Rentz v. Borem, No. 3:2011cv01623 - Document 38 (S.D. Cal. 2012)
Court Description: ORDER granting in part and denying in part Defendant's 32 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. Court denies Dft's motion to Dismiss Pla's First Amendment claims pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6), grants Dft's mo tion to dismiss Pla's Eighth Amendment claims pursuant to FRCP 12(6)(b), and denies Dft's motion to dismiss Pla's First Amendment claims on qualified immunity grounds. Dft shall serve and file an Answer to Pla's remaining First Amendment claims within the time prescribed by FRCP 12(a)(4)(B). Signed by Judge Irma E. Gonzalez on 12/11/2012. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service) (jah)
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Rentz v. Borem Doc. 38 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 DAVID RENTZ, II, CDCR #J-41030, Case No. Plaintiff, 13 vs. 14 15 T. BOREM, 16 Defendant. 11cv1623 IEG (NLS) ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 32) 17 18 David Rentz, II (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison (“CAL”) 19 in Calipatria, California, is proceeding in pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in this civil rights 20 action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 21 I. Procedural History 22 On July 19, 2011, Plaintiff filed his original Complaint (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff was 23 granted leave to proceed IFP and the Court directed the U.S. Marshal to effect service of process 24 upon Defendant Borem pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) and FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2) (ECF No. 4 25 at 4-5). Before Defendant Borem appeared in the action, Plaintiff filed a First Amended 26 Complaint (“FAC”) (ECF No. 8). Defendant Borem filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC 27 pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 16). On May 8, 2012, the Court granted 28 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and gave Plaintiff leave to file a Second Amended Complaint 1 11cv1623 IEG (NLS) Dockets.Justia.com 1 (ECF No. 23 at 5). After seeking extensions of time which were granted by the Court, Plaintiff 2 filed his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on July 23, 2012 (ECF No. 29). 3 Defendant has now filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint 4 pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 32). Plaintiff has filed an Opposition in Response 5 (ECF No. 36) to which Defendant has filed a Reply (ECF No. 37), and the matter has been 6 submitted on the papers without oral argument pursuant to S.D. CAL. CIVLR 7.1(d)(1). 7 II. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 8 A. Defendant’s Arguments 9 Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint on the grounds that: 10 (1) Plaintiff has failed to state a First Amendment claim; (2) Plaintiff has failed to state an Eighth 11 Amendment claim; and (3) Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from liability for 12 damages in his individual capacity. (Def.’s Memo of P&As in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (ECF 13 No. 32-1) at 3-10). FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) Standard of Review 14 B. 15 A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a “‘lack of a cognizable legal theory’ 16 or ‘the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’” Johnson v. 17 Riverside Healthcare System, LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Balistreri 18 v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). In other words, the plaintiff’s 19 complaint must provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled 20 to relief.” Id. (citing FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2)). “Specific facts are not necessary; the statement 21 need only give the defendant[s] fair notice of what ... the claim is and the grounds upon which 22 it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (internal quotation 23 marks omitted). 24 A motion to dismiss should be granted if plaintiff fails to proffer “enough facts to state 25 a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 26 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 27 court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 28 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) . 2 11cv1623 IEG (NLS) 1 In addition, factual allegations asserted by pro se petitioners, “however inartfully 2 pleaded,” are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines 3 v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519-20 (1972). Because “Iqbal incorporated the Twombly pleading standard 4 and Twombly did not alter courts’ treatment of pro se filings, [courts] continue to construe pro 5 se filings liberally when evaluating them under Iqbal.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & 6 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985). C. 7 Application to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint 1. 8 First Amendment Free Exercise 9 “The right to exercise religious practices and beliefs does not terminate at the prison door. 10 The free exercise right, however, is necessarily limited by the fact of incarceration, and may be 11 curtailed in order to achieve legitimate correctional goals or to maintain security.” McElyea v. 12 Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197 (9th Cir. 1987). The protections of the Free Exercise Clause are 13 triggered when prison officials burden the practice of an inmate’s religion by preventing him 14 from engaging in conduct which he sincerely believes is consistent with his faith. Shakur v. 15 Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884 (9th Cir. 2008); Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 16 1997), overruled in part by Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85. 