Godoy v. Brock et al, No. 3:2013cv00194 - Document 11 (S.D. Cal. 2013)
Court Description: ORDER Granting 7 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Each of Plaintiff's claims are Dismissed Without Leave to Amend to the extent they are asserted against the State of California or Brock and Steadmon in their official capacities. Pla intiff's First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Claims as alleged against Brock and Steadmon in their individual capacities are Dismissed With Leave to Amend; Plaintiff may file amended complaint by May 10, 2013; The hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, set for May 3, 2013, is Vacated. Signed by Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel on 5/1/2013. (srm)
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Godoy v. Brock et al Doc. 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ) ) 12 Plaintiff, ) v. ) 13 ) CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL ) 14 OFFICER J. BROCK, individually and ) in his official capacity; CALIFORNIA ) 15 HIGHWAY PATROL OFFICER ) STEADMON, individually and in his ) 16 official capacity; THE STATE OF ) CALIFORNIA; and DOES 1through ) 17 20, inclusive, ) ) 18 Defendants. ) ) 11 ENRIQUE NICHOLAS GODOY, Case No. 3:13-cv-0194-GPC-BGS ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF NO. 7) 19 20 On January 24, 2013, Plaintiff filed a complaint, asserting claims for violations 21 of his civil rights and various common law torts. (ECF No. 1.) Before the Court is 22 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 7), which has been fully briefed, (ECF Nos. 23 9, 10), and which the Court finds suitable for disposition without oral argument, see 24 CivLR 7.1.d.1. After a careful review of the parties’ submissions, and for the 25 following reasons, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff’s 26 First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Claims as alleged against defendants Brock and 27 Steadmon in their individual capacities are DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO 28 AMEND. Plaintiff’s remaining claims against defendant the State of California and/or 3:13-cv-0194-GPC-BGS Dockets.Justia.com 1 against Brock and Steadmon in their official capacities are DISMISSED WITHOUT 2 LEAVE TO AMEND. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 3 4 Plaintiff sets forth the facts underlying his claims in one paragraph: 5 On January 27, 2012 CHP officers, including defendants Brock, Steadmon, and Doe officers 1 through 20, while on duty with the CHP, confronted the plaintiff at his residence in the City of Escondido. The officers were investigating a prior hit and run accident. The officers had also received information concerning a separate alleged reckless driving incident around the same time and near the same location as the hit and run. The officers requested that plaintiff step out of his home for interrogation. When plaintiff declined, Brock and/or Steadmon reached into plaintiff’s residence and forcefully seized hold of plaintiff’s arm, and attempted to pull him out of the residence. After successfully pulling his arm away from the officers, plaintiff continued to decline the officer’s [sic] requests to step out of his home. A short time later, the officers stepped into the residence without probable cause or warrant and deployed an electrical shock weapon which sent barbs into plaintiff’s body and conducted repeated electrical energy impulses into plaintiff’s body. At no time was plaintiff a threat to the officers or to others. The invasion of the barbs into plaintiff’s body and the electrical energy impulses resulted in injuries and losses to plaintiff. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 (ECF No. 1. at ¶ 10.) 16 Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts six claims for relief: (1) Violation 17 of Civil Rights Causing Serious Bodily Injury; (2) Failure to Supervise Causing 18 Constitutional Violations; (3) Negligence Causing Serious Bodily Injury; (4) Battery 19 Causing Serious Bodily Injury; (5) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (6) 20 Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress. 21 Plaintiff asserts his First Claim (excessive force) against defendants Brock and 22 Steadmon, individually and in their official capacities. Plaintiff asserts his Second 23 Claim (failure to supervise) against defendant the State of California. Plaintiff asserts 24 his Third Claim (negligence) against all Defendants. Plaintiff asserts his Fourth Claim 25 (battery) against defendants Brock and Steadmon without specifying whether the claim 26 is against those defendants individually and/or in their official capacities. Lastly, 27 Plaintiff asserts his Fifth Claim (IIED) and Sixth Claim (NIED) against all Defendants. 