Whitaker v. Ben Bridge-Jeweler, Inc., No. 5:2021cv00808 - Document 26 (N.D. Cal. 2022)
Court Description: Order granting 12 MOTION to Dismiss Unruh Act Cause of Action. Signed by Judge Edward J. Davila on March 18, 2022.(ejdlc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/18/2022)
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN JOSE DIVISION 7 BRIAN WHITAKER, 8 Plaintiff, 9 v. 10 BEN BRIDGE-JEWELER, INC., United States District Court Northern District of California 11 Case No. 5:21-cv-00808-EJD ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS UNRUH ACT CLAIM Re: Dkt. No. 12 Defendant. 12 Defendant Ben Bridge-Jeweler, Inc. moves this Court to decline to exercise supplemental 13 14 jurisdiction over Plaintiff Brian Whitaker’s California Unruh Act claim. See Motion to Dismiss 15 Unruh Act Cause of Action (“Mot.”), Dkt. No. 12. On May 5, 2021, Plaintiff filed an opposition, 16 to which Defendant filed a reply. See Opposition to Motion to Dismiss (“Opp.”), Dkt. No. 16; 17 Defendant Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition (“Reply”), Dkt. No. 19. For the following reasons, the 18 Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 19 over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim.1 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 Plaintiff is a California resident with physical disabilities. Complaint for Damages and 22 Injunctive Relief (“Compl.”) ¶ 1, Dkt. 1. He is substantially limited in his ability to walk, suffers 23 from a C-4 spinal cord injury, is a quadriplegic, and uses a wheelchair for mobility. Compl. ¶ 1. In January 2021, Plaintiff visited Ben Bridge-Jeweler, located at 2855 Stevens Creek 24 25 Blvd., Santa Clara, California. Compl. ¶ 2. During his visit, Plaintiff alleges that he encountered 26 27 28 1 On November 19, 2021, the Court found this motion appropriate for decision without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). See Dkt. No. 25. Case No.: 5:21-cv-00808-EJD ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS UNRUH ACT CLAIM 1 United States District Court Northern District of California 1 inaccessible counters that do not comply with handicap accessibility requirements under the 2 Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) standards. Compl. ¶¶ 10–19 (“There was no counter 3 that was 36 inches or less that plaintiff could use for his transactions.”). Plaintiff initiated this 4 action on February 1, 2021, asserting violations of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and 5 California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51-53 (“Unruh Act”). 6 II. LEGAL STANDARD 7 In an action over which a district court possesses original jurisdiction, that court “shall 8 have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action 9 within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article 10 III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Even if supplemental jurisdiction 11 exists, district courts have discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction: 12 13 14 15 16 17 The district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if— (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or 18 (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. 19 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The Supreme Court has described 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) as a “codification” of 20 the principles of “‘economy, convenience, fairness, and comity’” that underlie the Supreme 21 Court’s earlier jurisprudence concerning pendent jurisdiction. City of Chi. v. Int’l Coll. of 22 Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172–73 (1997) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 23 357 (1988)); see also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“It has 24 consistently been recognized that pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s 25 right. Its justification lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to 26 litigants; if these are not present a federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state 27 claims, even though bound to apply state law to them.”). 28 Case No.: 5:21-cv-00808-EJD ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS UNRUH ACT CLAIM 2 District courts may decline to exercise jurisdiction over supplemental state law claims 1 2 “[d]epending on a host of factors” including “the circumstances of the particular case, the nature 3 of the state law claims, the character of the governing state law, and the relationship between the 4 state and federal claims.” City of Chi., 522 U.S. at 173. The supplemental jurisdiction statute 5 “reflects the understanding that, when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, ‘a 6 federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the 7 values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’” Id. (quoting Cohill, 484 U.S. at 8 350). United States District Court Northern District of California 9 The Ninth Circuit does not require an “explanation for a district court’s reasons [for 10 declining supplemental jurisdiction] when the district court acts under” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(c)(1)– 11 (3), but does require a district court to “articulate why the circumstances of the case are 12 exceptional in addition to inquiring whether the balance of the Gibbs values provide compelling 13 reasons for declining jurisdiction in such circumstances.” Exec. Software N. Am. Inc. v. U.S. Dist. 14 Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 24 F.3d 1545, 1558 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds 15 by Cal. Dep’t of Water Res. v. Powerex Corp., 533 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2008). According to the 16 Ninth Circuit, this “inquiry is not particularly burdensome.” Id. When declining to exercise 17 supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4), “the court must identify the predicate that 18 triggers the applicability of the category (the exceptional circumstances), and then determine 19 whether, in its judgment, the underlying Gibbs values are best served by declining jurisdiction in 20 the particular case (the compelling reasons).” Id. 21 III. 22 1. California’s Limitations on the Filing of Construction-Related Accessibility Claims 23 24 25 26 DISCUSSION “In 2012, in an attempt to deter baseless claims and vexatious litigation, California adopted heightened pleading requirements for disability discrimination lawsuits under the Unruh Act.” Velez v. Il Fornaio (America) Corp., 2018 WL 6446169, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2018). These heightened pleading requirements apply to actions, like this, that allege a “construction-related 27 28 Case No.: 5:21-cv-00808-EJD ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS UNRUH ACT CLAIM 3 United States District Court Northern District of California 1 accessibility claim.” Cal. Civ. Code § 55.52(a)(1) (construction-related accessibility claims are 2 civil claims involving alleged violations of construction-related accessibility standards in a public 3 accommodation “brought under Section 51, 54, 54.1, or 55”). The heightened pleading standard 4 requires a plaintiff to include specific facts concerning the plaintiff’s claim, including the specific 5 barriers encountered or how the plaintiff was deterred and each date on which the plaintiff 6 encountered each barrier or was deterred. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.50(a). California law 7 requires plaintiffs to verify their complaints alleging construction-related accessibility claims. See 8 id. § 425.50(b)(1). A complaint alleging construction-related accessibility claims that is not 9 verified is subject to a motion to strike. Id. 10 When California continued to experience large numbers of these actions, California 11 imposed additional limitations on “high-frequency litigants.” These additional restrictions became 12 effective on October 15, 2015. Under California law, a “high frequency litigant is: 13 14 15 A plaintiff who has filed 10 or more complaints alleging a construction-related accessibility violation within the 12-month period immediately preceding the filing of the current complaint alleging a construction-related accessibility violation. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.55(b)(1). 16 This definition also extends to attorneys. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 425.55(b)(2). In 17 support of its imposition of additional requirements on high-frequency litigants, the California 18 Legislature found and declared: 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 According to information from the California Commission on Disability Access, more than one-half, or 54 percent, of all construction-related accessibility complaints filed between 2012 and 2014 were filed by two law firms. Forty-six percent of all complaints were filed by a total of 14 parties. Therefore, a very small number of plaintiffs have filed a disproportionately large number of the construction-related accessibility claims in the state, from 70 to 300 lawsuits each year. Moreover, these lawsuits are frequently filed against small businesses on the basis of boilerplate complaints, apparently seeking quick cash settlements rather than correction of the accessibility violation. This practice unfairly taints the reputation of other innocent disabled consumers who are merely trying to go about their daily lives accessing public accommodations as they are entitled to have full and equal access under the state’s Unruh Civil Rights Act (Section 51 of the Civil Code) and the federal Americans with Disability Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-336). Case No.: 5:21-cv-00808-EJD ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS UNRUH ACT CLAIM 4 United States District Court Northern District of California 1 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.55(a)(2). 2 Because of these “special and unique circumstances,” California imposed a “high- 3 frequency litigant fee” that requires high-frequency litigants to pay a $1,000 filing fee at the time 4 of the filing of the initial complaint in addition to the standard filing fees. Cal. Gov’t Code 5 § 70616.5. California law also requires complaints filed by high-frequency litigants to allege 6 certain additional facts, including whether the action is filed by, or on behalf of, a high-frequency 7 litigant, the number of construction-related accessibility claims filed by the high-frequency litigant 8 in the preceding 12 months, the high-frequency litigant plaintiff’s reason for being in the 9 geographic area of the defendant’s business, and the reason why the high-frequency litigant 10 plaintiff desired to access the defendant’s business. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.50(a)(4)(A). 11 Here, Plaintiff falls within the definition of a high-frequency litigant.2 12 2. Supplemental Jurisdiction 13 The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim. 14 Because California’s heightened pleading standards and increased filing fees do not apply in 15 federal court, plaintiffs can circumvent the restrictions that California has imposed on Unruh Act 16 claims by relying on § 1367(a)’s grant of supplemental jurisdiction to file their Unruh Act claims 17 in combination with an ADA claim for injunctive relief. As Judge Wright discussed in Whitaker 18 v. Mac, 411 F. Supp. 3d 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2019), by enacting restrictions on the filing of 19 construction-related accessibility claims, California has expressed a desire to limit the financial 20 burdens that California’s businesses may face under the Unruh Act. By allowing plaintiffs like 21 Mr. Whitaker to evade these limits through the federal courts would require this Court to be a 22 forum for disregarding interests deemed important by California. This, in combination with the 23 burden of the “ever-increasing number” of these ADA-Unruh cases through a minority of 24 plaintiffs poses “exceptional circumstances” and “compelling reasons” that justify the Court’s 25 discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim. See 26 27 28 2 In this district alone, Plaintiff is currently a plaintiff in 242 cases. Case No.: 5:21-cv-00808-EJD ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS UNRUH ACT CLAIM 5 1 Whitaker, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 1116; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). Rather than repeat the cogent 2 and thoughtful analysis articulated in Whitaker, the Court adopts the reasoning of Whitaker v. 3 Mac, 411 F. Supp. 3d 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2019) herein. Because of California’s expressed interest in 4 limiting the construction-type claim at issue and because of the early stages of this case, the Court 5 GRANTS Defendant’s motion to decline supplemental jurisdiction. Cf. Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 6 1202, 1214–15 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding that district court abused its discretion by declining to 7 exercise supplemental jurisdiction when it had already made findings as to the plaintiff’s ADA 8 claim). 9 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 13 IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, Defendant’s request that this Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim is GRANTED. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: March 18, 2022 14 15 16 EDWARD J. DAVILA United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case No.: 5:21-cv-00808-EJD ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS UNRUH ACT CLAIM 6
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