Galindo v. Smelosky et al, No. 3:2008cv02080 - Document 30 (S.D. Cal. 2011)
Court Description: ORDER granting 25 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge William V. Gallo on 6/21/11. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(lao)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Galindo v. Smelosky et al Doc. 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 13 14 15 ESTEBAN GALINDO, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) M.A. SMELOSKY, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) _______________________________ ) Civil No. 08-CV-2080-WVG ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DOC. NO. 25] 16 17 Pending before the Court is Defendants’ unopposed Motion for 18 Summary Judgment. (Doc. No. 25.) The parties have consented to the 19 undersigned Magistrate Judge’s jurisdiction, and the matter has 20 accordingly been referred to the undersigned for all purposes. 21 (Doc. No. 24.) 22 argue they did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights when 23 they denied his request for dentures. As explained below, the Court 24 GRANTS Defendants’ motion and enters judgment in their favor. 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / Defendants claim qualified immunity from suit and 1 08CV2080 Dockets.Justia.com 1 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1/ 2 On August 21, 2006, the California Department of Corrections 3 and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) entered into a stipulation addressing 4 the dental care needs of its inmates as part of a class action. 5 class certified was “all California state prisoners in the custody 6 of CDCR who have serious dental care needs.” 7 stipulation, CDCR agreed to implement Health Care Services Division 8 Dental Policies and Procedures (hereinafter, “P&P”). The As part of the 9 The P&P was “designed to meet at least the minimum level of 10 dental care necessary to fulfill [CDCR]’s obligations under the 11 Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.” 12 procedure under the class action stipulation relating to dental 13 prostheses in force from October 9, 2007 through at least July 2010. 14 The P&P provides that a “dental prosthesis shall be constructed only 15 when: . . . b. 16 missing an anterior [front] tooth, or has seven or fewer posterior 17 teeth in occlusion.” 18 also authorized dentures when an inmate had seven or fewer posterior 19 teeth in occlusion, although the policy was worded differently. 20 The P&P outlines the An inmate-patient is edentulous [toothless], is Prior to August 2006, the CDCR’s P&P manual Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his “right to 21 dental 22 Plaintiff seeks only an “order to defendants to provide the needed 23 dental prosthesis.” 24 missing four teeth (two molars on each side of his jaw). care.” Under “Request for Relief” in his Complaint, On or about January 7, 2008, Plaintiff was On January 25 26 27 28 1/ The factual background is substantially adapted from Defendants’ motion. The Court deems Defendants’ facts admitted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)(2) and after Plaintiff’s failure to file any opposition despite the Court’s December 10, 2010, notice pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) and Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988). (See Doc. No. 28.) 2 08CV2080 1 7, 2008, Plaintiff had a dental examination with Defendant Dentist 2 Musgrave at Centinela State Prison. 3 requested dentures and claims he told the dentist he had difficulty 4 chewing his food due to the limited time he was given to eat. 5 Plaintiff had nine posterior teeth in occlusion and claims he was 6 informed he did not qualify for dentures as a result. Plaintiff has 7 admitted that under institutional policy, he would have to have 8 seven or fewer posterior teeth in occlusion to qualify for a dental 9 prosthesis. At this appointment, Plaintiff Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Chief Dental Officer 10 Peters at Centinela State Prison approved Defendant Musgrave’s 11 denial of the prosthesis. 12 Defendant Musgrave did not list dentures on Plaintiff’s 13 treatment plan. 14 protocol, dental staff were directed that a treatment plan should be 15 provided only when an inmate patient has seven or fewer posterior 16 teeth in occlusion. 17 teeth in occlusion. Defendant Musgrave did not believe there was an 18 excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health by requiring Plaintiff to 19 follow the mandated dental protocols. 20 that Plaintiff would still be able to eat with his nine posterior 21 teeth that were in occlusion—only that Plaintiff might be inconve- 22 nienced by having to eat a bit slower than if he had dentures. Under the class action-mandated dental treatment Inmate Galindo had at least nine posterior Defendant Musgrave believed 23 Defendant Musgrave never became aware that the lack of 24 dentures caused Plaintiff any serious health problems due to not 25 receiving adequate nutrition or otherwise. 26 27 At all relevant times, Defendant Smelosky was the warden at Centinela State Prison. 28 3 08CV2080 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) mandates the grant of 3 summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 4 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 5 judgment as a matter of law.” 6 for summary judgment is essentially the same as for the granting of 7 a directed verdict. 8 governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the 9 verdict.” The standard for granting a motion Judgment must be entered “if, under the Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51 10 (1986). 11 should not be entered in favor of the moving party. 