28 /// 2 3:13-cv-0194-GPC-BGS DISCUSSION 1 2 I. Legal Standard 3 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the 4 sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 5 Dismissal is warranted under Rule12(b)(6) where the complaint lacks a cognizable 6 legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 7 1984); see Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989) (“Rule12(b)(6) authorizes a 8 court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law.”). Alternatively, a 9 complaint may be dismissed where it presents a cognizable legal theory yet fails to 10 plead essential facts under that theory. Robertson, 749 F.2d at 534. While a plaintiff 11 need not give “detailed factual allegations,” a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts that, 12 if true, “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 13 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). 14 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 15 matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 16 Ashcroft v. Iqbal,129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547). 17 A claim is facially plausible when the factual allegations permit “the court to draw the 18 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In 19 other words, “the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that 20 content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss 21 v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). “Determining whether a 22 complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that 23 requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” 24 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. 25 In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the 26 truth of all factual allegations and must construe all inferences from them in the light 27 most favorable to the nonmoving party. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th 28 Cir. 2002); Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Legal 3 3:13-cv-0194-GPC-BGS 1 conclusions, however, need not be taken as true merely because they are cast in the 2 form of factual allegations. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003); 3 W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). 4 Where a motion to dismiss is granted, “leave to amend should be granted ‘unless 5 the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged 6 pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.’” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 7 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well 8 Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). In other words, where leave to 9 amend would be futile, the Court may deny leave to amend. See Desoto, 957 F.2d at 10 658. 11 II. Analysis 12 Defendants argue “[a]ll claims against the State of California and all claims 13 against Officers Brock and Steadmon in their official capacities are barred by sovereign 14 immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.” (ECF No. 7 at 2.) Defendants also argue 15 Plaintiff’s “First Claim (excessive force) and Second Claim (failure to supervise) fail 16 to state claims upon which relief can be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the 17 State of California or against Officers Brock and Steadmon because none is a ‘person’ 18 within the meaning of § 1983.” (Id.) Defendants lastly argue that Plaintiff’s “Third 19 Claim (negligence), Fifth Claim (intentional infliction of emotional distress), and Sixth 20 Claim (negligent infliction of emotional distress) fail to state claims upon which relief 21 can be granted under California law against the State of California because no 22 California statutory basis for public entity liability is alleged.” (Id.) 23 In response, Plaintiff argues that “[a]lthough the Eleventh Amendment arguably 24 prevents suit against a non-consenting State, it does not prevent an action under Title 25 42 U.S.C. section 1983 against the officers individually for violation of Plaintiff’s 26 Fourth Amendment rights.” (ECF No. 9 at 2.) With regard to whether Brock and 27 Steadmon are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983, Plaintiff argues that, 28 “[a]lthough the State of California arguably may not be a ‘person’ under section 1983, 4 3:13-cv-0194-GPC-BGS 1 Officer Brock and Officer Steadmon are “persons” in their individual capacities.” (Id.) 2 With regard to his Third, Fifth, and Sixth Claims against the State of Clafornia, 3 “Plaintiff submits that the claims do not state a statutory basis against the public entity, 4 and requests leave to amend the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 15(a)(1).” (Id. at 3.) 