17 A prison regulation or policy that might otherwise unconstitutionally impinge on an 18 inmate’s First Amendment rights will survive a First Amendment challenge, however, if it is 19 “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 20 (1987); O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987). In determining whether a prison 21 regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest, the court considers the 22 following factors: (1) whether there is a valid, rational connection between the regulation and 23 the interest used to justify the regulation; (2) whether prisoners retain alternative means of 24 exercising the right at issue; (3) the impact the requested accommodation will have on inmates, 25 prison staff, and prison resources generally; and (4) whether the prisoner has identified easy 26 alternatives to the regulation which could be implemented at a minimal cost to legitimate 27 penological interests. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90; Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884. 28 /// 3 11cv1623 IEG (NLS) 1 Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Borem confiscated his prayer oil which prevented 2 him from being able to practice his religion. (See SAC at 4.) As to the first Turner factor, 3 Defendant argues that the policy of banning prayer oil was rationally related to a legitimate 4 government interest. (See Def’s. Memo of P&As in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 32-1) 5 at 7.) In support of this argument, Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of the 6 Director’s Level Appeal Decision to Plaintiff’s administrative grievance regarding the 7 confiscation of his prayer oil. (Id.) The Court will take judicial notice of Defendant’s Exhibit 8 “A,” and notes that Plaintiff has attached some of the same documents to his Opposition. 9 In this Director’s Level decision, it is stated that on “February 1, 2010, a committee 10 consisting of Warden L. Small, Associate Hazardous Material Specialist K. Ours and Fire Chief 11 Wietzel determined that religious prayer oils will not be allowed at CAL.” (Id., Ex. “A,” 12 Director’s Level Appeal Decision, Log No. CAL-10-01798, dated March 16, 2011.) This 13 document further indicates that the decision to ban prayer oil was due to a determination by the 14 committee that “religious prayer oils were flammable, and as such, posed a fire and health and 15 safety risk.” (Id.) While it would seem that the banning of the flammable material would be 16 rationally related to a legitimate penological interest, both parties have submitted a document 17 that would suggest that prison officials reversed their finding and lifted their prayer oil ban prior 18 to the confiscation of Plaintiff’s prayer oils. 19 Both Defendant and Plaintiff have attached to their papers a copy of correspondence from 20 Associate Warden Andersen to another inmate. (See Defs.’ Ex. “A,” (ECF No. 32-2 at 10), 21 Letter from Sheila Andersen to William Harris dated July 12, 2010; see also Pl.’s Opp’n (ECF 22 No. 36 at 8.)) In this correspondence it states, in part, “the purchase and distribution of prayer 23 oil was temporarily suspended by Warden Larry Small due to an issue of flammability.” (Id.) 24 However, Warden Andersen goes on to state “since that time, Warden McEwen and Calipatria 25 staff have reviewed the matter, and find that there is no compelling reason to deny the oils from 26 the vendors that have been approved by the Institution in the past.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that 27 the confiscation of his prayer oil occurred on August 20, 2010, several weeks after CAL prison 28 officials acknowledged there was no legitimate penological reason to ban prayer oil. 4 11cv1623 IEG (NLS) 1 Accordingly, based on the allegations and the documents attached to the Defendant’s own 2 Motion, the ban on prayer oil due to flammability does not support a finding of a legitimate 3 penological reason for Defendant allegedly confiscating Plaintiff’s prayer oil on August 20, 4 2010. The first Turner factor weighs in favor of Plaintiff. 5 Defendant argues that the second Turner factor has been met as Plaintiff “had other 6 means of exercising his religion.” (See Def’s. Memo of P&As in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 7 (ECF No. 32-1) at 7.) Specifically, Defendant contend that “Plaintiff has alleged no facts to 8 indicate that he was not free to practice all other tenets in his religion or to engage in all other 9 aspects of religious expression consistent with his religious beliefs.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that 10 without the prayer oil he was “unable to rightfully prepare himself for prayer in the mental and 11 emotional state of being.” (SAC at 4.) Plaintiff alleges in his Opposition that his health and 12 safety are at risk because he is unable “to perform a basic element of his purification rites” 13 without the prayer oil. (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 6.) Based on the Defendant’s own moving papers, 14 it appears there was a total ban on prayer oil and thus, Plaintiff had no access to any prayer oil. 15 Plaintiff has adequately plead facts to indicate that he had no other means available to practice 16 a central tenet of his religious beliefs. 17 For the third Turner factor, Defendants argue that to accommodate Plaintiff’s request for 18 prayer oils “would inherently pose [risk of fire and a threat to prison security] to other inmates 19 and to prison staff.” (See Def’s. Memo of P&As in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 32-1) 20 at 7.) This argument is completely undermined by the letter Defendants’ have asked this Court 21 to take judicial notice of in which Associate Warden Andersen indicated that there was no reason 22 to continue the ban on prayer oil. This letter was dated nearly a month prior to the alleged 23 confiscation of Plaintiff’s prayer oil by Defendant Borem. In their moving papers, Defendants 24 maintain that to accommodate the use of prayer oils places a budgetary strain due to the 25 “oversight of all inmates possessing prayer oils and to assure their proper use and storage, as 26 well as to prevent the development of a black-market trade among inmates in such materials.” 