Naranjo v. SBMC Mortgage et al, No. 3:2011cv02229 - Document 20 (S.D. Cal. 2012)
Court Description: ORDER granting in part and denying in part 12 Motion to Dismiss. The Court also DENIES Defendants motion to strike Plaintiffs request for attorneys fees on the grounds that they fail to make the request under the appropriate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. If Plaintiff decides to file a Second Amended Complaint, she must do so by August 7, 2012. Signed by Judge M. James Lorenz on 7/24/2012. (mtb) Modified to change to an opinion on 7/25/2012 (mtb).
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Naranjo v. SBMC Mortgage et al Doc. 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 CARMEN R. NARANJO, ) Case No. 11-cv-2229-L(WVG) ) Plaintiff, ) ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND ) DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ v. ) MOTION TO DISMISS [DOC. 12] ) SBMC MORTGAGE, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) ) ) On September 29, 2011, Plaintiff Carmen R. Naranjo commenced this action against 20 Defendants SBMC Mortgage (“SBMC”),1 JPMorgan Chase (“JPMorgan”), and U.S. Bank N.A. 21 After defaulting on her home loan, Plaintiff now sues Defendants in an attempt to prevent 22 foreclosure of the property securing the loan. Defendants now moves to dismiss the First 23 Amended Complaint (“FAC”). Plaintiff opposes. 24 The Court found this motion suitable for determination on the papers submitted and 25 without oral argument. See Civ. L.R. 7.1(d.1). (Doc. 15.) For the following reasons, the Court 26 GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 27 28 1 Plaintiff has since voluntarily dismissed SBMC Mortgage from this action. (Doc. 8.) 11cv2229 Dockets.Justia.com 1 I. BACKGROUND2 2 On or about February 21, 2006, Plaintiff executed a promissory note in favor of SBMC 3 Mortgage (“SBMC”) in the amount of $825,000.00, secured by a deed of trust (“DOT”), to 4 finance real property located in La Jolla, California. (FAC ¶¶ 1, 15 [Doc. 10].3) The DOT, 5 attached as Exhibit E to the FAC, identified Plaintiff as Borrower, SBMC Mortgage as Lender, 6 T.D. Service Co. as Trustee, and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) as 7 both nominee and beneficiary under the security instrument. (DOT 1.) 8 Shortly thereafter, SBMC sold her loan to a currently unknown entity or entities. (FAC ¶ 9 15.) Plaintiff alleges that these unknown entities and Defendants were involved in an attempt to 10 securitize the loan into the WAMU Mortgage Pass-through Certificates WMALT Series 200611 AR4 Trust (“WAMU Trust”). (Id. ¶ 17.) However, these entities involved in the attempted 12 securitization of the loan “failed to adhere to the requirements of the Trust Agreement necessary 13 to properly assign the mortgage loan into the Trust.”4 (Id.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that her 14 loan “was not properly assigned to the WAMU Trust on or before May 30, 2006, the ‘Closing 15 Date’ as set forth in the Trust Agreement.” (Id. ¶¶ 17, 21.) “The Closing Date is the date by 16 which all of the notes and mortgages had to be transferred into the WAMU Trust in order for the 17 mortgage loan to be a part of the trust res.” (Id. ¶ 21.) 18 In May 2009, Plaintiff sought to modify her loan with JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. 19 (“JPMorgan”) under the belief that it had the authority to negotiate her loan. (FAC ¶¶ 22–24.) 20 However, she made little progress. (Id.) She continued to follow-up and submit loan21 22 2 Defendants also request judicial notice for five documents, all of which are documents 23 recorded in the Official Records of San Diego County. (Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) 1:1–2:1 [Doc. 12-2].) These documents are central to Plaintiff’s claims, and there is no question 24 concerning the authenticity of these documents. Moreover, Plaintiff has not opposed the request. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the request. See Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453-54 (9th 25 Cir. 1994). 26 27 3 Paragraph 1 in the FAC states that Plaintiff executed the note with Countrywide. After reviewing the moving papers, this appears to be a misidentification that will be treated as such. 4 Plaintiff’s references to the Trust Agreement and Pooling Services Agreement (“PSA”) 28 appear to be interchangeable. (See Compl. ¶ 20.) 11cv2229 2 1 modification applications for over 19 months. (Id. ¶ 27.) 2 In August 2009, Plaintiff was hospitalized, resulting in unforeseen financial hardship. 3 (FAC ¶ 25.) As a result, she defaulted on her loan. (See id. ¶ 26.) 