaintiffs were told the consular officer had “‘reason to believe’ Plaintiff [Angulo] is or has been a drug trafficker,” this inference does not justify the reconsideration of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. In Bustamante, Jose Bustamante was not only told his visa application was denied because the consular officer had reason to believe he was “trafficking in illegal drugs,” he was informed the consular officer had a reason for his belief but that the reason was secret, he was referred to a derogatory letter written by the Agent-in-Charge of the local Drug Enforcement Administration, and he was asked to become an informant. 531 F.3d at 1060-61. These facts legitimized the denial of Jose Bustamante’s visa application on the basis that the consular officer believed he was trafficking in illegal drugs. See Din, 718 F.3d at 862 (“The statute gave the reason legitimacy, but the statute standing alone was not the reason.”). However, in the present case, no similar factual allegations were offered to Plaintiffs in support of the denial of Plaintiff Angulo’s Application on a similar ground. Therefore, any inference that can be drawn from Paragraph 10 of the Complaint does not constitute a facially legitimate reason for denying Plaintiff Angulo’s Application because the inference is not supported by any factual allegations similar to those provided to Jose Bustamante in Bustamante. 4 -7- 13cv0201-GPC-JMA 1 facially legitimate reason for denying an immigrant visa application. As a result, the 2 Court again finds that Plaintiffs’ Complaint sufficiently alleges the lack of a facially 3 legitimate reason for the denial of Plaintiff Angulo’s Application to survive 4 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 5 2. Bona Fide Reason 6 In addition, Defendants argue the July 18th Order constitutes clear error 7 because Plaintiffs failed to “produce evidence [establishing] that the consular 8 decision was made in bad faith” and therefore was not bona fide. (Dkt. No. 11 at 8.) 9 The Court is not moved by Defendants’ argument. For the reasons stated in the July 10 18th Order, the Court again finds Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged Defendants failed to 11 provide a bona fide reason for the denial of Plaintiff Angulo’s Application. 12 As discussed in the July 18th Order, without a facially legitimate reason for 13 the denial of Plaintiff Angulo’s Application, it is nearly impossible for Plaintiffs to 14 satisfy the bona fide inquiry pleading requirement. (Dkt. No. 9 at 8-9) (citing Din, 15 718 F.3d at 867). Because the Court again finds Plaintiffs’ Complaint sufficiently 16 alleged Defendants did not present a facially legitimate reason for the denial of 17 Plaintiff Angulo’s Application, the Court is not prepared to make the bona fide 18 inquiry pleading requirement an impossible hurdle for the Plaintiffs at this stage in 19 the litigation. CONCLUSION 20 21 For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Defendants failed to 22 demonstrate the Court committed clear error in its July 18th Order. Accordingly, the 23 Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 26 DATED: February 18, 2014 27 28 HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL United States District Judge -8- 13cv0201-GPC-JMA
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