United States of America v. Wroblewski et al, No. 3:2007cv00081 - Document 65 (S.D. Cal. 2009)
Court Description: ORDER Granting In Part and Denying In Part 57 Motion for Summary Judgment. The United States' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to the first, second, and third claims for relief (to reduce assessments to judgment) and is denied as to t he fourth claim for relief (to foreclose federal tax liens). It is unclear to the Court whether the United States requests that the Court declare the validity and amount of its liens independent of the foreclosure claim. If the United States requests such relief, the United States shall, within 30 days of this Order, file papers indicating as such and explaining why such relief is necessary. Signed by Judge Barry Ted Moskowitz on 1/16/09. (vet)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
United States of America v. Wroblewski et al Doc. 65 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CASE NO. 07cv81 BTM(WMc) Plaintiff, 12 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT vs. 13 GERALD J. WROBLEWSKI, et al., 14 Defendant. 15 16 17 18 19 20 The United States of America (“United States”) has filed a motion for summary judgment against Defendants Gerald J. Wroblewski (“Mr. Wroblewski”) and Sharon M. Wroblewski (“Mrs. Wroblewski”) (collectively “the Wroblewskis”). For the reasons discussed below, the United States’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 I. FACTS The United States commenced this action to reduce to judgment federal income tax assessments against the Wroblewskis, individually and jointly, and to foreclose federal tax liens against property located at 1269 Farmington Place, San Marcos, California, 92078 (“Subject Property”). The United States does not seek to collect “protective assessments” that were made against the Wroblewskis in tax years 1994, 1995, and 1996. The United States also does not seek to reduce to judgment penalties and interest on penalties that were 1 07cv81 BTM(WMc) Dockets.Justia.com 1 assessed against the Wroblewskis because these amounts were arguably discharged in 2 bankruptcy in 2006. (The Wroblewskis filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in 2005.) 3 4 Excluding the protective assessments, penalties, and interest on penalties, the United States seeks to reduce to judgment the following amounts: 5 6 Individual Assessments Against Mr. Wroblewski 7 Tax Year 1994: $ 6,758.90 8 Tax Year 1995: $ 7,264.72 9 Tax Year 1996 $22,011.41 Total: $36,035.03 plus interest accruing after 9/5/08 10 11 12 Individual Assessments Against Mrs. Wroblewski 13 Tax Year 1994: $ 7,275.08 14 Tax Year 1995: $ 8,249.21 15 Tax Year 1996: $32,466.34 16 Total: $47,990.63 plus interest accruing after 9/5/08 17 18 Joint Assessments Against the Wroblewskis 19 Tax Year 1997 $42,610.70 20 Tax Year 1998 $89,581.92 21 Tax Year 1999 $69,455.50 22 Tax Year 2000 $11,213.26 23 Tax Year 2001 $ 8,306.36 24 Tax Year 2002 $ 4,611.55 25 Total: $225,779.29 plus interest accruing after 9/5/08 26 27 28 2 07cv81 BTM(WMc) 1 II. DISCUSSION 2 The Wroblewskis do not claim to have paid the amounts that the United States seeks 3 to reduce to judgment. Instead, the Wroblewskis question the computation of their individual 4 tax liabilities and contend that their individual and joint liabilities (with the exception of their 5 joint liabilities for 2002) were discharged in bankruptcy. However, as discussed below, the 6 Wroblewskis have failed to raise a triable issue of material fact with respect to either the 7 amount or nondischargeability of their liabilities. 8 9 A. Computation of Individual Liabilities 10 As discussed above, the United States does not seek to collect the “protective 11 assessments” that were assessed against Mr. and Mrs. Wroblewski, individually, for tax 12 years 1994, 1995, and 1996. Nevertheless, the Wroblewskis argue that it is unclear how the 13 protective assessments were made and how they were corrected. In response to this 14 argument, the United States clarified that: (1) Mr. Wroblewski was assessed tax based on 15 100% of his community property income; (2) Mrs. Wroblewski was assessed tax on 50% of 16 her community property income; (3) the following protective assessments were made against 17 Mr. Wroblewski: 1994: $9,715; 1995: $10,810; 1996: $45,419; (4) the following protective 18 assessments were made against Mrs. Wroblewski: 1994: $96,475; 1995: $9,318.50; 1996: 19 $3,622.50; (5) these protective assessments are excluded from the total unpaid balances 20 that the United States seeks to reduce to judgment. (Decl. of Rosanna Savala in Support 21 of Reply, ¶¶ 7-9.) The United States has provided sufficient information regarding how the 22 protective assessments were calculated and how they have been excluded from the amounts 23 sought in this action. 