4 On May 26, 2010, Defendants recorded an Assignment of Deed of Trust, which states 5 that MERS assigned and transferred to U.S. Bank as trustee for the WAMU Trust under the 6 DOT. (RJN Ex. B.) Colleen Irby executed the Assignment as Officer for MERS. (Id.) On the 7 same day, Defendants also recorded a Substitution of Trustee, which states that the U.S. Bank as 8 trustee, by JP Morgan, as attorney-in-fact substituted its rights under the DOT to the California 9 Reconveyance Company (“CRC”). (RJN Ex. C.) Colleen Irby also executed the Substitution as 10 Officer of “U.S. Bank, National Association as trustee for the WAMU Trust.” (Id.) And again, 11 on the same day, CRC, as trustee, recorded a Notice of Default and Election to Sell. (RJN Ex. 12 D.) 13 A Notice of Trustee’s sale was recorded, stating that the estimated unpaid balance on the 14 note was $989,468.00 on July 1, 2011. (RJN Ex. E.) 15 On August 8, 2011, Plaintiff sent JPMorgan a Qualified Written Request (“QWR”) letter 16 in an effort to verify and validate her debt. (FAC ¶ 35 & Ex. C.) In the letter, she requested that 17 JPMorgan provide, among other things, a true and correct copy of the original note and a 18 complete life of the loan transactional history. (Id.) Although JPMorgan acknowledged the 19 QWR within five days of receipt, Plaintiff alleges that it “failed to provide a substantive 20 response.” (Id. ¶ 35.) Specifically, even though the QWR contained the borrow’s name, loan 21 number, and property address, Plaintiff alleges that “JPMorgan’s substantive response concerned 22 the same borrower, but instead supplied information regarding an entirely different loan and 23 property.” (Id.) 24 On September 26, 2011, Plaintiff commenced this action. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed her 25 FAC asserting nine claims: (1) declaratory relief; (2) negligence; (3) quasi contract; (4) violation 26 of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692; (5) violation of the 27 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 2605; (6) violation of California 28 Business and Professions Code § 17200; (7) accounting; (8) breach of contract; and (9) breach of 11cv2229 3 1 implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Defendants now moves to dismiss the FAC in 2 its entirety with prejudice. Plaintiff opposes. (Doc. 14.) 3 4 II. LEGAL STANDARD 5 The court must dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 6 be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal 7 sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). The court 8 must accept all allegations of material fact as true and construe them in light most favorable to 9 the nonmoving party. Cedars-Sanai Med. Ctr. v. Nat’l League of Postmasters of U.S., 497 F.3d 10 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2007). Material allegations, even if doubtful in fact, are assumed to be true. 11 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). However, the court need not “necessarily 12 assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual 13 allegations.” Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003) 14 (internal quotation marks omitted). In fact, the court does not need to accept any legal 15 conclusions as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, — , 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) 16 “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed 17 factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ 18 requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 19 of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). Instead, the 20 allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 21 level.” Id. Thus, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 22 matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 23 at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 24 pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 25 liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability 26 requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” 27 Id. A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law either for lack of a cognizable legal theory 28 or for insufficient facts under a cognizable theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 11cv2229 4 1 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). 2 Generally, courts may not consider material outside the complaint when ruling on a 3 motion to dismiss. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 4 (9th Cir. 1990). However, documents specifically identified in the complaint whose authenticity 5 is not questioned by parties may also be considered. Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1080 n.1 6 (9th Cir. 1995) (superceded by statutes on other grounds). Moreover, the court may consider the 7 full text of those documents, even when the complaint quotes only selected portions. Id. It may 8 also consider material properly subject to judicial notice without converting the motion into one 9 for summary judgment. Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994). 10 11 III. DISCUSSION 12 Plaintiff’s primary contention here is that Defendants “are not her true creditors and as 13 such have no legal, equitable, or pecuniary right in this debt obligation” in the loan. (Pl.’s Opp’n 14 1:5–11.) She contends that her promissory note and DOT were never properly assigned to the 15 WAMU Trust because the entities involved in the attempted transfer failed to adhere to the 16 requirements set forth in the Trust Agreement and thus the note and DOT are not a part of the 17 trust res. (FAC ¶¶ 17, 20.) Defendants moves to dismiss the FAC in its entirety with prejudice. 