Baker v. Schwarzenegger et al, No. 3:2007cv01773 - Document 6 (S.D. Cal. 2007)
Court Description: ORDER granting Pla's 5 Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. Pla's Complaint is dismissed w/o prejudice. Secy of CA Dept of Corrections shall collect from Pla's prison trust acct the $350 balance of the filing fee by c ollecting monthly payments from acct in an amount equal to 20% of the preceding month's income and forward payments to Clerk of Court each time acct amount in acct exceeds $10. Pla is granted 45 days leave from the date of this Order t o file a 1st Amended Complaint. Dfts not named and all claims not re-alleged in Amended Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. If Pla's Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, it may be dismissed w/o fur ther leave to amend and may be counted as a "strike". Signed by Judge Irma E. Gonzalez on 12/20/2007. Blank copy of Amended Complaint t/w this Order mailed to Pla. Copy of this Order mailed to James Tilton, Secy of CA Dept of Corrections. (jah)
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Baker v. Schwarzenegger et al Doc. 6 Case 3:07-cv-01773-IEG-NLS Document 6 Filed 12/20/2007 Page 1 of 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 ARTHUR BAKER, CDCR #T-19858, Civil No. Plaintiff, 13 vs. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 ORDER: (1) GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, IMPOSING NO INITIAL PARTIAL FILING FEE AND GARNISHING $350 BALANCE FROM PRISONER’S TRUST ACCOUNT [Doc. No. 5]; AND 14 15 07-1773 IEG (NLS) ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER; Governor; JOHN DOVERY, Director; M.E. BOURLAND, Assoc. Warden; W.C. ROBERTS, Facility Captain; G. STRATTON, Lt. Commander; J. JIMENEZ, Lt. Commander; R. HOPPER, Lt. Commander; J. CRABTREE, Correctional Officer; C. HUGHEY, Correctional Officer; V. CANADA, Correctional Officer; S.D. LEAPHEART, (2) DISMISSING ACTION FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) & 1915A(b)(1) Defendants. 24 25 Arthur Baker (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Kern Valley State 26 Prison (“KVSP”) in Delano, California, and proceeding pro se, has submitted a civil rights 27 Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 which alleges due process, access to courts and Eighth 28 Amendment violations occurring in 2005 at Calipatria State Prison. (Compl. at 1.) -1- 07cv1773 Dockets.Justia.com Case 3:07-cv-01773-IEG-NLS Document 6 Filed 12/20/2007 Page 2 of 7 1 Plaintiff has not prepaid the $350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, 2 he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 3 [Doc. No. 5]. 4 I. Motion to Proceed IFP 5 Effective April 9, 2006, all parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a 6 district court of the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a 7 filing fee of $350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure 8 to prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 9 § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, prisoners 10 granted leave to proceed IFP remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless 11 of whether their action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. 12 Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002). 13 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a 14 prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account 15 statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately 16 preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 17 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the Court must assess an initial 18 payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or 19 (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, 20 unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The 21 institution having custody of the prisoner must collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20% 22 of the preceding month’s income, in any month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and 23 forward those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. 24 § 1915(b)(2). 25 The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit which complies with 28 U.S.C. 26 § 1915(a)(1), and that he has attached a certified copy of his trust account statement pursuant to 27 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. Plaintiff’s trust 28 account statement shows that he has no available funds from which to pay filing fees at this time. -2- 07cv1773 Case 3:07-cv-01773-IEG-NLS Document 6 Filed 12/20/2007 Page 3 of 7 1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from 2 bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the 3 prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 4 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal 5 of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available to 6 him when payment is ordered.”). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed 7 IFP [Doc. No. 5] and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, 8 the entire $350 balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded to the Clerk 9 of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 10 II. Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A 11 A. Standard 12 The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding 13 IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused 14 of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or 15 conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as 16 practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these 17 provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any IFP or prisoner complaint, or any portion 18 thereof, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or which seeks damages from 19 defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 20 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 21 446 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A). 22 Before amendment by the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte 23 dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130. An action is 24 frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 25 324 (1989). However 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A now mandate that the court reviewing 26 an IFP or prisoner’s suit make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before effecting service of 27 the Complaint by the U.S. Marshal pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2). Id. at 1127 (“[S]ection 28 1915(e) not only permits, but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint -3- 07cv1773 Case 3:07-cv-01773-IEG-NLS Document 6 Filed 12/20/2007 Page 4 of 7 1 that fails to state a claim.”); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) 2 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). 3 “[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 4 allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the 5 plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2) 6 “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). In addition, the Court’s 7 duty to liberally construe a pro se’s pleadings, see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 8 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. 9 Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). 10 B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Liability 11 Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person 12 acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived 13 the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the 14 United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122 15 (2004); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). 