24 The individual assessments against Mr. and Mrs. Wroblewski are supported by 25 Certificates of Assessments and Payments (Exs. A-G to Decl. of Rosanna Savala.) The 26 introduction of Certificates of Assessments and Payments establishes a prima facie case for 27 the United States. United States v. Jones, 33 F.3d 1137, 1139 (9th Cir. 1994). The burden 28 then shifts to the taxpayer to show that he or she is not liable for the assessment. 3 07cv81 BTM(WMc) 1 The Wroblewskis generally argue that there is uncertainty regarding the computation 2 of the assessments and complain that when they have asked the IRS for payoff numbers, 3 they have been given different answers. However, the Wroblewskis do not point to any 4 specific inaccuracies in the United States’ computations, nor do they provide calculations of 5 their own. 1 Therefore, the Wroblewskis have failed to satisfy their burden of showing that the 6 amounts of the assessments are incorrect. 7 Furthermore, Mrs. Wroblewski is barred from challenging her individual assessments. 8 Mrs. Wroblewski unsuccessfully challenged her individual assessments for tax years 1994 9 through 1996 in the United States Tax Court. (Ex. 4 to Decl. of Michael G. Pitman.) The Tax 10 Court’s adjudication of Mrs. Wroblewski’s tax liabilities for tax years 1994 through 1996 is res 11 judicata as to any subsequent proceedings involving the same liabilities. 12 13 B. Bankruptcy Discharge 14 Generally, a debtor who files a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition is discharged from 15 personal liability for all debts that arose before the filing of the petition, including those related 16 to unpaid taxes. 11 U.S.C. § 727(b). However, 11 U.S.C. § 523 provides for the following 17 exception: 18 (a) A discharge under section 727 . . . of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt-- 19 (1) for a tax or a customs duty-20 (A) of the kind and for the periods specified in section 507(a)(3) or 507(a)(8) of this title, whether or not a claim for such tax was filed or allowed; 21 22 (B) with respect to which a return, or equivalent report or notice, if required-- 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 In a declaration, Robert J. Gumser, the Wroblewskis’ attorney, complains that the United States did not submit detailed interest computations. However, IRS Officer Rosanna Savala explains that she determined the amount of interest due by using an IRS computer program. (Decl. of Rosanna Savala, ¶¶ 6-7.) Ms. Savala is familiar with the proper use of the IRS computer interest calculation functions. (Id.) Ms. Savala’s declaration is sufficient to establish a prima facie case regarding the amount of interest that is owed. The Wroblewskis have not submitted evidence shedding doubt on these interest calculations or the method that was used to derive them. 4 07cv81 BTM(WMc) 1 (i) was not filed or given; or 2 (ii) was filed or given after the date on which such return, report, or notice was last due, under applicable law or under any extension, and after two years before the date of the filing of the petition; or 3 4 5 6 7 (C) with respect to which the debtor made a fraudulent return or willfully attempted in any manner to evade or defeat such tax . . . . 8 In order for a document to qualify as a “return,” within the meaning of section 9 523(a)(2)(B), the document (1) must purport to be a return; (2) must be executed under 10 penalty of perjury; (3) must contain sufficient data to allow calculation of tax; and (4) must 11 represent an honest and reasonable attempt to satisfy the requirements of the tax law. In 12 re Hatton, 220 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2000). 13 The United States has no record of Mr. Wroblewski ever filing a form 1040 for tax 14 years 1994, 1995, or 1996. (Decl. of Rosanna Savala, ¶ 14.) The United States also has 15 no record of Mrs. Wroblewski filing a Form 1040 for tax years 1994 or 1995. (Decl. or 16 Rosanna Savala, ¶ 15.) Mrs. Wroblewski did file a Form 1040 for tax year 1996. However, 17 in that Form 1040, Mrs. Wroblewski reported her income as “0" and made nonsensical 18 arguments regarding why she was not liable for taxes. (Ex. R to Decl. of Rosanna Savala.) 