18 19 A. 20 Plaintiff alleges that the May 2010 assignments are improper for two primary reasons: (1) Applicability of Gomes 21 the assignment of her loan into the WAMU Trust is improper because it was not assigned before 22 the end of May 2006 as required by the Trust Agreement, and (2) the May 2010 assignments are 23 improper because Collen Irby lacked the authority to execute the assignments. Defendants argue 24 that like the borrower in Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1149 25 (2011), Plaintiff seeks to “‘test whether the person initiating the foreclosure has the authority to 26 do so’ without presenting any competent, particularized factual allegations or evidence 27 Defendants ‘lack[] authority to proceed with the foreclosure.’” (Defs.’ Mot. 4:13–18.) They go 28 on to explain that the assignments and notice of default and election to sell executed in May 11cv2229 5 1 2010 are proper. (Defs.’ Reply 3:26–4:4.) However, Defendants put the cart before the horse. 2 The vital allegation in this case is the assignment of the loan into the WAMU Trust was 3 not completed by May 30, 2006 as required by the Trust Agreement. This allegation gives rise 4 to a plausible inference that the subsequent assignment, substitution, and notice of default and 5 election to sell may also be improper. Defendants wholly fail to address that issue. (See Defs.’ 6 Mot. 3:16–6:2; Defs.’ Reply 2:13–4:4.) This reason alone is sufficient to deny Defendants’ 7 motion with respect to this issue. 8 Moving on, Defendants’ reliance on Gomes is misguided. In Gomes, the California Court 9 of Appeal held that a plaintiff does not have a right to bring an action to determine a nominee’s 10 authorization to proceed with a nonjudicial foreclosure on behalf of a noteholder. 192 Cal. App. 11 4th at 1155. The nominee in Gomes was MERS. Id. at 1151. Here, Plaintiff is not seeking such 12 a determination. The role of the nominee is not central to this action as it was in Gomes. Rather, 13 Plaintiff alleges that the transfer of rights to the WAMU Trust is improper, thus Defendants 14 consequently lack the legal right to either collect on the debt or enforce the underlying security 15 interest. 16 17 B. 18 Declaratory relief is not an independent cause of action or theory of recovery, only a Declaratory Relief 19 remedy. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202. Where a substantive cause of action already exists in the 20 complaint, a plaintiff cannot assert a declaratory-relief claim as a “superfluous second cause of 21 action for the determination of identical issues.” Jensen v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 702 F. 22 Supp. 2d 1183, 1189 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). To grant declaratory 23 relief, a district court must find an “actual controversy,” which is “definite and concrete . . . 24 [and] real and substantial.” Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 25 240-41 (1937). 26 Plaintiff requests that the Court “make a finding and issue appropriate orders stating that 27 none of the named Defendants . . . have any right or interest in Plaintiff’s Note, Deed of Trust, or 28 the Property which authorizes them . . . to collect Plaintiff’s mortgage payments or enforce the 11cv2229 6 1 terms of the Note or Deed of Trust in any manner whatsoever.” (FAC ¶ 50.) Defendant 2 simplifies this as a request for “a determination of the ownership of [the] Note and Deed of 3 Trust,” which they argue is “addressed in her other causes of action.” (Defs.’ Mot. 6:16–20.) 4 The Court disagrees with Defendants. As discussed above and below, there is an actual 5 controversy that is not superfluous. Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion as to 6 Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief. 7 8 C. 9 “[T]o recover on a theory of negligence, [p]laintiffs must prove duty, breach, causation, Negligence 10 and damages.” Truong v. Nguyen, 156 Cal. App. 4th 865, 875 (2007). “The existence of a duty 11 of care owed by defendant to a plaintiff is a prerequisite to establishing a claim for negligence.” 12 Nymark v. Heart Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 1095 (1991). “[A]s a general 13 rule, a financial institution owes no duty of care to a borrower when the institution’s 14 involvement in the loan transaction does not exceed the scope of its conventional role as a mere 15 lender of money.” Id. at 1096. “Liability to a borrower for negligence arises only when the 16 lender ‘actively participates’ in the financed enterprise ‘beyond the domain of the usual money 17 lender.’” Wagner v. Benson, 101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 35 (1980) (quoting Connor v. Great W. Sav. & 18 Loan Ass’n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 864 (1968)). 19 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “have a duty to exercise reasonable care and skill to 20 follow California law with regard to enforcement of monetary obligations, and to refrain from 21 taking or failing to take any action against Plaintiff that they did not have legal authority to do.” 22 (FAC ¶ 56.) Defendants argue that they are the mortgage servicer and that Plaintiff fails to 23 “plead facts supporting a finding that Defendants’ conduct exceeded the scope of a conventional 24 mortgage servicer.” (Defs.’ Mot. 7:5–7.) Plaintiff responds that JPMorgan’s mishandling of the 25 loan-modification applications and failure to afford a loan modification is “beyond the domain 26 of a usual money lender.” (Pl.’s Opp’n 17:24–18:19.) However, there is no common-law duty 27 to modify a contract. Vella v. Hudgins, 151 Cal. App. 3d 515, 519 (1984). Thus, Plaintiff fails 28 to allege facts as to the loan-modification process that maintain her claim for negligence. 11cv2229 7 1 Defendants also argue that they have “clearly established they had such authority” to 2 collect payments. (Defs.’ Reply 5:28–6:5.) However, as discussed above, they have not. 3 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ 4 motion as to Plaintiff’s negligence claim. Given that the legal authority of Defendants that 5 derive from the allegedly improper assignment of rights to the WAMU Trust is central to this 6 action, Plaintiff may pursue her claim on that ground. However, that said, the Court 7 DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s negligence claim insofar as it relies on facts 8 alleged regarding the loan-modification process, which are insufficient to maintain her 9 negligence claim. 10 11 D. 12 A claim for quasi-contract is synonymous with one for unjust enrichment. FDIC v. Quasi-Contract 13 Dintino, 167 Cal. App. 4th 333, 346 (2008). Unjust enrichment requires the receipt of a benefit 14 and the unjust retention of that benefit at the expense of another. Peterson v. Cellco P’ship, 164 15 Cal. App. 4th 1583, 1593 (2008). However, “California courts appear to be split on whether 16 unjust enrichment can be an independent claim or merely an equitable remedy.” Falk v. Gen. 17 Motors Corp., 496 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1099 (N.D. Cal. 2007); see Bernardi v. JPMorgan Chase 18 Bank, N.A., No. 11-cv-4212, 2012 WL 2343679, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2012) (noting that 19 quasi-contract is not an independent cause of action under California law, and thus the claim is 20 subject to dismissal for that reason alone). 21 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s quasi-contract claim fails because “[t]he Deed of Trust 22 is an express binding agreement that defines the parties’ rights.” (Defs.’ Mot. 7:8–16.) Plaintiff 23 responds that she “was not paying her true creditor because there was no valid assignment that 24 allowed [Defendants] to collect on her debt obligation.” (Pl.’s Opp’n 19:3–13.) As discussed 25 above, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges facts that put Defendants’ legal rights that derive from the 26 Trust Agreement in question. Consequently, Plaintiff adequately alleges facts that show 27 Defendants were unjustly enriched in collecting payments based on those presumed rights. 28 Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion as to Plaintiff’s quasi-contract claim. 11cv2229 8 1 E. 2 “The [FDCPA] prohibits debt collector[s] from making false or misleading FDCPA 3 representations and from engaging in various abusive and unfair practices.” Heintz v. Jenkins, 4 514 U.S. 291, 292 (1995). To be liable for an FDCPA violation, a defendant must, as a 5 threshold matter, be a “debt collector” within the meaning of those acts. Id. at 294. 6 Under the FDCPA, a debt collector is “any person who uses any instrumentality of 7 interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection 8 of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or 9 due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). This definition includes “any 10 creditor who, in the process of collecting his own debts, uses any name other than his own which 11 would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts.” Id. § 12 1692a(6). The FDCPA does not, however, cover “the consumer’s creditors, a mortgage 13 servicing company, or any assignee of the debt, so long as the debt was not in default at the time 14 it was assigned.” Nool v. HomeQ Servicing, 653 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1053 (E.D. Cal. 2009) 15 (quoting Perry v. Stewart Title Co., 756 F.2d 1197, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985)); see also 15 U.S.C. § 16 1692a(4) (defining “creditor”). Consequently, a loan servicer is not a debt collector if it 17 acquired the loan before the borrower was in default. See Schlegel v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 18 799 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1103-04 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 19 Defendants argue that they are not “debt collectors” within the meaning of the FDCPA. 20 (Defs.’ Mot. 9:13–15.) That argument is predicated on the presumption that all of the legal 21 rights attached to the loan were properly assigned. Plaintiff responds that Defendants are debt 22 collectors because U.S. Bank’s principal purpose is to collect debt and it also attempted to 23 collect payments. (Pl.’s Opp’n 19:23–27.) She explicitly alleges in the FAC that U.S. Bank has 24 attempted to collect her debt obligation and that U.S. Bank is a debt collector. Consequently, 25 Plaintiff sufficiently alleges a claim under the FDCPA. 