Stonebreaker v. Guardian Life Insurance Company of America et al, No. 3:2011cv00797 - Document 205 (S.D. Cal. 2012)
Court Description: ORDER Granting Defendant Union Security's Applications To Compel: The Deposition Of Pamela Stonebreaker, Production Of Documents. Signed by Magistrate Judge William V. Gallo on 2/3/2012. (mdc)
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Stonebreaker v. Guardian Life Insurance Company of America et al Doc. 205 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PAMELA STONEBREAKER, 12 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Plaintiff, 13 v. 14 THE GUARDIAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 Civil No. 11-0797-WQH(WVG) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT UNION SECURITY’S APPLICATIONS TO COMPEL: THE DEPOSITION OF PAMELA STONEBREAKER PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 17 18 19 On January 18, 2012, Defendant Union Security Insurance 20 Company (“Defendants”) submitted an application via letter to compel 21 the 22 (“Plaintiff”) and to compel the production of documents.1/ On January 23 27, 24 Defendants’ application. The Court, having reviewed the application, 25 opposition, the documents attached thereto and the authorities cited 26 therein, HEREBY GRANTS Defendants’ application. continued 2012, deposition Plaintiff of Plaintiff submitted an Pamela opposition via Stonebreaker letter to 27 28 1/ The application is joined by the other Defendants in this case. 1 11cv0797 Dockets.Justia.com 1 On September 27, 2011, the Court ordered that “Defendants... 2 could 3 deposition taken on September 13, 2011.2/ The scope of the subsequent 4 deposition shall not be limited.” “depose Plaintiff at a later date in addition to the 5 Defendants seek to depose Plaintiff again regarding all other 6 aspects of her claims against them. Plaintiff is willing to submit 7 to another three hours of deposition, but not more. Defendants seek 8 up to seven hours for the subsequent deposition. 9 1. Plaintiff’s Deposition 10 Defendants argue that they should be entitled to depose 11 Plaintiff again for up to seven hours because (1) at the September 12 13, 2011 deposition, Plaintiff identified several categories of her 13 alleged damages, but Defendants did not complete their examination 14 of Plaintiff on these topics; and (2) Plaintiff’s responses to 15 Defendants’ document requests were due in December 2011 and January 16 2012. Consequently, the produced documents were not available to 17 Defendants at the September 13, 2011 deposition. Defendants claim 18 that they need to depose Plaintiff regarding the produced documents 19 to defend against her bad faith claim. (3) Defendant Guardian Life 20 intends to question Plaintiff regarding Plaintiff’s alleged renewal 21 of its insurance policies in late 2009, after Plaintiff’s husband’s 22 death. 23 Defendants assert that good cause exists to depose Plaintiff 24 for up to seven hours. They posit that not only did the Court allow 25 the scope of the subsequent deposition to be unlimited, but that 26 27 28 2/ The Court allowed Defendants to take Plaintiff’s September 13, 2011 deposition for the limited purpose of allowing them to obtain information on topics needed to defend Plaintiff’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment on her breach of contract claim. 2 11cv0797 1 this is a multi-Defendant case in which each Defendant needs to 2 examine Plaintiff, necessitating extra time for the deposition. 3 Further, Defendants seek to depose Plaintiff regarding recently 4 produced documents that were not available to them at the September 5 13, 2011 deposition. 6 Plaintiff argues that the discovery sought by Defendants is 7 unreasonably cumulative. She asserts that the September 13, 2011 8 deposition was not limited and that her damage claims were covered 9 in that deposition. Plaintiff cites numerous instances in the 10 September 13, 2011 deposition in which her damage claims were 11 covered. Also, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s use of time at the 12 September 13, 2011 deposition was not efficient in that Defendants 13 spent time deposing Plaintiff on issues that are not relevant to 14 this litigation. 15 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(d)(1) states in pertinent 16 part: “Unless... ordered by the Court, a deposition is limited to 1 17 day of 7 hours. The court must allow additional time consistent with 18 Rule 26(b)(2) if needed to fairly examine the deponent...” 19 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2) states in pertinent 20 part: “By order, the court may alter the limits in these rules on... 21 the length of depositions under Rule 30...” 22 A party seeking a court order to extend the time of a 23 deposition must show good cause to justify such an order. Pratt v. 24 Archstone, 25 Schwartz, 2008 WL 298824 at *2 (E.D. Cal. 2008) citing The Notes of 26 the Advisory Committee on the 2000 Amendments to Federal Rule of 27 Civil Procedure 30 (“The party seeking a court order to extend the 2009 WL 2032469 at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Tatum 28 3 11cv0797 v. 1 examination, or otherwise alter the limitations, is expected to show 2 good cause to justify such an order.”) 