19 Therefore, the Form 1040 for tax year 1996 does not qualify as a “return.” 20 Mr. and Mrs. Wroblewski both declare that they filed returns for tax years 1994, 1995, 21 and 1996. (Decl. of Sharon M. Wroblewski, ¶ 11; Decl. of Gerald J. Wroblewski, ¶ 11.) 22 However, they do not attach copies of the alleged returns, nor do they establish that these 23 alleged returns satisfied the requirements set forth above. In 2003, the IRS received a 24 purported joint tax return from the Wroblewskis for tax year 1995. (Decl. of Rosanna Savala 25 in Support of Reply, ¶ 4.) This return was disallowed because it was not signed and omitted 26 more than $8,000 worth of gambling winnings third parties reported paying to the 27 Wroblewskis. (Id.) The Wroblewskis have failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect 28 5 07cv81 BTM(WMc) 1 to whether they filed returns for tax years 1994, 1995, and 1996.2 As a result, the Court finds 2 that the Wroblewskis’ tax liabilities for these years were not discharged in bankruptcy. 3 With respect to the Wroblewskis’ joint liabilities for tax years 1997-2001, the United 4 States contends that these liabilities were non-dischargeable under section 523(a)(1)(C) 5 because the Wroblewskis willfully attempted to evade them. Specifically, the United States 6 has submitted evidence that in 2000, the Wroblewskis transferred title to the Subject Property 7 to Thomas J. Martiniak, Mrs. Wroblewski’s brother, for little to no consideration, while 8 maintaining control of the property. At the time of the transfer, the Wroblewskis did not have 9 substantial assets other than the Subject Property. (Depo. of Sharon M. Wroblewski (Ex. 2 10 to Pitman Decl.) at 128:13-16.) Mrs. Wroblewski, a realtor, orchestrated the transaction; she 11 contacted the title company and lender and arranged for the paperwork to be drawn up. 12 (Martiniak depo. (Ex. 1 to Pitman Decl.) at 20:6-8.) Martiniak and the Wroblewskis agreed 13 that Martiniak would buy the house, and the Wroblewskis would pay him rent on the house 14 in an amount equal to his monthly expenses. (Id. at 19:22-24.) Martiniak did not make a 15 down payment in connection with the purchase, despite paperwork indicating otherwise. (Id. 16 at 28:12-14.) The Wroblewskis covered all of Martiniak’s mortgage and property tax 17 payments. (Id. at 43:7-44:4; Depo. of Gerald J. Wroblewski (Ex. 3 to Pitman Decl.) at 31:11- 18 12, 32:4-12.) The Wroblewskis retained control over the Subject Property during Martiniak’s 19 ownership of the property. (Martiniak depo. at 20:1-2, 60:20-22.) In 2003, the Subject 20 Property was transferred back to Mr. Wroblewski, with no money exchanged. (Depo. of 21 Gerald J. Wroblewski at 26:21-25.) 22 The Wroblewskis state that the reason they sold the Subject Property to Martiniak was 23 because they wanted to move to the State of Washington but were having difficulty selling 24 the house. (Decl. of Sharon M. Wroblewski, ¶ 20.) According to the Wroblewskis, they 25 26 27 28 2 In their opposition, the Wroblewskis argue that certain abatements reflected in the Certificates of Assessments and Payments might be evidence that returns were actually filed. However, IRS Officer Rosanna Savala explains that the abatements identified by the Wroblewskis were due to the IRS’s conclusion that the underlying assessments, which were the result of forgiveness of debt income reported by a third party, were discharged in banrkuptcy. (Decl. of Rosanna Savala in Support of Reply, ¶ 10.) 6 07cv81 BTM(WMc) 1 expected the property to eventually be resold to a third party at or around the price Martiniak 2 bought the house for. (Id. at ¶ 21.) However, the Wroblewskis ended up not moving, and 3 the property was not sold to a third-party. (Id. at ¶ 22.) The Wroblewskis also claim that the 4 Subject Property was deeded back to Mr. Wroblewski at the urging of an IRS officer named 5 Mr. Rude. (Id. at ¶ 28.) 6 The Wroblewskis do not, however, refute the essential aspects of the transaction – 7 i.e., the Subject Property was the Wroblewski’s only substantial asset; title was transferred 8 to Martiniak; Martiniak did not have to pay any out-of-pocket expenses in connection with the 9 purchase or subsequent ownership of the property; the Wroblewskis retained control over 10 the property throughout Martiniak’s ownership of it; and the property was transferred back 11 to Mr. Wroblewski without consideration. In addition, the transfer of the Subject Property 12 occurred less than two weeks after the Tax Court issued an opinion entering judgment 13 against Mrs. Wroblewski for tax years 1994, 1995, and 1996 in the amount of $96,868.75. 