12 Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 470 (9th Cir. 2007) 13 (“If a rational trier of fact might resolve the issue in favor of 14 the nonmoving party, summary judgment must be denied.”) (alteration 15 omitted). However, “[i]f reasonable minds could differ,” judgment Id.; see also 16 The parties bear the same substantive burden of proof as 17 would apply at a trial on the merits, including plaintiff’s burden 18 to establish any element essential to his case. 19 at 252; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 20 a genuine issue of material fact on a single element of a claim for 21 relief is sufficient to warrant summary judgment on that claim. 22 Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23. Anderson, 477 U.S. Lack of 23 The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying the 24 elements of the claim in the pleadings, or other evidence, and 25 “‘showing’ -- that is, pointing out to the district court -- that 26 there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s 27 case.” Id. at 325; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “A material 28 4 08CV2080 1 issue of fact is one that affects the outcome of the litigation and 2 requires a trial to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the 3 truth.” 4 1982). 5 beyond the pleadings, that there is a genuine dispute for trial. 6 Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. S.E.C. v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish, 7 8 III. A. DISCUSSION Defendants Are Entitled To Summary Judgment 9 Based on the undisputed facts of this case, a dispute of fact 10 does not exist regarding whether Defendants violated Plaintiff’s 11 Eight 12 Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law as a 13 result. Amendment rights by denying his request for dentures. 14 The threshold requirement to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. 15 § 1983 is the identification of a cognizable right that defendants 16 violated. 17 2000). 18 dental care” as a claim under the Eighth Amendment’s proscription 19 against cruel and unusual punishment based on the denial of medical 20 care. 21 comfortable nor that they provide every amenity that one might find 22 desirable.” 23 Instead, it proscribes the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of 24 pain,” or punishment “so totally without penological justification 25 that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.” 26 v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 183 (1976). 27 failure to act serves as the basis for the claim, courts use the See Devereaux v. Perez, 218 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. The Court construes Plaintiff’s sole claim for “Right to The Eighth Amendment “requires neither that prisons be Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982). When an official’s 28 5 Gregg 08CV2080 1 standard of “deliberate indifference,” which is stricter than mere 2 negligence. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 106 (1976). 3 Prison officials demonstrate deliberate indifference toward 4 an inmate by knowing of and disregarding an excessive risk to inmate 5 health or safety. 6 constitute deliberate indifference to an inmate’s medical care, two 7 factors must be present: 8 treatment 9 circumstances; and (2) a subjective component—that officials chose 10 that course of treatment in conscious disregard of an excessive risk 11 to the inmate’s health. 12 Cir. 1996). doctors Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). To (1) an objective component—the course of chose was medically unacceptable under the Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th 13 To satisfy the objective component for deliberate indiffer- 14 ence, the deprivation suffered by an inmate must be sufficiently 15 serious, meaning deprivations which result in “the minimal civilized 16 measure of life’s necessities.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 17 (1991). Deliberate indifference to medical needs only amounts to an 18 Eighth Amendment violation if those medical needs are serious. 19 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). 20 exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result 21 in 22 infliction of pain.” 23 overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 24 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 25 Routine discomfort is part of the prison sentence and does not rise 26 to the level of deliberate indifference. further significant injury or the “A serious medical need unnecessary and wanton McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059, Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. 27 Although prisoners must be provided with access to adequate 28 dental care, Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 6 08CV2080 1 1989), prison inmates are not entitled to every possible dental 2 treatment that they might request: 3 4 5 6 7 It must be remembered that the State is not constitutionally obligated, much as it may be desired by inmates, to construct a perfect plan for dental care that exceeds what the average reasonable person would expect or avail herself of in life outside the prison walls. . . . We are governed by the principle that the objective is not to impose upon a state prison a model system of dental care beyond average needs but to provide the minimum level of dental care required by the Constitution. 8 Dean v. Coughlin, 804 F.2d 207, 215 (2d Cir. 1986) (citations, 9 internal quotations, and brackets omitted). 10 To satisfy the subjective element, a prison official must 11 have a sufficiently culpable state of mind to violate the Eighth 12 Amendment. 13 ence, “[a] defendant must purposefully ignore or fail to respond to 14 a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need.” 15 1060. 