26 Defendants also argue that the FDCPA claim is time barred. (Defs.’ Mot. 7:18–27.) A 27 FDCPA claim must be brought “within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” 28 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). Defendants contend that the violation occurred when the allegedly false 11cv2229 9 1 assignment occurred on May 26, 2010. (Defs.’ Mot. 7:22–27.) However, Plaintiff alleges that 2 U.S. Bank violated the FDCPA when it attempted to enforce Plaintiff’s debt obligation and 3 collect mortgage payments when it allegedly had no legal authority to do so. (FAC ¶ 72.) 4 Defendants wholly overlook those allegations in the FAC. Thus, Defendants fail to show that 5 Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim is time barred. 6 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion as to Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim. 7 8 F. 9 “RESPA imposes certain disclosure obligations on loan servicers who transfer or assume RESPA 10 the servicing of a federally related mortgage loan.” Morris v. Bank of America, No. C 09-02849, 11 2011 WL 250325, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2011) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 2605(b)). Under RESPA, 12 a Qualified Written Response (“QWR”) is “written request from the borrower (or an agent of the 13 borrower) for information relating to the servicing of such loan.” 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(A). 14 “The term ‘servicing’ means receiving any scheduled periodic payments from a borrower 15 pursuant to the terms of any loan . . . and making the payments of principal and interest and such 16 other payments with respect to the amounts received from the borrower as may be required 17 pursuant to the terms of the loan.” 12 U.S.C. § 2603(i)(3). Among other things, a QWR must 18 include a “statement of the reasons for the belief of the borrower, to the extent applicable, that 19 the account is in error or provide[] sufficient detail to the servicer regarding other information 20 sought by the borrower.” Id. § 2605(e)(1)(B). It must also include the name and account of the 21 borrower. Id. 22 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s letter does not constitute a QWR because it requests a 23 list of unsupported demands rather than specific particular errors or omissions in the account 24 along with an explanation from the borrower why she believes an error exists. (Defs.’ Mot. 25 10:4–13.) However, the letter explains that it “concerns sales and transfers of mortgage 26 servicing rights; deceptive and fraudulent servicing practices to enhance balance sheets; 27 deceptive, abusive, and fraudulent accounting tricks and practices that may have also negatively 28 affected any credit rating, mortgage account and/or the debt or payments that [Plaintiff] may be 11cv2229 10 1 obligated to.” (FAC Ex. C.) The letter goes on to put JPMorgan on notice of 2 3 4 5 6 7 potential abuses of J.P. Morgan Chase or previous servicing companies or previous servicing companies [that] could have deceptively, wrongfully, unlawfully, and/or illegally: Increased the amounts of monthly payments; Increased the principal balance Ms. Naranjo owes; Increased the escrow payments; Increased the amounts applied and attributed toward interest on this account; Decreased the proper amounts applied and attributed toward the principal on this account; and/or[] Assessed, charged and/or collected fees, expenses and miscellaneous charges Ms. Naranjo is not legally obligated to pay under this mortgage, note and/or deed of trust. (Id.) Based on the substance of letter, the Court cannot find as a matter of law that the letter is 8 not a QWR. 9 Defendants also argue that the RESPA claim fails because Plaintiff fails to plead actual 10 damages arising from JPMorgan’s alleged failure to respond. (Defs.’ Mot. 10:14–19.) To state 11 a claim for relief under RESPA, a plaintiff must allege either a purported pattern or practice of 12 violating the statute or actual damages caused by the asserted violation. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f); 13 Fonua v. First Allied Funding, No. C 09-497, 2009 WL 816291, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 14 2009). Here, Plaintiff alleges “actual pecuniary damages” that include costs related to damage to 15 her credit. (FAC ¶ 91.) That is a sufficient allegation of actual damages. See Wise v. Wells 16 Fargo Bank, N.A., — F. Supp. 2d —, 2012 WL 105887, at *6 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 17 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion as to Plaintiff’s RESPA claim. 18 19 G. 20 California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or California Business and Professions Code § 17200 (Unfair Competition Law) 21 fraudulent business act or practice . . . .” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. This cause of action 22 is generally derivative of some other illegal conduct or fraud committed by a defendant. Khoury 23 v. Maly’s of Cal., Inc., 14 Cal. App. 4th 612, 619 (1993). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants 24 violated the UCL by collecting payments that they lacked the right to collect, and engaging in 25 unlawful business practices by violating the FDCPA and RESPA. 26 // 27 // 28 // 11cv2229 11 1 2 1. Standing Standing to bring a UCL claim requires “a person who has suffered injury in fact and has 3 lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204. 4 To have standing under the UCL, a plaintiff must sufficiently allege that (1) she has lost “money 5 or property” sufficient to constitute an “injury in fact” under Article III of the Constitution, and 6 (2) there is a “causal connection” between the defendant’s alleged UCL violation and the 7 plaintiff’s injury in fact. Rubio v. Capital One Bank, 613 F.3d 1195, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 2010) 8 (citing Birdsong v. Apple, Inc., 590 F.3d 959-60 (9th Cir. 2009); Hall v. Time Inc., 158 Cal. App. 9 4th 847, 855-56 (2008)). 10 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegation regarding a cloud on her title does not 11 constitute an allegation of loss of money or property, and even if Plaintiff were to lose her 12 property, she cannot show it was a result of Defendants’ actions. (Defs.’ Mot. 12:22–13:4.) The 13 Court disagrees. As discussed above, Plaintiff alleges damages resulting from Defendants’ 14 collection of payments that they purportedly did not have the legal right to collect. These 15 injuries are monetary, but also may result in the loss of Plaintiff’s property. Furthermore, these 16 injuries are causally connected to Defendants’ conduct. Thus, Plaintiff has standing to pursue a 17 UCL claim against Defendants. 18 19 20 2. Unlawful, Unfair or Fraudulent Conduct Under the UCL, there are three varieties of unfair competition—business acts or practices 21 that are unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. “Each prong of the 22 UCL is a separate and distinct theory of liability,” each offering “an independent basis for 23 relief.” Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009). Furthermore, a claim 24 under § 17200 is “derivative of some other illegal conduct or fraud committed by a defendant, 25 and ‘[a] plaintiff must state with reasonable particularity the facts supporting the statutory 26 elements of the violation.’” Benham v. Aurora Loan Servs., No. C-09-2059, 2009 WL 2880232, 27 at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2009) (quoting Khoury, 14 Cal. App. 4th at 619). 28 // 11cv2229 12 1 Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to plead an unlawful, fraudulent, and unfair act. 2 (Defs.’ Mot. 13:5–15:3.) Specifically, with respect to pleading a fraudulent act, Defendants 3 contend that Plaintiff fails to meet the heightened pleading standard required to allege fraud 4 against a corporation. (Id. at 14:4–20.) Plaintiff responds that she satisfies the unlawful prong 5 through her allegations that Defendants’ business practices violated the FDCPA and RESPA, 6 and the fraudulent prong because “Defendants’ business pattern, collecting debt they have no 7 right to, is extremely likely to deceive both Plaintiff[] and the public.” (Pl.’s Opp’n 22:5–18.) 8 As discussed above, Plaintiff alleges cognizable theories of liability, including, among 9 others, violations of the FDCPA and RESPA. Thus, Plaintiff may proceed with her UCL claim 10 under the unlawful prong. 11 The fraudulent prong requires a plaintiff to have “actually relied” on the alleged 12 misrepresentation to her detriment. In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 326, 330 (2009). 13 Moreover, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), the “circumstances constituting fraud” or 14 any other claim that “sounds in fraud” must be stated “with particularity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); 15 Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2003). This standard requires, 16 at a minimum, that a plaintiff plead evidentiary facts, such as time, place, persons, statements, 17 and explanations of why the statements are misleading. See In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 18 F.3d 1541, 1547-48 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc). Plaintiff fails allege facts that satisfy these 19 heightened requirements. (See FAC ¶¶ 95–123.) 20 Finally, Plaintiff fails to respond to Defendants’ argument that she fails to allege facts to 21 satisfy the unfairness prong. (See Pl.’s Opp’n 22:5–18.) The only mention of the unfairness 22 prong in Plaintiff’s opposition is a conclusory assertion that Defendants engaged in unfair 23 practices. (Id. at 22:5–6.) Thus, it appears that Plaintiff has abandoned this ground of her UCL 24 claim. 25 In sum, Plaintiff has standing to pursue her UCL claim. Furthermore, the Court 26 GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion as to the UCL claim. 27 Plaintiff may pursue her UCL claim under the unlawful prong, but the Court DISMISSES 28 WITHOUT PREJUDICE the UCL claim under the fraudulent and unfairness prongs. 