14 (Ex. 4 to Pitman Decl.) These facts, when considered together with the Wroblewskis’ past 15 failure to file individual returns, are sufficient to establish that the Wroblewskis willfully 16 attempted to evade their joint liabilities for 1997 through 2001. See In re Griffith, 206 F.3d 17 1389, 1396 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that an intra-family transfer of property for little to no 18 consideration supported a finding that the debtor willfully attempted to evade payment of 19 taxes); See also Dalton v. IRS, 77 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1996) (affirming bankruptcy court’s 20 finding that taxpayer willfully attempted to evade taxes by transferring property to betrothed 21 where there was no documentation properly accounting for the transaction). 22 Mrs. Wroblewski argues that since she was never on the title to the Subject Property, 23 the transfer of the property to Martiniak cannot be held against her. This argument lacks 24 merit. The proper inquiry is whether Mrs. Wroblewski engaged in actions designed to defeat 25 the collection of taxes owed jointly by herself and her husband. As pointed out by the United 26 States, the best avenue available to the IRS for the collection of the Wroblewskis’ joint tax 27 liabilities was foreclosure upon the Subject Property. Mrs. Wroblewski actively participated 28 in the plan to transfer the property to her brother so that the property would be shielded from 7 07cv81 BTM(WMc) 1 tax collection proceedings. Therefore, the Wroblewskis’ joint liabilities for tax years 1997 2 through 2001 were rendered non-dischargeable in their entirety under section 523(a)(1)(C). 3 4 C. Foreclosure 5 The United States seeks to foreclose federal tax liens against the Wroblewskis’ 6 interest in the Subject Property. However, according to the Wroblewskis, on August 20, 7 2008, the lender holding the First Deed of Trust foreclosed on the property. (Decl. of Sharon 8 M. Wroblewski, ¶ 8.) The United States concedes that if this is true, the United States’ 9 foreclosure claim would be impacted. Accordingly, the Court denies the United States’ 10 motion for summary judgment as to this claim. Upon further investigation, the United States 11 may either request that the foreclosure claim be dismissed or may file a new motion for 12 summary judgment on the claim. 13 14 III. CONCLUSION 15 For the reasons discussed above, the United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment 16 is GRANTED as to the first, second, and third claims for relief (to reduce assessments to 17 judgment) and is DENIED as to the fourth claim for relief (to foreclose federal tax liens). 18 The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of the United States and against (1) Defendant 19 Gerald J. Wroblewski in the amount of $36,035.03, plus interest accruing after September 20 5, 2008 pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §§ 6601, 6621 & 6622, and 28 U.S.C. § 1961(c), until paid; 21 (2) Defendant Sharon M. Wroblewski in the amount of $47,990.63, plus interest accruing 22 after September 5, 2008 pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §§ 6601, 6621 & 6622, and 28 U.S.C. § 23 1961(c), until paid; and (3) Defendants Gerald J. and Sharon M. Wroblewski, jointly and 24 severally, in the amount of $225,779.29, plus interest accruing after September 5, 2008 25 pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §§ 6601, 6621 & 6622, and 28 U.S.C. § 1961(c), until paid. 26 The Judgment is not final because the foreclosure claim is still pending. In addition, 27 it is unclear to the Court whether the United States requests that the Court declare the 28 validity and amount of its liens independent of the foreclosure claim. If the United States 8 07cv81 BTM(WMc) 1 requests such relief, the United States shall, within 30 days of this Order, file papers 2 indicating as such and explaining why such relief is necessary. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 DATED: January 16, 2009 5 6 Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 9 07cv81 BTM(WMc)
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