27 (Id. at 7-8.) 28 /// 5 11cv1623 IEG (NLS) 1 Again the letter by Associate Warden Andersen undermines this argument. She 2 acknowledges that CAL previous permitted the use of prayer oils prior to the ban and found 3 there was “no compelling reason to deny the oils.” (Def.’s Req. for Judicial Notice (ECF No. 4 32-2) at 10.) 5 correspondence. Defendant provides no basis for the argument that the use of prayer oil, a 6 practice that was previously allowed, causes an undue budgetary strain. Thus, the third Turner 7 factor also weighs in favor of Plaintiff. There is no reference to administrative costs or black market in this 8 Finally, Defendant argues that the fourth Turner factors weighs in his favor as “Plaintiff 9 has alleged no alternatives that would address the prison’s legitimate penological concerns about 10 the risk of fire, threats to the prison’s safety and security, and severe budget constraints.” 11 (See Def’s. Memo of P&As in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 8.) Plaintiff has alleged a complete 12 deprivation of the use of prayer oil. It is not clear to the Court if there was an alternative 13 available to Plaintiff if he was completely deprived of using the prayer oil. 14 Thus, for all the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately 15 alleged a First Amendment claim relating to the alleged confiscation of prayer oil. Defendant’s 16 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) is 17 DENIED. 18 2. Eighth Amendment claims 19 Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims on the grounds that he 20 has failed to allege how Defendant Borem was ever “aware of any risk to Plaintiff’s health or 21 safety.” (See Def’s. Memo of P&As in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 4.) “Whatever rights one 22 may lose at the prison gates, ... the full protections of the eighth amendment most certainly 23 remain in force. The whole point of the amendment is to protect persons convicted of crimes.” 24 Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 193-94 (9th Cir. 1979) (citation omitted). The Eighth 25 Amendment, however, is not a basis for broad prison reform. It requires neither that prisons be 26 comfortable nor that they provide every amenity that one might find desirable. Rhodes v. 27 Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 349 (1981); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982). 28 Rather, the Eighth Amendment proscribes the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” 6 11cv1623 IEG (NLS) 1 which includes those sanctions that are “so totally without penological justification that it results 2 in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 183 (1976); 3 see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. This includes 4 not only physical torture, but any punishment incompatible with “the evolving standards of 5 decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) 6 To assert an Eighth Amendment claim for deprivation of humane conditions of 7 confinement, a prisoner must satisfy two requirements: one objective and one subjective. 8 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1994). “Under the 9 objective requirement, the prison official’s acts or omissions must deprive an inmate of the 10 minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. This objective component is satisfied so 11 long as the institution “furnishes sentenced prisoners with adequate food, clothing, shelter, 12 sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at1246. In his SAC, Plaintiff 13 simply alleges that Defendant Borem’s confiscation of the prayer oil “displayed a callousness 14 indifference to me and my religion.” (SAC at 3.) These claims simply do not rise to the level 15 of an Eighth Amendment claim. Thus, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth 16 Amendment claims pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) is GRANTED. 17 3. Qualified Immunity 18 Defendant also seeks qualified immunity. (See Def’s. Memo of P&As in Supp. of Mot. 19 to Dismiss at 8-10.) “Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from civil damages unless 20 their conduct violates ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 21 person would have known.’” Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 910 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 22 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). When presented with a qualified immunity 23 defense, the central questions for the court are: (1) whether the facts alleged, taken in the light 24 most favorable to Plaintiff, demonstrate that the Defendant’s conduct violated a statutory or 25 constitutional right; and (2) whether the right at issue was “clearly established” at the time it is 26 alleged to have been violated. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Although Saucier 27 originally required the Court to answer these questions in order, the U.S. Supreme Court has 28 recently held that “while the sequence set forth there is often appropriate, it should no longer be 7 11cv1623 IEG (NLS) 1 regarded as mandatory.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). 2 If the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations do not make out a statutory or constitutional 3 violation, “there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Saucier, 4 533 U.S. at 201. Similarly, if the Court determines that the right at issue was not clearly 5 established at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct, the court may end further inquiries 6 concerning qualified immunity without determining whether the allegations in fact make out a 7 statutory or constitutional violation. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. 8 In this case, the Court has found Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims fail to state a claim 9 upon which relief can be granted pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6). Therefore, it need not 10 further determine whether Defendant Borem is further entitled to qualified immunity as to those 11 purported claims. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201 (“If no constitutional right would have been violated 12 were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified 13 immunity.”); see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998) (“[T]he 14 better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to 15 determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.”). 16 However, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts, taken in the light most favorable to him, 17 to state a First Amendment claim. Thus, “the next, sequential step is to ask whether [Plaintiff’s 18 free exercise rights under the First Amendment] w[ere] clearly established” at the time. Saucier, 19 533 U.S. at 201. 20 A right is “clearly established” when its contours are “sufficiently clear that a reasonable 21 official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Id. at 202. This does not 22 mean “that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in 23 question has previously been held unlawful.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002). 24 Instead, “in the light of pre-existing law[,] the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Id. The “salient 25 question” is whether the state of the law at the time gives officials “fair warning” that their 26 conduct is unconstitutional. Id. at 740. “This inquiry ... must be undertaken in light of the 27 specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202; 28 Crowell v. City of Coeur D’Alene, 339 F.3d 828, 846 (9th Cir. 2003). Indeed, “‘[o]fficials can 8 11cv1623 IEG (NLS) 1 still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual 2 circumstances.’” Hope, 536 U.S. at 741. In order to find that the law was clearly established, 3 then, the court “need not find a prior case with identical, or even ‘materially similar,’ facts.” 4 Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 1130, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hope, 5 536 U.S. at 741). Because qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, however, the burden 6 of proof lies with the party asserting it. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 812. 7 Defendant claims that “a prison policy was in effect at Calipatria State Prison on August 8 20, 2010, prohibiting inmates from possessing prayer oils.” (See Def’s. Memo of P&As in 9 Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 9.) Defendant further argues that he was acting “wholly in 10 compliance with prison regulations and with his duties as an officer” when he confiscated 11 Plaintiff’s prayer oils. (Id. at 10.) 12 First, it is not clear in the record provided by both parties that the policy of banning prayer 13 oils was in effect in August of 2010. Defendants provide the letter from Associate Warden 14 Andersen who refers to the ban, while initially implemented in February of 2010, as temporary. 15 (Id., Ex. A.) In addition, Associate Warden Andersen indicates that the new administration at 16 CAL, as of at least July 12, 2010, found “no compelling reason to deny the oils.” (Id.) In 17 Plaintiff’s SAC, he alleges Defendant Borem told him “I run R&R not Sheila Andersen.” (SAC 18 at 3.) 19 Here, Plaintiff’s right to practice his religion was clearly established at the time the claims 20 in this action arose. McElyea, 833 F.2d at 197 (“The right to exercise religious practices and 21 beliefs does not terminate at the prison door. The free exercise right, however, is necessarily 22 limited by the fact of incarceration, and may be curtailed in order to achieve legitimate 23 correctional goals or to maintain security.”) In addition, the Court finds that a reasonable office 24 in Defendant Borem’s position would have reason to know that his conduct was unlawful. 25 Thus, while the Court notes “a resolution of the factual issues may well relieve 26 [Defendant] of any liability in this case,” Clement, 298 F.3d at 906, Saucier instructs the Court 27 at this stage of the proceedings to presume the Plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts are true. Saucier, 28 533 U.S. at 201. Assuming they are, this Court finds both that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged 9 11cv1623 IEG (NLS) 1 a First Amendment violation as to Defendant Borem and that it would be clear to a reasonable 2 officer in Borem’s position that to deny Plaintiff the right to possess prayer oil, in light of only 3 the circumstances as they are currently alleged, would violate clearly established law. Saucier, 4 533 U.S. at 202; Greene, 513 F.3d at 988. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First 5 6 Amendment claim on qualified immunity grounds. 7 III. Conclusion and Order 8 Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby: 9 1) 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6); 2) GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6); and 3) DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims on qualified immunity grounds. Defendant shall serve and file an Answer to Plaintiff’s remaining First Amendment claims within the time prescribed by FED.R.CIV.P. 12(a)(4)(B). IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 19 20 DATED: December 11, 2012 _________________________________________ HON. IRMA E. GONZALEZ United States District Judge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10 11cv1623 IEG (NLS)
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