11cv2229 13 1 H. 2 Accounting “is not an independent cause of action but merely a type of remedy and an Accounting 3 equitable remedy at that.” Batt v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 155 Cal. App. 4th 65, 82 4 (2007). An accounting may be brought to compel a defendant to account to a plaintiff for money 5 where (1) a fiduciary duty exists, or (2) where no fiduciary duty exists, “the accounts are so 6 complicated that an ordinary legal action demanding a fixed sum is impracticable.” Civic W. 7 Corp. v. Zila Indus., Inc., 66 Cal. App. 3d 1, 14 (1977). 8 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants owe a fiduciary duty in their capacities as creditor and 9 mortgage servicer. (FAC ¶ 125.) She pursues this claim on the grounds that Defendants 10 collected payments from her that they had no right to do. Defendants argue that various 11 documents recorded in the Official Records of San Diego County from May 2010 show that 12 Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for accounting. (Defs.’ Mot. 16:1–3.) 13 Defendants are mistaken. As discussed above, a fundamental issue in this action is whether 14 Defendants’ rights were properly assigned in accordance with the Trust Agreement in 2006. 15 Plaintiff alleges facts that allows the Court to draw a reasonable inference that Defendants may 16 be liable for various misconduct alleged. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. 17 Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion as to Plaintiff’s accounting claim. 18 19 I. Fair Dealing5 20 21 Breach of Contract, and Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and A claim for breach of contract requires that a plaintiff plead: (1) the existence of a 22 contract, (2) a breach of the contract by defendant, (3) performance or excuse of non23 performance on behalf of the plaintiff, and (4) damages suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the 24 defendant’s breach. McDonald v. John P. Scripps Newspaper, 210 Cal. App. 3d 100, 104 25 26 5 Plaintiff pleads her claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing “[i]n the alternative, if the Court finds that U.S. Bank is a successor 27 in interest to the Deed of Trust.” (FAC ¶¶ 129, 140.) Though the Court has not found that U.S. Bank is the successor in interest, the Court will address the sufficiency of these claims for the 28 sake of completion. 11cv2229 14 1 (1989). Every contract also contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that 2 “neither party will do anything which will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of 3 the agreement.” Kransco v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 23 Cal. 4th 390, 400 (2000) 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 5 protects only the parties’ right to receive the benefit of their agreement.” Foley v. Interactive 6 Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 698 n.39 (1988). “[T]he implied covenant will only be recognized 7 to further the contract’s purpose; it will not be read into a contract to prohibit a party from doing 8 that which is expressly permitted by the agreement itself.” Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures & 9 Television, 162 Cal. App. 4th 1107, 1120 (2008). 10 Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to allege facts that constitute a breach of contract or a 11 breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Defs.’ Reply 8:21–27.) The 12 Court agrees. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants breached the contract by failing to follow Section 13 2 of the DOT, which in turn “resulted in improper fees and taxes being added to the balance of 14 the Loan,” but fails to allege detailed facts demonstrating that Defendants indeed failed to 15 comply with the DOT. (See FAC ¶¶ 133–36.) For example, she does not identify which 16 payments were misapplied, when they were misapplied, and for how much. 17 Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion as to Plaintiff’s claim for breach of 18 contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.6 Accordingly, the 19 Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE both of these claims. 20 21 IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER 22 In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART 23 Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Court also DENIES Defendants’ motion to strike 24 Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees on the grounds that they fail to make the request under the 25 appropriate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. If Plaintiff decides to file a Second Amended 26 27 6 In the absence of a breach-of-contract claim, the Court also dismisses Plaintiff’s claim 28 for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 11cv2229 15 1 Complaint, she must do so by August 7, 2012. 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 4 DATED: July 24, 2012 5 6 7 COPY TO: M. James Lorenz United States District Court Judge HON. WILLIAM V. GALLO 8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9 ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11cv2229 16
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