16 C. Respondeat Superior Claims 17 In his Complaint, Plaintiff names Arnold Schwarzenegger, the Governor for the State of 18 California and John Dovery, the Director of the California Department of Corrections and 19 Rehabilitation as Defendants. However, Plaintiff does not allege any specific factual allegations 20 pertaining to these Defendants in the body of the Complaint. Thus, it appears that Plaintiff is 21 seeking to hold Defendants Schwarzenegger and Dovery liable in their supervisory capacity. 22 (Compl. at 5-6.) There is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Palmer v. 23 Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993). Instead, “[t]he inquiry into causation must be 24 individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose 25 acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 26 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976)). In order 27 to avoid the respondeat superior bar, Plaintiff must allege personal acts by each individual 28 Defendant which have a direct causal connection to the constitutional violation at issue. See -4- 07cv1773 Case 3:07-cv-01773-IEG-NLS Document 6 Filed 12/20/2007 Page 5 of 7 1 Sanders v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 483 (9th Cir. 1986); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th 2 Cir. 1989). 3 unconstitutional violations of his subordinates if Plaintiff alleges specific facts which show: (1) 4 how or to what extent this supervisor personally participated in or directed Defendants’ actions, 5 and (2) in either acting or failing to act, the supervisor was an actual and proximate cause of the 6 deprivation of his constitutional rights. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 7 As currently pleaded, however, Plaintiff’s Complaint in no way sets forth facts which might be 8 liberally construed to support an individualized constitutional claim against Governor 9 Schwarzenegger or Director Dovery. 10 11 As a supervisor, a Defendant may only be held liable for the allegedly Thus, the claims against Defendants Schwarzenegger and Dovery are dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which section 1983 relief can be granted. 12 D. Access to Courts claims 13 In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have failed to provide him with access to the 14 courts. Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s factual allegations fall short of the pleading 15 standards necessary to state an access to courts claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Prisoners 16 do “have a constitutional right to petition the government for redress of their grievances, which 17 includes a reasonable right of access to the courts.” O’Keefe v. Van Boening, 82 F.3d 322, 325 18 (9th Cir. 1996); accord Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995). In Bounds, 430 19 U.S. at 817, the Supreme Court held that “the fundamental constitutional right of access to the 20 courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful 21 legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from 22 persons who are trained in the law.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). To establish 23 a violation of the right to access to the courts, however, a prisoner must allege facts sufficient 24 to show that: (1) a nonfrivolous legal attack on his conviction, sentence, or conditions of 25 confinement has been frustrated or impeded, and (2) he has suffered an actual injury as a result. 26 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353-55 (1996). An “actual injury” is defined as “actual prejudice 27 with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline 28 or to present a claim.” Id. at 348; see also Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794, 796 (9th Cir. 1994); -5- 07cv1773 Case 3:07-cv-01773-IEG-NLS Document 6 Filed 12/20/2007 Page 6 of 7 1 Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 1989); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th 2 Cir. 1996). 3 Here, however, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts sufficient to show that he has been 4 precluded from pursuing a non-frivolous direct or collateral attack upon either his criminal 5 conviction or sentence or the conditions of his current confinement. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355 6 (right to access to the courts protects only an inmate’s need and ability to “attack [his] 7 sentence[], directly or collaterally, and . . . to challenge the conditions of [his] confinement.”); 8 see also Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002) (the non-frivolous nature of the 9 “underlying cause of action, whether anticipated or lost, is an element that must be described in 10 the complaint, just as much as allegations must describe the official acts frustrating the 11 litigation.”). Moreover, Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to show that he has been 12 actually injured by any specific Defendant’s actions. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. 13 In short, Plaintiff has not alleged that “a complaint he prepared was dismissed,” or that 14 he was “so stymied” by Defendants’ actions or grievance processing that “he was unable to even 15 file a complaint,” direct appeal or petition for writ of habeas corpus. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351; 16 Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416 (“like any other element of an access claim[,] . . . the predicate 17 claim [must] be described well enough to apply the ‘nonfrivolous’ test and to show that the 18 ‘arguable’ nature of the underlying claim is more than hope.”). Therefore, these claims must be 19 dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which section 1983 relief can be granted. 20 Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a section 1983 claim 21 upon which relief may be granted, and is therefore subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 22 §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). 23 III. Conclusion and Order 24 For the reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that: 25 1. 26 GRANTED. 27 //// 28 //// Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 5] is -6- 07cv1773 Case 3:07-cv-01773-IEG-NLS 1 2 Document 6 Filed 12/20/2007 Page 7 of 7 The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his 2 designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee 3 owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty 4 percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court 5 each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 6 ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 7 ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION. 8 9 10 3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on James Tilton, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite 502, Sacramento, California 95814. 11 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: 12 4. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 13 §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave 14 from the date this Order is “Filed” in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all 15 the deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in 16 itself without reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1. Defendants 17 not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed to have been 18 waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended 19 Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, it may be dismissed without 20 further leave to amend and may hereafter be counted as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 21 See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996). 22 5. The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a Court approved form § 1983 complaint 23 to Plaintiff. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 26 DATED: December 20, 2007 27 28 IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge United States District Court -7- 07cv1773
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