16 Plaintiff must show the course of treatment chosen was “medically 17 unacceptable under the circumstances, and the course of treatment 18 was chosen in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to the 19 plaintiff’s health.” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297. To show deliberate indiffer- McGuckin, 974 F.2d at Moreover, a delay in treatment must be harmful. Id. A Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332 (citations omitted). 20 The facts in this case establish that Defendants’ denial of 21 Plaintiff’s request for dentures was objectively reasonable and 22 justified. 23 ments for receiving dentures. 24 CDCR’s policies when they denied Plaintiff’s request. 25 Plaintiff’s medical condition serious such that the CDCR’s policy 26 amounts to an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. 27 Plaintiff could not eat as fast as he liked, he nonetheless was able 28 to eat. Plaintiff did not meet the CDCR’s established requireDefendants were well within the Nor was Although Moreover, the facts establish that Defendants had no 7 08CV2080 1 knowledge regarding whether Plaintiff was experiencing any pain or 2 other harmful effects as a result of not having dentures. 3 there any evidence that Defendants knew that Plaintiff suffered any 4 actual harm. Defendants consequently did not purposefully ignore or 5 fail to respond to Plaintiff’s pain or possible medical need. Based 6 on the foregoing, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a 7 matter of law on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim.2/ 8 B. Nor is Defendants Are Entitled to Qualified Immunity 9 Defendants claim they are entitled to summary judgment 10 because they are immune from suit. 11 out a constitutional violation against any of them, the undersigned 12 agrees. Because Plaintiff cannot make 13 Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity 14 “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 15 statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 16 would have known.” Liston v. County of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 975 17 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 18 (1982)). 19 judgment and protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who 20 knowingly violate the law. . . . 21 competence could disagree [whether a specific action was constitu- 22 tional], immunity should be recognized.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 23 335, 341 (1986). 24 need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power 25 26 27 28 2/ The defense of qualified immunity allows for errors in [I]f officers of reasonable Qualified immunity balances the interests of “the Warden Smelosky is entitled to summary judgment on the additional basis that he was not involved in the decision to deny Plaintiff’s dentures request and did not personally participate in this case in any way. He is sued merely based on his status as Warden, and liability cannot be found against him solely on that basis. See Hydrick v. Hunter , 500 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2007); Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 418 (9th Cir. 2003); MacKinney v. Nielsen, 69 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 1995); Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989). 8 08CV2080 1 irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, 2 distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reason- 3 ably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 4 (2009). The Court must determine “whether, in light of clearly 5 established 6 officer 7 lawful.” 8 1998). 9 principles objectively governing could have the conduct believed in that question, his conduct the was Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. The Court engages in a two-part inquiry: (1) whether the 10 facts shown “make out a violation of a constitutional right,” and 11 (2) “whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the 12 time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” 13 815-16. 14 Id. at 818. 15 Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at The Court may consider these steps in any order it wishes. If the Court first determines that no constitutional 16 violation has been made out, “there is no necessity for further 17 inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 18 194, 201 (2001), overruled on other grounds by Pearson, 129 S. Ct. 19 at 818. 20 Because, as discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to make out 21 a constitutional violation against any of the Defendants, the 22 undersigned’s inquiry ends there. 23 attempt to determine whether a constitutional right was clearly 24 established when no such violation exists in the first place. 25 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201 (“If no constitutional right would have 26 been 27 necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”); 28 see also Tennison v. City & County of San Francisco, 570 F.3d 1078, violated were the After all, it would be futile to allegations 9 established, there 08CV2080 is See no 1 1092 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2009) (same; recognizing Pearson’s partial 2 overruling of Saucier). 3 4 Based on the foregoing, all three Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and are immune from suit as a result. 5 III. 6 CONCLUSION The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion and enters judgment in 7 Defendants’ favor. 8 matter accordingly. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 DATED: The Clerk of Court is directed to close this June 21, 2011 11 12 Hon. William V. Gallo U.S. Magistrate Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10 08CV2080
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