3 Here, Defendants have shown good cause to extend the time for 4 Plaintiff’s subsequent deposition. The documents that should have 5 been produced by Plaintiff to Defendants in December 2011 and 6 January 2012 appear to be numerous and lengthy. Therefore, extra 7 time for the deposition is needed so that Defendants can thoroughly 8 examine Plaintiff with regard to those documents. Further, three 9 Defendants in this case seek to depose Plaintiff on various topics. 10 In at least one instance identified to the Court, one Defendant 11 seeks to depose Plaintiff on a topic that the other Defendants do 12 not seek deposition testimony. Moreover, the Court’s September 27, 13 2011 Order stated that Defendants may take Plaintiff’s deposition at 14 a later date and that the scope of the subsequent deposition shall 15 not be limited. From the Court’s discussions with counsel prior to 16 the issuance of the September 27, 2011 Order, the Court and the 17 parties should have understood that the scope of the subsequent 18 deposition would be unlimited and that the time allotted for that 19 deposition would not be curtailed. 20 Moreover, Plaintiff wrongly argues that the subsequent 21 deposition 22 cumulative. The Court’s review of Plaintiff’s citations to instances 23 in the September 13, 2011 deposition in which her damage claims were 24 covered simply identify her damages claims. Plaintiff’s testimony 25 did not cover the details of her damage claims, which Defendants are 26 entitled to probe at her subsequent deposition. Further, at the 27 September 13, 2011 deposition, Defendants did not possess the 28 documents they requested from Plaintiff. Therefore, it was not testimony sought by 4 Defendants is unreasonably 11cv0797 1 possible for Defendants to have been able to depose Plaintiff on the 2 subjects and contents of those documents. 3 The Court is perturbed that Plaintiff would take such an 4 unreasonable stance and oppose a subsequent seven hour deposition 5 when the reasons therefor are so abundantly clear. 6 7 Defendants’ request is GRANTED and the subsequent deposition of Plaintiff shall be limited to seven hours. 8 2. Plaintiff’s Fee Agreement 9 Defendants sought the production of Plaintiff’s fee agreement 10 with her counsel. Plaintiff’s counsel produced to Defendants a 11 redacted version of the fee agreement, claiming that the redacted 12 portions of the agreement were protected from disclosure by the 13 attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. This claim is 14 erroneous. 15 The Ninth Circuit, and district courts in the Ninth Circuit, 16 have long and repeatedly held that fee agreements between an 17 attorney and his/her client are not protected from disclosure by the 18 attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine. Ralls v. US, 52 19 F.3d 223, 225 (1995); US v. Blackman, 72 F.3d 1418, 1424 (9th Cir. 20 1995); Stanley v. Bayer Healthcare, 2011 WL 5569761 (S.D. Cal. 21 2011); Hoot Winc v. RSM McGladrey, 2009 WL 3857425 (S.D. Cal. 2009); 22 Carrizosa v. Stassinos, 2006 WL 2529503 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 23 Moreover, the Court’s review of the unredacted version of 24 Plaintiff’s fee agreement (sent to the Court for in camera review) 25 reveals 26 (produced to Defendants) contain confidential information protected 27 from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege or the work product 28 doctrine. In fact, it appears to the Court that most of the redacted that none of the redacted 5 portions of the agreement 11cv0797 1 portions of the fee agreement are nothing more than standard, 2 customary, and boilerplate language that probably appears in many 3 such fee agreements. There is nothing in the fee agreement that even 4 remotely, or with the broadest possible interpretation, is attorney- 5 client privileged or work product. Again, Plaintiff unjustifiably 6 created a dispute where none reasonably existed. As a result, at 7 least one week prior to Plaintiff’s subsequent deposition, Plaintiff 8 shall produce to Defendants an unredacted copy of her fee agreement 9 with her counsel. 10 The Court is extremely disturbed that Plaintiff’s counsel 11 would claim portions of Plaintiff’s fee agreement are protected from 12 disclosure 13 doctrine, when that position is clearly contrary to long-standing 14 Ninth Circuit law, which has been repeatedly cited by district 15 courts in the Ninth Circuit. That Plaintiff’s counsel actually 16 produced to Defendants a redacted version of the fee agreement, in 17 light of the clear law on the subject, and spent time seeking to 18 limit 19 astonishing. The Court cautions Plaintiff that future disputes with 20 Defendants that cannot be resolved without the Court’s involvement 21 will be scrutinized very closely. by the Plaintiff’s attorney-client subsequent privilege deposition to and work three product hours 22 23 DATED: February 3, 2012 24 25 Hon. William V. Gallo U.S. Magistrate Judge 26 27 28 6 11cv0797 is
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