6 In reply, Defendants assert that Plaintiff has conceded that all of his claims 7 against the State of California and against Brock and Steadmon in their official 8 capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (ECF No. 10 at 2.) Defendants 9 similarly assert Plaintiff has conceded that Brock and Steadmon, in their official 10 capacities, are not “persons” under § 1983. (Id.) Defendants lastly note that Plaintiff 11 has conceded that he has not alleged a statutory basis for his Third, Fifth, and Sixth 12 Claims against the State of Calfornia. (Id.) 13 The Court finds Plaintiff has conceded that, pursuant to the Eleventh 14 Amendment, all of his claims should be dismissed to the extent they are asserted 15 against the State of California or against Brock and Steadmon in their official 16 capacities. Similarly, the Court finds Plaintiff has conceded that, pursuant to the 17 definition of a “person” under § 1983, his First Claim (excessive force) should be 18 dismissed to the extent it is asserted against Brock and Steadmon in their official 19 capacities. The Court further finds Plaintiff has conceded that he has not alleged a 20 statutory basis for asserting his Third, Fifth, and Sixth Claims against the State of 21 California, which claims are, in any event, barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 22 Accordingly, the Court will dismiss with prejudice each of Plaintiff’s claims to the 23 extent they are asserted against the State of California or against Brock and Steadmon 24 in their official capacities. Thus, Plaintiff’s First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 25 Claims—as alleged against Brock and Steadmon in their individual capacities—remain 26 to be analyzed. 27 Defendants argue “[a]ll claims against all Defendants fail to state claims upon 28 which relief can be granted under Federal or Califonria law because Plaintiff fails to 5 3:13-cv-0194-GPC-BGS 1 allege sufficient facts to meet the requisite pleading standard.” (ECF No. 7 at 2.) 2 Defendants argue “Plaintiff’s allegation that he was not ‘a threat to the officers or to 3 others’ . . . is obviously a conclusion,” and that “it would be an unreasonable inference 4 in light of Plaintiff’s admission [that] the Officers were investigating a serious crime, 5 he ‘declined’ to ‘step out of his home for interrogation,’ ‘successfully pull[ed] his arm 6 away from the officers,’ and ‘continued to decline the officer’s requests to step out of 7 his home.’” (Id. at 6-7.) 8 Defendants further argue Plaintiff’s allegation that “Officers tased him for no 9 reason other than to cause him pain . . . is simply not plausible and raises nothing more 10 than a mere possibility.” (Id. at 7.) In short, Defendants argue Plaintiff has failed to 11 plausibly allege that Brock’s and/or Steadmon’s use of the taser was not objectively 12 reasonable from the perspective of a reasonable police officer. (Id.) 13 In response, Plaintiff asserts that “[a]ll claims are stated with sufficient 14 specificity to give the defendants notice of the nature of the claims against them.” 15 (ECF 9 at 2.) “Defendants mistake the ‘plausibility’ standard for a ‘credibility’ 16 standard.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff argues Defendants’ “conclusory reasoning” fails to 17 specify “why the allegations are not ‘plausible.’” (Id. (emphasis in original).) Plaintiff 18 suggests Defendants could have attached Brock’s and Steadmon’s reports “to prove 19 that the allegations are ‘implausible.’” (Id.) 20 In reply, Defendants argue it is not their burden to establish implausibility. (ECF 21 No. 10 at 3.) Defendants thus assert they have no burden to produce extraneous 22 evidence, such as Brock’s and Steadmon’s reports, to establish implausibility. (Id.) 23 The Court first notes that neither party addresses the plausibility of Plaintiff’s 24 allegations within the context of Plaintiff’s specific claims. The Court agrees with 25 Defendants, however, that the facts contained in Plaintiff’s single paragraph of 26 allegations, (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 10), are too sparse to support Plaintiff’s claims for 27 excessive force, negligence, battery, IIED, and NIED. Intertwined with Plaintiff’s 28 sparse factual allegations are important legal conclusions, such as “the officers stepped 6 3:13-cv-0194-GPC-BGS 1 into the residence without probable cause,” and that “[a]t no time was plaintiff a threat 2 to the officers.” (Id.) The Court does not assume the truth of these conclusions, Ileto, 3 349 F.3d at 1200, which in turn makes it difficult to assess whether Plaintiff has 4 plausibly alleged that Brock’s and Steadmon’s use of force was unreasonable. 5 Accordingly, the Court must grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to these claims 6 as well. CONCLUSION 7 8 9 10 After a careful review of the parties’ submissions, and for the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 1. Each of Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO 11 AMEND to the extent they are asserted against the State of California or 12 Brock and Steadmon in their official capacities; 13 2. Plaintiff’s First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Claims–as alleged against 14 Brock and Steadmon in their individual capacities–are DISMISSED 15 WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; 16 3. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint on or before May 10, 2013; 17 4. The hearing on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, currently set for May 3, 18 2013, is VACATED. 19 20 DATED: May 1, 2013 21 22 HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28 7 3:13-cv-0194-GPC-BGS
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